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path: root/fs/crypto/Makefile
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2020-07-08fscrypt: add inline encryption supportSatya Tangirala1-0/+1
Add support for inline encryption to fs/crypto/. With "inline encryption", the block layer handles the decryption/encryption as part of the bio, instead of the filesystem doing the crypto itself via Linux's crypto API. This model is needed in order to take advantage of the inline encryption hardware present on most modern mobile SoCs. To use inline encryption, the filesystem needs to be mounted with '-o inlinecrypt'. Blk-crypto will then be used instead of the traditional filesystem-layer crypto whenever possible to encrypt the contents of any encrypted files in that filesystem. Fscrypt still provides the key and IV to use, and the actual ciphertext on-disk is still the same; therefore it's testable using the existing fscrypt ciphertext verification tests. Note that since blk-crypto has a fallback to Linux's crypto API, and also supports all the encryption modes currently supported by fscrypt, this feature is usable and testable even without actual inline encryption hardware. Per-filesystem changes will be needed to set encryption contexts when submitting bios and to implement the 'inlinecrypt' mount option. This patch just adds the common code. Signed-off-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200702015607.1215430-3-satyat@google.com Co-developed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-13fscrypt: add an HKDF-SHA512 implementationEric Biggers1-0/+1
Add an implementation of HKDF (RFC 5869) to fscrypt, for the purpose of deriving additional key material from the fscrypt master keys for v2 encryption policies. HKDF is a key derivation function built on top of HMAC. We choose SHA-512 for the underlying unkeyed hash, and use an "hmac(sha512)" transform allocated from the crypto API. We'll be using this to replace the AES-ECB based KDF currently used to derive the per-file encryption keys. While the AES-ECB based KDF is believed to meet the original security requirements, it is nonstandard and has problems that don't exist in modern KDFs such as HKDF: 1. It's reversible. Given a derived key and nonce, an attacker can easily compute the master key. This is okay if the master key and derived keys are equally hard to compromise, but now we'd like to be more robust against threats such as a derived key being compromised through a timing attack, or a derived key for an in-use file being compromised after the master key has already been removed. 2. It doesn't evenly distribute the entropy from the master key; each 16 input bytes only affects the corresponding 16 output bytes. 3. It isn't easily extensible to deriving other values or keys, such as a public hash for securely identifying the key, or per-mode keys. Per-mode keys will be immediately useful for Adiantum encryption, for which fscrypt currently uses the master key directly, introducing unnecessary usage constraints. Per-mode keys will also be useful for hardware inline encryption, which is currently being worked on. HKDF solves all the above problems. Reviewed-by: Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com> Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-13fscrypt: add FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctlEric Biggers1-0/+1
Add a new fscrypt ioctl, FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY. This ioctl adds an encryption key to the filesystem's fscrypt keyring ->s_master_keys, making any files encrypted with that key appear "unlocked". Why we need this ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The main problem is that the "locked/unlocked" (ciphertext/plaintext) status of encrypted files is global, but the fscrypt keys are not. fscrypt only looks for keys in the keyring(s) the process accessing the filesystem is subscribed to: the thread keyring, process keyring, and session keyring, where the session keyring may contain the user keyring. Therefore, userspace has to put fscrypt keys in the keyrings for individual users or sessions. But this means that when a process with a different keyring tries to access encrypted files, whether they appear "unlocked" or not is nondeterministic. This is because it depends on whether the files are currently present in the inode cache. Fixing this by consistently providing each process its own view of the filesystem depending on whether it has the key or not isn't feasible due to how the VFS caches work. Furthermore, while sometimes users expect this behavior, it is misguided for two reasons. First, it would be an OS-level access control mechanism largely redundant with existing access control mechanisms such as UNIX file permissions, ACLs, LSMs, etc. Encryption is actually for protecting the data at rest. Second, almost all users of fscrypt actually do need the keys to be global. The largest users of fscrypt, Android and Chromium OS, achieve this by having PID 1 create a "session keyring" that is inherited by every process. This works, but it isn't scalable because it prevents session keyrings from being used for any other purpose. On general-purpose Linux distros, the 'fscrypt' userspace tool [1] can't similarly abuse the session keyring, so to make 'sudo' work on all systems it has to link all the user keyrings into root's user keyring [2]. This is ugly and raises