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2021-04-28Merge tag 'fixes-v5.13' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-18/+34
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security layer fixes from James Morris: "Miscellaneous minor fixes" * tag 'fixes-v5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: security: commoncap: clean up kernel-doc comments security: commoncap: fix -Wstringop-overread warning
2021-04-15security: commoncap: clean up kernel-doc commentsRandy Dunlap1-17/+33
Fix kernel-doc notation in commoncap.c. Use correct (matching) function name in comments as in code. Use correct function argument names in kernel-doc comments. Use kernel-doc's "Return:" format for function return values. Fixes these kernel-doc warnings: ../security/commoncap.c:1206: warning: expecting prototype for cap_task_ioprio(). Prototype was for cap_task_setioprio() instead ../security/commoncap.c:1219: warning: expecting prototype for cap_task_ioprio(). Prototype was for cap_task_setnice() instead Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
2021-03-24security: commoncap: fix -Wstringop-overread warningArnd Bergmann1-1/+1
gcc-11 introdces a harmless warning for cap_inode_getsecurity: security/commoncap.c: In function ‘cap_inode_getsecurity’: security/commoncap.c:440:33: error: ‘memcpy’ reading 16 bytes from a region of size 0 [-Werror=stringop-overread] 440 | memcpy(&nscap->data, &cap->data, sizeof(__le32) * 2 * VFS_CAP_U32); | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The problem here is that tmpbuf is initialized to NULL, so gcc assumes it is not accessible unless it gets set by vfs_getxattr_alloc(). This is a legitimate warning as far as I can tell, but the code is correct since it correctly handles the error when that function fails. Add a separate NULL check to tell gcc about it as well. Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
2021-03-13Revert 95ebabde382c ("capabilities: Don't allow writing ambiguous v3 file ↵Eric W. Biederman1-11/+1
capabilities") It turns out that there are in fact userspace implementations that care and this recent change caused a regression. https://github.com/containers/buildah/issues/3071 As the motivation for the original change was future development, and the impact is existing real world code just revert this change and allow the ambiguity in v3 file caps. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 95ebabde382c ("capabilities: Don't allow writing ambiguous v3 file capabilities") Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2021-02-24Merge tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-20/+88
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux Pull idmapped mounts from Christian Brauner: "This introduces idmapped mounts which has been in the making for some time. Simply put, different mounts can expose the same file or directory with different ownership. This initial implementation comes with ports for fat, ext4 and with Christoph's port for xfs with more filesystems being actively worked on by independent people and maintainers. Idmapping mounts handle a wide range of long standing use-cases. Here are just a few: - Idmapped mounts make it possible to easily share files between multiple users or multiple machines especially in complex scenarios. For example, idmapped mounts will be used in the implementation of portable home directories in systemd-homed.service(8) where they allow users to move their home directory to an external storage device and use it on multiple computers where they are assigned different uids and gids. This effectively makes it possible to assign random uids and gids at login time. - It is possible to share files from the host with unprivileged containers without having to change ownership permanently through chown(2). - It is possible to idmap a container's rootfs and without having to mangle every file. For example, Chromebooks use it to share the user's Download folder with their unprivileged containers in their Linux subsystem. - It is possible to share files between containers with non-overlapping idmappings. - Filesystem that lack a proper concept of ownership such as fat can use idmapped mounts to implement discretionary access (DAC) permission checking. - They allow users to efficiently changing ownership on a per-mount basis without having to (recursively) chown(2) all files. In contrast to chown (2) changing ownership of large sets of files is instantenous with idmapped mounts. This is especially useful when ownership of a whole root filesystem of a virtual machine or container is changed. With idmapped mounts a single syscall mount_setattr syscall will be sufficient to change the ownership of all files. - Idmapped mounts always take the current ownership into account as idmappings specify what a given uid or gid is supposed to be mapped to. This contrasts with the chown(2) syscall which cannot by itself take the current ownership of the files it changes into account. It simply changes the ownership to the specified uid and gid. This is especially problematic when recursively chown(2)ing a large set of files which is commong with the aforementioned portable home directory and container and vm scenario. - Idmapped mounts allow to change ownership locally, restricting it to specific mounts, and temporarily as the ownership changes only apply as long as the mount exists. Several userspace projects have either already put up patches and pull-requests for this feature or will do so should you decide to pull this: - systemd: In a wide variety of scenarios but especially right away in their implementation of portable home directories. https://systemd.io/HOME_DIRECTORY/ - container runtimes: containerd, runC, LXD:To share data between host and unprivileged containers, unprivileged and privileged containers, etc. The pull request for idmapped mounts support in containerd, the default Kubernetes runtime is already up for quite a while now: https://github.com/containerd/containerd/pull/4734 - The virtio-fs developers and several users have expressed interest in using this feature with virtual machines once virtio-fs is ported. - ChromeOS: Sharing host-directories with unprivileged containers. I've tightly synced with all those projects and all of those listed here have also expressed their need/desire for this feature on the mailing list. For more info on how people use this there's a bunch of talks about this too. Here's just two recent ones: https://www.cncf.