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2017-11-02License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no licenseGreg Kroah-Hartman1-0/+1
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-08-29net: rxrpc: Replace time_t type with time64_t typeBaolin Wang1-0/+23
Since the 'expiry' variable of 'struct key_preparsed_payload' has been changed to 'time64_t' type, which is year 2038 safe on 32bits system. In net/rxrpc subsystem, we need convert 'u32' type to 'time64_t' type when copying ticket expires time to 'prep->expiry', then this patch introduces two helper functions to help convert 'u32' to 'time64_t' type. This patch also uses ktime_get_real_seconds() to get current time instead of get_seconds() which is not year 2038 safe on 32bits system. Signed-off-by: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-04-03KEYS: Split role of the keyring pointer for keyring restrict functionsMat Martineau1-2/+4
The first argument to the restrict_link_func_t functions was a keyring pointer. These functions are called by the key subsystem with this argument set to the destination keyring, but restrict_link_by_signature expects a pointer to the relevant trusted keyring. Restrict functions may need something other than a single struct key pointer to allow or reject key linkage, so the data used to make that decision (such as the trust keyring) is moved to a new, fourth argument. The first argument is now always the destination keyring. Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
2017-04-03KEYS: Add a system blacklist keyringDavid Howells1-0/+12
Add the following: (1) A new system keyring that is used to store information about blacklisted certificates and signatures. (2) A new key type (called 'blacklist') that is used to store a blacklisted hash in its description as a hex string. The key accepts no payload. (3) The ability to configure a list of blacklisted hashes into the kernel at build time. This is done by setting CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST to the filename of a list of hashes that are in the form: "<hash>", "<hash>", ..., "<hash>" where each <hash> is a hex string representation of the hash and must include all necessary leading zeros to pad the hash to the right size. The above are enabled with CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING. Once the kernel is booted, the blacklist keyring can be listed: root@andromeda ~]# keyctl show %:.blacklist Keyring 723359729 ---lswrv 0 0 keyring: .blacklist 676257228 ---lswrv 0 0 \_ blacklist: 123412341234c55c1dcc601ab8e172917706aa32fb5eaf826813547fdf02dd46 The blacklist cannot currently be modified by userspace, but it will be possible to load it, for example, from the UEFI blacklist database. A later commit will make it possible to load blacklisted asymmetric keys in here too. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-03-02KEYS: Differentiate uses of rcu_dereference_key() and user_key_payload()David Howells1-2/+7
rcu_dereference_key() and user_key_payload() are currently being used in two different, incompatible ways: (1) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference() - when only the RCU read lock used to protect the key. (2) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference_protected() - when the key semaphor is used to protect the key and the may be being modified. Fix this by splitting both of the key wrappers to produce: (1) RCU accessors for keys when caller has the key semaphore locked: dereference_key_locked() user_key_payload_locked() (2) RCU accessors for keys when caller holds the RCU read lock: dereference_key_rcu() user_key_payload_rcu() This should fix following warning in the NFS idmapper =============================== [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ] 4.10.0 #1 Tainted: G W ------------------------------- ./include/keys/user-type.h:53 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 0 1 lock held by mount.nfs/5987: #0: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<d000000002527abc>] nfs_idmap_get_key+0x15c/0x420 [nfsv4] stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 5987 Comm: mount.nfs Tainted: G W 4.10.0 #1 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xe8/0x154 (unreliable) lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x140/0x190 nfs_idmap_get_key+0x380/0x420 [nfsv4] nfs_map_name_to_uid+0x2a0/0x3b0 [nfsv4] decode_getfattr_attrs+0xfac/0x16b0 [nfsv4] decode_getfattr_generic.constprop.106+0xbc/0x150 [nfsv4] nfs4_xdr_dec_lookup_root+0xac/0xb0 [nfsv4] rpcauth_unwrap_resp+0xe8/0x140 [sunrpc] call_decode+0x29c/0x910 [sunrpc] __rpc_execute+0x140/0x8f0 [sunrpc] rpc_run_task+0x170/0x200 [sunrpc] nfs4_call_sync_sequence+0x68/0xa0 [nfsv4] _nfs4_lookup_root.isra.44+0xd0/0xf0 [nfsv4] nfs4_lookup_root+0xe0/0x350 [nfsv4] nfs4_lookup_root_sec+0x70/0xa0 [nfsv4] nfs4_find_root_sec+0xc4/0x100 [nfsv4] nfs4_proc_get_rootfh+0x5c/0xf0 [nfsv4] nfs4_get_rootfh+0x6c/0x190 [nfsv4] nfs4_server_common_setup+0xc4/0x260 [nfsv4] nfs4_create_server+0x278/0x3c0 [nfsv4] nfs4_remote_mount+0x50/0xb0 [nfsv4] mount_fs+0x74/0x210 vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220 nfs_do_root_mount+0xb0/0x140 [nfsv4] nfs4_try_mount+0x60/0x100 [nfsv4] nfs_fs_mount+0x5ec/0xda0 [nfs] mount_fs+0x74/0x210 vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220 do_mount+0x254/0xf70 SyS_mount+0x94/0x100 system_call+0x38/0xe0 Reported-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2016-06-14KEYS: Strip trailing spacesDavid Howells1-1/+1
