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2019-06-26Allow 0.0.0.0/8 as a valid address rangeDave Taht1-1/+1
The longstanding prohibition against using 0.0.0.0/8 dates back to two issues with the early internet. There was an interoperability problem with BSD 4.2 in 1984, fixed in BSD 4.3 in 1986. BSD 4.2 has long since been retired. Secondly, addresses of the form 0.x.y.z were initially defined only as a source address in an ICMP datagram, indicating "node number x.y.z on this IPv4 network", by nodes that know their address on their local network, but do not yet know their network prefix, in RFC0792 (page 19). This usage of 0.x.y.z was later repealed in RFC1122 (section 3.2.2.7), because the original ICMP-based mechanism for learning the network prefix was unworkable on many networks such as Ethernet (which have longer addresses that would not fit into the 24 "node number" bits). Modern networks use reverse ARP (RFC0903) or BOOTP (RFC0951) or DHCP (RFC2131) to find their full 32-bit address and CIDR netmask (and other parameters such as default gateways). 0.x.y.z has had 16,777,215 addresses in 0.0.0.0/8 space left unused and reserved for future use, since 1989. This patch allows for these 16m new IPv4 addresses to appear within a box or on the wire. Layer 2 switches don't care. 0.0.0.0/32 is still prohibited, of course. Signed-off-by: Dave Taht <dave.taht@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: John Gilmore <gnu@toad.com> Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-05-30treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 152Thomas Gleixner1-5/+1
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at your option any later version extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-or-later has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 3029 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070032.746973796@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-01-23bridge: Snoop Multicast Router AdvertisementsLinus Lüssing1-0/+5
When multiple multicast routers are present in a broadcast domain then only one of them will be detectable via IGMP/MLD query snooping. The multicast router with the lowest IP address will become the selected and active querier while all other multicast routers will then refrain from sending queries. To detect such rather silent multicast routers, too, RFC4286 ("Multicast Router Discovery") provides a standardized protocol to detect multicast routers for multicast snooping switches. This patch implements the necessary MRD Advertisement message parsing and after successful processing adds such routers to the internal multicast router list. Signed-off-by: Linus Lüssing <linus.luessing@c0d3.blue> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-10-13UAPI: (Scripted) Disintegrate include/linuxDavid Howells1-234/+1
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
2012-02-09ipv4: Implement IP_UNICAST_IF socket option.Erich E. Hoover1-0/+1
The IP_UNICAST_IF feature is needed by the Wine project. This patch implements the feature by setting the outgoing interface in a similar fashion to that of IP_MULTICAST_IF. A separate option is needed to handle this feature since the existing options do not provide all of the characteristics required by IP_UNICAST_IF, a summary is provided below. SO_BINDTODEVICE: * SO_BINDTODEVICE requires administrative privileges, IP_UNICAST_IF does not. From reading some old mailing list articles my understanding is that SO_BINDTODEVICE requires administrative privileges because it can override the administrator's routing settings. * The SO_BINDTODEVICE option restricts both outbound and inbound traffic, IP_UNICAST_IF only impacts outbound traffic. IP_PKTINFO: * Since IP_PKTINFO and IP_UNICAST_IF are independent options, implementing IP_UNICAST_IF with IP_PKTINFO will likely break some applications. * Implementing IP_UNICAST_IF on top of IP_PKTINFO significantly complicates the Wine codebase and reduces the socket performance (doing this requires a lot of extra communication between the "server" and "user" layers). bind(): * bind() does not work on broadcast packets, IP_UNICAST_IF is specifically intended to work with broadcast packets. * Like SO_BINDTODEVICE, bind() restricts both outbound and inbound traffic. Signed-off-by: Erich E. Hoover <ehoover@mines.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-08-26headers, net: Use __kernel_sa_family_t in more definitions shared with userlandBen Hutchings1-1/+1
Complete the work started with commit 6602a4baf4d1a73cc4685a39ef859e1c5ddf654c ('net: Make userland include of netlink.h more sane'). Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2010-08-20net: introduce proto_ports_offset()Changli Gao1-0/+19