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Rootless-Containers-in-Gitpod.pdf https://fosdem.org/2021/schedule/event/containers_idmap/ This comes with an extensive xfstests suite covering both ext4 and xfs: https://git.kernel.org/brauner/xfstests-dev/h/idmapped_mounts It covers truncation, creation, opening, xattrs, vfscaps, setid execution, setgid inheritance and more both with idmapped and non-idmapped mounts. It already helped to discover an unrelated xfs setgid inheritance bug which has since been fixed in mainline. It will be sent for inclusion with the xfstests project should you decide to merge this. In order to support per-mount idmappings vfsmounts are marked with user namespaces. The idmapping of the user namespace will be used to map the ids of vfs objects when they are accessed through that mount. By default all vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace. The initial user namespace is used to indicate that a mount is not idmapped. All operations behave as before and this is verified in the testsuite. Based on prior discussions we want to attach the whole user namespace and not just a dedicated idmapping struct. This allows us to reuse all the helpers that already exist for dealing with idmappings instead of introducing a whole new range of helpers. In addition, if we decide in the future that we are confident enough to enable unprivileged users to setup idmapped mounts the permission checking can take into account whether the caller is privileged in the user namespace the mount is currently marked with. The user namespace the mount will be marked with can be specified by passing a file descriptor refering to the user namespace as an argument to the new mount_setattr() syscall together with the new MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP flag. The system call follows the openat2() pattern of extensibility. The following conditions must be met in order to create an idmapped mount: - The caller must currently have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the user namespace the underlying filesystem has been mounted in. - The underlying filesystem must support idmapped mounts. - The mount must not already be idmapped. This also implies that the idmapping of a mount cannot be altered once it has been idmapped. - The mount must be a detached/anonymous mount, i.e. it must have been created by calling open_tree() with the OPEN_TREE_CLONE flag and it must not already have been visible in the filesystem. The last two points guarantee easier semantics for userspace and the kernel and make the implementation significantly simpler. By default vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace and no behavioral or performance changes are observed. The manpage with a detailed description can be found here: https://git.kernel.org/brauner/man-pages/c/1d7b902e2875a1ff342e036a9f866a995640aea8 In order to support idmapped mounts, filesystems need to be changed and mark themselves with the FS_ALLOW_IDMAP flag in fs_flags. The patches to convert individual filesystem are not very large or complicated overall as can be seen from the included fat, ext4, and xfs ports. Patches for other filesystems are actively worked on and will be sent out separately. The xfstestsuite can be used to verify that port has been done correctly. The mount_setattr() syscall is motivated independent of the idmapped mounts patches and it's been around since July 2019. One of the most valuable features of the new mount api is the ability to perform mounts based on file descriptors only. Together with the lookup restrictions available in the openat2() RESOLVE_* flag namespace which we added in v5.6 this is the first time we are close to hardened and race-free (e.g. symlinks) mounting and path resolution. While userspace has started porting to the new mount api to mount proper filesystems and create new bind-mounts it is currently not possible to change mount options of an already existing bind mount in the new mount api since the mount_setattr() syscall is missing. With the addition of the mount_setattr() syscall we remove this last restriction and userspace can now fully port to the new mount api, covering every use-case the old mount api could. We also add the crucial ability to recursively change mount options for a whole mount tree, both removing and adding mount options at the same time. This syscall has been requested multiple times by various people and projects. There is a simple tool available at https://github.com/brauner/mount-idmapped that allows to create idmapped mounts so people can play with this patch series. I'll add support for the regular mount binary should you decide to pull this in the following weeks: Here's an example to a simple idmapped mount of another user's home directory: u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo ./mount --idmap both:1000:1001:1 /home/ubuntu/ /mnt u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/ total 28 drwxr-xr-x 2 ubuntu ubuntu 4096 Oct 28 22:07 . drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Oct 28 04:00 .. -rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history -rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout -rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3771 Feb 25 2020 .bashrc -rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile -rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful -rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/ total 28 drwxr-xr-x 2 u1001 u1001 4096 Oct 28 22:07 . drwxr-xr-x 29 root root 4096 Oct 28 22:01 .. -rw------- 1 u1001 u1001 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history -rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout -rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 3771 Feb 25 2020 .bashrc -rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile -rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful -rw------- 1 u1001 u1001 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo u1001@f2-vm:/$ touch /mnt/my-file u1001@f2-vm:/$ setfacl -m u:1001:rwx /mnt/my-file u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo setcap -n 1001 cap_net_raw+ep /mnt/my-file u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/my-file -rw-rwxr--+ 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 28 22:14 /mnt/my-file u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/my-file -rw-rwxr--+ 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 28 22:14 /home/ubuntu/my-file u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /mnt/my-file getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names # file: mnt/my-file # owner: u1001 # group: u1001 user::rw- user:u1001:rwx group::rw- mask::rwx other::r-- u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /home/ubuntu/my-file getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names # file: home/ubuntu/my-file # owner: ubuntu # group: ubuntu user::rw- user:ubuntu:rwx group::rw- mask::rwx other::r--" * tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux: (41 commits) xfs: remove the possibly unused mp variable in xfs_file_compat_ioctl xfs: support idmapped mounts ext4: support idmapped mounts fat: handle idmapped mounts tests: add mount_setattr() selftests fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP fs: add mount_setattr() fs: add attr_flags_to_mnt_flags helper fs: split out functions to hold writers namespace: only take read lock in do_reconfigure_mnt() mount: make {lock,unlock}_mount_hash() static namespace: take lock_mount_hash() directly when changing flags nfs: do not export idmapped mounts overlayfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts ecryptfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts ima: handle idmapped mounts apparmor: handle idmapped mounts fs: make helpers idmap mount aware exec: handle idmapped mounts would_dump: handle idmapped mounts ...