Strip some trailing spaces. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-12IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings instead of .ima_mokDavid Howells1-11/+2
Add a config option (IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY) that, when enabled, allows keys to be added to the IMA keyrings by userspace - with the restriction that each must be signed by a key in the system trusted keyrings. EPERM will be returned if this option is disabled, ENOKEY will be returned if no authoritative key can be found and EKEYREJECTED will be returned if the signature doesn't match. Other errors such as ENOPKG may also be returned. If this new option is enabled, the builtin system keyring is searched, as is the secondary system keyring if that is also enabled. Intermediate keys between the builtin system keyring and the key being added can be added to the secondary keyring (which replaces .ima_mok) to form a trust chain - provided they are also validly signed by a key in one of the trusted keyrings. The .ima_mok keyring is then removed and the IMA blacklist keyring gets its own config option (IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-04-12certs: Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to dynamicallyDavid Howells1-0/+9
Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to by root whilst the system is running - provided the key being added is vouched for by a key built into the kernel or already added to the secondary keyring. Rename .system_keyring to .builtin_trusted_keys to distinguish it more obviously from the new keyring (called .secondary_trusted_keys). The new keyring needs to be enabled with CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING. If the secondary keyring is enabled, a link is created from that to .builtin_trusted_keys so that the the latter will automatically be searched too if the secondary keyring is searched. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-12KEYS: Remove KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED and KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTEDDavid Howells1-1/+0
Remove KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED and KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED as they're no longer meaningful. Also we can drop the trusted flag from the preparse structure. Given this, we no longer need to pass the key flags through to restrict_link(). Further, we can now get rid of keyring_restrict_trusted_only() also. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-12KEYS: Move the point of trust determination to __key_link()David Howells1-12/+7
Move the point at which a key is determined to be trustworthy to __key_link() so that we use the contents of the keyring being linked in to to determine whether the key being linked in is trusted or not. What is 'trusted' then becomes a matter of what's in the keyring. Currently, the test is done when the key is parsed, but given that at that point we can only sensibly refer to the contents of the system trusted keyring, we can only use that as the basis for working out the trustworthiness of a new key. With this change, a trusted keyring is a set of keys that once the trusted-only flag is set cannot be added to except by verification through one of the contained keys. Further, adding a key into a trusted keyring, whilst it might grant trustworthiness in the context of that keyring, does not automatically grant trustworthiness in the context of a second keyring to which it could be secondarily linked. To accomplish this, the authentication data associated with the key source must now be retained. For an X.509 cert, this means the contents of the AuthorityKeyIdentifier and the signature data. If system keyrings are disabled then restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted() resolves to restrict_link_reject(). The integrity digital signature code still works correctly with this as it was previously using KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, which doesn't permit anything to be added if there is no system keyring against which trust can be determined. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-12KEYS: Generalise x509_request_asymmetric_key()David Howells1-4/+4
Generalise x509_request_asymmetric_key(). It doesn't really have any dependencies on X.509 features as it uses generalised IDs and the public_key structs that contain data extracted from X.509. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-12KEYS: Move x509_request_asymmetric_key() to asymmetric_type.cDavid Howells1-0/+5
Move x509_request_asymmetric_key() to asymmetric_type.c so that it can be generalised. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-06KEYS: Generalise system_verify_data() to provide access to internal contentDavid Howells2-6/+2
Generalise system_verify_data() to provide access to internal content through a callback. This allows all the PKCS#7 stuff to be hidden inside this function and removed from the PE file parser and the PKCS#7 test key. If external content is not required, NULL should be passed as data to the function. If the callback is not required, that can be set to NULL. The function is now called verify_pkcs7_signature() to contrast with verify_pefile_signature() and the definitions of both have been moved into linux/verification.h along with the key_being_used_for enum. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-06KEYS: Allow authentication data to be stored in an asymmetric keyDavid Howells2-4/+5
