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2022-08-03KEYS: asymmetric: enforce SM2 signature use pkey algoTianjia Zhang1-2/+5
The signature verification of SM2 needs to add the Za value and recalculate sig->digest, which requires the detection of the pkey_algo in public_key_verify_signature(). As Eric Biggers said, the pkey_algo field in sig is attacker-controlled and should be use pkey->pkey_algo instead of sig->pkey_algo, and secondly, if sig->pkey_algo is NULL, it will also cause signature verification failure. The software_key_determine_akcipher() already forces the algorithms are matched, so the SM3 algorithm is enforced in the SM2 signature, although this has been checked, we still avoid using any algorithm information in the signature as input. Fixes: 215525639631 ("X.509: support OSCCA SM2-with-SM3 certificate verification") Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10+ Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
2022-08-03pkcs7: support EC-RDSA/streebog in SignerInfoElvira Khabirova1-0/+11
Allow using EC-RDSA/streebog in pkcs7 certificates in a similar way to how it's done in the x509 parser. This is needed e.g. for loading kernel modules signed with EC-RDSA. Signed-off-by: Elvira Khabirova <e.khabirova@omp.ru> Reviewed-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org> Reviewed-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
2022-08-03pkcs7: parser support SM2 and SM3 algorithms combinationTianjia Zhang1-0/+7
Support parsing the message signature of the SM2 and SM3 algorithm combination. This group of algorithms has been well supported. One of the main users is module signature verification. Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
2022-08-03X.509: Support parsing certificate using SM2 algorithmTianjia Zhang1-0/+3
The SM2-with-SM3 certificate generated by latest openssl no longer reuses the OID_id_ecPublicKey, but directly uses OID_sm2. This patch supports this type of x509 certificate parsing. Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
2022-06-21certs: Add FIPS selftestsDavid Howells5-1/+251
Add some selftests for signature checking when FIPS mode is enabled. These need to be done before we start actually using the signature checking for things and must panic the kernel upon failure. Note that the tests must not check the blacklist lest this provide a way to prevent a kernel from booting by installing a hash of a test key in the appropriate UEFI table. Reported-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165515742832.1554877.2073456606206090838.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/
2022-06-21certs: Move load_certificate_list() to be with the asymmetric keys codeDavid Howells2-0/+58
Move load_certificate_list(), which loads a series of binary X.509 certificates from a blob and inserts them as keys into a keyring, to be with the asymmetric keys code that it drives. This makes it easier to add FIPS selftest code in which we need to load up a private keyring for the tests to use. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165515742145.1554877.13488098107542537203.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/
2022-05-23certs: Factor out the blacklist hash creationMickaël Salaün1-1/+2
Factor out the blacklist hash creation with the get_raw_hash() helper. This also centralize the "tbs" and "bin" prefixes and make them private, which help to manage them consistently. Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210712170313.884724-5-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
2022-03-22Merge branch 'linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2-2/+2
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6 Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu: "API: - hwrng core now credits for low-quality RNG devices. Algorithms: - Optimisations for neon aes on arm/arm64. - Add accelerated crc32_be on arm64. - Add ffdheXYZ(dh) templates. - Disallow hmac keys < 112 bits in FIPS mode. - Add AVX assembly implementation for sm3 on x86. Drivers: - Add missing local_bh_disable calls for crypto_engine callback. - Ensure BH is disabled in crypto_engine callback path. - Fix zero length DMA mappings in ccree. - Add synchronization between mailbox accesses in octeontx2. - Add Xilinx SHA3 driver. - Add support for the TDES IP available on sama7g5 SoC in atmel" * 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (137 commits) crypto: xilinx - Turn SHA into a tristate and allow COMPILE_TEST MAINTAINERS: update HPRE/SEC2/TRNG driver maintainers list crypto: dh - Remove the unused function dh_safe_prime_dh_alg() hwrng: nomadik - Change clk_disable to clk_disable_unprepare crypto: arm64 - cleanup comments crypto: qat - fix initialization of pfvf rts_map_msg structures crypto: qat - fix initialization of pfvf cap_msg structures crypto: qat - remove unneeded assignment crypto: qat - disable registration of algorithms crypto: hisilicon/qm - fix memset during queues clearing crypto: xilinx: prevent probing on non-xilinx hardware crypto: marvell/octeontx - Use swap() instead of open coding it crypto: ccree - Fix use after free in cc_cipher_exit() crypto: ccp - ccp_dmaengine_unregister release dma channels crypto: octeontx2 - fix missing unlock hwrng: cavium - fix NULL but dereferenced coccicheck error crypto: cavium/nitrox - don't cast parameter in bit operations crypto: vmx - add missing dependencies MAINTAINERS: Add maintainer for Xilinx ZynqMP SHA3 driver crypto: xilinx - Add Xilinx SHA3 driver ...
