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2017-05-09proc/sysctl: fix the int overflow for jiffies conversionGao Feng1-1/+1
do_proc_dointvec_jiffies_conv() uses LONG_MAX/HZ as the max value to avoid overflow. But actually the *valp is int type, so it still causes overflow. For example, echo 2147483647 > ./sys/net/ipv4/tcp_keepalive_time Then, cat ./sys/net/ipv4/tcp_keepalive_time The output is "-1", it is not expected. Now use INT_MAX/HZ as the max value instead LONG_MAX/HZ to fix it. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1490109532-9228-1-git-send-email-fgao@ikuai8.com Signed-off-by: Gao Feng <fgao@ikuai8.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-05-02Merge branch 'timers-core-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-0/+2
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull timer updates from Thomas Gleixner: "The timer departement delivers: - more year 2038 rework - a massive rework of the arm achitected timer - preparatory patches to allow NTP correction of clock event devices to avoid early expiry - the usual pile of fixes and enhancements all over the place" * 'timers-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (91 commits) timer/sysclt: Restrict timer migration sysctl values to 0 and 1 arm64/arch_timer: Mark errata handlers as __maybe_unused Clocksource/mips-gic: Remove redundant non devicetree init MIPS/Malta: Probe gic-timer via devicetree clocksource: Use GENMASK_ULL in definition of CLOCKSOURCE_MASK acpi/arm64: Add SBSA Generic Watchdog support in GTDT driver clocksource: arm_arch_timer: add GTDT support for memory-mapped timer acpi/arm64: Add memory-mapped timer support in GTDT driver clocksource: arm_arch_timer: simplify ACPI support code. acpi/arm64: Add GTDT table parse driver clocksource: arm_arch_timer: split MMIO timer probing. clocksource: arm_arch_timer: add structs to describe MMIO timer clocksource: arm_arch_timer: move arch_timer_needs_of_probing into DT init call clocksource: arm_arch_timer: refactor arch_timer_needs_probing clocksource: arm_arch_timer: split dt-only rate handling x86/uv/time: Set ->min_delta_ticks and ->max_delta_ticks unicore32/time: Set ->min_delta_ticks and ->max_delta_ticks um/time: Set ->min_delta_ticks and ->max_delta_ticks tile/time: Set ->min_delta_ticks and ->max_delta_ticks score/time: Set ->min_delta_ticks and ->max_delta_ticks ...
2017-04-20timer/sysclt: Restrict timer migration sysctl values to 0 and 1Myungho Jung1-0/+2
timer_migration sysctl acts as a boolean switch, so the allowed values should be restricted to 0 and 1. Add the necessary extra fields to the sysctl table entry to enforce that. [ tglx: Rewrote changelog ] Signed-off-by: Myungho Jung <mhjungk@gmail.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1492640690-3550-1-git-send-email-mhjungk@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2017-04-08sysctl: report EINVAL if value is larger than UINT_MAX for proc_douintvecLiping Zhang1-0/+2
Currently, inputting the following command will succeed but actually the value will be truncated: # echo 0x12ffffffff > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_notsent_lowat This is not friendly to the user, so instead, we should report error when the value is larger than UINT_MAX. Fixes: e7d316a02f68 ("sysctl: handle error writing UINT_MAX to u32 fields") Signed-off-by: Liping Zhang <zlpnobody@gmail.com> Cc: Subash Abhinov Kasiviswanathan <subashab@codeaurora.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-04-07sysctl: don't print negative flag for proc_douintvecLiping Zhang1-0/+1
I saw some very confusing sysctl output on my system: # cat /proc/sys/net/core/xfrm_aevent_rseqth -2 # cat /proc/sys/net/core/xfrm_aevent_etime -10 # cat /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_notsent_lowat -4294967295 Because we forget to set the *negp flag in proc_douintvec, so it will become a garbage value. Since the value related to proc_douintvec is always an unsigned integer, so we can set *negp to false explictily to fix this issue. Fixes: e7d316a02f68 ("sysctl: handle error writing UINT_MAX to u32 fields") Signed-off-by: Liping Zhang <zlpnobody@gmail.com> Cc: Subash Abhinov Kasiviswanathan <subashab@codeaurora.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-03-02sched/headers: Prepare for new header dependencies before moving code to ↵Ingo Molnar1-0/+1
<linux/sched/coredump.h> We are going to split <linux/sched/coredump.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files. Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/coredump.h> file that just maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and bisectable. Include the new header in the files that are going to need it. Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-02-01sched/rt: Show the 'sched_rr_timeslice' SCHED_RR timeslice tuning knob in ↵Shile Zhang1-1/+1
milliseconds We added the 'sched_rr_timeslice_ms' SCHED_RR tuning knob in this commit: ce0dbbbb30ae ("sched/rt: Add a tuning knob to allow changing SCHED_RR timeslice") ... which name suggests to users that it's in milliseconds, while in reality it's being set in milliseconds but the result is shown in jiffies. This is obviously confusing when HZ is not 1000, it makes it appear like the value set failed, such as HZ=100: root# echo 100 > /proc/sys/kernel/sched_rr_timeslice_ms root# cat /proc/sys/kernel/sched_rr_timeslice_ms 10 Fix this to be milliseconds all around. Signed-off-by: Shile Zhang <shile.zhang@nokia.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1485612049-20923-1-git-send-email-shile.zhang@nokia.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-01-26sysctl: fix proc_doulongvec_ms_jiffies_minmax()Eric Dumazet1-0/+1
We perform the conversion between kernel jiffies and ms only when exporting kernel value to user space. We need to do the opposite operation when value is written by user. Only matters when HZ != 1000 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-12-24Replace <asm/uaccess.h> with <linux/uaccess.h> globallyLinus Torvalds1-1/+1
This was entirely automated, using the script by Al: PATT='^[[:blank:]]*#[[:blank:]]*include[[:blank:]]*<asm/uaccess.h>' sed -i -e "s!$PATT!#include <linux/uaccess.h>!" \ $(git grep -l "$PATT"|grep -v ^include/linux/uaccess.h) to do the replacement at the end of the merge window. Requested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-12-16Merge tag 'trace-v4.10' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-1/+1
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace Pull tracing updates from Steven Rostedt: "This release has a few updates: - STM can hook into the function tracer - Function filtering now supports more advance glob matching - Ftrace selftests updates and added tests - Softirq tag in traces now show only softirqs - ARM nop added to non traced locations at compile time - New trace_marker_raw file that allows for binary input - Optimizations to the ring buffer - Removal of kmap in trace_marker - Wakeup and irqsoff tracers now adhere to the set_graph_notrace file - Other various fixes and clean ups" * tag 'trace-v4.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace: (42 commits) selftests: ftrace: Shift down default message verbosity kprobes/trace: Fix kprobe selftest for newer gcc tracing/kprobes: Add a helper method to return number of probe hits tracing/rb: Init the CPU mask on allocation tracing: Use SOFTIRQ_OFFSET for softirq dectection for more accurate results tracing/fgraph: Have wakeup and irqsoff tracers ignore graph functions too fgraph: Handle a case where a tracer ignores set_graph_notrace tracing: Replace kmap with copy_from_user() in trace_marker writing ftrace/x86_32: Set ftrace_stub to weak to prevent gcc from using short jumps to it tracing: Allow benchmark to be enabled at early_initcall() tracing: Have system enable return error if one of the events fail tracing: Do not start benchmark on boot up tracing: Have the reg function allow to fail ring-buffer: Force rb_end_commit() and rb_set_commit_to_write() inline ring-buffer: Froce rb_update_write_stamp() to be inlined ring-buffer: Force inline of hotpath helper functions tracing: Make __buffer_unlock_commit() always_inline tracing: Make tracepoint_printk a static_key ring-buffer: Always inline rb_event_data() ring-buffer: Make rb_reserve_next_event() always inlined ...