Allow authentication data to be stored in an asymmetric key in the 4th element of the key payload and provide a way for it to be destroyed. For the public key subtype, this will be a public_key_signature struct. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-02-10tpm: fix checks for policy digest existence in tpm2_seal_trusted()Jarkko Sakkinen1-1/+1
In my original patch sealing with policy was done with dynamically allocated buffer that I changed later into an array so the checks in tpm2-cmd.c became invalid. This patch fixes the issue. Fixes: 5beb0c435bdd ("keys, trusted: seal with a TPM2 authorization policy") Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
2015-12-26Merge branch 'next' of ↵James Morris1-0/+24
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity into next
2015-12-20keys, trusted: seal with a TPM2 authorization policyJarkko Sakkinen1-0/+4
TPM2 supports authorization policies, which are essentially combinational logic statements repsenting the conditions where the data can be unsealed based on the TPM state. This patch enables to use authorization policies to seal trusted keys. Two following new options have been added for trusted keys: * 'policydigest=': provide an auth policy digest for sealing. * 'policyhandle=': provide a policy session handle for unsealing. If 'hash=' option is supplied after 'policydigest=' option, this will result an error because the state of the option would become mixed. Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
2015-12-20keys, trusted: select hash algorithm for TPM2 chipsJarkko Sakkinen1-0/+1
Added 'hash=' option for selecting the hash algorithm for add_key() syscall and documentation for it. Added entry for sm3-256 to the following tables in order to support TPM_ALG_SM3_256: * hash_algo_name * hash_digest_size Includes support for the following hash algorithms: * sha1 * sha256 * sha384 * sha512 * sm3-256 Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
2015-12-15IMA: create machine owner and blacklist keyringsPetko Manolov1-0/+24
This option creates IMA MOK and blacklist keyrings. IMA MOK is an intermediate keyring that sits between .system and .ima keyrings, effectively forming a simple CA hierarchy. To successfully import a key into .ima_mok it must be signed by a key which CA is in .system keyring. On turn any key that needs to go in .ima keyring must be signed by CA in either .system or .ima_mok keyrings. IMA MOK is empty at kernel boot. IMA blacklist keyring contains all revoked IMA keys. It is consulted before any other keyring. If the search is successful the requested operation is rejected and error is returned to the caller. Signed-off-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2015-10-21KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload dataDavid Howells3-1/+24
Merge the type-specific data with the payload data into one four-word chunk as it seems pointless to keep them separate. Use user_key_payload() for accessing the payloads of overloaded user-defined keys. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
2015-10-19tpm: seal/unseal for TPM 2.0Jarkko Sakkinen1-1/+1
Added tpm_trusted_seal() and tpm_trusted_unseal() API for sealing trusted keys. This patch implements basic sealing and unsealing functionality for TPM 2.0: * Seal with a parent key using a 20 byte auth value. * Unseal with a parent key using a 20 byte auth value. Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
2015-10-19keys, trusted: move struct trusted_key_options to trusted-type.hJarkko Sakkinen1-0/+12
Moved struct trusted_key_options to trustes-type.h so that the fields can be accessed from drivers/char/tpm. Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
2015-08-12PKCS#7: Appropriately restrict authenticated attributes and content typeDavid Howells1-1/+3
A PKCS#7 or CMS message can have per-signature authenticated attributes that are digested as a lump and signed by the authorising key for that signature. If such attributes exist, the content digest isn't itself signed, but rather it is included in a special authattr which then contributes to the signature. Further, we already require the master message content type to be pkcs7_signedData - but there's also a separate content type for the data itself within the SignedData object and this must be repeated inside the authattrs for each signer [RFC2315 9.2, RFC5652 11.1]. We should really validate the authattrs if they exist or forbid them entirely as appropriate. To this end: (1) Alter the PKCS#7 parser to reject any message that has more than one signature where at least one signature has authattrs and at least one that does not. (2) Validate authattrs if they are present and strongly restrict them. Only the following authattrs are permitted and all others are rejected: (a) contentType. This is checked to be an OID that matches the content type in the SignedData object. (b) messageDigest. This must match the crypto digest of the data. (c) signingTime. If present, we check that this is a valid, parseable UTCTime or GeneralTime and that the date it encodes fits within the validity window of the matching