2022-03-10KEYS: asymmetric: properly validate hash_algo and encodingEric Biggers1-35/+76
It is insecure to allow arbitrary hash algorithms and signature encodings to be used with arbitrary signature algorithms. Notably, ECDSA, ECRDSA, and SM2 all sign/verify raw hash values and don't disambiguate between different hash algorithms like RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 padding does. Therefore, they need to be restricted to certain sets of hash algorithms (ideally just one, but in practice small sets are used). Additionally, the encoding is an integral part of modern signature algorithms, and is not supposed to vary. Therefore, tighten the checks of hash_algo and encoding done by software_key_determine_akcipher(). Also rearrange the parameters to software_key_determine_akcipher() to put the public_key first, as this is the most important parameter and it often determines everything else. Fixes: 299f561a6693 ("x509: Add support for parsing x509 certs with ECDSA keys") Fixes: 215525639631 ("X.509: support OSCCA SM2-with-SM3 certificate verification") Fixes: 0d7a78643f69 ("crypto: ecrdsa - add EC-RDSA (GOST 34.10) algorithm") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Tested-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
2022-03-10KEYS: asymmetric: enforce that sig algo matches key algoEric Biggers3-12/+15
Most callers of public_key_verify_signature(), including most indirect callers via verify_signature() as well as pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(), don't check that public_key_signature::pkey_algo matches public_key::pkey_algo. These should always match. However, a malicious signature could intentionally declare an unintended algorithm. It is essential that such signatures be rejected outright, or that the algorithm of the *key* be used -- not the algorithm of the signature as that would allow attackers to choose the algorithm used. Currently, public_key_verify_signature() correctly uses the key's algorithm when deciding which akcipher to allocate. That's good. However, it uses the signature's algorithm when deciding whether to do the first step of SM2, which is incorrect. Also, v4.19 and older kernels used the signature's algorithm for the entire process. Prevent such errors by making public_key_verify_signature() enforce that the signature's algorithm (if given) matches the key's algorithm. Also remove two checks of this done by callers, which are now redundant. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Tested-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
2022-03-08KEYS: remove support for asym_tpm keysEric Biggers5-1097/+0
asym_tpm keys are tied to TPM v1.2, which uses outdated crypto and has been deprecated in favor of TPM v2.0 for over 7 years. A very quick look at this code also immediately found some memory safety bugs (https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220113235440.90439-2-ebiggers@kernel.org). Note that this code is reachable by unprivileged users. According to Jarkko (one of the keyrings subsystem maintainers), this code has no practical use cases, and he isn't willing to maintain it (https://lore.kernel.org/r/YfFZPbKkgYJGWu1Q@iki.fi). Therefore, let's remove it. Note that this feature didn't have any documentation or tests, so we don't need to worry about removing those. Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
2022-03-08KEYS: x509: remove dead code that set ->unsupported_sigEric Biggers1-9/+0
The X.509 parser always sets cert->sig->pkey_algo and cert->sig->hash_algo on success, since x509_note_sig_algo() is a mandatory action in the X.509 ASN.1 grammar, and it returns an error if the signature's algorithm is unknown. Thus, remove the dead code which handled these fields being NULL. Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
2022-03-08KEYS: x509: remove never-set ->unsupported_key flagEric Biggers3-15/+2
The X.509 parser always sets cert->pub->pkey_algo on success, since x509_extract_key_data() is a mandatory action in the X.509 ASN.1 grammar, and it returns an error if the algorithm is unknown. Thus, remove the dead code which handled this field being NULL. This results in the ->unsupported_key flag never being set, so remove that too. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
2022-03-08KEYS: x509: remove unused fieldsEric Biggers1-2/+0
Remove unused fields from struct x509_parse_context. Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
2022-03-08KEYS: x509: clearly distinguish between key and signature algorithmsEric Biggers2-15/+19
An X.509 certificate has two, potentially different public key algorithms: the one used by the certificate's key, and the one that was used to sign the certificate. Some of the naming made it unclear which algorithm was meant. Rename things appropriately: - x509_note_pkey_algo() => x509_note_sig_algo() - algo_oid => sig_algo Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
2022-03-03crypto: cleanup commentsTom Rix2-2/+2
For spdx /* */ for *.h, // for *.c Space before spdx tag Replacements paramenters to parameters aymmetric to asymmetric sigature to signature boudary to boundary compliled to compiled eninges to engines explicity to explicitly Signed-off-by: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2022-01-09keys: X.509 public key issuer lookup without AKIDAndrew Zaborowski5-35/+96