2016-12-15coredump: clarify "unsafe core_pattern" warningAlexey Dobriyan1-3/+5
I was amused to find "unsafe core_pattern" warning having these lines in /etc/sysctl.conf: fs.suid_dumpable=2 kernel.core_pattern=/core/core-%e-%p-%E kernel.core_uses_pid=0 Turns out kernel is formally right. Default core_pattern is just "core", which doesn't qualify for secure path while setting suid.dumpable. Hint admins about solution, clarify sysctl names, delete unnecessary '\' characters (string literals are concatenated regardless) and reformat for easier grepping. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161029152124.GA1258@avx2 Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-12-13Merge branch 'x86-asm-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-7/+0
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 asm updates from Ingo Molnar: "The main changes in this development cycle were: - a large number of call stack dumping/printing improvements: higher robustness, better cross-context dumping, improved output, etc. (Josh Poimboeuf) - vDSO getcpu() performance improvement for future Intel CPUs with the RDPID instruction (Andy Lutomirski) - add two new Intel AVX512 features and the CPUID support infrastructure for it: AVX512IFMA and AVX512VBMI. (Gayatri Kammela, He Chen) - more copy-user unification (Borislav Petkov) - entry code assembly macro simplifications (Alexander Kuleshov) - vDSO C/R support improvements (Dmitry Safonov) - misc fixes and cleanups (Borislav Petkov, Paul Bolle)" * 'x86-asm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (40 commits) scripts/decode_stacktrace.sh: Fix address line detection on x86 x86/boot/64: Use defines for page size x86/dumpstack: Make stack name tags more comprehensible selftests/x86: Add test_vdso to test getcpu() x86/vdso: Use RDPID in preference to LSL when available x86/dumpstack: Handle NULL stack pointer in show_trace_log_lvl() x86/cpufeatures: Enable new AVX512 cpu features x86/cpuid: Provide get_scattered_cpuid_leaf() x86/cpuid: Cleanup cpuid_regs definitions x86/copy_user: Unify the code by removing the 64-bit asm _copy_*_user() variants x86/unwind: Ensure stack grows down x86/vdso: Set vDSO pointer only after success x86/prctl/uapi: Remove #ifdef for CHECKPOINT_RESTORE x86/unwind: Detect bad stack return address x86/dumpstack: Warn on stack recursion x86/unwind: Warn on bad frame pointer x86/decoder: Use stderr if insn sanity test fails x86/decoder: Use stdout if insn decoder test is successful mm/page_alloc: Remove kernel address exposure in free_reserved_area() x86/dumpstack: Remove raw stack dump ...
2016-11-23tracing: Make tracepoint_printk a static_keySteven Rostedt (Red Hat)1-1/+1
Currently, when tracepoint_printk is set (enabled by the "tp_printk" kernel command line), it causes trace events to print via printk(). This is a very dangerous operation, but is useful for debugging. The issue is, it's seldom used, but it is always checked even if it's not enabled by the kernel command line. Instead of having this feature called by a branch against a variable, turn that variable into a static key, and this will remove the test and jump. To simplify things, the functions output_printk() and trace_event_buffer_commit() were moved from trace_events.c to trace.c. Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2016-10-25x86/dumpstack: Remove raw stack dumpJosh Poimboeuf1-7/+0
For mostly historical reasons, the x86 oops dump shows the raw stack values: ... [registers] Stack: ffff880079af7350 ffff880079905400 0000000000000000 ffffc900008f3ae0 ffffffffa0196610 0000000000000001 00010000ffffffff 0000000087654321 0000000000000002 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 Call Trace: ... This seems to be an artifact from long ago, and probably isn't needed anymore. It generally just adds noise to the dump, and it can be actively harmful because it leaks kernel addresses. Linus says: "The stack dump actually goes back to forever, and it used to be useful back in 1992 or so. But it used to be useful mainly because stacks were simpler and we didn't have very good call traces anyway. I definitely remember having used them - I just do not remember having used them in the last ten+ years. Of course, it's still true that if you can trigger an oops, you've likely already lost the security game, but since the stack dump is so useless, let's aim to just remove it and make games like the above harder." This also removes the related 'kstack=' cmdline option and the 'kstack_depth_to_print' sysctl. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e83bd50df52d8fe88e94d2566426ae40d813bf8f.1477405374.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-10-20sched/fair: Kill the unused 'sched_shares_window_ns' tunableMatt Fleming1-7/+0
The last user of this tunable was removed in 2012 in commit: 82958366cfea ("sched: Replace update_shares weight distribution with per-entity computation") Delete it since its very existence confuses people. Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <umgwanakikbuti@gmail.com> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161019141059.26408-1-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-10-10Merge branch 'work.misc' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-12/+2
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull misc vfs updates from Al Viro: "Assorted misc bits and pieces. There are several single-topic branches left after this (rename2 series from Miklos, current_time series from Deepa Dinamani, xattr series from Andreas, uaccess stuff from from me) and I'd prefer to send those separately" * 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (39 commits) proc: switch auxv to use of __mem_open() hpfs: support FIEMAP cifs: get rid of unused arguments of CIFSSMBWrite() posix_acl: uapi header split posix_acl: xattr representation cleanups fs/aio.c: eliminate redundant loads in put_aio_ring_file fs/internal.h: add const to ns_dentry_operations declaration compat: remove compat_printk() fs/buffer.c: make __getblk_slow() static proc: unsigned file descriptors fs/file: more unsigned file descriptors fs: compat: remove redundant check of nr_segs cachefiles: Fix attempt to read i_blocks after deleting file [ver #2] cifs: don't use memcpy() to copy struct iov_iter get rid of separate multipage fault-in primitives fs: Avoid premature clearing of capabilities fs: Give dentry to inode_change_ok() instead of inode fuse: Propagate dentry down to inode_change_ok() ceph: Propagate dentry down to inode_change_ok() xfs: Propagate dentry down to inode_change_ok() ...
