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2019-01-06Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-1/+1
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull trivial vfs updates from Al Viro: "A few cleanups + Neil's namespace_unlock() optimization" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: exec: make prepare_bprm_creds static genheaders: %-<width>s had been there since v6; %-*s - since v7 VFS: use synchronize_rcu_expedited() in namespace_unlock() iov_iter: reduce code duplication
2019-01-05fs/: remove caller signal_pending branch predictionsDavidlohr Bueso1-2/+2
This is already done for us internally by the signal machinery. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/buffer.c] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181116002713.8474-7-dave@stgolabs.net Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-05exec: separate MM_ANONPAGES and RLIMIT_STACK accountingOleg Nesterov1-53/+52
get_arg_page() checks bprm->rlim_stack.rlim_cur and re-calculates the "extra" size for argv/envp pointers every time, this is a bit ugly and even not strictly correct: acct_arg_size() must not account this size. Remove all the rlimit code in get_arg_page(). Instead, add bprm->argmin calculated once at the start of __do_execve_file() and change copy_strings to check bprm->p >= bprm->argmin. The patch adds the new helper, prepare_arg_pages() which initializes bprm->argc/envc and bprm->argmin. [oleg@redhat.com: fix !CONFIG_MMU version of get_arg_page()] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181126122307.GA1660@redhat.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: use max_t] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181112160910.GA28440@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-12-10exec: make prepare_bprm_creds staticChanho Min1-1/+1
prepare_bprm_creds is not used outside exec.c, so there's no reason for it to have external linkage. Signed-off-by: Chanho Min <chanho.min@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2018-12-04Revert "exec: make de_thread() freezable"Rafael J. Wysocki1-3/+2
Revert commit c22397888f1e "exec: make de_thread() freezable" as requested by Ingo Molnar: "So there's a new regression in v4.20-rc4, my desktop produces this lockdep splat: [ 1772.588771] WARNING: pkexec/4633 still has locks held! [ 1772.588773] 4.20.0-rc4-custom-00213-g93a49841322b #1 Not tainted [ 1772.588775] ------------------------------------ [ 1772.588776] 1 lock held by pkexec/4633: [ 1772.588778] #0: 00000000ed85fbf8 (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.}, at: prepare_bprm_creds+0x2a/0x70 [ 1772.588786] stack backtrace: [ 1772.588789] CPU: 7 PID: 4633 Comm: pkexec Not tainted 4.20.0-rc4-custom-00213-g93a49841322b #1 [ 1772.588792] Call Trace: [ 1772.588800] dump_stack+0x85/0xcb [ 1772.588803] flush_old_exec+0x116/0x890 [ 1772.588807] ? load_elf_phdrs+0x72/0xb0 [ 1772.588809] load_elf_binary+0x291/0x1620 [ 1772.588815] ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10 [ 1772.588817] ? search_binary_handler+0x6d/0x240 [ 1772.588820] search_binary_handler+0x80/0x240 [ 1772.588823] load_script+0x201/0x220 [ 1772.588825] search_binary_handler+0x80/0x240 [ 1772.588828] __do_execve_file.isra.32+0x7d2/0xa60 [ 1772.588832] ? strncpy_from_user+0x40/0x180 [ 1772.588835] __x64_sys_execve+0x34/0x40 [ 1772.588838] do_syscall_64+0x60/0x1c0 The warning gets triggered by an ancient lockdep check in the freezer: (gdb) list *0xffffffff812ece06 0xffffffff812ece06 is in flush_old_exec (./include/linux/freezer.h:57). 52 * DO NOT ADD ANY NEW CALLERS OF THIS FUNCTION 53 * If try_to_freeze causes a lockdep warning it means the caller may deadlock 54 */ 55 static inline bool try_to_freeze_unsafe(void) 56 { 57 might_sleep(); 58 if (likely(!freezing(current))) 59 return false; 60 return __refrigerator(false); 61 } I reviewed the ->cred_guard_mutex code, and the mutex is held across all of exec() - and we always did this. But there's this recent -rc4 commit: > Chanho Min (1): > exec: make de_thread() freezable c22397888f1e: exec: make de_thread() freezable I believe this commit is bogus, you cannot call try_to_freeze() from de_thread(), because it's holding the ->cred_guard_mutex." Reported-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Tested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
2018-11-19exec: make de_thread() freezableChanho Min1-2/+3
Suspend fails due to the exec family of functions blocking the freezer. The casue is that de_thread() sleeps in TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE waiting for all sub-threads to die, and we have the deadlock if one of them is frozen. This also can occur with the schedule() waiting for the group thread leader to exit if it is frozen. In our machine, it causes freeze timeout as bellows. Freezing of tasks failed after 20.010 seconds (1 tasks refusing to freeze, wq_busy=0): setcpushares-ls D ffffffc00008ed70 0 5817 1483 0x0040000d Call trace: [<ffffffc00008ed70>] __switch_to+0x88/0xa0 [<ffffffc000d1c30c>] __schedule+0x1bc/0x720 [<ffffffc000d1ca90>] schedule+0x40/0xa8 [<ffffffc0001cd784>] flush_old_exec+0xdc/0x640 [<ffffffc000220360>] load_elf_binary+0x2a8/0x1090 [<ffffffc0001ccff4>] search_binary_handler+0x9c/0x240 [<ffffffc00021c584>] load_script+0x20c/0x228 [<ffffffc0001ccff4>] search_binary_handler+0x9c/0x240 [<ffffffc0001ce8e0>] do_execveat_common.isra.14+0x4f8/0x6e8 [<ffffffc0001cedd0>] compat_SyS_execve+0x38/0x48 [<ffffffc00008de30>] el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28 To fix this, make de_thread() freezable. It looks safe and works fine. Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Chanho Min <chanho.min@lge.com> Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
2018-10-10vfs: require i_size <= SIZE_MAX in kernel_read_file()Eric Biggers1-4/+4
On 32-bit systems, the buffer allocated by kernel_read_file() is too small if the file size is > SIZE_MAX, due to truncation to size_t. Fortunately, since the 'count' argument to kernel_read() is also truncated to size_t, only the allocated space is filled; then, -EIO is returned since 'pos != i_size' after the read loop. But this is not obvious and seems incidental. We should be more explicit about this case. So, fail early if i_size > SIZE_MAX. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2018-08-21Merge branch 'siginfo-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-0/+1