X.509 cert. (d) S/MIME capabilities. We don't check the contents. (e) Authenticode SP Opus Info. We don't check the contents. (f) Authenticode Statement Type. We don't check the contents. The message is rejected if (a) or (b) are missing. If the message is an Authenticode type, the message is rejected if (e) is missing; if not Authenticode, the message is rejected if (d) - (f) are present. The S/MIME capabilities authattr (d) unfortunately has to be allowed to support kernels already signed by the pesign program. This only affects kexec. sign-file suppresses them (CMS_NOSMIMECAP). The message is also rejected if an authattr is given more than once or if it contains more than one element in its set of values. (3) Add a parameter to pkcs7_verify() to select one of the following restrictions and pass in the appropriate option from the callers: (*) VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE This requires that the SignedData content type be pkcs7-data and forbids authattrs. sign-file sets CMS_NOATTR. We could be more flexible and permit authattrs optionally, but only permit minimal content. (*) VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE This requires that the SignedData content type be pkcs7-data and requires authattrs. In future, this will require an attribute holding the target firmware name in addition to the minimal set. (*) VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE This requires that the SignedData content type be pkcs7-data but allows either no authattrs or only permits the minimal set. (*) VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE This only supports the Authenticode SPC_INDIRECT_DATA content type and requires at least an SpcSpOpusInfo authattr in addition to the minimal set. It also permits an SPC_STATEMENT_TYPE authattr (and an S/MIME capabilities authattr because the pesign program doesn't remove these). (*) VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE (*) VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE These are invalid in this context but are included for later use when limiting the use of X.509 certs. (4) The pkcs7_test key type is given a module parameter to select between the above options for testing purposes. For example: echo 1 >/sys/module/pkcs7_test_key/parameters/usage keyctl padd pkcs7_test foo @s </tmp/stuff.pkcs7 will attempt to check the signature on stuff.pkcs7 as if it contains a firmware blob (1 being VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE). Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
2015-08-07MODSIGN: Extract the blob PKCS#7 signature verifier from module signingDavid Howells1-0/+5
Extract the function that drives the PKCS#7 signature verification given a data blob and a PKCS#7 blob out from the module signing code and lump it with the system keyring code as it's generic. This makes it independent of module config options and opens it to use by the firmware loader. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Ming Lei <ming.lei@canonical.com> Cc: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Cc: Kyle McMartin <kyle@kernel.org>
2014-10-06KEYS: Restore partial ID matching functionality for asymmetric keysDmitry Kasatkin1-0/+3
Bring back the functionality whereby an asymmetric key can be matched with a partial match on one of its IDs. Whilst we're at it, allow for the possibility of having an increased number of IDs. Reported-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2014-09-16KEYS: Implement binary asymmetric key ID handlingDavid Howells1-0/+38
Implement the first step in using binary key IDs for asymmetric keys rather than hex string keys. The previously added match data preparsing will be able to convert hex criterion strings into binary which can then be compared more rapidly. Further, we actually want more then one ID string per public key. The problem is that X.509 certs refer to other X.509 certs by matching Issuer + AuthKeyId to Subject + SubjKeyId, but PKCS#7 messages match against X.509 Issuer + SerialNumber. This patch just provides facilities for a later patch to make use of. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
2014-09-16KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparseDavid Howells1-3/+0
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm. Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse to override it as needed. The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the user_match() function. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
2014-09-16KEYS: Preparse match dataDavid Howells1-1/+3
Preparse the match data. This provides several advantages: (1) The preparser can reject invalid criteria up front. (2) The preparser can convert the criteria to binary data if necessary (the asymmetric key type really wants to do binary comparison of the key IDs). (3) The preparser can set the type of search to be performed. This means that it's not then a one-off setting in the key type. (4) The preparser can set an appropriate comparator function. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
2014-07-23Merge remote-tracking branch 'integrity/next-with-keys' into keys-nextDavid Howells1-1/+9
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2014-07-23KEYS: big_key: Use key preparsingDavid Howells1-1/+2