2016-10-06Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-0/+9
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace Pull namespace updates from Eric Biederman: "This set of changes is a number of smaller things that have been overlooked in other development cycles focused on more fundamental change. The devpts changes are small things that were a distraction until we managed to kill off DEVPTS_MULTPLE_INSTANCES. There is an trivial regression fix to autofs for the unprivileged mount changes that went in last cycle. A pair of ioctls has been added by Andrey Vagin making it is possible to discover the relationships between namespaces when referring to them through file descriptors. The big user visible change is starting to add simple resource limits to catch programs that misbehave. With namespaces in general and user namespaces in particular allowing users to use more kinds of resources, it has become important to have something to limit errant programs. Because the purpose of these limits is to catch errant programs the code needs to be inexpensive to use as it always on, and the default limits need to be high enough that well behaved programs on well behaved systems don't encounter them. To this end, after some review I have implemented per user per user namespace limits, and use them to limit the number of namespaces. The limits being per user mean that one user can not exhause the limits of another user. The limits being per user namespace allow contexts where the limit is 0 and security conscious folks can remove from their threat anlysis the code used to manage namespaces (as they have historically done as it root only). At the same time the limits being per user namespace allow other parts of the system to use namespaces. Namespaces are increasingly being used in application sand boxing scenarios so an all or nothing disable for the entire system for the security conscious folks makes increasing use of these sandboxes impossible. There is also added a limit on the maximum number of mounts present in a single mount namespace. It is nontrivial to guess what a reasonable system wide limit on the number of mount structure in the kernel would be, especially as it various based on how a system is using containers. A limit on the number of mounts in a mount namespace however is much easier to understand and set. In most cases in practice only about 1000 mounts are used. Given that some autofs scenarious have the potential to be 30,000 to 50,000 mounts I have set the default limit for the number of mounts at 100,000 which is well above every known set of users but low enough that the mount hash tables don't degrade unreaonsably. These limits are a start. I expect this estabilishes a pattern that other limits for resources that namespaces use will follow. There has been interest in making inotify event limits per user per user namespace as well as interest expressed in making details about what is going on in the kernel more visible" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (28 commits) autofs: Fix automounts by using current_real_cred()->uid mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts netns: move {inc,dec}_net_namespaces into #ifdef nsfs: Simplify __ns_get_path tools/testing: add a test to check nsfs ioctl-s nsfs: add ioctl to get a parent namespace nsfs: add ioctl to get an owning user namespace for ns file descriptor kernel: add a helper to get an owning user namespace for a namespace devpts: Change the owner of /dev/pts/ptmx to the mounter of /dev/pts devpts: Remove sync_filesystems devpts: Make devpts_kill_sb safe if fsi is NULL devpts: Simplify devpts_mount by using mount_nodev devpts: Move the creation of /dev/pts/ptmx into fill_super devpts: Move parse_mount_options into fill_super userns: When the per user per user namespace limit is reached return ENOSPC userns; Document per user per user namespace limits. mntns: Add a limit on the number of mount namespaces. netns: Add a limit on the number of net namespaces cgroupns: Add a limit on the number of cgroup namespaces ipcns: Add a limit on the number of ipc namespaces ...
2016-09-30mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mountsEric W. Biederman1-0/+9
CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> pointed out that the semantics of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace. mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2 mount --make-rshared / for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem as some people have managed to hit this by accident. As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned. Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> described the situation for autofs users as follows: > The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of > the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance > problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less > than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired. > > Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that > have been triggered and not yet expired. > > The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common > case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've > not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries. > > The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large > number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat > more active mounts. So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and malfunctioning programs. For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl. Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2016-09-28compat: remove compat_printk()Arnd Bergmann1-10/+0
After 7e8e385aaf6e ("x86/compat: Remove sys32_vm86_warning"), this function has become unused, so we can remove it as well. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160617142903.3070388-1-arnd@arndb.de Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2016-09-28fs/file: more unsigned file descriptorsAlexey Dobriyan1-2/+2
Propagate unsignedness for grand total of 149 bytes: $ ./scripts/bloat-o-meter ../vmlinux-000 ../obj/vmlinux add/remove: 0/0 grow/shrink: 0/10 up/down: 0/-149 (-149) function old new delta set_close_on_exec 99 98 -1 put_files_struct 201 200 -1 get_close_on_exec 59 58 -1 do_prlimit 498 497 -1 do_execveat_common.isra 1662 1661 -1 __close_fd 178 173 -5 do_dup2 219 204 -15 seq_show 685 660 -25 __alloc_fd 384 357 -27 dup_fd 718 646 -72 It mostly comes from converting "unsigned int" to "long" for bit operations. Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-08-27sysctl: handle error writing UINT_MAX to u32 fieldsSubash Abhinov Kasiviswanathan1-2/+43
We have scripts which write to certain fields on 3.18 kernels but this seems to be failing on 4.4 kernels. An entry which we write to here is xfrm_aevent_rseqth which is u32. echo 4294967295 > /proc/sys/net/core/xfrm_aevent_rseqth Commit 230633d109e3 ("kernel/sysctl.c: detect overflows when converting to int") prevented writing to sysctl entries when integer overflow occurs. However, this does not apply to unsigned integers. Heinrich suggested that we introduce a new option to handle 64 bit limits and set min as 0 and max as UINT_MAX. This might not work as it leads to issues similar to __do_proc_doulongvec_minmax. Alternatively, we would need to change the datatype of the entry to 64 bit. static int __do_proc_doulongvec_minmax(void *data, struct ctl_table { i = (unsigned long *) data; //This cast is causing to read beyond the size of data (u32) vleft = table->maxlen / sizeof(unsigned long); //vleft is 0 because maxlen is sizeof(u32) which is lesser than sizeof(unsigned long) on x86_64. Introduce a new proc handler proc_douintvec. Individual proc entries will need to be updated to use the new handler. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Fixes: 230633d109e3 ("kernel/sysctl.c:detect overflows when converting to int") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1471479806-5252-1-git-send-email-subashab@codeaurora.org Signed-off-by: Subash Abhinov Kasiviswanathan <subashab@codeaurora.org> Cc: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-08-03printk: add kernel parameter to control writes to /dev/kmsgBorislav Petkov1-0/+7