There are non-root X.509 v3 certificates in use out there that contain no Authority Key Identifier extension (RFC5280 section 4.2.1.1). For trust verification purposes the kernel asymmetric key type keeps two struct asymmetric_key_id instances that the key can be looked up by, and another two to look up the key's issuer. The x509 public key type and the PKCS7 type generate them from the SKID and AKID extensions in the certificate. In effect current code has no way to look up the issuer certificate for verification without the AKID. To remedy this, add a third asymmetric_key_id blob to the arrays in both asymmetric_key_id's (for certficate subject) and in the public_keys_signature's auth_ids (for issuer lookup), using just raw subject and issuer DNs from the certificate. Adapt asymmetric_key_ids() and its callers to use the third ID for lookups when none of the other two are available. Attempt to keep the logic intact when they are, to minimise behaviour changes. Adapt the restrict functions' NULL-checks to include that ID too. Do not modify the lookup logic in pkcs7_verify.c, the AKID extensions are still required there. Internally use a new "dn:" prefix to the search specifier string generated for the key lookup in find_asymmetric_key(). This tells asymmetric_key_match_preparse to only match the data against the raw DN in the third ID and shouldn't conflict with search specifiers already in use. In effect implement what (2) in the struct asymmetric_key_id comment (include/keys/asymmetric-type.h) is probably talking about already, so do not modify that comment. It is also how "openssl verify" looks up issuer certificates without the AKID available. Lookups by the raw DN are unambiguous only provided that the CAs respect the condition in RFC5280 4.2.1.1 that the AKID may only be omitted if the CA uses a single signing key. The following is an example of two things that this change enables. A self-signed ceritficate is generated following the example from https://letsencrypt.org/docs/certificates-for-localhost/, and can be looked up by an identifier and verified against itself by linking to a restricted keyring -- both things not possible before due to the missing AKID extension: $ openssl req -x509 -out localhost.crt -outform DER -keyout localhost.key \ -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes -sha256 \ -subj '/CN=localhost' -extensions EXT -config <( \ echo -e "[dn]\nCN=localhost\n[req]\ndistinguished_name = dn\n[EXT]\n" \ "subjectAltName=DNS:localhost\nkeyUsage=digitalSignature\n" \ "extendedKeyUsage=serverAuth") $ keyring=`keyctl newring test @u` $ trusted=`keyctl padd asymmetric trusted $keyring < localhost.crt`; \ echo $trusted 39726322 $ keyctl search $keyring asymmetric dn:3112301006035504030c096c6f63616c686f7374 39726322 $ keyctl restrict_keyring $keyring asymmetric key_or_keyring:$trusted $ keyctl padd asymmetric verified $keyring < localhost.crt Signed-off-by: Andrew Zaborowski <andrew.zaborowski@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
2021-08-23certs: Add support for using elliptic curve keys for signing modulesStefan Berger1-0/+8
Add support for using elliptic curve keys for signing modules. It uses a NIST P384 (secp384r1) key if the user chooses an elliptic curve key and will have ECDSA support built into the kernel. Note: A developer choosing an ECDSA key for signing modules should still delete the signing key (rm certs/signing_key.*) when building an older version of a kernel that only supports RSA keys. Unless kbuild automati- cally detects and generates a new kernel module key, ECDSA-signed kernel modules will fail signature verification. Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
2021-03-26x509: Add OID for NIST P384 and extend parser for itSaulo Alessandre1-0/+3
Prepare the x509 parser to accept NIST P384 certificates and add the OID for ansip384r1, which is the identifier for NIST P384. Summary of changes: * crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c - prepare x509 parser to load NIST P384 * include/linux/oid_registry.h - add OID_ansip384r1 Signed-off-by: Saulo Alessandre <saulo.alessandre@tse.jus.br> Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2021-03-26x509: Add support for parsing x509 certs with ECDSA keysStefan Berger3-3/+39
Add support for parsing of x509 certificates that contain ECDSA keys, such as NIST P256, that have been signed by a CA using any of the current SHA hash algorithms. Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2021-03-26x509: Detect sm2 keys by their parameters OIDStefan Berger1-1/+11
Detect whether a key is an sm2 type of key by its OID in the parameters array rather than assuming that everything under OID_id_ecPublicKey is sm2, which is not the case. Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com> Tested-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2021-02-24Merge tag 'keys-misc-20210126' of ↵Linus Torvalds4-11/+11