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace Pull core signal handling updates from Eric Biederman: "It was observed that a periodic timer in combination with a sufficiently expensive fork could prevent fork from every completing. This contains the changes to remove the need for that restart. This set of changes is split into several parts: - The first part makes PIDTYPE_TGID a proper pid type instead something only for very special cases. The part starts using PIDTYPE_TGID enough so that in __send_signal where signals are actually delivered we know if the signal is being sent to a a group of processes or just a single process. - With that prep work out of the way the logic in fork is modified so that fork logically makes signals received while it is running appear to be received after the fork completes" * 'siginfo-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (22 commits) signal: Don't send signals to tasks that don't exist signal: Don't restart fork when signals come in. fork: Have new threads join on-going signal group stops fork: Skip setting TIF_SIGPENDING in ptrace_init_task signal: Add calculate_sigpending() fork: Unconditionally exit if a fatal signal is pending fork: Move and describe why the code examines PIDNS_ADDING signal: Push pid type down into complete_signal. signal: Push pid type down into __send_signal signal: Push pid type down into send_signal signal: Pass pid type into do_send_sig_info signal: Pass pid type into send_sigio_to_task & send_sigurg_to_task signal: Pass pid type into group_send_sig_info signal: Pass pid and pid type into send_sigqueue posix-timers: Noralize good_sigevent signal: Use PIDTYPE_TGID to clearly store where file signals will be sent pid: Implement PIDTYPE_TGID pids: Move the pgrp and session pid pointers from task_struct to signal_struct kvm: Don't open code task_pid in kvm_vcpu_ioctl pids: Compute task_tgid using signal->leader_pid ...
2018-07-27mm: fix vma_is_anonymous() false-positivesKirill A. Shutemov1-0/+1
vma_is_anonymous() relies on ->vm_ops being NULL to detect anonymous VMA. This is unreliable as ->mmap may not set ->vm_ops. False-positive vma_is_anonymous() may lead to crashes: next ffff8801ce5e7040 prev ffff8801d20eca50 mm ffff88019c1e13c0 prot 27 anon_vma ffff88019680cdd8 vm_ops 0000000000000000 pgoff 0 file ffff8801b2ec2d00 private_data 0000000000000000 flags: 0xff(read|write|exec|shared|mayread|maywrite|mayexec|mayshare) ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at mm/memory.c:1422! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN CPU: 0 PID: 18486 Comm: syz-executor3 Not tainted 4.18.0-rc3+ #136 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:zap_pmd_range mm/memory.c:1421 [inline] RIP: 0010:zap_pud_range mm/memory.c:1466 [inline] RIP: 0010:zap_p4d_range mm/memory.c:1487 [inline] RIP: 0010:unmap_page_range+0x1c18/0x2220 mm/memory.c:1508 Call Trace: unmap_single_vma+0x1a0/0x310 mm/memory.c:1553 zap_page_range_single+0x3cc/0x580 mm/memory.c:1644 unmap_mapping_range_vma mm/memory.c:2792 [inline] unmap_mapping_range_tree mm/memory.c:2813 [inline] unmap_mapping_pages+0x3a7/0x5b0 mm/memory.c:2845 unmap_mapping_range+0x48/0x60 mm/memory.c:2880 truncate_pagecache+0x54/0x90 mm/truncate.c:800 truncate_setsize+0x70/0xb0 mm/truncate.c:826 simple_setattr+0xe9/0x110 fs/libfs.c:409 notify_change+0xf13/0x10f0 fs/attr.c:335 do_truncate+0x1ac/0x2b0 fs/open.c:63 do_sys_ftruncate+0x492/0x560 fs/open.c:205 __do_sys_ftruncate fs/open.c:215 [inline] __se_sys_ftruncate fs/open.c:213 [inline] __x64_sys_ftruncate+0x59/0x80 fs/open.c:213 do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Reproducer: #include <stdio.h> #include <stddef.h> #include <stdint.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <fcntl.h> #define KCOV_INIT_TRACE _IOR('c', 1, unsigned long) #define KCOV_ENABLE _IO('c', 100) #define KCOV_DISABLE _IO('c', 101) #define COVER_SIZE (1024<<10) #define KCOV_TRACE_PC 0 #define KCOV_TRACE_CMP 1 int main(int argc, char **argv) { int fd; unsigned long *cover; system("mount -t debugfs none /sys/kernel/debug"); fd = open("/sys/kernel/debug/kcov", O_RDWR); ioctl(fd, KCOV_INIT_TRACE, COVER_SIZE); cover = mmap(NULL, COVER_SIZE * sizeof(unsigned long), PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); munmap(cover, COVER_SIZE * sizeof(unsigned long)); cover = mmap(NULL, COVER_SIZE * sizeof(unsigned long), PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0); memset(cover, 0, COVER_SIZE * sizeof(unsigned long)); ftruncate(fd, 3UL << 20); return 0; } This can be fixed by assigning anonymous VMAs own vm_ops and not relying on it being NULL. If ->mmap() failed to set ->vm_ops, mmap_region() will set it to dummy_vm_ops. This way we will have non-NULL ->vm_ops for all VMAs. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180724121139.62570-4-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Reported-by: syzbot+3f84280d52be9b7083cc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-07-22mm: make vm_area_alloc() initialize core fieldsLinus Torvalds1-3/+1
Like vm_area_dup(), it initializes the anon_vma_chain head, and the basic mm pointer. The rest of the fields end up being different for different users, although the plan is to also initialize the 'vm_ops' field to a dummy entry. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-07-21mm: use helper functions for allocating and freeing vm_area structsLinus Torvalds1-2/+2
The vm_area_struct is one of the most fundamental memory management objects, but the management of it is entirely open-coded evertwhere, ranging from allocation and freeing (using kmem_cache_[z]alloc and kmem_cache_free) to initializing all the fields. We want to unify this in order to end up having some unified initialization of the vmas, and the first step to this is to at least have basic allocation functions. Right now those functions are literally just wrappers around the kmem_cache_*() calls. This is a purely mechanical conversion: # new vma: kmem_cache_zalloc(vm_area_cachep, GFP_KERNEL) -> vm_area_alloc() # copy old vma kmem_cache_alloc(vm_area_cachep, GFP_KERNEL) -> vm_area_dup(old) # free vma kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma) -> vm_area_free(vma) to the point where the old vma passed in to the vm_area_dup() function isn't even used yet (because I've left all the old manual initialization alone). Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-07-21pid: Implement PIDTYPE_TGIDEric W. Biederman1-0/+1