Introduce proto_ports_offset() for getting the position of the ports or SPI in the message of a protocol. Signed-off-by: Changli Gao <xiaosuo@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2010-06-24net - IP_NODEFRAG option for IPv4 socketJiri Olsa1-0/+1
this patch is implementing IP_NODEFRAG option for IPv4 socket. The reason is, there's no other way to send out the packet with user customized header of the reassembly part. Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2010-01-12tcp: Generalized TTL Security MechanismStephen Hemminger1-0/+2
This patch adds the kernel portions needed to implement RFC 5082 Generalized TTL Security Mechanism (GTSM). It is a lightweight security measure against forged packets causing DoS attacks (for BGP). This is already implemented the same way in BSD kernels. For the necessary Quagga patch http://www.gossamer-threads.com/lists/quagga/dev/17389 Description from Cisco http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios/12_3t/12_3t7/feature/guide/gt_btsh.html It does add one byte to each socket structure, but I did a little rearrangement to reuse a hole (on 64 bit), but it does grow the structure on 32 bit This should be documented on ip(4) man page and the Glibc in.h file also needs update. IPV6_MINHOPLIMIT should also be added (although BSD doesn't support that). Only TCP is supported, but could also be added to UDP, DCCP, SCTP if desired. Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2009-11-04net: cleanup include/linuxEric Dumazet1-12/+6
This cleanup patch puts struct/union/enum opening braces, in first line to ease grep games. struct something { becomes : struct something { Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2009-06-02ipv4: New multicast-all socket optionNivedita Singhvi1-0/+1
After some discussion offline with Christoph Lameter and David Stevens regarding multicast behaviour in Linux, I'm submitting a slightly modified patch from the one Christoph submitted earlier. This patch provides a new socket option IP_MULTICAST_ALL. In this case, default behaviour is _unchanged_ from the current Linux standard. The socket option is set by default to provide original behaviour. Sockets wishing to receive data only from multicast groups they join explicitly will need to clear this socket option. Signed-off-by: Nivedita Singhvi <niv@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter<cl@linux.com> Acked-by: David Stevens <dlstevens@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2008-11-17TPROXY: implemented IP_RECVORIGDSTADDR socket optionBalazs Scheidler1-0/+4
In case UDP traffic is redirected to a local UDP socket, the originally addressed destination address/port cannot be recovered with the in-kernel tproxy. This patch adds an IP_RECVORIGDSTADDR sockopt that enables a IP_ORIGDSTADDR ancillary message in recvmsg(). This ancillary message contains the original destination address/port of the packet being received. Signed-off-by: Balazs Scheidler <bazsi@balabit.hu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2008-10-01ipv4: Implement IP_TRANSPARENT socket optionKOVACS Krisztian1-0/+1
This patch introduces the IP_TRANSPARENT socket option: enabling that will make the IPv4 routing omit the non-local source address check on output. Setting IP_TRANSPARENT requires NET_ADMIN capability. Signed-off-by: KOVACS Krisztian <hidden@sch.bme.hu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2008-03-18[IPV4]: ipv4_is_lbcast() misannotationsAl Viro1-1/+1
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2008-01-29[IPV4]: Enable use of 240/4 address space.Jan Engelhardt1-2/+3
This short patch modifies the IPv4 networking to enable use of the 240.0.0.0/4 (aka "class-E") address space as propsed in the internet draft draft-fuller-240space-00.txt. Signed-off-by: Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@computergmbh.de> Acked-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2008-01-29[IPV4]: Remove unused IPV4TYPE macrosJoe Perches1-14/+0
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2008-01-29[IPV4]: Create ipv4_is_<type>(__be32 addr) functionsJoe Perches1-13/+74
Change IPV4 specific macros LOOPBACK MULTICAST LOCAL_MCAST BADCLASS and ZERONET macros to inline functions ipv4_is_<type>(__be32 addr) Adds type safety and arguably some readability. Changes since last submission: Removed ipv4_addr_octets function Used hex constants Converted recently added rfc3330 macros Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2008-01-29[IPV6]: Add RFC4214 supportFred L. Templin1-0/+8