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs Pull keyring updates from David Howells: "Here's a set of minor keyrings fixes/cleanups that I've collected from various people for the upcoming merge window. A couple of them might, in theory, be visible to userspace: - Make blacklist_vet_description() reject uppercase letters as they don't match the all-lowercase hex string generated for a blacklist search. This may want reconsideration in the future, but, currently, you can't add to the blacklist keyring from userspace and the only source of blacklist keys generates lowercase descriptions. - Fix blacklist_init() to use a new KEY_ALLOC_* flag to indicate that it wants KEY_FLAG_KEEP to be set rather than passing KEY_FLAG_KEEP into keyring_alloc() as KEY_FLAG_KEEP isn't a valid alloc flag. This isn't currently a problem as the blacklist keyring isn't currently writable by userspace. The rest of the patches are cleanups and I don't think they should have any visible effect" * tag 'keys-misc-20210126' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs: watch_queue: rectify kernel-doc for init_watch() certs: Replace K{U,G}IDT_INIT() with GLOBAL_ROOT_{U,G}ID certs: Fix blacklist flag type confusion PKCS#7: Fix missing include certs: Fix blacklisted hexadecimal hash string check certs/blacklist: fix kernel doc interface issue crypto: public_key: Remove redundant header file from public_key.h keys: remove trailing semicolon in macro definition crypto: pkcs7: Use match_string() helper to simplify the code PKCS#7: drop function from kernel-doc pkcs7_validate_trust_one encrypted-keys: Replace HTTP links with HTTPS ones crypto: asymmetric_keys: fix some comments in pkcs7_parser.h KEYS: remove redundant memset security: keys: delete repeated words in comments KEYS: asymmetric: Fix kerneldoc security/keys: use kvfree_sensitive() watch_queue: Drop references to /dev/watch_queue keys: Remove outdated __user annotations security: keys: Fix fall-through warnings for Clang
2021-02-16keys: Update comment for restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring_chainAndrew Zaborowski1-3/+4
Add the bit of information that makes restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring_chain different from restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring to the inline docs comment. Signed-off-by: Andrew Zaborowski <andrew.zaborowski@intel.com> Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
2021-01-21crypto: pkcs7: Use match_string() helper to simplify the codeYueHaibing1-5/+4
match_string() returns the array index of a matching string. Use it instead of the open-coded implementation. Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com>
2021-01-21PKCS#7: drop function from kernel-doc pkcs7_validate_trust_oneAlex Shi1-1/+1
The function is a static function, so no needs add into kernel-doc. and we could avoid warning: crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c:25: warning: Function parameter or member 'pkcs7' not described in 'pkcs7_validate_trust_one' crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c:25: warning: Function parameter or member 'sinfo' not described in 'pkcs7_validate_trust_one' crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c:25: warning: Function parameter or member 'trust_keyring' not described in 'pkcs7_validate_trust_one' Signed-off-by: Alex Shi <alex.shi@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
2021-01-21crypto: asymmetric_keys: fix some comments in pkcs7_parser.hRandy Dunlap1-3/+2
Drop the doubled word "the" in a comment. Change "THis" to "This". Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com> Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
2021-01-21KEYS: asymmetric: Fix kerneldocKrzysztof Kozlowski1-2/+4
Fix W=1 compile warnings (invalid kerneldoc): crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c:160: warning: Function parameter or member 'kid1' not described in 'asymmetric_key_id_same' crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c:160: warning: Function parameter or member 'kid2' not described in 'asymmetric_key_id_same' crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c:160: warning: Excess function parameter 'kid_1' description in 'asymmetric_key_id_same' crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c:160: warning: Excess function parameter 'kid_2' description in 'asymmetric_key_id_same' Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@iki.fi>
2021-01-20X.509: Fix crash caused by NULL pointerTianjia Zhang1-1/+2
On the following call path, `sig->pkey_algo` is not assigned in asymmetric_key_verify_signature(), which causes runtime crash in public_key_verify_signature(). keyctl_pkey_verify asymmetric_key_verify_signature verify_signature public_key_verify_signature This patch simply check this situation and fixes the crash caused by NULL pointer. Fixes: 215525639631 ("X.509: support OSCCA SM2-with-SM3 certificate verification") Reported-by: Tobias Markus <tobias@markus-regensburg.de> Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-and-tested-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com> Tested-by: João Fonseca <jpedrofonseca@ua.pt> Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10+ Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-31crypto: asym_tpm: correct zero out potential secretsGreg Kroah-Hartman1-1/+1