2021-02-23Merge branch 'userns-for-v5.12' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-1/+11
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace Pull user namespace update from Eric Biederman: "There are several pieces of active development, but only a single change made it through the gauntlet to be ready for v5.12. That change is tightening up the semantics of the v3 capabilities xattr. It is just short of being a bug-fix/security issue as no user space is known to even generate the problem case" * 'userns-for-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: capabilities: Don't allow writing ambiguous v3 file capabilities
2021-01-28cap: fix conversions on getxattrMiklos Szeredi1-24/+43
If a capability is stored on disk in v2 format cap_inode_getsecurity() will currently return in v2 format unconditionally. This is wrong: v2 cap should be equivalent to a v3 cap with zero rootid, and so the same conversions performed on it. If the rootid cannot be mapped, v3 is returned unconverted. Fix this so that both v2 and v3 return -EOVERFLOW if the rootid (or the owner of the fs user namespace in case of v2) cannot be mapped into the current user namespace. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2021-01-24commoncap: handle idmapped mountsChristian Brauner1-13/+49
When interacting with user namespace and non-user namespace aware filesystem capabilities the vfs will perform various security checks to determine whether or not the filesystem capabilities can be used by the caller, whether they need to be removed and so on. The main infrastructure for this resides in the capability codepaths but they are called through the LSM security infrastructure even though they are not technically an LSM or optional. This extends the existing security hooks security_inode_removexattr(), security_inode_killpriv(), security_inode_getsecurity() to pass down the mount's user namespace and makes them aware of idmapped mounts. In order to actually get filesystem capabilities from disk the capability infrastructure exposes the get_vfs_caps_from_disk() helper. For user namespace aware filesystem capabilities a root uid is stored alongside the capabilities. In order to determine whether the caller can make use of the filesystem capability or whether it needs to be ignored it is translated according to the superblock's user namespace. If it can be translated to uid 0 according to that id mapping the caller can use the filesystem capabilities stored on disk. If we are accessing the inode that holds the filesystem capabilities through an idmapped mount we map the root uid according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to non-idmapped mounts: reading filesystem caps from disk enforces that the root uid associated with the filesystem capability must have a mapping in the superblock's user namespace and that the caller is either in the same user namespace or is a descendant of the superblock's user namespace. For filesystems that are mountable inside user namespace the caller can just mount the filesystem and won't usually need to idmap it. If they do want to idmap it they can create an idmapped mount and mark it with a user namespace they created and which is thus a descendant of s_user_ns. For filesystems that are not mountable inside user namespaces the descendant rule is trivially true because the s_user_ns will be the initial user namespace. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-11-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2021-01-24xattr: handle idmapped mountsTycho Andersen1-3/+3
When interacting with extended attributes the vfs verifies that the caller is privileged over the inode with which the extended attribute is associated. For posix access and posix default extended attributes a uid or gid can be stored on-disk. Let the functions handle posix extended attributes on idmapped mounts. If the inode is accessed through an idmapped mount we need to map it according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to non-idmapped mounts. This has no effect for e.g. security xattrs since they don't store uids or gids and don't perform permission checks on them like posix acls do. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-10-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.pizza> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2021-01-24acl: handle idmapped mountsChristian Brauner1-7/+38
The posix acl permission checking helpers determine whether a caller is privileged over an inode according to the acls associated with the inode. Add helpers that make it possible to handle acls on idmapped mounts. The vfs and the filesystems targeted by this first iteration make use of posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user() and posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user() to translate basic posix access and default permissions such as the ACL_USER and ACL_GROUP type according to the initial user namespace (or the superblock's user namespace) to and from the caller's current user namespace. Adapt these two helpers to handle idmapped mounts whereby we either map from or into the mount's user namespace depending on in which direction we're translating. Similarly, cap_convert_nscap() is used by the vfs to translate user namespace and non-user namespace aware filesystem capabilities from the superblock's user namespace to the caller's user namespace. Enable it to handle idmapped mounts by accounting for the mount's user namespace. In addition the fileystems targeted in the first iteration of this patch series make use of the posix_acl_chmod() and, posix_acl_update_mode() helpers. Both helpers perform permission checks on the target inode. Let them handle idmapped mounts. These two helpers are called when posix acls are set by the respective filesystems to handle this case we extend the ->set() method to take an additional user namespace argument to pass the mount's user namespace down. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-9-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2021-01-24capability: handle idmapped mountsChristian Brauner1-2/+3