Everywhere except in the pid array we distinguish between a tasks pid and a tasks tgid (thread group id). Even in the enumeration we want that distinction sometimes so we have added __PIDTYPE_TGID. With leader_pid we almost have an implementation of PIDTYPE_TGID in struct signal_struct. Add PIDTYPE_TGID as a first class member of the pid_type enumeration and into the pids array. Then remove the __PIDTYPE_TGID special case and the leader_pid in signal_struct. The net size increase is just an extra pointer added to struct pid and an extra pair of pointers of an hlist_node added to task_struct. The effect on code maintenance is the removal of a number of special cases today and the potential to remove many more special cases as PIDTYPE_TGID gets used to it's fullest. The long term potential is allowing zombie thread group leaders to exit, which will remove a lot more special cases in the code. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-06-10Merge branch 'core-rseq-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-0/+1
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull restartable sequence support from Thomas Gleixner: "The restartable sequences syscall (finally): After a lot of back and forth discussion and massive delays caused by the speculative distraction of maintainers, the core set of restartable sequences has finally reached a consensus. It comes with the basic non disputed core implementation along with support for arm, powerpc and x86 and a full set of selftests It was exposed to linux-next earlier this week, so it does not fully comply with the merge window requirements, but there is really no point to drag it out for yet another cycle" * 'core-rseq-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: rseq/selftests: Provide Makefile, scripts, gitignore rseq/selftests: Provide parametrized tests rseq/selftests: Provide basic percpu ops test rseq/selftests: Provide basic test rseq/selftests: Provide rseq library selftests/lib.mk: Introduce OVERRIDE_TARGETS powerpc: Wire up restartable sequences system call powerpc: Add syscall detection for restartable sequences powerpc: Add support for restartable sequences x86: Wire up restartable sequence system call x86: Add support for restartable sequences arm: Wire up restartable sequences system call arm: Add syscall detection for restartable sequences arm: Add restartable sequences support rseq: Introduce restartable sequences system call uapi/headers: Provide types_32_64.h
2018-06-06rseq: Introduce restartable sequences system callMathieu Desnoyers1-0/+1
Expose a new system call allowing each thread to register one userspace memory area to be used as an ABI between kernel and user-space for two purposes: user-space restartable sequences and quick access to read the current CPU number value from user-space. * Restartable sequences (per-cpu atomics) Restartables sequences allow user-space to perform update operations on per-cpu data without requiring heavy-weight atomic operations. The restartable critical sections (percpu atomics) work has been started by Paul Turner and Andrew Hunter. It lets the kernel handle restart of critical sections. [1] [2] The re-implementation proposed here brings a few simplifications to the ABI which facilitates porting to other architectures and speeds up the user-space fast path. Here are benchmarks of various rseq use-cases. Test hardware: arm32: ARMv7 Processor rev 4 (v7l) "Cubietruck", 2-core x86-64: Intel E5-2630 v3@2.40GHz, 16-core, hyperthreading The following benchmarks were all performed on a single thread. * Per-CPU statistic counter increment getcpu+atomic (ns/op) rseq (ns/op) speedup arm32: 344.0 31.4 11.0 x86-64: 15.3 2.0 7.7 * LTTng-UST: write event 32-bit header, 32-bit payload into tracer per-cpu buffer getcpu+atomic (ns/op) rseq (ns/op) speedup arm32: 2502.0 2250.0 1.1 x86-64: 117.4 98.0 1.2 * liburcu percpu: lock-unlock pair, dereference, read/compare word getcpu+atomic (ns/op) rseq (ns/op) speedup arm32: 751.0 128.5 5.8 x86-64: 53.4 28.6 1.9 * jemalloc memory allocator adapted to use rseq Using rseq with per-cpu memory pools in jemalloc at Facebook (based on rseq 2016 implementation): The production workload response-time has 1-2% gain avg. latency, and the P99 overall latency drops by 2-3%. * Reading the current CPU number Speeding up reading the current CPU number on which the caller thread is running is done by keeping the current CPU number up do date within the cpu_id field of the memory area registered by the thread. This is done by making scheduler preemption set the TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME flag on the current thread. Upon return to user-space, a notify-resume handler updates the current CPU value within the registered user-space memory area. User-space can then read the current CPU number directly from memory. Keeping the current cpu id in a memory area shared between kernel and user-space is an improvement over current mechanisms available to read the current CPU number, which has the following benefits over alternative approaches: - 35x speedup on ARM vs system call through glibc - 20x speedup on x86 compared to calling glibc, which calls vdso executing a "lsl" instruction, - 14x speedup on x86 compared to inlined "lsl" instruction, - Unlike vdso approaches, this cpu_id value can be read from an inline assembly, which makes it a useful building block for restartable sequences. - The approach of reading the cpu id through memory mapping shared between kernel and user-space is portable (e.g. ARM), which is not the case for the lsl-based x86 vdso. On x86, yet another possible approach would be to use the gs segment selector to point to user-space per-cpu data. This approach performs similarly to the cpu id cache, but it has two disadvantages: it is not portable, and it is incompatible with existing applications already using the gs segment selector for other purposes. Benchmarking various approaches for reading the current CPU number: ARMv7 Processor rev 4 (v7l) Machine model: Cubietruck - Baseline (empty loop): 8.4 ns - Read CPU from rseq cpu_id: 16.7 ns - Read CPU from rseq cpu_id (lazy register): 19.8 ns - glibc 2.19-0ubuntu6.6 getcpu: 301.8 ns - getcpu system call: 234.9 ns x86-64 Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2630 v3 @ 2.40GHz: - Baseline (empty loop): 0.8 ns - Read CPU from rseq cpu_id: 0.8 ns - Read CPU from rseq cpu_id (lazy register): 0.8 ns - Read using gs segment selector: 0.8 ns - "lsl" inline assembly: 13.0 ns - glibc 2.19-0ubuntu6 getcpu: 16.6 ns - getcpu system call: 53.9 ns - Speed (benchmark taken on v8 of patchset) Running 10 runs of hackbench -l 100000 seems to indicate, contrary to expectations, that enabling CONFIG_RSEQ slightly accelerates the scheduler: Configuration: 2 sockets * 8-core Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2630 v3 @ 2.40GHz (directly on hardware, hyperthreading disabled in BIOS, energy saving disabled in BIOS, turboboost disabled in BIOS, cpuidle.off=1 kernel parameter), with a Linux v4.6 defconfig+localyesconfig, restartable sequences series applied. * CONFIG_RSEQ=n avg.: 41.37 s std.dev.: 0.36 s * CONFIG_RSEQ=y avg.: 40.46 s std.dev.: 0.33 s - Size On x86-64, between CONFIG_RSEQ=n/y, the text size increase of vmlinux is 567 bytes, and the data size increase of vmlinux is 5696 bytes. [1] https://lwn.net/Articles/650333/ [2] http://www.linuxplumbersconf.org/2013/ocw/system/presentations/1695/original/LPC%20-%20PerCpu%20Atomics.pdf Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Joel Fernandes <joelaf@google.