The function derive_pub_key() should be calling memzero_explicit() instead of memset() in case the complier decides to optimize away the call to memset() because it "knows" no one is going to touch the memory anymore. Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reported-by: Ilil Blum Shem-Tov <ilil.blum.shem-tov@intel.com> Tested-by: Ilil Blum Shem-Tov <ilil.blum.shem-tov@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/X8ns4AfwjKudpyfe@kroah.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-11-20crypto: sha - split sha.h into sha1.h and sha2.hEric Biggers1-1/+1
Currently <crypto/sha.h> contains declarations for both SHA-1 and SHA-2, and <crypto/sha3.h> contains declarations for SHA-3. This organization is inconsistent, but more importantly SHA-1 is no longer considered to be cryptographically secure. So to the extent possible, SHA-1 shouldn't be grouped together with any of the other SHA versions, and usage of it should be phased out. Therefore, split <crypto/sha.h> into two headers <crypto/sha1.h> and <crypto/sha2.h>, and make everyone explicitly specify whether they want the declarations for SHA-1, SHA-2, or both. This avoids making the SHA-1 declarations visible to files that don't want anything to do with SHA-1. It also prepares for potentially moving sha1.h into a new insecure/ or dangerous/ directory. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Acked-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-10-08X.509: Fix modular build of public_key_sm2Herbert Xu3-64/+57
The sm2 code was split out of public_key.c in a way that breaks modular builds. This patch moves the code back into the same file as the original motivation was to minimise ifdefs and that has nothing to do with splitting the code out. Fixes: 215525639631 ("X.509: support OSCCA SM2-with-SM3...") Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-10-08X.509: fix error return value on the failed pathTianjia Zhang1-1/+3
When memory allocation fails, an appropriate return value should be set. Fixes: 215525639631 ("X.509: support OSCCA SM2-with-SM3 certificate verification") Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-09-25X.509: support OSCCA SM2-with-SM3 certificate verificationTianjia Zhang4-0/+71
The digital certificate format based on SM2 crypto algorithm as specified in GM/T 0015-2012. It was published by State Encryption Management Bureau, China. The method of generating Other User Information is defined as ZA=H256(ENTLA || IDA || a || b || xG || yG || xA || yA), it also specified in https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-shen-sm2-ecdsa-02. The x509 certificate supports SM2-with-SM3 type certificate verification. Because certificate verification requires ZA in addition to tbs data, ZA also depends on elliptic curve parameters and public key data, so you need to access tbs in sig and calculate ZA. Finally calculate the digest of the signature and complete the verification work. The calculation process of ZA is declared in specifications GM/T 0009-2012 and GM/T 0003.2-2012. Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com> Tested-by: Xufeng Zhang <yunbo.xufeng@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-09-25X.509: support OSCCA certificate parseTianjia Zhang1-5/+22
The digital certificate format based on SM2 crypto algorithm as specified in GM/T 0015-2012. It was published by State Encryption Management Bureau, China. This patch adds the OID object identifier defined by OSCCA. The x509 certificate supports SM2-with-SM3 type certificate parsing. It uses the standard elliptic curve public key, and the sm2 algorithm signs the hash generated by sm3. Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com> Tested-by: Xufeng Zhang <yunbo.xufeng@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-08-07mm, treewide: rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive()Waiman Long1-2/+2
As said by Linus: A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use. Otherwise it's actively misleading. In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the caller wants. In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_. The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory objects. Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the recently added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API more explicit. In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the memory to make sure that it won't get optimized away by the compiler. The renaming is done by using the command sequence: git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\ xargs sed -i 's/kzfree/kfree_sensitive/' followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and adding a kzfree backward compatibility macro in slab.h. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c needs linux/slab.h] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c some more] Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616154311.12314-3-longman@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-05Merge tag 'docs-5.9' of git://git.lwn.net/linuxLinus Torvalds3-3/+3