Add a "printk.devkmsg" kernel command line parameter which controls how userspace writes into /dev/kmsg. It has three options: * ratelimit - ratelimit logging from userspace. * on - unlimited logging from userspace * off - logging from userspace gets ignored The default setting is to ratelimit the messages written to it. This changes the kernel default setting of "on" to "ratelimit" and we do that because we want to keep userspace spamming /dev/kmsg to sane levels. This is especially moot when a small kernel log buffer wraps around and messages get lost. So the ratelimiting setting should be a sane setting where kernel messages should have a bit higher chance of survival from all the spamming. It additionally does not limit logging to /dev/kmsg while the system is booting if we haven't disabled it on the command line. Furthermore, we can control the logging from a lower priority sysctl interface - kernel.printk_devkmsg. That interface will succeed only if printk.devkmsg *hasn't* been supplied on the command line. If it has, then printk.devkmsg is a one-time setting which remains for the duration of the system lifetime. This "locking" of the setting is to prevent userspace from changing the logging on us through sysctl(2). This patch is based on previous patches from Linus and Steven. [bp@suse.de: fixes] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160719072344.GC25563@nazgul.tnic Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160716061745.15795-3-bp@alien8.de Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Franck Bui <fbui@suse.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-07-29mm: convert zone_reclaim to node_reclaimMel Gorman1-2/+2
As reclaim is now per-node based, convert zone_reclaim to be node_reclaim. It is possible that a node will be reclaimed multiple times if it has multiple zones but this is unavoidable without caching all nodes traversed so far. The documentation and interface to userspace is the same from a configuration perspective and will will be similar in behaviour unless the node-local allocation requests were also limited to lower zones. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1467970510-21195-24-git-send-email-mgorman@techsingularity.net Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Hillf Danton <hillf.zj@alibaba-inc.com> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-06-16rcu: sysctl: Panic on RCU StallDaniel Bristot de Oliveira1-0/+11
It is not always easy to determine the cause of an RCU stall just by analysing the RCU stall messages, mainly when the problem is caused by the indirect starvation of rcu threads. For example, when preempt_rcu is not awakened due to the starvation of a timer softirq. We have been hard coding panic() in the RCU stall functions for some time while testing the kernel-rt. But this is not possible in some scenarios, like when supporting customers. This patch implements the sysctl kernel.panic_on_rcu_stall. If set to 1, the system will panic() when an RCU stall takes place, enabling the capture of a vmcore. The vmcore provides a way to analyze all kernel/tasks states, helping out to point to the culprit and the solution for the stall. The kernel.panic_on_rcu_stall sysctl is disabled by default. Changes from v1: - Fixed a typo in the git log - The if(sysctl_panic_on_rcu_stall) panic() is in a static function - Fixed the CONFIG_TINY_RCU compilation issue - The var sysctl_panic_on_rcu_stall is now __read_mostly Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com> Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Reviewed-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Tested-by: "Luis Claudio R. Goncalves" <lgoncalv@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-05-26Merge branch 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-1/+10
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull perf updates from Ingo Molnar: "Mostly tooling and PMU driver fixes, but also a number of late updates such as the reworking of the call-chain size limiting logic to make call-graph recording more robust, plus tooling side changes for the new 'backwards ring-buffer' extension to the perf ring-buffer" * 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (34 commits) perf record: Read from backward ring buffer perf record: Rename variable to make code clear perf record: Prevent reading invalid data in record__mmap_read perf evlist: Add API to pause/resume perf trace: Use the ptr->name beautifier as default for "filename" args perf trace: Use the fd->name beautifier as default for "fd" args perf report: Add srcline_from/to branch sort keys perf evsel: Record fd into perf_mmap perf evsel: Add overwrite attribute and check write_backward perf tools: Set buildid dir under symfs when --symfs is provided perf trace: Only auto set call-graph to "dwarf" when syscalls are being traced perf annotate: Sort list of recognised instructions perf annotate: Fix identification of ARM blt and bls instructions perf tools: Fix usage of max_stack sysctl perf callchain: Stop validating callchains by the max_stack sysctl perf trace: Fix exit_group() formatting perf top: Use machine->kptr_restrict_warned perf trace: Warn when trying to resolve kernel addresses with kptr_restrict=1 perf machine: Do not bail out if not managing to read ref reloc symbol perf/x86/intel/p4: Trival indentation fix, remove space ...
2016-05-20mm: /proc/sys/vm/stat_refresh to force vmstat updateHugh Dickins1-0/+7
Provide /proc/sys/vm/stat_refresh to force an immediate update of per-cpu into global vmstats: useful to avoid a sleep(2) or whatever before checking counts when testing. Originally added to work around a bug which left counts stranded indefinitely on a cpu going idle (an inaccuracy magnified when small below-batch numbers represent "huge" amounts of memory), but I believe that bug is now fixed: nonetheless, this is still a useful knob. Its schedule_on_each_cpu() is probably too expensive just to fold into reading /proc/meminfo itself: give this mode 0600 to prevent abuse. Allow a write or a read to do the same: nothing to read, but "grep -h Shmem /proc/sys/vm/stat_refresh /proc/meminfo" is convenient. Oh, and since global_page_state() itself is careful to disguise any underflow as 0, hack in an "Invalid argument" and pr_warn() if a counter is negative after the refresh - this helped to fix a misaccounting of NR_ISOLATED_FILE in my migration code. But on recent kernels, I find that NR_ALLOC_BATCH and NR_PAGES_SCANNED often go negative some of the time. I have not yet worked out why, but have no evidence that it's actually harmful. Punt for the moment by just ignoring the anomaly on those. Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Andres Lagar-Cavilla <andreslc@google.com> Cc: Yang Shi <yang.shi@linaro.org> Cc: Ning Qu <quning@gmail.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Cc: Andres Lagar-Cavilla <andreslc@google.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-05-17perf core: Separate accounting of contexts and real addresses in a stack traceArnaldo Carvalho de Melo1-0/+9
The perf_sample->ip_callchain->nr value includes all the entries in the ip_callchain->ip[] array, real addresses and PERF_CONTEXT_{KERNEL,USER,etc}, while what the user expects is that what is in the kernel.perf_event_max_stack sysctl or in the upcoming per event perf_event_attr.sample_max_stack knob be honoured in terms of IP addresses in the stack trace. So allocate a bunch of extra entries for contexts, and do the accounting via perf_callchain_entry_ctx struct members. A new sysctl, kernel.perf_event_max_contexts_per_stack is also introduced for investigating possible bugs in the callchain implementation by some arch. Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Brendan Gregg <brendan.d.gregg@gmail.com> Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: He Kuang <hekuang@huawei.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Milian Wolff <milian.wolff@kdab.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Cc: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com> Cc: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-3b4wnqk340c4sg4gwkfdi9yk@git.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
