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path: root/include/linux/securebits.h
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2009-10-30define convenient securebits masks for prctl users (v2)Serge E. Hallyn1-6/+18
Hi James, would you mind taking the following into security-testing? The securebits are used by passing them to prctl with the PR_{S,G}ET_SECUREBITS commands. But the defines must be shifted to be used in prctl, which begs to be confused and misused by userspace. So define some more convenient values for userspace to specify. This way userspace does prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, SECBIT_NOROOT); instead of prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, 1 << SECURE_NOROOT); (Thanks to Michael for the idea) This patch also adds include/linux/securebits to the installed headers. Then perhaps it can be included by glibc's sys/prctl.h. Changelog: Oct 29: Stephen Rothwell points out that issecure can be under __KERNEL__. Oct 14: (Suggestions by Michael Kerrisk): 1. spell out SETUID in SECBIT_NO_SETUID* 2. SECBIT_X_LOCKED does not imply SECBIT_X 3. add definitions for keepcaps Oct 14: As suggested by Michael Kerrisk, don't use SB_* as that convention is already in use. Use SECBIT_ prefix instead. Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14CRED: Wrap current->cred and a few other accessorsDavid Howells1-1/+1
Wrap current->cred and a few other accessors to hide their actual implementation. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14CRED: Separate task security context from task_structDavid Howells1-1/+1
Separate the task security context from task_struct. At this point, the security data is temporarily embedded in the task_struct with two pointers pointing to it. Note that the Alpha arch is altered as it refers to (E)UID and (E)GID in entry.S via asm-offsets. With comment fixes Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-07-04security: filesystem capabilities: fix fragile setuid fixup codeAndrew G. Morgan1-7/+8
This commit includes a bugfix for the fragile setuid fixup code in the case that filesystem capabilities are supported (in access()). The effect of this fix is gated on filesystem capability support because changing securebits is only supported when filesystem capabilities support is configured.) [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-28capabilities: implement per-process securebitsAndrew G. Morgan1-7/+18
Filesystem capability support makes it possible to do away with (set)uid-0 based privilege and use capabilities instead. That is, with filesystem support for capabilities but without this present patch, it is (conceptually) possible to manage a system with capabilities alone and never need to obtain privilege via (set)uid-0. Of course, conceptually isn't quite the same as currently possible since few user applications, certainly not enough to run a viable system, are currently prepared to leverage capabilities to exercise privilege. Further, many applications exist that may never get upgraded in this way, and the kernel will continue to want to support their setuid-0 base privilege needs. Where pure-capability applications evolve and replace setuid-0 binaries, it is desirable that there be a mechanisms by which they can contain their privilege. In addition to leveraging the per-process bounding and inheritable sets, this should include suppressing the privilege of the uid-0 superuser from the process' tree of children. The feature added by this patch can be leveraged to suppress the privilege associated with (set)uid-0. This suppression requires CAP_SETPCAP to initiate, and only immediately affects the 'current' process (it is inherited through fork()/exec()). This reimplementation differs significantly from the historical support for securebits which was system-wide, unwieldy and which has ultimately withered to a dead relic in the source of the modern kernel. With this patch applied a process, that is capable(CAP_SETPCAP), can now drop all legacy privilege (through uid=0) for itself and all subsequently fork()'d/exec()'d children with: prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, 0x2f); This patch represents a no-op unless CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES is enabled at configure time. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix uninitialised var warning] [serue@us.ibm.com: capabilities: use cap_task_prctl when !CONFIG_SECURITY] Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2005-04-17Linux-2.6.12-rc2Linus Torvalds1-0/+30
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!