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Chris Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andrew Hunter <ahh@google.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: "Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com> Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Ben Maurer <bmaurer@fb.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20151027235635.16059.11630.stgit@pjt-glaptop.roam.corp.google.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150624222609.6116.86035.stgit@kitami.mtv.corp.google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180602124408.8430-3-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com
2018-05-23umh: introduce fork_usermode_blob() helperAlexei Starovoitov1-9/+29
Introduce helper: int fork_usermode_blob(void *data, size_t len, struct umh_info *info); struct umh_info { struct file *pipe_to_umh; struct file *pipe_from_umh; pid_t pid; }; that GPLed kernel modules (signed or unsigned) can use it to execute part of its own data as swappable user mode process. The kernel will do: - allocate a unique file in tmpfs - populate that file with [data, data + len] bytes - user-mode-helper code will do_execve that file and, before the process starts, the kernel will create two unix pipes for bidirectional communication between kernel module and umh - close tmpfs file, effectively deleting it - the fork_usermode_blob will return zero on success and populate 'struct umh_info' with two unix pipes and the pid of the user process As the first step in the development of the bpfilter project the fork_usermode_blob() helper is introduced to allow user mode code to be invoked from a kernel module. The idea is that user mode code plus normal kernel module code are built as part of the kernel build and installed as traditional kernel module into distro specified location, such that from a distribution point of view, there is no difference between regular kernel modules and kernel modules + umh code. Such modules can be signed, modprobed, rmmod, etc. The use of this new helper by a kernel module doesn't make it any special from kernel and user space tooling point of view. Such approach enables kernel to delegate functionality traditionally done by the kernel modules into the user space processes (either root or !root) and reduces security attack surface of the new code. The buggy umh code would crash the user process, but not the kernel. Another advantage is that umh code of the kernel module can be debugged and tested out of user space (e.g. opening the possibility to run clang sanitizers, fuzzers or user space test suites on the umh code). In case of the bpfilter project such architecture allows complex control plane to be done in the user space while bpf based data plane stays in the kernel. Since umh can crash, can be oom-ed by the kernel, killed by the admin, the kernel module that uses them (like bpfilter) needs to manage life time of umh on its own via two unix pipes and the pid of umh. The exit code of such kernel module should kill the umh it started, so that rmmod of the kernel module will cleanup the corresponding umh. Just like if the kernel module does kmalloc() it should kfree() it in the exit code. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-04-11exec: pin stack limit during execKees Cook1-12/+15
Since the stack rlimit is used in multiple places during exec and it can be changed via other threads (via setrlimit()) or processes (via prlimit()), the assumption that the value doesn't change cannot be made. This leads to races with mm layout selection and argument size calculations. This changes the exec path to use the rlimit stored in bprm instead of in current. Before starting the thread, the bprm stack rlimit is stored back to current. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1518638796-20819-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Fixes: 64701dee4178e ("exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec") Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-11exec: introduce finalize_exec() before start_thread()Kees Cook1-0/+6
Provide a final callback into fs/exec.c before start_thread() takes over, to handle any last-minute changes, like the coming restoration of the stack limit. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1518638796-20819-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-11exec: pass stack rlimit into mm layout functionsKees Cook1-1/+7
Patch series "exec: Pin stack limit during exec". Attempts to solve problems with the stack limit changing during exec continue to be frustrated[1][2]. In addition to the specific issues around the Stack Clash family of flaws, Andy Lutomirski pointed out[3] other places during exec where the stack limit is used and is assumed to be unchanging. Given the many places it gets used and the fact that it can be manipulated/raced via setrlimit() and prlimit(), I think the only way to handle this is to move away from the "current" view of the stack limit and instead attach it to the bprm, and plumb this down into the functions that need to know the stack limits. This series implements the approach. [1] 04e35f4495dd ("exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()") [2] 779f4e1c6c7c ("Revert "exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()"") [3] to security@kernel.org, "Subject: existing rlimit races?" This patch (of 3): Since it is possible that the stack rlimit can change externally during exec (either via another thread calling setrlimit() or another process calling prlimit()), provide a way to pass the rlimit down into the per-architecture mm layout functions so that the rlimit can stay in the bprm structure instead of sitting in the signal structure until exec is finalized. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1518638796-20819-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-03-19exec: Set file unwritable before LSM checkKees Cook1-3/+3
The LSM check should happen after the file has been confirmed to be unchanging. Without this, we could have a race between the Time of Check (the call to security_kernel_read_file() which could read the file and make access policy decisions) and the Time of Use (starting with kernel_read_file()'s reading of the file contents). In theory, file contents could change between the two. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-01-03exec: Weaken dumpability for secureexecKees Cook1-2/+7