2016-05-17perf core: Generalize max_stack sysctl handlerArnaldo Carvalho de Melo1-1/+1
So that it can be used for other stack related knobs, such as the upcoming one to tweak the max number of of contexts per stack sample. In all those cases we can only change the value if there are no perf sessions collecting stacks, so they need to grab that mutex, etc. Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-8t3fk94wuzp8m2z1n4gc0s17@git.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
2016-04-27perf core: Allow setting up max frame stack depth via sysctlArnaldo Carvalho de Melo1-0/+12
The default remains 127, which is good for most cases, and not even hit most of the time, but then for some cases, as reported by Brendan, 1024+ deep frames are appearing on the radar for things like groovy, ruby. And in some workloads putting a _lower_ cap on this may make sense. One that is per event still needs to be put in place tho. The new file is: # cat /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_max_stack 127 Chaging it: # echo 256 > /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_max_stack # cat /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_max_stack 256 But as soon as there is some event using callchains we get: # echo 512 > /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_max_stack -bash: echo: write error: Device or resource busy # Because we only allocate the callchain percpu data structures when there is a user, which allows for changing the max easily, its just a matter of having no callchain users at that point. Reported-and-Tested-by: Brendan Gregg <brendan.d.gregg@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: He Kuang <hekuang@huawei.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Milian Wolff <milian.wolff@kdab.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Cc: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com> Cc: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160426002928.GB16708@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
2016-03-18mm: scale kswapd watermarks in proportion to memoryJohannes Weiner1-0/+10
In machines with 140G of memory and enterprise flash storage, we have seen read and write bursts routinely exceed the kswapd watermarks and cause thundering herds in direct reclaim. Unfortunately, the only way to tune kswapd aggressiveness is through adjusting min_free_kbytes - the system's emergency reserves - which is entirely unrelated to the system's latency requirements. In order to get kswapd to maintain a 250M buffer of free memory, the emergency reserves need to be set to 1G. That is a lot of memory wasted for no good reason. On the other hand, it's reasonable to assume that allocation bursts and overall allocation concurrency scale with memory capacity, so it makes sense to make kswapd aggressiveness a function of that as well. Change the kswapd watermark scale factor from the currently fixed 25% of the tunable emergency reserve to a tunable 0.1% of memory. Beyond 1G of memory, this will produce bigger watermark steps than the current formula in default settings. Ensure that the new formula never chooses steps smaller than that, i.e. 25% of the emergency reserve. On a 140G machine, this raises the default watermark steps - the distance between min and low, and low and high - from 16M to 143M. Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-02-09sched/debug: Make schedstats a runtime tunable that is disabled by defaultMel Gorman1-1/+12
schedstats is very useful during debugging and performance tuning but it incurs overhead to calculate the stats. As such, even though it can be disabled at build time, it is often enabled as the information is useful. This patch adds a kernel command-line and sysctl tunable to enable or disable schedstats on demand (when it's built in). It is disabled by default as someone who knows they need it can also learn to enable it when necessary. The benefits are dependent on how scheduler-intensive the workload is. If it is then the patch reduces the number of cycles spent calculating the stats with a small benefit from reducing the cache footprint of the scheduler. These measurements were taken from a 48-core 2-socket machine with Xeon(R) E5-2670 v3 cpus although they were also tested on a single socket machine 8-core machine with Intel i7-3770 processors. netperf-tcp 4.5.0-rc1 4.5.0-rc1 vanilla nostats-v3r1 Hmean 64 560.45 ( 0.00%) 575.98 ( 2.77%) Hmean 128 766.66 ( 0.00%) 795.79 ( 3.80%) Hmean 256 950.51 ( 0.00%) 981.50 ( 3.26%) Hmean 1024 1433.25 ( 0.00%) 1466.51 ( 2.32%) Hmean 2048 2810.54 ( 0.00%) 2879.75 ( 2.46%) Hmean 3312 4618.18 ( 0.00%) 4682.09 ( 1.38%) Hmean 4096 5306.42 ( 0.00%) 5346.39 ( 0.75%) Hmean 8192 10581.44 ( 0.00%) 10698.15 ( 1.10%) Hmean 16384 18857.70 ( 0.00%) 18937.61 ( 0.42%) Small gains here, UDP_STREAM showed nothing intresting and neither did the TCP_RR tests. The gains on the 8-core machine were very similar. tbench4 4.5.0-rc1 4.5.0-rc1 vanilla nostats-v3r1 Hmean mb/sec-1 500.85 ( 0.00%) 522.43 ( 4.31%) Hmean mb/sec-2 984.66 ( 0.00%) 1018.19 ( 3.41%) Hmean mb/sec-4 1827.91 ( 0.00%) 1847.78 ( 1.09%) Hmean mb/sec-8 3561.36 ( 0.00%) 3611.28 ( 1.40%) Hmean mb/sec-16 5824.52 ( 0.00%) 5929.03 ( 1.79%) Hmean mb/sec-32 10943.10 ( 0.00%) 10802.83 ( -1.28%) Hmean mb/sec-64 15950.81 ( 0.00%) 16211.31 ( 1.63%) Hmean mb/sec-128 15302.17 ( 0.00%) 15445.11 ( 0.93%) Hmean mb/sec-256 14866.18 ( 0.00%) 15088.73 ( 1.50%) Hmean mb/sec-512 15223.31 ( 0.00%) 15373.69 ( 0.99%) Hmean mb/sec-1024 14574.25 ( 0.00%) 14598.02 ( 0.16%) Hmean mb/sec-2048 13569.02 ( 0.00%) 13733.86 ( 1.21%) Hmean mb/sec-3072 12865.98 ( 0.00%) 13209.23 ( 2.67%) Small gains of 2-4% at low thread counts and otherwise flat. The gains on the 8-core machine were slightly different tbench4 on 8-core i7-3770 single socket machine Hmean mb/sec-1 442.59 ( 0.00%) 448.73 ( 1.39%) Hmean mb/sec-2 796.68 ( 0.00%) 794.39 ( -0.29%) Hmean mb/sec-4 1322.52 ( 0.00%) 1343.66 ( 1.60%) Hmean mb/sec-8 2611.65 ( 0.00%) 2694.86 ( 3.19%) Hmean mb/sec-16 2537.07 ( 0.00%) 2609.34 ( 2.85%) Hmean mb/sec-32 2506.02 ( 0.00%) 2578.18 ( 2.88%) Hmean mb/sec-64 2511.06 ( 0.00%) 2569.16 ( 2.31%) Hmean mb/sec-128 2313.38 ( 0.00%) 2395.50 ( 3.55%) Hmean mb/sec-256 2110.04 ( 0.00%) 2177.45 ( 3.19%) Hmean mb/sec-512 2072.51 ( 0.00%) 2053.97 ( -0.89%) In constract, this shows a relatively steady 2-3% gain at higher thread counts. Due to the nature of the patch and the type of workload, it's not a surprise that the result will depend on the CPU used. hackbench-pipes 4.5.0-rc1 4.5.0-rc1 vanilla nostats-v3r1 Amean 1 0.0637 ( 0.00%) 0.0660 ( -3.59%) Amean 4 0.1229 ( 0.00%) 0.1181 ( 3.84%) Amean 7 0.1921 ( 0.00%) 0.1911 ( 0.52%) Amean 12 0.3117 ( 0.00%) 0.2923 ( 6.23%) Amean 21 0.4050 ( 0.00%) 0.3899 ( 3.74%) Amean 30 0.4586 ( 0.00%) 0.4433 ( 3.33%) Amean 48 0.5910 ( 0.00%) 0.5694 ( 3.65%) Amean 79 0.8663 ( 0.00%) 0.8626 ( 0.43%) Amean 110 1.1543 ( 0.00%) 1.1517 ( 0.22%) Amean 141 1.4457 ( 0.00%) 1.4290 ( 1.16%) Amean 172 1.7090 ( 0.00%) 1.6924 ( 0.97%) Amean 192 1.9126 ( 0.00%) 1.9089 ( 0.19%) Some small gains and losses and while the variance data is not included, it's close to the noise. The UMA machine did not show anything particularly different pipetest 4.5.0-rc1 4.5.0-rc1 vanilla nostats-v2r2 Min Time 4.13 ( 0.00%) 3.99 ( 3.39%) 1st-qrtle Time 4.38 ( 0.00%) 4.27 ( 2.51%) 2nd-qrtle Time 4.46 ( 0.00%) 4.39 ( 1.57%) 3rd-qrtle Time 4.56 ( 0.00%) 4.51 ( 1.10%) Max-90% Time 4.67 ( 0.00%) 4.60 ( 1.50%) Max-93% Time 4.71 ( 0.00%) 4.65 ( 1.27%) Max-95% Time 4.74 ( 0.00%) 4.71 ( 0.63%) Max-99% Time 4.88 ( 0.00%) 4.79 ( 1.84%) Max Time 4.93 ( 0.00%) 4.83 ( 2.03%) Mean Time 4.48 ( 0.00%) 4.39 ( 1.91%) Best99%Mean Time 4.47 ( 0.00%) 4.39 ( 1.91%) Best95%Mean Time 4.46 ( 0.00%) 4.38 ( 1.93%) Best90%Mean Time 4.45 ( 0.00%) 4.36 ( 1.98%) Best50%Mean Time 4.36 ( 0.00%) 4.25 ( 2.49%) Best10%Mean Time 4.23 ( 0.00%) 4.10 ( 3.13%) Best5%Mean Time 4.19 ( 0.00%) 4.06 ( 3.20%) Best1%Mean Time 4.13 ( 0.00%) 4.00 ( 3.39%) Small improvement and similar gains were seen on the UMA machine. The gain is small but it stands to reason that doing less work in the scheduler is a good thing. The downside is that the lack of schedstats and tracepoints may be surprising to experts doing performance analysis until they find the existence of the schedstats= parameter or schedstats sysctl. It will be automatically activated for latencytop and sleep profiling to alleviate the problem. For tracepoints, there is a simple warning as it's not safe to activate schedstats in the context when it's known the tracepoint may be wanted but is unavailable. Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Reviewed-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <mgalbraith@suse.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1454663316-22048-1-git-send-email-mgorman@techsingularity.net Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-01-22Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-0/+14