In order to determine whether a caller holds privilege over a given inode the capability framework exposes the two helpers privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid() and capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(). The former verifies that the inode has a mapping in the caller's user namespace and the latter additionally verifies that the caller has the requested capability in their current user namespace. If the inode is accessed through an idmapped mount map it into the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to non-idmapped inodes. If the initial user namespace is passed all operations are a nop so non-idmapped mounts will not see a change in behavior. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-5-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2020-12-29capabilities: Don't allow writing ambiguous v3 file capabilitiesEric W. Biederman1-1/+11
The v3 file capabilities have a uid field that records the filesystem uid of the root user of the user namespace the file capabilities are valid in. When someone is silly enough to have the same underlying uid as the root uid of multiple nested containers a v3 filesystem capability can be ambiguous. In the spirit of don't do that then, forbid writing a v3 filesystem capability if it is ambiguous. Fixes: 8db6c34f1dbc ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities") Reviewed-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2020-12-14vfs: move cap_convert_nscap() call into vfs_setxattr()Miklos Szeredi1-2/+1
cap_convert_nscap() does permission checking as well as conversion of the xattr value conditionally based on fs's user-ns. This is needed by overlayfs and probably other layered fs (ecryptfs) and is what vfs_foo() is supposed to do anyway. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
2020-05-30exec: Compute file based creds only onceEric W. Biederman1-11/+13
Move the computation of creds from prepare_binfmt into begin_new_exec so that the creds need only be computed once. This is just code reorganization no semantic changes of any kind are made. Moving the computation is safe. I have looked through the kernel and verified none of the binfmts look at bprm->cred directly, and that there are no helpers that look at bprm->cred indirectly. Which means that it is not a problem to compute the bprm->cred later in the execution flow as it is not used until it becomes current->cred. A new function bprm_creds_from_file is added to contain the work that needs to be done. bprm_creds_from_file first computes which file bprm->executable or most likely bprm->file that the bprm->creds will be computed from. The funciton bprm_fill_uid is updated to receive the file instead of accessing bprm->file. The now unnecessary work needed to reset the bprm->cred->euid, and bprm->cred->egid is removed from brpm_fill_uid. A small comment to document that bprm_fill_uid now only deals with the work to handle suid and sgid files. The default case is already heandled by prepare_exec_creds. The function security_bprm_repopulate_creds is renamed security_bprm_creds_from_file and now is explicitly passed the file from which to compute the creds. The documentation of the bprm_creds_from_file security hook is updated to explain when the hook is called and what it needs to do. The file is passed from cap_bprm_creds_from_file into get_file_caps so that the caps are computed for the appropriate file. The now unnecessary work in cap_bprm_creds_from_file to reset the ambient capabilites has been removed. A small comment to document that the work of cap_bprm_creds_from_file is to read capabilities from the files secureity attribute and derive capabilities from the fact the user had uid 0 has been added. Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2020-05-30exec: Add a per bprm->file version of per_clearEric W. Biederman1-1/+1
There is a small bug in the code that recomputes parts of bprm->cred for every bprm->file. The code never recomputes the part of clear_dangerous_personality_flags it is responsible for. Which means that in practice if someone creates a sgid script the interpreter will not be able to use any of: READ_IMPLIES_EXEC ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE ADDR_COMPAT_LAYOUT MMAP_PAGE_ZERO. This accentially clearing of personality flags probably does not matter in practice because no one has complained but it does make the code more difficult to understand. Further remaining bug compatible prevents the recomputation from being removed and replaced by simply computing bprm->cred once from the final bprm->file. Making this change removes the last behavior difference between computing bprm->creds from the final file and recomputing bprm->cred several times. Which allows this behavior change to be justified for it's own reasons, and for any but hunts looking into why the behavior changed to wind up here instead of in the code that will follow that computes bprm->cred from the final bprm->file. This small logic bug appears to have existed since the code started clearing dangerous personality bits. History Tree: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git Fixes: 1bb0fa189c6a ("[PATCH] NX: clean up legacy binary support") Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2020-05-28Merge commit a4ae32c71fe9 ("exec: Always set cap_ambient in cap_bprm_set_creds")Eric W. Biederman1-0/+1
This is a bug fix and one of two places where I have found that the result of calling security_bprm_repopulate_creds more than once on different bprm->files depends on all of the bprm->files not just the file bprm->file. I intend to fix both of those cases and then modify the code to only call security_bprm_repopulate_creds on the final bprm file. So merge this change in so I hopefully reduce conflicts for others and I make it possible to build on top of this change. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2020-05-26exec: Always set cap_ambient in cap_bprm_set_credsEric W. Biederman1-0/+1
An invariant of cap_bprm_set_creds is that every field in the new cred structure that cap_bprm_set_creds might set, needs to be set every time to ensure the fields does not get a stale value. The field cap_ambient is not set every time cap_bprm_set_creds is called, which means that if there is a suid or sgid script with an interpreter that has neither the suid nor the sgid bits set the interpreter should be able to accept ambient credentials. Unfortuantely because cap_ambient is not reset to it's original value the interpreter can not accept ambient credentials. Given that the ambient capability set is expected to be controlled by the caller, I don't think this is particularly serious. But it is definitely worth fixing so the code works correctly. I have tested to verify my reading of the code is correct and the interpreter of a sgid can receive ambient capabilities with this change and cannot receive ambient capabilities without this change. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Fixes: 58319057b784 ("capabilities: ambient capabilities") Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2020-05-21exec: Convert security_bprm_set_creds into security_bprm_repopulate_credsEric W. Biederman1-5/+4