security concerns. Moreover it can't make the keys available to system services, such as sshd trying to access the user's '~/.ssh' directory (see [3], [4]) or NetworkManager trying to read certificates from the user's home directory (see [5]); or to Docker containers (see [6], [7]). By having an API to add a key to the *filesystem* we'll be able to fix the above bugs, remove userspace workarounds, and clearly express the intended semantics: the locked/unlocked status of an encrypted directory is global, and encryption is orthogonal to OS-level access control. Why not use the add_key() syscall ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ We use an ioctl for this API rather than the existing add_key() system call because the ioctl gives us the flexibility needed to implement fscrypt-specific semantics that will be introduced in later patches: - Supporting key removal with the semantics such that the secret is removed immediately and any unused inodes using the key are evicted; also, the eviction of any in-use inodes can be retried. - Calculating a key-dependent cryptographic identifier and returning it to userspace. - Allowing keys to be added and removed by non-root users, but only keys for v2 encryption policies; and to prevent denial-of-service attacks, users can only remove keys they themselves have added, and a key is only really removed after all users who added it have removed it. Trying to shoehorn these semantics into the keyrings syscalls would be very difficult, whereas the ioctls make things much easier. However, to reuse code the implementation still uses the keyrings service internally. Thus we get lockless RCU-mode key lookups without having to re-implement it, and the keys automatically show up in /proc/keys for debugging purposes. References: [1] https://github.com/google/fscrypt [2] https://goo.gl/55cCrI#heading=h.vf09isp98isb [3] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/111#issuecomment-444347939 [4] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/116 [5] https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/fscrypt/+bug/1770715 [6] https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/128 [7] https://askubuntu.com/questions/1130306/cannot-run-docker-on-an-encrypted-filesystem Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-13fscrypt: rename keyinfo.c to keysetup.cEric Biggers1-1/+1
Rename keyinfo.c to keysetup.c since this better describes what the file does (sets up the key), and it matches the new file keysetup_v1.c. Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-08-13fscrypt: move v1 policy key setup to keysetup_v1.cEric Biggers1-1/+7
In preparation for introducing v2 encryption policies which will find and derive encryption keys differently from the current v1 encryption policies, move the v1 policy-specific key setup code from keyinfo.c into keysetup_v1.c. Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2019-05-21treewide: Add SPDX license identifier - Makefile/KconfigThomas Gleixner1-0/+1
Add SPDX license identifiers to all Make/Kconfig files which: - Have no license information of any form These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX license identifier is: GPL-2.0-only Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-10-19fscrypt: new helper function - fscrypt_file_open()Eric Biggers1-1/+1
Add a helper function which prepares to open a regular file which may be encrypted. It handles setting up the file's encryption key, then checking that the file's encryption policy matches that of its parent directory (if the parent directory is encrypted). It may be set as the ->open() method or it can be called from another ->open() method. Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2017-01-02fscrypt: factor out bio specific functionsRichard Weinberger1-0/+1
That way we can get rid of the direct dependency on CONFIG_BLOCK. Fixes: d475a507457b ("ubifs: Add skeleton for fscrypto") Reported-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at> Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2016-03-18fs crypto: move per-file encryption from f2fs tree to fs/cryptoJaegeuk Kim1-0/+3
This patch adds the renamed functions moved from the f2fs crypto files. 1. definitions for per-file encryption used by ext4 and f2fs. 2. crypto.c for encrypt/decrypt functions a. IO preparation: - fscrypt_get_ctx / fscrypt_release_ctx b. before IOs: - fscrypt_encrypt_page - fscrypt_decrypt_page - fscrypt_zeroout_range c. after IOs: - fscrypt_decrypt_bio_pages - fscrypt_pullback_bio_page - fscrypt_restore_control_page 3. policy.c supporting context management. a. For ioctls: - fscrypt_process_policy - fscrypt_get_policy b. For context permission - fscrypt_has_permitted_context - fscrypt_inherit_context 4. keyinfo.c to handle permissions - fscrypt_get_encryption_info - fscrypt_free_encryption_info 5. fname.c to support filename encryption a. general wrapper functions - fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr - fscrypt_fname_usr_to_disk - fscrypt_setup_filename - fscrypt_free_filename b. specific filename handling functions - fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer - fscrypt_fname_free_buffer 6. Makefile and Kconfig Cc: Al Viro <viro@ftp.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com> Signed-off-by: Ildar Muslukhov <ildarm@google.com> Signed-off-by: Uday Savagaonkar <savagaon@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>