Make use of key preparsing in the big key type so that quota size determination can take place prior to keyring locking when a key is being added. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
2014-07-23KEYS: user: Use key preparsingDavid Howells1-1/+2
Make use of key preparsing in user-defined and logon keys so that quota size determination can take place prior to keyring locking when a key is being added. Also the idmapper key types need to change to match as they use the user-defined key type routines. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
2014-07-17KEYS: verify a certificate is signed by a 'trusted' keyMimi Zohar1-1/+9
Only public keys, with certificates signed by an existing 'trusted' key on the system trusted keyring, should be added to a trusted keyring. This patch adds support for verifying a certificate's signature. This is derived from David Howells pkcs7_request_asymmetric_key() patch. Changelog v6: - on error free key - Dmitry - validate trust only for not already trusted keys - Dmitry - formatting cleanup Changelog: - define get_system_trusted_keyring() to fix kbuild issues Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
2013-09-25KEYS: Separate the kernel signature checking keyring from module signingDavid Howells1-0/+23
Separate the kernel signature checking keyring from module signing so that it can be used by code other than the module-signing code. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2013-09-24KEYS: Implement a big key type that can save to tmpfsDavid Howells1-0/+25
Implement a big key type that can save its contents to tmpfs and thus swapspace when memory is tight. This is useful for Kerberos ticket caches. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
2013-09-24KEYS: Expand the capacity of a keyringDavid Howells1-15/+2
Expand the capacity of a keyring to be able to hold a lot more keys by using the previously added associative array implementation. Currently the maximum capacity is: (PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(header)) / sizeof(struct key *) which, on a 64-bit system, is a little more 500. However, since this is being used for the NFS uid mapper, we need more than that. The new implementation gives us effectively unlimited capacity. With some alterations, the keyutils testsuite runs successfully to completion after this patch is applied. The alterations are because (a) keyrings that are simply added to no longer appear ordered and (b) some of the errors have changed a bit. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2012-10-08KEYS: Asymmetric key pluggable data parsersDavid Howells1-0/+37
The instantiation data passed to the asymmetric key type are expected to be formatted in some way, and there are several possible standard ways to format the data. The two obvious standards are OpenPGP keys and X.509 certificates. The latter is especially useful when dealing with UEFI, and the former might be useful when dealing with, say, eCryptfs. Further, it might be desirable to provide formatted blobs that indicate hardware is to be accessed to retrieve the keys or that the keys live unretrievably in a hardware store, but that the keys can be used by means of the hardware. From userspace, the keys can be loaded using the keyctl command, for example, an X.509 binary certificate: keyctl padd asymmetric foo @s <dhowells.pem or a PGP key: keyctl padd asymmetric bar @s <dhowells.pub or a pointer into the contents of the TPM: keyctl add asymmetric zebra "TPM:04982390582905f8" @s Inside the kernel, pluggable parsers register themselves and then get to examine the payload data to see if they can handle it. If they can, they get to: (1) Propose a name for the key, to be used it the name is "" or NULL. (2) Specify the key subtype. (3) Provide the data for the subtype. The key type asks the parser to do its stuff before a key is allocated and thus before the name is set. If successful, the parser stores the suggested data into the key_preparsed_payload struct, which will be either used (if the key is successfully created and instantiated or updated) or discarded. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
2012-10-08KEYS: Implement asymmetric key typeDavid Howells2-0/+80
Create a key type that can be used to represent an asymmetric key type for use in appropriate cryptographic operations, such as encryption, decryption, signature generation and signature verification. The key type is "asymmetric" and can provide access to a variety of cryptographic algorithms. Possibly, this would be better as "public_key" - but that has the disadvantage that "public key" is an overloaded term. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
2012-10-08KEYS: Add payload preparsing opportunity prior to key instantiate or updateDavid Howells1-2/+4