This patch includes support for the Intra-Site Automatic Tunnel Addressing Protocol (ISATAP) per RFC4214. It uses the SIT module, and is configured using extensions to the "iproute2" utility. The diffs are specific to the Linux 2.6.24-rc2 kernel distribution. This version includes the diff for ./include/linux/if.h which was missing in the v2.4 submission and is needed to make the patch compile. The patch has been installed, compiled and tested in a clean 2.6.24-rc2 kernel build area. Signed-off-by: Fred L. Templin <fred.l.templin@boeing.com> Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-04-26[INET]: Add IP(V6)_PMTUDISC_RPOBEJohn Heffner1-0/+1
Add IP(V6)_PMTUDISC_PROBE value for IP(V6)_MTU_DISCOVER. This option forces us not to fragment, but does not make use of the kernel path MTU discovery. That is, it allows for user-mode MTU probing (or, packetization-layer path MTU discovery). This is particularly useful for diagnostic utilities, like traceroute/tracepath. Signed-off-by: John Heffner <jheffner@psc.edu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-12-03[NET]: Supporting UDP-Lite (RFC 3828) in LinuxGerrit Renker1-0/+1
This is a revision of the previously submitted patch, which alters the way files are organized and compiled in the following manner: * UDP and UDP-Lite now use separate object files * source file dependencies resolved via header files net/ipv{4,6}/udp_impl.h * order of inclusion files in udp.c/udplite.c adapted accordingly [NET/IPv4]: Support for the UDP-Lite protocol (RFC 3828) This patch adds support for UDP-Lite to the IPv4 stack, provided as an extension to the existing UDPv4 code: * generic routines are all located in net/ipv4/udp.c * UDP-Lite specific routines are in net/ipv4/udplite.c * MIB/statistics support in /proc/net/snmp and /proc/net/udplite * shared API with extensions for partial checksum coverage [NET/IPv6]: Extension for UDP-Lite over IPv6 It extends the existing UDPv6 code base with support for UDP-Lite in the same manner as per UDPv4. In particular, * UDPv6 generic and shared code is in net/ipv6/udp.c * UDP-Litev6 specific extensions are in net/ipv6/udplite.c * MIB/statistics support in /proc/net/snmp6 and /proc/net/udplite6 * support for IPV6_ADDRFORM * aligned the coding style of protocol initialisation with af_inet6.c * made the error handling in udpv6_queue_rcv_skb consistent; to return `-1' on error on all error cases * consolidation of shared code [NET]: UDP-Lite Documentation and basic XFRM/Netfilter support The UDP-Lite patch further provides * API documentation for UDP-Lite * basic xfrm support * basic netfilter support for IPv4 and IPv6 (LOG target) Signed-off-by: Gerrit Renker <gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-10-04[XFRM]: BEET modeDiego Beltrami1-0/+1
This patch introduces the BEET mode (Bound End-to-End Tunnel) with as specified by the ietf draft at the following link: http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-nikander-esp-beet-mode-06.txt The patch provides only single family support (i.e. inner family = outer family). Signed-off-by: Diego Beltrami <diego.beltrami@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Miika Komu <miika@iki.fi> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Abhinav Pathak <abhinav.pathak@hiit.fi> Signed-off-by: Jeff Ahrenholz <ahrenholz@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-09-29[IPV4]: annotate ipv4 address fields in struct ip_msfilter and struct ↵Al Viro1-6/+6
ip_mreq_source Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-09-23[IPV4]: Make struct sockaddr_in::sin_port __be16Alexey Dobriyan1-1/+1
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-09-23[IPV4]: Make struct in_addr::s_addr __be32Alexey Dobriyan1-1/+1
There will be relatively small increase in sparse endian warnings, but this (and sin_port) patch is a first step to make networking code endian clean. Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-03-21[SECURITY]: TCP/UDP getpeersecCatherine Zhang1-0/+1
This patch implements an application of the LSM-IPSec networking controls whereby an application can determine the label of the security association its TCP or UDP sockets are currently connected to via getsockopt and the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Patch purpose: This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the security context of an IPSec security association a particular TCP or UDP socket is using. The application can then use this security context to determine the security context for processing on behalf of the peer at the other end of this connection. In the case of UDP, the security context is for each individual packet. An example application is the