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull more vfs updates from Al Viro: "Embarrassing braino fix + pipe page accounting + fixing an eyesore in find_filesystem() (checking that s1 is equal to prefix of s2 of given length can be done in many ways, but "compare strlen(s1) with length and then do strncmp()" is not a good one...)" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: [regression] fix braino in fs/dlm/user.c pipe: limit the per-user amount of pages allocated in pipes find_filesystem(): simplify comparison
2016-01-21sysctl: enable strict writesKees Cook1-1/+1
SYSCTL_WRITES_WARN was added in commit f4aacea2f5d1 ("sysctl: allow for strict write position handling"), and released in v3.16 in August of 2014. Since then I can find only 1 instance of non-zero offset writing[1], and it was fixed immediately in CRIU[2]. As such, it appears safe to flip this to the strict state now. [1] https://www.google.com/search?q="when%20file%20position%20was%20not%200" [2] http://lists.openvz.org/pipermail/criu/2015-April/019819.html Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-01-20pipe: limit the per-user amount of pages allocated in pipesWilly Tarreau1-0/+14
On no-so-small systems, it is possible for a single process to cause an OOM condition by filling large pipes with data that are never read. A typical process filling 4000 pipes with 1 MB of data will use 4 GB of memory. On small systems it may be tricky to set the pipe max size to prevent this from happening. This patch makes it possible to enforce a per-user soft limit above which new pipes will be limited to a single page, effectively limiting them to 4 kB each, as well as a hard limit above which no new pipes may be created for this user. This has the effect of protecting the system against memory abuse without hurting other users, and still allowing pipes to work correctly though with less data at once. The limit are controlled by two new sysctls : pipe-user-pages-soft, and pipe-user-pages-hard. Both may be disabled by setting them to zero. The default soft limit allows the default number of FDs per process (1024) to create pipes of the default size (64kB), thus reaching a limit of 64MB before starting to create only smaller pipes. With 256 processes limited to 1024 FDs each, this results in 1024*64kB + (256*1024 - 1024) * 4kB = 1084 MB of memory allocated for a user. The hard limit is disabled by default to avoid breaking existing applications that make intensive use of pipes (eg: for splicing). Reported-by: socketpair@gmail.com Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Mitigates: CVE-2013-4312 (Linux 2.0+) Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-01-15mm: mmap: add new /proc tunable for mmap_base ASLRDaniel Cashman1-0/+22
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) provides a barrier to exploitation of user-space processes in the presence of security vulnerabilities by making it more difficult to find desired code/data which could help an attack. This is done by adding a random offset to the location of regions in the process address space, with a greater range of potential offset values corresponding to better protection/a larger search-space for brute force, but also to greater potential for fragmentation. The offset added to the mmap_base address, which provides the basis for the majority of the mappings for a process, is set once on process exec in arch_pick_mmap_layout() and is done via hard-coded per-arch values, which reflect, hopefully, the best compromise for all systems. The trade-off between increased entropy in the offset value generation and the corresponding increased variability in address space fragmentation is not absolute, however, and some platforms may tolerate higher amounts of entropy. This patch introduces both new Kconfig values and a sysctl interface which may be used to change the amount of entropy used for offset generation on a system. The direct motivation for this change was in response to the libstagefright vulnerabilities that affected Android, specifically to information provided by Google's project zero at: http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/09/stagefrightened.html The attack presented therein, by Google's project zero, specifically targeted the limited randomness used to generate the offset added to the mmap_base address in order to craft a brute-force-based attack. Concretely, the attack was against the mediaserver process, which was limited to respawning every 5 seconds, on an arm device. The hard-coded 8 bits used resulted in an average expected success rate of defeating the mmap ASLR after just over 10 minutes (128 tries at 5 seconds a piece). With this patch, and an accompanying increase in the entropy value to 16 bits, the same attack would take an average expected time of over 45 hours (32768 tries), which makes it both less feasible and more likely to be noticed. The introduced Kconfig and sysctl options are limited by per-arch minimum and maximum values, the minimum of which was chosen to match the current hard-coded value and the maximum of which was chosen so as to give the greatest flexibility without generating an invalid mmap_base address, generally a 3-4 bits less than the number of bits in the user-space accessible virtual address space. When decided whether or not to change the default value, a system developer should consider that mmap_base address could be placed anywhere up to 2^(value) bits away from the non-randomized location, which would introduce variable-sized areas above and below the mmap_base address such that the maximum vm_area_struct size may be reduced, preventing very large allocations. This patch (of 4): ASLR only uses as few as 8 bits to generate the random offset for the mmap base address on 32 bit architectures. This value was chosen to prevent a poorly chosen value from dividing the address space in such a way as to prevent large allocations. This may not be an issue on all platforms. Allow the specification of a minimum number of bits so that platforms desiring greater ASLR protection may determine where to place the trade-off. Signed-off-by: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@google.com> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com> Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Cc: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-01-04kernel/*: switch to memdup_user_nul()Al Viro1-51/+28
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-11-06kernel/watchdog.c: add sysctl knob hardlockup_panicDon Zickus1-0/+11
The only way to enable a hardlockup to panic the machine is to set 'nmi_watchdog=panic' on the kernel command line. This makes it awkward for end users and folks who want to run automate tests (like myself). Mimic the softlockup_panic knob and create a /proc/sys/kernel/hardlockup_panic knob. Signed-off-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Cc: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-06kernel/watchdog.c: perform all-CPU backtrace in case of hard lockupJiri Kosina1-0/+9