Give the key type the opportunity to preparse the payload prior to the instantiation and update routines being called. This is done with the provision of two new key type operations: int (*preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); void (*free_preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); If the first operation is present, then it is called before key creation (in the add/update case) or before the key semaphore is taken (in the update and instantiate cases). The second operation is called to clean up if the first was called. preparse() is given the opportunity to fill in the following structure: struct key_preparsed_payload { char *description; void *type_data[2]; void *payload; const void *data; size_t datalen; size_t quotalen; }; Before the preparser is called, the first three fields will have been cleared, the payload pointer and size will be stored in data and datalen and the default quota size from the key_type struct will be stored into quotalen. The preparser may parse the payload in any way it likes and may store data in the type_data[] and payload fields for use by the instantiate() and update() ops. The preparser may also propose a description for the key by attaching it as a string to the description field. This can be used by passing a NULL or "" description to the add_key() system call or the key_create_or_update() function. This cannot work with request_key() as that required the description to tell the upcall about the key to be created. This, for example permits keys that store PGP public keys to generate their own name from the user ID and public key fingerprint in the key. The instantiate() and update() operations are then modified to look like this: int (*instantiate)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); int (*update)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); and the new payload data is passed in *prep, whether or not it was preparsed. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
2012-05-11KEYS: Permit in-place link replacement in keyring listDavid Howells1-1/+1
Make use of the previous patch that makes the garbage collector perform RCU synchronisation before destroying defunct keys. Key pointers can now be replaced in-place without creating a new keyring payload and replacing the whole thing as the discarded keys will not be destroyed until all currently held RCU read locks are released. If the keyring payload space needs to be expanded or contracted, then a replacement will still need allocating, and the original will still have to be freed by RCU. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2012-01-18keys: add a "logon" key typeJeff Layton1-1/+2
For CIFS, we want to be able to store NTLM credentials (aka username and password) in the keyring. We do not, however want to allow users to fetch those keys back out of the keyring since that would be a security risk. Unfortunately, due to the nuances of key permission bits, it's not possible to do this. We need to grant search permissions so the kernel can find these keys, but that also implies permissions to read the payload. Resolve this by adding a new key_type. This key type is essentially the same as key_type_user, but does not define a .read op. This prevents the payload from ever being visible from userspace. This key type also vets the description to ensure that it's "qualified" by checking to ensure that it has a ':' in it that is preceded by other characters. Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
2011-06-27encrypted-keys: add key format supportRoberto Sassu1-2/+11
This patch introduces a new parameter, called 'format', that defines the format of data stored by encrypted keys. The 'default' format identifies encrypted keys containing only the symmetric key, while other formats can be defined to support additional information. The 'format' parameter is written in the datablob produced by commands 'keyctl print' or 'keyctl pipe' and is integrity protected by the HMAC. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Acked-by: Gianluca Ramunno <ramunno@polito.it> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2011-03-29libceph: Create a new key type "ceph".Tommi Virtanen1-0/+8
This allows us to use existence of the key type as a feature test, from userspace. Signed-off-by: Tommi Virtanen <tommi.virtanen@dreamhost.com> Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@newdream.net>
2011-03-03RxRPC: Fix v1 keysAnton Blanchard1-1/+0
commit 339412841d7 (RxRPC: Allow key payloads to be passed in XDR form) broke klog for me. I notice the v1 key struct had a kif_version field added: -struct rxkad_key { - u16 security_index; /* RxRPC header security index */ - u16 ticket_len; /* length of ticket[] */ - u32 expiry; /* time at which expires */ - u32 kvno; /* key version number */ - u8 session_key[8]; /* DES session key */ - u8 ticket[0]; /* the encrypted ticket */ -}; +struct rxrpc_key_data_v1 { + u32 kif_version; /* 1 */ + u16 security_index; + u16 ticket_length; + u32 expiry; /* time_t */ + u32 kvno; + u8 session_key[8]; + u8 ticket[0]; +}; However the code in rxrpc_instantiate strips it away: data += sizeof(kver); datalen -= sizeof(kver); Removing kif_version fixes my problem. Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2010-11-29keys: add new key-type encryptedMimi Zohar1-0/+29