Rename bprm->cap_elevated to bprm->active_secureexec and initialize it in prepare_binprm instead of in cap_bprm_set_creds. Initializing bprm->active_secureexec in prepare_binprm allows multiple implementations of security_bprm_repopulate_creds to play nicely with each other. Rename security_bprm_set_creds to security_bprm_reopulate_creds to emphasize that this path recomputes part of bprm->cred. This recomputation avoids the time of check vs time of use problems that are inherent in unix #! interpreters. In short two renames and a move in the location of initializing bprm->active_secureexec. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87o8qkzrxp.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2019-07-09Merge branch 'next-lsm' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-3/+3
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull capabilities update from James Morris: "Minor fixes for capabilities: - Update the commoncap.c code to utilize XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN, from Carmeli tamir. - Make the capability hooks static, from Yue Haibing" * 'next-lsm' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: security/commoncap: Use xattr security prefix len security: Make capability_hooks static
2019-07-07security/commoncap: Use xattr security prefix lenCarmeli Tamir1-2/+2
Using the existing defined XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN instead of sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1. Pretty simple cleanup. Signed-off-by: Carmeli Tamir <carmeli.tamir@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
2019-06-12security: Make capability_hooks staticYueHaibing1-1/+1
Fix sparse warning: security/commoncap.c:1347:27: warning: symbol 'capability_hooks' was not declared. Should it be static? Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
2019-05-30treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 152Thomas Gleixner1-6/+1
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at your option any later version extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-or-later has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 3029 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070032.746973796@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-03-07Merge tag 'audit-pr-20190305' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-0/+2
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit Pull audit updates from Paul Moore: "A lucky 13 audit patches for v5.1. Despite the rather large diffstat, most of the changes are from two bug fix patches that move code from one Kconfig option to another. Beyond that bit of churn, the remaining changes are largely cleanups and bug-fixes as we slowly march towards container auditing. It isn't all boring though, we do have a couple of new things: file capabilities v3 support, and expanded support for filtering on filesystems to solve problems with remote filesystems. All changes pass the audit-testsuite. Please merge for v5.1" * tag 'audit-pr-20190305' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit: audit: mark expected switch fall-through audit: hide auditsc_get_stamp and audit_serial prototypes audit: join tty records to their syscall audit: remove audit_context when CONFIG_ AUDIT and not AUDITSYSCALL audit: remove unused actx param from audit_rule_match audit: ignore fcaps on umount audit: clean up AUDITSYSCALL prototypes and stubs audit: more filter PATH records keyed on filesystem magic audit: add support for fcaps v3 audit: move loginuid and sessionid from CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL to CONFIG_AUDIT audit: add syscall information to CONFIG_CHANGE records audit: hand taken context to audit_kill_trees for syscall logging audit: give a clue what CONFIG_CHANGE op was involved
2019-02-26LSM: Update function documentation for cap_capableMicah Morton1-1/+1
This should have gone in with commit c1a85a00ea66cb6f0bd0f14e47c28c2b0999799f. Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-01-25audit: add support for fcaps v3Richard Guy Briggs1-0/+2
V3 namespaced file capabilities were introduced in commit 8db6c34f1dbc ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities") Add support for these by adding the "frootid" field to the existing fcaps fields in the NAME and BPRM_FCAPS records. Please see github issue https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/103 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> [PM: comment tweak to fit an 80 char line width] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2019-01-11LSM: generalize flag passing to security_capableMicah Morton1-8/+9
This patch provides a general mechanism for passing flags to the security_capable LSM hook. It replaces the specific 'audit' flag that is used to tell security_capable whether it should log an audit message for the given capability check. The reason for generalizing this flag passing is so we can add an additional flag that signifies whether security_capable is being called by a setid syscall (which is needed by the proposed SafeSetID LSM). Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2019-01-09capability: Initialize as LSM_ORDER_FIRSTKees Cook1-1/+8
This converts capabilities to use the new LSM_ORDER_FIRST position. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2018-12-13security: audit and remove any unnecessary uses of module.hPaul Gortmaker1-1/+0
Historically a lot of these existed because we did not have a distinction between what was modular code and what was providing support to modules via EXPORT_SYMBOL and friends. That changed when we forked out support for the latter into the export.h file. This means we should be able to reduce the usage of module.h in code that is obj-y Makefile or bool Kconfig. The advantage in removing such instances is that module.h itself sources about 15 other headers; adding significantly to what we feed cpp, and it can obscure what headers we are effectively using. Since module.h might have been the implicit source for init.h (for __init) and for export.h (for EXPORT_SYMBOL) we consider each instance for the presence of either and replace as needed. Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-09-04Merge tag 'v4.19-rc2' into next-generalJames Morris1-1/+1
Sync to Linux 4.19-rc2 for downstream developers.