This is a logical revert of commit e37fdb785a5f ("exec: Use secureexec for setting dumpability") This weakens dumpability back to checking only for uid/gid changes in current (which is useless), but userspace depends on dumpability not being tied to secureexec. https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1528633 Reported-by: Tom Horsley <horsley1953@gmail.com> Fixes: e37fdb785a5f ("exec: Use secureexec for setting dumpability") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-12-18Revert "exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()"Kees Cook1-6/+1
This reverts commit 04e35f4495dd560db30c25efca4eecae8ec8c375. SELinux runs with secureexec for all non-"noatsecure" domain transitions, which means lots of processes end up hitting the stack hard-limit change that was introduced in order to fix a race with prlimit(). That race fix will need to be redesigned. Reported-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Reported-by: Tomáš Trnka <trnka@scm.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-12-15exec: avoid gcc-8 warning for get_task_commArnd Bergmann1-4/+3
gcc-8 warns about using strncpy() with the source size as the limit: fs/exec.c:1223:32: error: argument to 'sizeof' in 'strncpy' call is the same expression as the source; did you mean to use the size of the destination? [-Werror=sizeof-pointer-memaccess] This is indeed slightly suspicious, as it protects us from source arguments without NUL-termination, but does not guarantee that the destination is terminated. This keeps the strncpy() to ensure we have properly padded target buffer, but ensures that we use the correct length, by passing the actual length of the destination buffer as well as adding a build-time check to ensure it is exactly TASK_COMM_LEN. There are only 23 callsites which I all reviewed to ensure this is currently the case. We could get away with doing only the check or passing the right length, but it doesn't hurt to do both. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171205151724.1764896-1-arnd@arndb.de Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-11-30exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()Kees Cook1-1/+6
While the defense-in-depth RLIMIT_STACK limit on setuid processes was protected against races from other threads calling setrlimit(), I missed protecting it against races from external processes calling prlimit(). This adds locking around the change and makes sure that rlim_max is set too. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171127193457.GA11348@beast Fixes: 64701dee4178e ("exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec") Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-10-25locking/atomics: COCCINELLE/treewide: Convert trivial ACCESS_ONCE() patterns ↵Mark Rutland1-1/+1
to READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() Please do not apply this to mainline directly, instead please re-run the coccinelle script shown below and apply its output. For several reasons, it is desirable to use {READ,WRITE}_ONCE() in preference to ACCESS_ONCE(), and new code is expected to use one of the former. So far, there's been no reason to change most existing uses of ACCESS_ONCE(), as these aren't harmful, and changing them results in churn. However, for some features, the read/write distinction is critical to correct operation. To distinguish these cases, separate read/write accessors must be used. This patch migrates (most) remaining ACCESS_ONCE() instances to {READ,WRITE}_ONCE(), using the following coccinelle script: ---- // Convert trivial ACCESS_ONCE() uses to equivalent READ_ONCE() and // WRITE_ONCE() // $ make coccicheck COCCI=/home/mark/once.cocci SPFLAGS="--include-headers" MODE=patch virtual patch @ depends on patch @ expression E1, E2; @@ - ACCESS_ONCE(E1) = E2 + WRITE_ONCE(E1, E2) @ depends on patch @ expression E; @@ - ACCESS_ONCE(E) + READ_ONCE(E) ---- Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: davem@davemloft.net Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: mpe@ellerman.id.au Cc: shuah@kernel.org Cc: snitzer@redhat.com Cc: thor.thayer@linux.intel.com Cc: tj@kernel.org Cc: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk Cc: will.deacon@arm.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1508792849-3115-19-git-send-email-paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-10-20membarrier: Provide register expedited private commandMathieu Desnoyers1-0/+1
This introduces a "register private expedited" membarrier command which allows eventual removal of important memory barrier constraints on the scheduler fast-paths. It changes how the "private expedited" membarrier command (new to 4.14) is used from user-space. This new command allows processes to register their intent to use the private expedited command. This affects how the expedited private command introduced in 4.14-rc is meant to be used, and should be merged before 4.14 final. Processes are now required to register before using MEMBARRIER_CMD_PRIVATE_EXPEDITED, otherwise that command returns EPERM. This fixes a problem that arose when designing requested extensions to sys_membarrier() to allow JITs to efficiently flush old code from instruction caches. Several potential algorithms are much less painful if the user register intent to use this functionality early on, for example, before the process spawns the second thread. Registering at this time removes the need to interrupt each and every thread in that process at the first expedited sys_membarrier() system call. Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-10-04exec: load_script: kill the onstack interp[BINPRM_BUF_SIZE] arrayOleg Nesterov1-1/+1
Patch series "exec: binfmt_misc: fix use-after-free, kill iname[BINPRM_BUF_SIZE]". It looks like this code was always wrong, then commit 948b701a607f ("binfmt_misc: add persistent opened binary handler for containers") added more problems. This patch (of 6): load_script() can simply use i_name instead, it points into bprm->buf[] and nobody can change this memory until we call prepare_binprm(). The only complication is that we need to also change the signature of bprm_change_interp() but this change looks good too. While at it, do whitespace/style cleanups. NOTE: the real motivation for this change is that people want to increase BINPRM_BUF_SIZE, we need to change load_misc_binary() too but this looks more complicated because afaics it is very buggy. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170918163446.GA26793@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Travis Gummels <tgummels@redhat.com> Cc: Ben Woodard <woodard@redhat.com> Cc: Jim Foraker <foraker1@llnl.gov> Cc: <tdhooge@llnl.gov> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-09-15vfs: constify path argument to kernel_read_file_from_pathMimi Zohar1-1/+1