In many cases of hardlockup reports, it's actually not possible to know why it triggered, because the CPU that got stuck is usually waiting on a resource (with IRQs disabled) in posession of some other CPU is holding. IOW, we are often looking at the stacktrace of the victim and not the actual offender. Introduce sysctl / cmdline parameter that makes it possible to have hardlockup detector perform all-CPU backtrace. Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com> Acked-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-10-13bpf: enable non-root eBPF programsAlexei Starovoitov1-0/+13
In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-09-10sysctl: fix int -> unsigned long assignments in INT_MIN caseIlya Dryomov1-5/+5
The following if (val < 0) *lvalp = (unsigned long)-val; is incorrect because the compiler is free to assume -val to be positive and use a sign-extend instruction for extending the bit pattern. This is a problem if val == INT_MIN: # echo -2147483648 >/proc/sys/dev/scsi/logging_level # cat /proc/sys/dev/scsi/logging_level -18446744071562067968 Cast to unsigned long before negation - that way we first sign-extend and then negate an unsigned, which is well defined. With this: # cat /proc/sys/dev/scsi/logging_level -2147483648 Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Cc: Mikulas Patocka <mikulas@twibright.com> Cc: Robert Xiao <nneonneo@gmail.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-10kexec: split kexec_load syscall from kexec core codeDave Young1-1/+1
There are two kexec load syscalls, kexec_load another and kexec_file_load. kexec_file_load has been splited as kernel/kexec_file.c. In this patch I split kexec_load syscall code to kernel/kexec.c. And add a new kconfig option KEXEC_CORE, so we can disable kexec_load and use kexec_file_load only, or vice verse. The original requirement is from Ted Ts'o, he want kexec kernel signature being checked with CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG enabled. But kexec-tools use kexec_load syscall can bypass the checking. Vivek Goyal proposed to create a common kconfig option so user can compile in only one syscall for loading kexec kernel. KEXEC/KEXEC_FILE selects KEXEC_CORE so that old config files still work. Because there's general code need CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE, so I updated all the architecture Kconfig with a new option KEXEC_CORE, and let KEXEC selects KEXEC_CORE in arch Kconfig. Also updated general kernel code with to kexec_load syscall. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Petr Tesarik <ptesarik@suse.cz> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-07-04Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-7/+1
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace Pull user namespace updates from Eric Biederman: "Long ago and far away when user namespaces where young it was realized that allowing fresh mounts of proc and sysfs with only user namespace permissions could violate the basic rule that only root gets to decide if proc or sysfs should be mounted at all. Some hacks were put in place to reduce the worst of the damage could be done, and the common sense rule was adopted that fresh mounts of proc and sysfs should allow no more than bind mounts of proc and sysfs. Unfortunately that rule has not been fully enforced. There are two kinds of gaps in that enforcement. Only filesystems mounted on empty directories of proc and sysfs should be ignored but the test for empty directories was insufficient. So in my tree directories on proc, sysctl and sysfs that will always be empty are created specially. Every other technique is imperfect as an ordinary directory can have entries added even after a readdir returns and shows that the directory is empty. Special creation of directories for mount points makes the code in the kernel a smidge clearer about it's purpose. I asked container developers from the various container projects to help test this and no holes were found in the set of mount points on proc and sysfs that are created specially. This set of changes also starts enforcing the mount flags of fresh mounts of proc and sysfs are consistent with the existing mount of proc and sysfs. I expected this to be the boring part of the work but unfortunately unprivileged userspace winds up mounting fresh copies of proc and sysfs with noexec and nosuid clear when root set those flags on the previous mount of proc and sysfs. So for now only the atime, read-only and nodev attributes which userspace happens to keep consistent are enforced. Dealing with the noexec and nosuid attributes remains for another time. This set of changes also addresses an issue with how open file descriptors from /proc/<pid>/ns/* are displayed. Recently readlink of /proc/<pid>/fd has been triggering a WARN_ON that has not been meaningful since it was added (as all of the code in the kernel was converted) and is not now actively wrong. There is also a short list of issues that have not been fixed yet that I will mention briefly. It is possible to rename a directory from below to above a bind mount. At which point any directory pointers below the renamed directory can be walked up to the root directory of the filesystem. With user namespaces enabled a bind mount of the bind mount can be created allowing the user to pick a directory whose children they can rename to outside of the bind mount. This is challenging to fix and doubly so because all obvious solutions must touch code that is in the performance part of pathname resolution. As mentioned above there is also a question of how to ensure that developers by accident or with purpose do not introduce exectuable files on sysfs and proc and in doing so introduce security regressions in the current userspace that will not be immediately obvious and as such are likely to require breaking userspace in painful ways once they are recognized" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: vfs: Remove incorrect debugging WARN in prepend_path mnt: Update fs_fully_visible to test for permanently empty directories sysfs: Create mountpoints with sysfs_create_mount_point sysfs: Add support for permanently empty directories to serve as mount points. kernfs: Add support for always empty directories. proc: Allow creating permanently empty directories that serve as mount points sysctl: Allow creating permanently empty directories that serve as mountpoints. fs: Add helper functions for permanently empty directories. vfs: Ignore unlocked mounts in fs_fully_visible mnt: Modify fs_fully_visible to deal with locked ro nodev and atime mnt: Refactor the logic for mounting sysfs and proc in a user namespace
2015-07-01sysctl: Allow creating permanently empty directories that serve as mountpoints.Eric W. Biederman1-7/+1
Add a magic sysctl table sysctl_mount_point that when used to create a directory forces that directory to be permanently empty. Update the code to use make_empty_dir_inode when accessing permanently empty directories. Update the code to not allow adding to permanently empty directories. Update /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc to be a permanently empty directory. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-06-25watchdog: add watchdog_cpumask sysctl to assist nohzChris Metcalf1-0/+7
Change the default behavior of watchdog so it only runs on the housekeeping cores when nohz_full is enabled at build and boot time. Allow modifying the set of cores the watchdog is currently running on with a new kernel.watchdog_cpumask sysctl. In the current system, the watchdog subsystem runs a periodic timer that schedules the watchdog kthread to run. However, nohz_full cores are designed to allow userspace application code running on those cores to have 100% access to the CPU. So the watchdog system prevents the nohz_full application code from being able to run the way it wants to, thus the motivation to suppress the watchdog on nohz_full cores, which this patchset provides by default. However, if we disable the watchdog globally, then the housekeeping cores can't benefit from the watchdog functionality. So we allow disabling it only on some cores. See Documentation/lockup-watchdogs.txt for more information. [jhubbard@nvidia.com: fix a watchdog crash in some configurations] Signed-off-by: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com> Acked-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-19timer: Reduce timer migration overhead if disabledThomas Gleixner1-9/+9