2018-08-29security/capabilities: remove check for -EINVALChristian Brauner1-3/+0
bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps() never returned -EINVAL so remove the rc == -EINVAL check. Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-08-11cap_inode_getsecurity: use d_find_any_alias() instead of d_find_alias()Eddie.Horng1-1/+1
The code in cap_inode_getsecurity(), introduced by commit 8db6c34f1dbc ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities"), should use d_find_any_alias() instead of d_find_alias() do handle unhashed dentry correctly. This is needed, for example, if execveat() is called with an open but unlinked overlayfs file, because overlayfs unhashes dentry on unlink. This is a regression of real life application, first reported at https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-unionfs/msg05363.html Below reproducer and setup can reproduce the case. const char* exec="echo"; const char *newargv[] = { "echo", "hello", NULL}; const char *newenviron[] = { NULL }; int fd, err; fd = open(exec, O_PATH); unlink(exec); err = syscall(322/*SYS_execveat*/, fd, "", newargv, newenviron, AT_EMPTY_PATH); if(err<0) fprintf(stderr, "execveat: %s\n", strerror(errno)); gcc compile into ~/test/a.out mount -t overlay -orw,lowerdir=/mnt/l,upperdir=/mnt/u,workdir=/mnt/w none /mnt/m cd /mnt/m cp /bin/echo . ~/test/a.out Expected result: hello Actually result: execveat: Invalid argument dmesg: Invalid argument reading file caps for /dev/fd/3 The 2nd reproducer and setup emulates similar case but for regular filesystem: const char* exec="echo"; int fd, err; char buf[256]; fd = open(exec, O_RDONLY); unlink(exec); err = fgetxattr(fd, "security.capability", buf, 256); if(err<0) fprintf(stderr, "fgetxattr: %s\n", strerror(errno)); gcc compile into ~/test_fgetxattr cd /tmp cp /bin/echo . ~/test_fgetxattr Result: fgetxattr: Invalid argument On regular filesystem, for example, ext4 read xattr from disk and return to execveat(), will not trigger this issue, however, the overlay attr handler pass real dentry to vfs_getxattr() will. This reproducer calls fgetxattr() with an unlinked fd, involkes vfs_getxattr() then reproduced the case that d_find_alias() in cap_inode_getsecurity() can't find the unlinked dentry. Suggested-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Acked-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Fixes: 8db6c34f1dbc ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.14 Signed-off-by: Eddie Horng <eddie.horng@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-05-24capabilities: Allow privileged user in s_user_ns to set security.* xattrsEric W. Biederman1-2/+6
A privileged user in s_user_ns will generally have the ability to manipulate the backing store and insert security.* xattrs into the filesystem directly. Therefore the kernel must be prepared to handle these xattrs from unprivileged mounts, and it makes little sense for commoncap to prevent writing these xattrs to the filesystem. The capability and LSM code have already been updated to appropriately handle xattrs from unprivileged mounts, so it is safe to loosen this restriction on setting xattrs. The exception to this logic is that writing xattrs to a mounted filesystem may also cause the LSM inode_post_setxattr or inode_setsecurity callbacks to be invoked. SELinux will deny the xattr update by virtue of applying mountpoint labeling to unprivileged userns mounts, and Smack will deny the writes for any user without global CAP_MAC_ADMIN, so loosening the capability check in commoncap is safe in this respect as well. Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-04-11commoncap: Handle memory allocation failure.Tetsuo Handa1-0/+2
syzbot is reporting NULL pointer dereference at xattr_getsecurity() [1], for cap_inode_getsecurity() is returning sizeof(struct vfs_cap_data) when memory allocation failed. Return -ENOMEM if memory allocation failed. [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=a55ba438506fe68649a5f50d2d82d56b365e0107 Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Fixes: 8db6c34f1dbc8e06 ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities") Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+9369930ca44f29e60e2d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.14+ Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-01-02capabilities: fix buffer overread on very short xattrEric Biggers1-12/+9
If userspace attempted to set a "security.capability" xattr shorter than 4 bytes (e.g. 'setfattr -n security.capability -v x file'), then cap_convert_nscap() read past the end of the buffer containing the xattr value because it accessed the ->magic_etc field without verifying that the xattr value is long enough to contain that field. Fix it by validating the xattr value size first. This bug was found using syzkaller with KASAN. The KASAN report was as follows (cleaned up slightly): BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in cap_convert_nscap+0x514/0x630 security/commoncap.c:498 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88002d8741c0 by task syz-executor1/2852 CPU: 0 PID: 2852 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc6-00200-gcc0aac99d977 #253 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-20171110_100015-anatol 04/01/2014 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0xe3/0x195 lib/dump_stack.c:53 print_address_description+0x73/0x260 mm/kasan/report.c:252 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline] kasan_report+0x235/0x350 mm/kasan/report.c:409 cap_convert_nscap+0x514/0x630 security/commoncap.c:498 setxattr+0x2bd/0x350 fs/xattr.c:446 path_setxattr+0x168/0x1b0 fs/xattr.c:472 SYSC_setxattr fs/xattr.c:487 [inline] SyS_setxattr+0x36/0x50 fs/xattr.c:483 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x18/0x85 Fixes: 8db6c34f1dbc ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.14+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-11-13Merge branch 'next-general' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-65/+128
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull general security subsystem updates from James Morris: "TPM (from Jarkko): - essential clean up for tpm_crb so that ARM64 and x86 versions do not distract each other as much as before - /dev/tpm0 rejects now too short writes (shorter buffer than specified in the command header - use DMA-safe buffer in tpm_tis_spi - otherwise mostly minor fixes. Smack: - base support for overlafs Capabilities: - BPRM_FCAPS fixes, from Richard Guy Briggs: The audit subsystem is adding a BPRM_FCAPS record when auditing setuid application execution (SYSCALL execve). This is not expected as it was supposed to be limited to when the file system actually had capabilities in an extended attribute. It lists all capabilities making the event really ugly to parse what is happening. The PATH record correctly records the setuid bit and owner. Suppress the BPRM_FCAPS record on set*id. TOMOYO: - Y2038 timestamping fixes" * 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (28 commits) MAINTAINERS: update the IMA, EVM, trusted-keys, encrypted-keys entries Smack: Base support for overlayfs MAINTAINERS: remove David Safford as maintainer for encrypted+trusted keys tomoyo: fix timestamping for y2038 capabilities: audit log other surprising conditions capabilities: fix logic for effective root or real root capabilities: invert logic for clarity capabilities: remove a layer of conditional logic capabilities: move audit log decision to function capabilities: use intuitive names for id changes capabilities: use root_priveleged inline to clarify logic capabilities: rename has_cap to has_fcap capabilities: intuitive names for cap gain status capabilities: factor out cap_bprm_set_creds privileged root tpm, tpm_tis: use ARRAY_SIZE() to define TPM_HID_USR_IDX tpm: fix duplicate inline declaration specifier tpm: fix type of a local variables in tpm_tis_spi.c tpm: fix type of a local variable in tpm2_map_command() tpm: fix type of a local variable in tpm2_get_cc_attrs_tbl() tpm-dev-common: Reject too short writes ...