This patch constifies the path argument to kernel_read_file_from_path(). Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-09-15Merge branch 'work.set_fs' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-21/+3
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull more set_fs removal from Al Viro: "Christoph's 'use kernel_read and friends rather than open-coding set_fs()' series" * 'work.set_fs' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: fs: unexport vfs_readv and vfs_writev fs: unexport vfs_read and vfs_write fs: unexport __vfs_read/__vfs_write lustre: switch to kernel_write gadget/f_mass_storage: stop messing with the address limit mconsole: switch to kernel_read btrfs: switch write_buf to kernel_write net/9p: switch p9_fd_read to kernel_write mm/nommu: switch do_mmap_private to kernel_read serial2002: switch serial2002_tty_write to kernel_{read/write} fs: make the buf argument to __kernel_write a void pointer fs: fix kernel_write prototype fs: fix kernel_read prototype fs: move kernel_read to fs/read_write.c fs: move kernel_write to fs/read_write.c autofs4: switch autofs4_write to __kernel_write ashmem: switch to ->read_iter
2017-09-14mm: treewide: remove GFP_TEMPORARY allocation flagMichal Hocko1-2/+2
GFP_TEMPORARY was introduced by commit e12ba74d8ff3 ("Group short-lived and reclaimable kernel allocations") along with __GFP_RECLAIMABLE. It's primary motivation was to allow users to tell that an allocation is short lived and so the allocator can try to place such allocations close together and prevent long term fragmentation. As much as this sounds like a reasonable semantic it becomes much less clear when to use the highlevel GFP_TEMPORARY allocation flag. How long is temporary? Can the context holding that memory sleep? Can it take locks? It seems there is no good answer for those questions. The current implementation of GFP_TEMPORARY is basically GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_RECLAIMABLE which in itself is tricky because basically none of the existing caller provide a way to reclaim the allocated memory. So this is rather misleading and hard to evaluate for any benefits. I have checked some random users and none of them has added the flag with a specific justification. I suspect most of them just copied from other existing users and others just thought it might be a good idea to use without any measuring. This suggests that GFP_TEMPORARY just motivates for cargo cult usage without any reasoning. I believe that our gfp flags are quite complex already and especially those with highlevel semantic should be clearly defined to prevent from confusion and abuse. Therefore I propose dropping GFP_TEMPORARY and replace all existing users to simply use GFP_KERNEL. Please note that SLAB users with shrinkers will still get __GFP_RECLAIMABLE heuristic and so they will be placed properly for memory fragmentation prevention. I can see reasons we might want some gfp flag to reflect shorterm allocations but I propose starting from a clear semantic definition and only then add users with proper justification. This was been brought up before LSF this year by Matthew [1] and it turned out that GFP_TEMPORARY really doesn't have a clear semantic. It seems to be a heuristic without any measured advantage for most (if not all) its current users. The follow up discussion has revealed that opinions on what might be temporary allocation differ a lot between developers. So rather than trying to tweak existing users into a semantic which they haven't expected I propose to simply remove the flag and start from scratch if we really need a semantic for short term allocations. [1] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170118054945.GD18349@bombadil.infradead.org [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix typo] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] [sfr@canb.auug.org.au: drm/i915: fix up] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170816144703.378d4f4d@canb.auug.org.au Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170728091904.14627-1-mhocko@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-09-05fs: fix kernel_read prototypeChristoph Hellwig1-4/+3
Use proper ssize_t and size_t types for the return value and count argument, move the offset last and make it an in/out argument like all other read/write helpers, and make the buf argument a void pointer to get rid of lots of casts in the callers. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2017-09-05fs: move kernel_read to fs/read_write.cChristoph Hellwig1-17/+0
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2017-08-01exec: Consolidate pdeath_signal clearingKees Cook1-4/+3
Instead of an additional secureexec check for pdeath_signal, just move it up into the initial secureexec test. Neither perf nor arch code touches pdeath_signal, so the relocation shouldn't change anything. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
2017-08-01exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexecKees Cook1-0/+12
For a secureexec, before memory layout selection has happened, reset the stack rlimit to something sane to avoid the caller having control over the resulting layouts. $ ulimit -s 8192 $ ulimit -s unlimited $ /bin/sh -c 'ulimit -s' unlimited $ sudo /bin/sh -c 'ulimit -s' 8192 Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
2017-08-01exec: Consolidate dumpability logicKees Cook1-6/+5
Since it's already valid to set dumpability in the early part of setup_new_exec(), we can consolidate the logic into a single place. The BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP is set during would_dump() calls before setup_new_exec(), so its test is safe to move as well. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-08-01exec: Use secureexec for clearing pdeath_signalKees Cook1-2/+1