Define a new kernel key-type called 'encrypted'. Encrypted keys are kernel generated random numbers, which are encrypted/decrypted with a 'trusted' symmetric key. Encrypted keys are created/encrypted/decrypted in the kernel. Userspace only ever sees/stores encrypted blobs. Changelog: - bug fix: replaced master-key rcu based locking with semaphore (reported by David Howells) - Removed memset of crypto_shash_digest() digest output - Replaced verification of 'key-type:key-desc' using strcspn(), with one based on string constants. - Moved documentation to Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt - Replace hash with shash (based on comments by David Howells) - Make lengths/counts size_t where possible (based on comments by David Howells) Could not convert most lengths, as crypto expects 'unsigned int' (size_t: on 32 bit is defined as unsigned int, but on 64 bit is unsigned long) - Add 'const' where possible (based on comments by David Howells) - allocate derived_buf dynamically to support arbitrary length master key (fixed by Roberto Sassu) - wait until late_initcall for crypto libraries to be registered - cleanup security/Kconfig - Add missing 'update' keyword (reported/fixed by Roberto Sassu) - Free epayload on failure to create key (reported/fixed by Roberto Sassu) - Increase the data size limit (requested by Roberto Sassu) - Crypto return codes are always 0 on success and negative on failure, remove unnecessary tests. - Replaced kzalloc() with kmalloc() Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-11-29keys: add new trusted key-typeMimi Zohar1-0/+31
Define a new kernel key-type called 'trusted'. Trusted keys are random number symmetric keys, generated and RSA-sealed by the TPM. The TPM only unseals the keys, if the boot PCRs and other criteria match. Userspace can only ever see encrypted blobs. Based on suggestions by Jason Gunthorpe, several new options have been added to support additional usages. The new options are: migratable= designates that the key may/may not ever be updated (resealed under a new key, new pcrinfo or new auth.) pcrlock=n extends the designated PCR 'n' with a random value, so that a key sealed to that PCR may not be unsealed again until after a reboot. keyhandle= specifies the sealing/unsealing key handle. keyauth= specifies the sealing/unsealing key auth. blobauth= specifies the sealed data auth. Implementation of a kernel reserved locality for trusted keys will be investigated for a possible future extension. Changelog: - Updated and added examples to Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt - Moved generic TPM constants to include/linux/tpm_command.h (David Howell's suggestion.) - trusted_defined.c: replaced kzalloc with kmalloc, added pcrlock failure error handling, added const qualifiers where appropriate. - moved to late_initcall - updated from hash to shash (suggestion by David Howells) - reduced worst stack usage (tpm_seal) from 530 to 312 bytes - moved documentation to Documentation directory (suggestion by David Howells) - all the other code cleanups suggested by David Howells - Add pcrlock CAP_SYS_ADMIN dependency (based on comment by Jason Gunthorpe) - New options: migratable, pcrlock, keyhandle, keyauth, blobauth (based on discussions with Jason Gunthorpe) - Free payload on failure to create key(reported/fixed by Roberto Sassu) - Updated Kconfig and other descriptions (based on Serge Hallyn's suggestion) - Replaced kzalloc() with kmalloc() (reported by Serge Hallyn) Signed-off-by: David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2010-08-05DNS: Separate out CIFS DNS Resolver codeWang Lei1-0/+23
Separate out the DNS resolver key type from the CIFS filesystem into its own module so that it can be made available for general use, including the AFS filesystem module. This facility makes it possible for the kernel to upcall to userspace to have it issue DNS requests, package up the replies and present them to the kernel in a useful form. The kernel is then able to cache the DNS replies as keys can be retained in keyrings. Resolver keys are of type "dns_resolver" and have a case-insensitive description that is of the form "[<type>:]<domain_name>". The optional <type> indicates the particular DNS lookup and packaging that's required. The <domain_name> is the query to be made. If <type> isn't given, a basic hostname to IP address lookup is made, and the result is stored in the key in the form of a printable string consisting of a comma-separated list of IPv4 and IPv6 addresses. This key type is supported by userspace helpers driven from /sbin/request-key and configured through /etc/request-key.conf. The cifs.upcall utility is invoked for UNC path server name to IP address resolution. The CIFS functionality is encapsulated by the dns_resolve_unc_to_ip() function, which is used to resolve a UNC path to an IP address for CIFS filesystem. This part remains in the CIFS module for now. See the added Documentation/networking/dns_resolver.txt for more information. Signed-off-by: Wang Lei <wang840925@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2009-09-16RxRPC: Use uX/sX rather than uintX_t/intX_t typesDavid Howells1-10/+10
Use uX rather than uintX_t types for consistency. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2009-09-15RxRPC: Parse security index 5 keys (Kerberos 5)David Howells1-0/+52
Parse RxRPC security index 5 type keys (Kerberos 5 tokens). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2009-09-15RxRPC: Allow key payloads to be passed in XDR formDavid Howells1-0/+55
Allow add_key() and KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE to accept key payloads in XDR form as described by openafs-1.4.10/src/auth/afs_token.xg. This provides a way of passing kaserver, Kerberos 4, Kerberos 5 and GSSAPI keys from userspace, and allows for future expansion. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2008-11-14KEYS: Disperse linux/key_ui.hDavid Howells1-0/+31
Disperse the bits of linux/key_ui.h as the reason they were put here (keyfs) didn't get in. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>