2017-10-20capabilities: audit log other surprising conditionsRichard Guy Briggs1-7/+22
The existing condition tested for process effective capabilities set by file attributes but intended to ignore the change if the result was unsurprisingly an effective full set in the case root is special with a setuid root executable file and we are root. Stated again: - When you execute a setuid root application, it is no surprise and expected that it got all capabilities, so we do not want capabilities recorded. if (pE_grew && !(pE_fullset && (eff_root || real_root) && root_priveleged) ) Now make sure we cover other cases: - If something prevented a setuid root app getting all capabilities and it wound up with one capability only, then it is a surprise and should be logged. When it is a setuid root file, we only want capabilities when the process does not get full capabilities.. root_priveleged && setuid_root && !pE_fullset - Similarly if a non-setuid program does pick up capabilities due to file system based capabilities, then we want to know what capabilities were picked up. When it has file system based capabilities we want the capabilities. !is_setuid && (has_fcap && pP_gained) - If it is a non-setuid file and it gets ambient capabilities, we want the capabilities. !is_setuid && pA_gained - These last two are combined into one due to the common first parameter. Related: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/16 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-10-20capabilities: fix logic for effective root or real rootRichard Guy Briggs1-3/+2
Now that the logic is inverted, it is much easier to see that both real root and effective root conditions had to be met to avoid printing the BPRM_FCAPS record with audit syscalls. This meant that any setuid root applications would print a full BPRM_FCAPS record when it wasn't necessary, cluttering the event output, since the SYSCALL and PATH records indicated the presence of the setuid bit and effective root user id. Require only one of effective root or real root to avoid printing the unnecessary record. Ref: commit 3fc689e96c0c ("Add audit_log_bprm_fcaps/AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS") See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/16 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-10-20capabilities: invert logic for clarityRichard Guy Briggs1-4/+4
The way the logic was presented, it was awkward to read and verify. Invert the logic using DeMorgan's Law to be more easily able to read and understand. Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Okay-ished-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-10-20capabilities: remove a layer of conditional logicRichard Guy Briggs1-13/+10
Remove a layer of conditional logic to make the use of conditions easier to read and analyse. Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Okay-ished-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-10-20capabilities: move audit log decision to functionRichard Guy Briggs1-20/+30
Move the audit log decision logic to its own function to isolate the complexity in one place. Suggested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Okay-ished-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-10-20capabilities: use intuitive names for id changesRichard Guy Briggs1-6/+22
Introduce a number of inlines to make the use of the negation of uid_eq() easier to read and analyse. Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Okay-ished-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-10-20capabilities: use root_priveleged inline to clarify logicRichard Guy Briggs1-2/+4
Introduce inline root_privileged() to make use of SECURE_NONROOT easier to read. Suggested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Okay-ished-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-10-20capabilities: rename has_cap to has_fcapRichard Guy Briggs1-10/+10
Rename has_cap to has_fcap to clarify it applies to file capabilities since the entire source file is about capabilities. Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Okay-ished-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-10-20capabilities: intuitive names for cap gain statusRichard Guy Briggs1-7/+11
Introduce macros cap_gained, cap_grew, cap_full to make the use of the negation of is_subset() easier to read and analyse. Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Okay-ished-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-10-20capabilities: factor out cap_bprm_set_creds privileged rootRichard Guy Briggs1-28/+48
Factor out the case of privileged root from the function cap_bprm_set_creds() to make the latter easier to read and analyse. Suggested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Okay-ished-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-10-19commoncap: move assignment of fs_ns to avoid null pointer dereferenceColin Ian King1-1/+2
The pointer fs_ns is assigned from inode->i_ib->s_user_ns before a null pointer check on inode, hence if inode is actually null we will get a null pointer dereference on this assignment. Fix this by only dereferencing inode after the null pointer check on inode. Detected by CoverityScan CID#1455328 ("Dereference before null check") Fixes: 8db6c34f1dbc ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities") Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-09-24Merge branch 'next-general' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-3/+3
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull misc security layer update from James Morris: "This is the remaining 'general' change in the security tree for v4.14, following the direct merging of SELinux (+ TOMOYO), AppArmor, and seccomp. That's everything now for the security tree except IMA, which will follow shortly (I've been traveling for the past week with patchy internet)" * 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: security: fix description of values returned by cap_inode_need_killpriv
2017-09-24security: fix description of values returned by cap_inode_need_killprivStefan Berger1-3/+3
cap_inode_need_killpriv returns 1 if security.capability exists and has a value and inode_killpriv() is required, 0 otherwise. Fix the description of the return value to reflect this. Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-09-12Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-21/+256