Pull documentation updates from Jonathan Corbet: "It's been a busy cycle for documentation - hopefully the busiest for a while to come. Changes include: - Some new Chinese translations - Progress on the battle against double words words and non-HTTPS URLs - Some block-mq documentation - More RST conversions from Mauro. At this point, that task is essentially complete, so we shouldn't see this kind of churn again for a while. Unless we decide to switch to asciidoc or something...:) - Lots of typo fixes, warning fixes, and more" * tag 'docs-5.9' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (195 commits) scripts/kernel-doc: optionally treat warnings as errors docs: ia64: correct typo mailmap: add entry for <alobakin@marvell.com> doc/zh_CN: add cpu-load Chinese version Documentation/admin-guide: tainted-kernels: fix spelling mistake MAINTAINERS: adjust kprobes.rst entry to new location devices.txt: document rfkill allocation PCI: correct flag name docs: filesystems: vfs: correct flag name docs: filesystems: vfs: correct sync_mode flag names docs: path-lookup: markup fixes for emphasis docs: path-lookup: more markup fixes docs: path-lookup: fix HTML entity mojibake CREDITS: Replace HTTP links with HTTPS ones docs: process: Add an example for creating a fixes tag doc/zh_CN: add Chinese translation prefer section doc/zh_CN: add clearing-warn-once Chinese version doc/zh_CN: add admin-guide index doc:it_IT: process: coding-style.rst: Correct __maybe_unused compiler label futex: MAINTAINERS: Re-add selftests directory ...
2020-07-16keys: asymmetric: fix error return code in software_key_query()Wei Yongjun1-0/+1
Fix to return negative error code -ENOMEM from kmalloc() error handling case instead of 0, as done elsewhere in this function. Fixes: f1774cb8956a ("X.509: parse public key parameters from x509 for akcipher") Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-06-19docs: crypto: convert asymmetric-keys.txt to ReSTMauro Carvalho Chehab3-3/+3
This file is almost compatible with ReST. Just minor changes were needed: - Adjust document and titles markups; - Adjust numbered list markups; - Add a comments markup for the Contents section; - Add markups for literal blocks. Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c2275ea94e0507a01b020ab66dfa824d8b1c2545.1592203650.git.mchehab+huawei@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2019-12-13KEYS: asymmetric: return ENOMEM if akcipher_request_alloc() failsEric Biggers2-0/+2
No error code was being set on this error path. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: ad4b1eb5fb33 ("KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement encryption operation [ver #2]") Fixes: c08fed737126 ("KEYS: Implement encrypt, decrypt and sign for software asymmetric key [ver #2]") Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
2019-11-12KEYS: trusted: Create trusted keys subsystemSumit Garg1-1/+1
Move existing code to trusted keys subsystem. Also, rename files with "tpm" as suffix which provides the underlying implementation. Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
2019-11-12KEYS: Use common tpm_buf for trusted and asymmetric keysSumit Garg1-62/+45
Switch to utilize common heap based tpm_buf code for TPM based trusted and asymmetric keys rather than using stack based tpm1_buf code. Also, remove tpm1_buf code. Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
2019-11-12tpm: Move tpm_buf code to include/linux/Sumit Garg1-6/+6
Move tpm_buf code to common include/linux/tpm.h header so that it can be reused via other subsystems like trusted keys etc. Also rename trusted keys and asymmetric keys usage of TPM 1.x buffer implementation to tpm1_buf to avoid any compilation errors. Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
2019-09-28Merge branch 'next-lockdown' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-1/+3
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull kernel lockdown mode from James Morris: "This is the latest iteration of the kernel lockdown patchset, from Matthew Garrett, David Howells and others. From the original description: This patchset introduces an optional kernel lockdown feature, intended to strengthen the boundary between UID 0 and the kernel. When enabled, various pieces of kernel functionality are restricted. Applications that rely on low-level access to either hardware or the kernel may cease working as a result - therefore this should not be enabled without appropriate evaluation beforehand. The majority of mainstream distributions have been carrying variants of this patchset for many years now, so there's value in providing a doesn't meet every distribution requirement, but gets us much closer to not requiring external patches. There are two major changes since this was last proposed for mainline: - Separating lockdown from EFI secure boot. Background discussion is covered here: https://lwn.net/Articles/751061/ - Implementation as an LSM, with a default stackable lockdown LSM module. This allows the lockdown feature to be policy-driven, rather than encoding an implicit policy within the mechanism. The new locked_down LSM hook is provided to allow LSMs to make a policy decision around whether kernel functionality that would allow tampering with or examining the runtime state of the kernel should be permitted. The included lockdown LSM provides an implementation with a simple policy