Eric reported that the timer_migration sysctl is not really nice performance wise as it needs to check at every timer insertion whether the feature is enabled or not. Further the check does not live in the timer code, so we have an extra function call which checks an extra cache line to figure out that it is disabled. We can do better and store that information in the per cpu (hr)timer bases. I pondered to use a static key, but that's a nightmare to update from the nohz code and the timer base cache line is hot anyway when we select a timer base. The old logic enabled the timer migration unconditionally if CONFIG_NO_HZ was set even if nohz was disabled on the kernel command line. With this modification, we start off with migration disabled. The user visible sysctl is still set to enabled. If the kernel switches to NOHZ migration is enabled, if the user did not disable it via the sysctl prior to the switch. If nohz=off is on the kernel command line, migration stays disabled no matter what. Before: 47.76% hog [.] main 14.84% [kernel] [k] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave 9.55% [kernel] [k] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore 6.71% [kernel] [k] mod_timer 6.24% [kernel] [k] lock_timer_base.isra.38 3.76% [kernel] [k] detach_if_pending 3.71% [kernel] [k] del_timer 2.50% [kernel] [k] internal_add_timer 1.51% [kernel] [k] get_nohz_timer_target 1.28% [kernel] [k] __internal_add_timer 0.78% [kernel] [k] timerfn 0.48% [kernel] [k] wake_up_nohz_cpu After: 48.10% hog [.] main 15.25% [kernel] [k] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave 9.76% [kernel] [k] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore 6.50% [kernel] [k] mod_timer 6.44% [kernel] [k] lock_timer_base.isra.38 3.87% [kernel] [k] detach_if_pending 3.80% [kernel] [k] del_timer 2.67% [kernel] [k] internal_add_timer 1.33% [kernel] [k] __internal_add_timer 0.73% [kernel] [k] timerfn 0.54% [kernel] [k] wake_up_nohz_cpu Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Paul McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org> Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Cc: Joonwoo Park <joonwoop@codeaurora.org> Cc: Wenbo Wang <wenbo.wang@memblaze.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150526224512.127050787@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2015-04-17kernel/sysctl.c: detect overflows when converting to intHeinrich Schuchardt1-1/+9
When converting unsigned long to int overflows may occur. These currently are not detected when writing to the sysctl file system. E.g. on a system where int has 32 bits and long has 64 bits echo 0x800001234 > /proc/sys/kernel/threads-max has the same effect as echo 0x1234 > /proc/sys/kernel/threads-max The patch adds the missing check in do_proc_dointvec_conv. With the patch an overflow will result in an error EINVAL when writing to the the sysctl file system. Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-17kernel/sysctl.c: threads-max observe limitsHeinrich Schuchardt1-4/+2
Users can change the maximum number of threads by writing to /proc/sys/kernel/threads-max. With the patch the value entered is checked against the same limits that apply when fork_init is called. Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-16mm: allow compaction of unevictable pagesEric B Munson1-0/+9
Currently, pages which are marked as unevictable are protected from compaction, but not from other types of migration. The POSIX real time extension explicitly states that mlock() will prevent a major page fault, but the spirit of this is that mlock() should give a process the ability to control sources of latency, including minor page faults. However, the mlock manpage only explicitly says that a locked page will not be written to swap and this can cause some confusion. The compaction code today does not give a developer who wants to avoid swap but wants to have large contiguous areas available any method to achieve this state. This patch introduces a sysctl for controlling compaction behavior with respect to the unevictable lru. Users who demand no page faults after a page is present can set compact_unevictable_allowed to 0 and users who need the large contiguous areas can enable compaction on locked memory by leaving the default value of 1. To illustrate this problem I wrote a quick test program that mmaps a large number of 1MB files filled with random data. These maps are created locked and read only. Then every other mmap is unmapped and I attempt to allocate huge pages to the static huge page pool. When the compact_unevictable_allowed sysctl is 0, I cannot allocate hugepages after fragmenting memory. When the value is set to 1, allocations succeed. Signed-off-by: Eric B Munson <emunson@akamai.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-15Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew)Linus Torvalds1-11/+24
Merge first patchbomb from Andrew Morton: - arch/sh updates - ocfs2 updates - kernel/watchdog feature - about half of mm/ * emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (122 commits) Documentation: update arch list in the 'memtest' entry Kconfig: memtest: update number of test patterns up to 17 arm: add support for memtest arm64: add support for memtest memtest: use phys_addr_t for physical addresses mm: move memtest under mm mm, hugetlb: abort __get_user_pages if current has been oom killed mm, mempool: do not allow atomic resizing memcg: print cgroup information when system panics due to panic_on_oom mm: numa: remove migrate_ratelimited mm: fold arch_randomize_brk into ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE mm: split ET_DYN ASLR from mmap ASLR s390: redefine randomize_et_dyn for ELF_ET_DYN_BASE mm: expose arch_mmap_rnd when available s390: standardize mmap_rnd() usage powerpc: standardize mmap_rnd() usage mips: extract logic for mmap_rnd() arm64: standardize mmap_rnd() usage x86: standardize mmap_rnd() usage arm: factor out mmap ASLR into mmap_rnd ...
2015-04-15watchdog: enable the new user interface of the watchdog mechanismUlrich Obergfell1-11/+24
With the current user interface of the watchdog mechanism it is only possible to disable or enable both lockup detectors at the same time. This series introduces new kernel parameters and changes the semantics of some existing kernel parameters, so that the hard lockup detector and the soft lockup detector can be disabled or enabled individually. With this series applied, the user interface is as follows. - parameters in /proc/sys/kernel . soft_watchdog This is a new parameter to control and examine the run state of the soft lockup detector. . nmi_watchdog The semantics of this parameter have changed. It can now be used to control and examine the run state of the hard lockup detector. . watchdog This parameter is still available to control the run state of both lockup detectors at the same time. If this parameter is examined, it shows the logical OR of soft_watchdog and nmi_watchdog. . watchdog_thresh The semantics of this parameter are not affected by the patch. - kernel command line parameters . nosoftlockup The semantics of this parameter have changed. It can now be used to disable the soft lockup detector at boot time. . nmi_watchdog=0 or nmi_watchdog=1 Disable or enable the hard lockup detector at boot time. The patch introduces '=1' as a new option. . nowatchdog The semantics of this parameter are not affected by the patch. It is still available to disable both lockup detectors at boot time. Also, remove the proc_dowatchdog() function which is no longer needed. [dzickus@redhat.com: wrote changelog] [dzickus@redhat.com: update documentation for kernel params and sysctl] Signed-off-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>