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace Pull namespace updates from Eric Biederman: "Life has been busy and I have not gotten half as much done this round as I would have liked. I delayed it so that a minor conflict resolution with the mips tree could spend a little time in linux-next before I sent this pull request. This includes two long delayed user namespace changes from Kirill Tkhai. It also includes a very useful change from Serge Hallyn that allows the security capability attribute to be used inside of user namespaces. The practical effect of this is people can now untar tarballs and install rpms in user namespaces. It had been suggested to generalize this and encode some of the namespace information information in the xattr name. Upon close inspection that makes the things that should be hard easy and the things that should be easy more expensive. Then there is my bugfix/cleanup for signal injection that removes the magic encoding of the siginfo union member from the kernel internal si_code. The mips folks reported the case where I had used FPE_FIXME me is impossible so I have remove FPE_FIXME from mips, while at the same time including a return statement in that case to keep gcc from complaining about unitialized variables. I almost finished the work to get make copy_siginfo_to_user a trivial copy to user. The code is available at: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace.git neuter-copy_siginfo_to_user-v3 But I did not have time/energy to get the code posted and reviewed before the merge window opened. I was able to see that the security excuse for just copying fields that we know are initialized doesn't work in practice there are buggy initializations that don't initialize the proper fields in siginfo. So we still sometimes copy unitialized data to userspace" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities mips/signal: In force_fcr31_sig return in the impossible case signal: Remove kernel interal si_code magic fcntl: Don't use ambiguous SIG_POLL si_codes prctl: Allow local CAP_SYS_ADMIN changing exe_file security: Use user_namespace::level to avoid redundant iterations in cap_capable() userns,pidns: Verify the userns for new pid namespaces signal/testing: Don't look for __SI_FAULT in userspace signal/mips: Document a conflict with SI_USER with SIGFPE signal/sparc: Document a conflict with SI_USER with SIGFPE signal/ia64: Document a conflict with SI_USER with SIGFPE signal/alpha: Document a conflict with SI_USER for SIGTRAP
2017-09-01Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilitiesSerge E. Hallyn1-19/+251
Root in a non-initial user ns cannot be trusted to write a traditional security.capability xattr. If it were allowed to do so, then any unprivileged user on the host could map his own uid to root in a private namespace, write the xattr, and execute the file with privilege on the host. However supporting file capabilities in a user namespace is very desirable. Not doing so means that any programs designed to run with limited privilege must continue to support other methods of gaining and dropping privilege. For instance a program installer must detect whether file capabilities can be assigned, and assign them if so but set setuid-root otherwise. The program in turn must know how to drop partial capabilities, and do so only if setuid-root. This patch introduces v3 of the security.capability xattr. It builds a vfs_ns_cap_data struct by appending a uid_t rootid to struct vfs_cap_data. This is the absolute uid_t (that is, the uid_t in user namespace which mounted the filesystem, usually init_user_ns) of the root id in whose namespaces the file capabilities may take effect. When a task asks to write a v2 security.capability xattr, if it is privileged with respect to the userns which mounted the filesystem, then nothing should change. Otherwise, the kernel will transparently rewrite the xattr as a v3 with the appropriate rootid. This is done during the execution of setxattr() to catch user-space-initiated capability writes. Subsequently, any task executing the file which has the noted kuid as its root uid, or which is in a descendent user_ns of such a user_ns, will run the file with capabilities. Similarly when asking to read file capabilities, a v3 capability will be presented as v2 if it applies to the caller's namespace. If a task writes a v3 security.capability, then it can provide a uid for the xattr so long as the uid is valid in its own user namespace, and it is privileged with CAP_SETFCAP over its namespace. The kernel will translate that rootid to an absolute uid, and write that to disk. After this, a task in the writer's namespace will not be able to use those capabilities (unless rootid was 0), but a task in a namespace where the given uid is root will. Only a single security.capability xattr may exist at a time for a given file. A task may overwrite an existing xattr so long as it is privileged over the inode. Note this is a departure from previous semantics, which required privilege to remove a security.capability xattr. This check can be re-added if deemed useful. This allows a simple setxattr to work, allows tar/untar to work, and allows us to tar in one namespace and untar in another while preserving the capability, without risking leaking privilege into a parent namespace. Example using tar: $ cp /bin/sleep sleepx $ mkdir b1 b2 $ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100000:1 -m b:1:$(id -u):1 -- chown 0:0 b1 $ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100001:1 -m b:1:$(id -u):1 -- chown 0:0 b2 $ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100000:1000 -- tar --xattrs-include=security.capability --xattrs -cf b1/sleepx.tar sleepx $ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100001:1000 -- tar --xattrs-include=security.capability --xattrs -C b2 -xf b1/sleepx.tar $ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100001:1000 -- getcap b2/sleepx b2/sleepx = cap_sys_admin+ep # /opt/ltp/testcases/bin/getv3xattr b2/sleepx v3 xattr, rootid is 100001 A patch to linux-test-project adding a new set of tests for this functionality is in the nsfscaps branch at github.com/hallyn/ltp Changelog: Nov 02 2016: fix invalid check at refuse_fcap_overwrite() Nov 07 2016: convert rootid from and to fs user_ns (From ebiederm: mar 28 2017) commoncap.c: fix typos - s/v4/v3 get_vfs_caps_from_disk: clarify the fs_ns root access check nsfscaps: change the code split for cap_inode_setxattr() Apr 09 2017: don't return v3 cap for caps owned by current root. return a v2 cap for a true v2 cap in non-init ns Apr 18 2017: . Change the flow of fscap writing to support s_user_ns writing. . Remove refuse_fcap_overwrite(). The value of the previous xattr doesn't matter. Apr 24 2017: . incorporate Eric's incremental diff . move cap_convert_nscap to setxattr and simplify its usage May 8, 2017: . fix leaking dentry refcount in cap_inode_getsecurity Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>