intended for general purpose use. This policy provides a coarse level of granularity, controllable via the kernel command line: lockdown={integrity|confidentiality} Enable the kernel lockdown feature. If set to integrity, kernel features that allow userland to modify the running kernel are disabled. If set to confidentiality, kernel features that allow userland to extract confidential information from the kernel are also disabled. This may also be controlled via /sys/kernel/security/lockdown and overriden by kernel configuration. New or existing LSMs may implement finer-grained controls of the lockdown features. Refer to the lockdown_reason documentation in include/linux/security.h for details. The lockdown feature has had signficant design feedback and review across many subsystems. This code has been in linux-next for some weeks, with a few fixes applied along the way. Stephen Rothwell noted that commit 9d1f8be5cf42 ("bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode") is missing a Signed-off-by from its author. Matthew responded that he is providing this under category (c) of the DCO" * 'next-lockdown' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (31 commits) kexec: Fix file verification on S390 security: constify some arrays in lockdown LSM lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load when the kernel is locked down tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down lockdown: Lock down perf when in confidentiality mode bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode lockdown: Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode lockdown: Lock down /proc/kcore x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module lockdown: Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) lockdown: Lock down TIOCSSERIAL lockdown: Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down ...
2019-08-20kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCEJiri Bohac1-1/+3
This is a preparatory patch for kexec_file_load() lockdown. A locked down kernel needs to prevent unsigned kernel images from being loaded with kexec_file_load(). Currently, the only way to force the signature verification is compiling with KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG. This prevents loading usigned images even when the kernel is not locked down at runtime. This patch splits KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE. Analogous to the MODULE_SIG and MODULE_SIG_FORCE for modules, KEXEC_SIG turns on the signature verification but allows unsigned images to be loaded. KEXEC_SIG_FORCE disallows images without a valid signature. Signed-off-by: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-06PKCS#7: Introduce pkcs7_get_digest()Thiago Jung Bauermann1-0/+33
IMA will need to access the digest of the PKCS7 message (as calculated by the kernel) before the signature is verified, so introduce pkcs7_get_digest() for that purpose. Also, modify pkcs7_digest() to detect when the digest was already calculated so that it doesn't have to do redundant work. Verifying that sinfo->sig->digest isn't NULL is sufficient because both places which allocate sinfo->sig (pkcs7_parse_message() and pkcs7_note_signed_info()) use kzalloc() so sig->digest is always initialized to zero. Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2019-07-09Merge branch 'linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-0/+3
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6 Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu: "Here is the crypto update for 5.3: API: - Test shash interface directly in testmgr - cra_driver_name is now mandatory Algorithms: - Replace arc4 crypto_cipher with library helper - Implement 5 way interleave for ECB, CBC and CTR on arm64 - Add xxhash - Add continuous self-test on noise source to drbg - Update jitter RNG Drivers: - Add support for SHA204A random number generator - Add support for 7211 in iproc-rng200 - Fix fuzz test failures in inside-secure - Fix fuzz test failures in talitos - Fix fuzz test failures in qat" * 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (143 commits) crypto: stm32/hash - remove interruptible condition for dma crypto: stm32/hash - Fix hmac issue more than 256 bytes crypto: stm32/crc32 - rename driver file crypto: amcc - remove memset after dma_alloc_coherent crypto: ccp - Switch to SPDX license identifiers crypto: ccp - Validate the the error value used to index error messages crypto: doc - Fix formatting of new crypto engine content crypto: doc - Add parameter documentation crypto: arm64/aes-ce - implement 5 way interleave for ECB, CBC and CTR crypto: arm64/aes-ce - add 5 way interleave routines crypto: talitos - drop icv_ool crypto: talitos - fix hash on SEC1. crypto: talitos - move struct talitos_edesc into talitos.h lib/scatterlist: Fix mapping iterator when sg->offset is greater than PAGE_SIZE crypto/NX: Set receive window credits to max number of CRBs in RxFIFO crypto: asymmetric_keys - select CRYPTO_HASH where needed crypto: serpent - mark __serpent_setkey_sbox noinline crypto: testmgr - dynamically allocate crypto_shash crypto: testmgr - dynamically allocate testvec_config crypto: talitos - eliminate unneeded 'done' functions at build time ...