inetd daemon, which could be modified to start daemons running at security contexts dependent on the remote client. Patch design approach: - Design for TCP The patch enables the SELinux LSM to set the peer security context for a socket based on the security context of the IPSec security association. The application may retrieve this context using getsockopt. When called, the kernel determines if the socket is a connected (TCP_ESTABLISHED) TCP socket and, if so, uses the dst_entry cache on the socket to retrieve the security associations. If a security association has a security context, the context string is returned, as for UNIX domain sockets. - Design for UDP Unlike TCP, UDP is connectionless. This requires a somewhat different API to retrieve the peer security context. With TCP, the peer security context stays the same throughout the connection, thus it can be retrieved at any time between when the connection is established and when it is torn down. With UDP, each read/write can have different peer and thus the security context might change every time. As a result the security context retrieval must be done TOGETHER with the packet retrieval. The solution is to build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for retrieving user credentials. Linux offers the API for obtaining user credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages that are bundled together with a normal message). Patch implementation details: - Implementation for TCP The security context can be retrieved by applications using getsockopt with the existing SO_PEERSEC flag. As an example (ignoring error checking): getsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERSEC, optbuf, &optlen); printf("Socket peer context is: %s\n", optbuf); The SELinux function, selinux_socket_getpeersec, is extended to check for labeled security associations for connected (TCP_ESTABLISHED == sk->sk_state) TCP sockets only. If so, the socket has a dst_cache of struct dst_entry values that may refer to security associations. If these have security associations with security contexts, the security context is returned. getsockopt returns a buffer that contains a security context string or the buffer is unmodified. - Implementation for UDP To retrieve the security context, the application first indicates to the kernel such desire by setting the IP_PASSSEC option via getsockopt. Then the application retrieves the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism. An example server application for UDP should look like this: toggle = 1; toggle_len = sizeof(toggle); setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_IP, IP_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len); recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0); if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) { cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr); if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_IP && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) { memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext)); } } ip_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option IP_PASSSEC to allow a server socket to receive security context of the peer. A new ancillary message type SCM_SECURITY. When the packet is received we get the security context from the sec_path pointer which is contained in the sk_buff, and copy it to the ancillary message space. An additional LSM hook, selinux_socket_getpeersec_udp, is defined to retrieve the security context from the SELinux space. The existing function, selinux_socket_getpeersec does not suit our purpose, because the security context is copied directly to user space, rather than to kernel space. Testing: We have tested the patch by setting up TCP and UDP connections between applications on two machines using the IPSec policies that result in labeled security associations being built. For TCP, we can then extract the peer security context using getsockopt on either end. For UDP, the receiving end can retrieve the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-08-30[DCCP]: Initial implementationArnaldo Carvalho de Melo1-0/+1
Development to this point was done on a subversion repository at: http://oops.ghostprotocols.net:81/cgi-bin/viewcvs.cgi/dccp-2.6/ This repository will be kept at this site for the foreseable future, so that interested parties can see the history of this code, attributions, etc. If I ever decide to take this offline I'll provide the full history at some other suitable place. Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-04-17Linux-2.6.12-rc2Linus Torvalds1-0/+253
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!