Like dumpability, clearing pdeath_signal happens both in setup_new_exec() and later in commit_creds(). The test in setup_new_exec() is different from all other privilege comparisons, though: it is checking the new cred (bprm) uid vs the old cred (current) euid. This appears to be a bug, introduced by commit a6f76f23d297 ("CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials"): - if (bprm->e_uid != current_euid() || - bprm->e_gid != current_egid()) { - set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable); + if (bprm->cred->uid != current_euid() || + bprm->cred->gid != current_egid()) { It was bprm euid vs current euid (and egids), but the effective got dropped. Nothing in the exec flow changes bprm->cred->uid (nor gid). The call traces are: prepare_bprm_creds() prepare_exec_creds() prepare_creds() memcpy(new_creds, old_creds, ...) security_prepare_creds() (unimplemented by commoncap) ... prepare_binprm() bprm_fill_uid() resets euid/egid to current euid/egid sets euid/egid on bprm based on set*id file bits security_bprm_set_creds() cap_bprm_set_creds() handle all caps-based manipulations so this test is effectively a test of current_uid() vs current_euid(), which is wrong, just like the prior dumpability tests were wrong. The commit log says "Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that may not be covered by commit_creds()." This may be meaning the earlier old euid vs new euid (and egid) test that got changed. Luckily, as with dumpability, this is all masked by commit_creds() which performs old/new euid and egid tests and clears pdeath_signal. And again, like dumpability, we should include LSM secureexec logic for pdeath_signal clearing. For example, Smack goes out of its way to clear pdeath_signal when it finds a secureexec condition. Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-08-01exec: Use secureexec for setting dumpabilityKees Cook1-1/+1
The examination of "current" to decide dumpability is wrong. This was a check of and euid/uid (or egid/gid) mismatch in the existing process, not the newly created one. This appears to stretch back into even the "history.git" tree. Luckily, dumpability is later set in commit_creds(). In earlier kernel versions before creds existed, similar checks also existed late in the exec flow, covering up the mistake as far back as I could find. Note that because the commit_creds() check examines differences of euid, uid, egid, gid, and capabilities between the old and new creds, it would look like the setup_new_exec() dumpability test could be entirely removed. However, the secureexec test may cover a different set of tests (specific to the LSMs) than what commit_creds() checks for. So, fix this test to use secureexec (the removed euid tests are redundant to the commoncap secureexec checks now). Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-08-01LSM: drop bprm_secureexec hookKees Cook1-2/+0
This removes the bprm_secureexec hook since the logic has been folded into the bprm_set_creds hook for all LSMs now. Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
2017-08-01commoncap: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hookKees Cook1-0/+7
The commoncap implementation of the bprm_secureexec hook is the only LSM that depends on the final call to its bprm_set_creds hook (since it may be called for multiple files, it ignores bprm->called_set_creds). As a result, it cannot safely _clear_ bprm->secureexec since other LSMs may have set it. Instead, remove the bprm_secureexec hook by introducing a new flag to bprm specific to commoncap: cap_elevated. This is similar to cap_effective, but that is used for a specific subset of elevated privileges, and exists solely to track state from bprm_set_creds to bprm_secureexec. As such, it will be removed in the next patch. Here, set the new bprm->cap_elevated flag when setuid/setgid has happened from bprm_fill_uid() or fscapabilities have been prepared. This temporarily moves the bprm_secureexec hook to a static inline. The helper will be removed in the next patch; this makes the step easier to review and bisect, since this does not introduce any changes to inputs nor outputs to the "elevated privileges" calculation. The new flag is merged with the bprm->secureexec flag in setup_new_exec() since this marks the end of any further prepare_binprm() calls. Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
2017-08-01binfmt: Introduce secureexec flagKees Cook1-0/+2
The bprm_secureexec hook can be moved earlier. Right now, it is called during create_elf_tables(), via load_binary(), via search_binary_handler(), via exec_binprm(). Nearly all (see exception below) state used by bprm_secureexec is created during the bprm_set_creds hook, called from prepare_binprm(). For all LSMs (except commoncaps described next), only the first execution of bprm_set_creds takes any effect (they all check bprm->called_set_creds which prepare_binprm() sets after the first call to the bprm_set_creds hook). However, all these LSMs also only do anything with bprm_secureexec when they detected a secure state during their first run of bprm_set_creds. Therefore, it is functionally identical to move the detection into bprm_set_creds, since the results from secureexec here only need to be based on the first call to the LSM's bprm_set_creds hook. The single exception is that the commoncaps secureexec hook also examines euid/uid and egid/gid differences which are controlled by bprm_fill_uid(), via prepare_binprm(), which can be called multiple times (e.g. binfmt_script, binfmt_misc), and may clear the euid/egid for the final load (i.e. the script interpreter). However, while commoncaps specifically ignores bprm->cred_prepared, and runs its bprm_set_creds hook each time prepare_binprm() may get called, it needs to base the secureexec decision on the final call to bprm_set_creds. As a result, it will need special handling. To begin this refactoring, this adds the secureexec flag to the bprm struct, and calls the secureexec hook during setup_new_exec(). This is safe since all the cred work is finished (and past the point of no return). This explicit call will be removed in later patches once the hook has been removed. Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-08-01exec: Correct comments about "point of no return"Kees Cook1-3/+13
In commit 221af7f87b97 ("Split 'flush_old_exec' into two functions"), the comment about the point of no return should have stayed in flush_old_exec() since it refers to "bprm->mm = NULL;" line, but prior changes in commits c89681ed7d0e ("remove steal_locks()"), and fd8328be874f ("sanitize handling of shared descriptor tables in failing execve()") made it look like it meant the current->sas_ss_sp line instead. The comment was referring to the fact that once bprm->mm is NULL, all failures from a binfmt load_binary hook (e.g. load_elf_binary), will get SEGV raised against current. Move this comment and expand the explanation a bit, putting it above the assignment this time, and add details about the true nature of "point of no return" being the call to flush_old_exec() itself. This also removes an erroneous commet about when credentials are being installed. That has its own dedicated function, install_exec_creds(), which carries a similar (and correct) comment, so remove the bogus comment where installation is not actually happening. Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