2019-07-09Merge tag 'keys-namespace-20190627' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-1/+1
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs Pull keyring namespacing from David Howells: "These patches help make keys and keyrings more namespace aware. Firstly some miscellaneous patches to make the process easier: - Simplify key index_key handling so that the word-sized chunks assoc_array requires don't have to be shifted about, making it easier to add more bits into the key. - Cache the hash value in the key so that we don't have to calculate on every key we examine during a search (it involves a bunch of multiplications). - Allow keying_search() to search non-recursively. Then the main patches: - Make it so that keyring names are per-user_namespace from the point of view of KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING so that they're not accessible cross-user_namespace. keyctl_capabilities() shows KEYCTL_CAPS1_NS_KEYRING_NAME for this. - Move the user and user-session keyrings to the user_namespace rather than the user_struct. This prevents them propagating directly across user_namespaces boundaries (ie. the KEY_SPEC_* flags will only pick from the current user_namespace). - Make it possible to include the target namespace in which the key shall operate in the index_key. This will allow the possibility of multiple keys with the same description, but different target domains to be held in the same keyring. keyctl_capabilities() shows KEYCTL_CAPS1_NS_KEY_TAG for this. - Make it so that keys are implicitly invalidated by removal of a domain tag, causing them to be garbage collected. - Institute a network namespace domain tag that allows keys to be differentiated by the network namespace in which they operate. New keys that are of a type marked 'KEY_TYPE_NET_DOMAIN' are assigned the network domain in force when they are created. - Make it so that the desired network namespace can be handed down into the request_key() mechanism. This allows AFS, NFS, etc. to request keys specific to the network namespace of the superblock. This also means that the keys in the DNS record cache are thenceforth namespaced, provided network filesystems pass the appropriate network namespace down into dns_query(). For DNS, AFS and NFS are good, whilst CIFS and Ceph are not. Other cache keyrings, such as idmapper keyrings, also need to set the domain tag - for which they need access to the network namespace of the superblock" * tag 'keys-namespace-20190627' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs: keys: Pass the network namespace into request_key mechanism keys: Network namespace domain tag keys: Garbage collect keys for which the domain has been removed keys: Include target namespace in match criteria keys: Move the user and user-session keyrings to the user_namespace keys: Namespace keyring names keys: Add a 'recurse' flag for keyring searches keys: Cache the hash value to avoid lots of recalculation keys: Simplify key description management
2019-06-27crypto: asymmetric_keys - select CRYPTO_HASH where neededArnd Bergmann1-0/+3
Build testing with some core crypto options disabled revealed a few modules that are missing CRYPTO_HASH: crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.o: In function `x509_get_sig_params': x509_public_key.c:(.text+0x4c7): undefined reference to `crypto_alloc_shash' x509_public_key.c:(.text+0x5e5): undefined reference to `crypto_shash_digest' crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.o: In function `pkcs7_digest.isra.0': pkcs7_verify.c:(.text+0xab): undefined reference to `crypto_alloc_shash' pkcs7_verify.c:(.text+0x1b2): undefined reference to `crypto_shash_digest' pkcs7_verify.c:(.text+0x3c1): undefined reference to `crypto_shash_update' pkcs7_verify.c:(.text+0x411): undefined reference to `crypto_shash_finup' This normally doesn't show up in randconfig tests because there is a large number of other options that select CRYPTO_HASH. Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-06-26keys: Add a 'recurse' flag for keyring searchesDavid Howells1-1/+1
Add a 'recurse' flag for keyring searches so that the flag can be omitted and recursion disabled, thereby allowing just the nominated keyring to be searched and none of the children. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2019-05-24treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 36Thomas Gleixner17-85/+17
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public licence as published by the free software foundation either version 2 of the licence or at your option any later version extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-or-later has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 114 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190520170857.552531963@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>