2017-08-01exec: Rename bprm->cred_prepared to called_set_credsKees Cook1-1/+1
The cred_prepared bprm flag has a misleading name. It has nothing to do with the bprm_prepare_cred hook, and actually tracks if bprm_set_creds has been called. Rename this flag and improve its comment. Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
2017-07-08exec: Limit arg stack to at most 75% of _STK_LIMKees Cook1-5/+6
To avoid pathological stack usage or the need to special-case setuid execs, just limit all arg stack usage to at most 75% of _STK_LIM (6MB). Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-06-24fs/exec.c: account for argv/envp pointersKees Cook1-4/+24
When limiting the argv/envp strings during exec to 1/4 of the stack limit, the storage of the pointers to the strings was not included. This means that an exec with huge numbers of tiny strings could eat 1/4 of the stack limit in strings and then additional space would be later used by the pointers to the strings. For example, on 32-bit with a 8MB stack rlimit, an exec with 1677721 single-byte strings would consume less than 2MB of stack, the max (8MB / 4) amount allowed, but the pointers to the strings would consume the remaining additional stack space (1677721 * 4 == 6710884). The result (1677721 + 6710884 == 8388605) would exhaust stack space entirely. Controlling this stack exhaustion could result in pathological behavior in setuid binaries (CVE-2017-1000365). [akpm@linux-foundation.org: additional commenting from Kees] Fixes: b6a2fea39318 ("mm: variable length argument support") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170622001720.GA32173@beast Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-03-20x86/arch_prctl: Add ARCH_[GET|SET]_CPUIDKyle Huey1-0/+1
Intel supports faulting on the CPUID instruction beginning with Ivy Bridge. When enabled, the processor will fault on attempts to execute the CPUID instruction with CPL>0. Exposing this feature to userspace will allow a ptracer to trap and emulate the CPUID instruction. When supported, this feature is controlled by toggling bit 0 of MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES. It is documented in detail in Section 2.3.2 of https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=243991 Implement a new pair of arch_prctls, available on both x86-32 and x86-64. ARCH_GET_CPUID: Returns the current CPUID state, either 0 if CPUID faulting is enabled (and thus the CPUID instruction is not available) or 1 if CPUID faulting is not enabled. ARCH_SET_CPUID: Set the CPUID state to the second argument. If cpuid_enabled is 0 CPUID faulting will be activated, otherwise it will be deactivated. Returns ENODEV if CPUID faulting is not supported on this system. The state of the CPUID faulting flag is propagated across forks, but reset upon exec. Signed-off-by: Kyle Huey <khuey@kylehuey.com> Cc: Grzegorz Andrejczuk <grzegorz.andrejczuk@intel.com> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com> Cc: Robert O'Callahan <robert@ocallahan.org> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: user-mode-linux-devel@lists.sourceforge.net Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: user-mode-linux-user@lists.sourceforge.net Cc: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170320081628.18952-9-khuey@kylehuey.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2017-03-02sched/headers: Prepare for new header dependencies before moving code to ↵Ingo Molnar1-0/+1
<linux/sched/task.h> We are going to split <linux/sched/task.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files. Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/task.h> file that just maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and bisectable. Include the new header in the files that are going to need it. Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-03-02sched/headers: Prepare for new header dependencies before moving code to ↵Ingo Molnar1-0/+1
<linux/sched/numa_balancing.h> We are going to split <linux/sched/numa_balancing.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files. Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/numa_balancing.h> file that just maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and bisectable. Include the new header in the files that are going to need it. Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-03-02sched/headers: Prepare for new header dependencies before moving code to ↵Ingo Molnar1-0/+1
<linux/sched/signal.h> We are going to split <linux/sched/signal.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files. Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/signal.h> file that just maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and bisectable. Include the new header in the files that are going to need it. Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-03-02sched/headers: Prepare for new header dependencies before moving code to ↵Ingo Molnar1-0/+1
<linux/sched/coredump.h> We are going to split <linux/sched/coredump.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files. Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/coredump.h> file that just maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and bisectable. Include the new header in the files that are going to need it. Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-03-02sched/headers: Prepare for new header dependencies before moving code to ↵Ingo Molnar1-0/+1
<linux/sched/mm.h> We are going to split <linux/sched/mm.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files. Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/mm.h> file that just maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and bisectable. The APIs that are going to be moved first are: mm_alloc() __mmdrop() mmdrop() mmdrop_async_fn() mmdrop_async() mmget_not_zero() mmput() mmput_async() get_task_mm() mm_access() mm_release() Include the new header in the files that are going to need it. Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-03-02sched/headers, cgroups: Remove the threadgroup_change_*() wrapperyIngo Molnar1-3/+3
threadgroup_change_begin()/end() is a pointless wrapper around cgroup_threadgroup_change_begin()/end(), minus a might_sleep() in the !CONFIG_CGROUPS=y case. Remove the wrappery, move the might_sleep() (the down_read() already has a might_sleep() check). This debloats <linux/sched.h> a bit and simplifies this API. Update all call sites. No change in functionality. Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>