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Passing a NULL buffer into the lsm_get_self_attr() syscall is a valid
way to quickly determine the minimum size of the buffer needed to for
the syscall to return all of the LSM attributes to the caller.
Unfortunately we/I broke that behavior in commit d7cf3412a9f6
("lsm: consolidate buffer size handling into lsm_fill_user_ctx()")
such that it returned an error to the caller; this patch restores the
original desired behavior of using the NULL buffer as a quick way to
correctly size the attribute buffer.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d7cf3412a9f6 ("lsm: consolidate buffer size handling into lsm_fill_user_ctx()")
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Change the size parameters in lsm_list_modules(), lsm_set_self_attr()
and lsm_get_self_attr() from size_t to u32. This avoids the need to
have different interfaces for 32 and 64 bit systems.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a04a1198088a ("LSM: syscalls for current process attributes")
Fixes: ad4aff9ec25f ("LSM: Create lsm_list_modules system call")
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reported-and-reviewed-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@strace.io>
[PM: subject and metadata tweaks, syscall.h fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore:
- Promote IMA/EVM to a proper LSM
This is the bulk of the diffstat, and the source of all the changes
in the VFS code. Prior to the start of the LSM stacking work it was
important that IMA/EVM were separate from the rest of the LSMs,
complete with their own hooks, infrastructure, etc. as it was the
only way to enable IMA/EVM at the same time as a LSM.
However, now that the bulk of the LSM infrastructure supports
multiple simultaneous LSMs, we can simplify things greatly by
bringing IMA/EVM into the LSM infrastructure as proper LSMs. This is
something I've wanted to see happen for quite some time and Roberto
was kind enough to put in the work to make it happen.
- Use the LSM hook default values to simplify the call_int_hook() macro
Previously the call_int_hook() macro required callers to supply a
default return value, despite a default value being specified when
the LSM hook was defined.
This simplifies the macro by using the defined default return value
which makes life easier for callers and should also reduce the number
of return value bugs in the future (we've had a few pop up recently,
hence this work).
- Use the KMEM_CACHE() macro instead of kmem_cache_create()
The guidance appears to be to use the KMEM_CACHE() macro when
possible and there is no reason why we can't use the macro, so let's
use it.
- Fix a number of comment typos in the LSM hook comment blocks
Not much to say here, we fixed some questionable grammar decisions in
the LSM hook comment blocks.
* tag 'lsm-pr-20240312' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: (28 commits)
cred: Use KMEM_CACHE() instead of kmem_cache_create()
lsm: use default hook return value in call_int_hook()
lsm: fix typos in security/security.c comment headers
integrity: Remove LSM
ima: Make it independent from 'integrity' LSM
evm: Make it independent from 'integrity' LSM
evm: Move to LSM infrastructure
ima: Move IMA-Appraisal to LSM infrastructure
ima: Move to LSM infrastructure
integrity: Move integrity_kernel_module_request() to IMA
security: Introduce key_post_create_or_update hook
security: Introduce inode_post_remove_acl hook
security: Introduce inode_post_set_acl hook
security: Introduce inode_post_create_tmpfile hook
security: Introduce path_post_mknod hook
security: Introduce file_release hook
security: Introduce file_post_open hook
security: Introduce inode_post_removexattr hook
security: Introduce inode_post_setattr hook
security: Align inode_setattr hook definition with EVM
...
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Cross-merge networking fixes after downstream PR.
Conflicts:
net/ipv4/udp.c
f796feabb9f5 ("udp: add local "peek offset enabled" flag")
56667da7399e ("net: implement lockless setsockopt(SO_PEEK_OFF)")
Adjacent changes:
net/unix/garbage.c
aa82ac51d633 ("af_unix: Drop oob_skb ref before purging queue in GC.")
11498715f266 ("af_unix: Remove io_uring code for GC.")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Change the definition of call_int_hook() to treat LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...)
as the "continue" value instead of 0. To further simplify this macro,
also drop the IRC argument and replace it with LSM_RET_DEFAULT(...).
After this the macro can be used in a couple more hooks, where similar
logic is currently open-coded. At the same time, some other existing
call_int_hook() users now need to be open-coded, but overall it's still
a net simplification.
There should be no functional change resulting from this patch.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: merge fuzz due to other hook changes, tweaks from list discussion]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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This commit fixes several typos in comment headers in security/security.c
where "Check is" should be "Check if".
Signed-off-by: Pairman Guo <pairmanxlr@gmail.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Since now IMA and EVM use their own integrity metadata, it is safe to
remove the 'integrity' LSM, with its management of integrity metadata.
Keep the iint.c file only for loading IMA and EVM keys at boot, and for
creating the integrity directory in securityfs (we need to keep it for
retrocompatibility reasons).
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Define a new structure for EVM-specific metadata, called evm_iint_cache,
and embed it in the inode security blob. Introduce evm_iint_inode() to
retrieve metadata, and register evm_inode_alloc_security() for the
inode_alloc_security LSM hook, to initialize the structure (before
splitting metadata, this task was done by iint_init_always()).
Keep the non-NULL checks after calling evm_iint_inode() except in
evm_inode_alloc_security(), to take into account inodes for which
security_inode_alloc() was not called. When using shared metadata,
obtaining a NULL pointer from integrity_iint_find() meant that the file
wasn't in the IMA policy. Now, because IMA and EVM use disjoint metadata,
the EVM status has to be stored for every inode regardless of the IMA
policy.
Given that from now on EVM relies on its own metadata, remove the iint
parameter from evm_verifyxattr(). Also, directly retrieve the iint in
evm_verify_hmac(), called by both evm_verifyxattr() and
evm_verify_current_integrity(), since now there is no performance penalty
in retrieving EVM metadata (constant time).
Replicate the management of the IMA_NEW_FILE flag, by introducing
evm_post_path_mknod() and evm_file_release() to respectively set and clear
the newly introduced flag EVM_NEW_FILE, at the same time IMA does. Like for
IMA, select CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH when EVM is enabled, to ensure that files
are marked as new.
Unlike ima_post_path_mknod(), evm_post_path_mknod() cannot check if a file
must be appraised. Thus, it marks all affected files. Also, it does not
clear EVM_NEW_FILE depending on i_version, but that is not a problem
because IMA_NEW_FILE is always cleared when set in ima_check_last_writer().
Move the EVM-specific flag EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG to
security/integrity/evm/evm.h, since that definition is now unnecessary in
the common integrity layer.
Finally, switch to the LSM reservation mechanism for the EVM xattr, and
consequently decrement by one the number of xattrs to allocate in
security_inode_init_security().
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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As for IMA, move hardcoded EVM function calls from various places in the
kernel to the LSM infrastructure, by introducing a new LSM named 'evm'
(last and always enabled like 'ima'). The order in the Makefile ensures
that 'evm' hooks are executed after 'ima' ones.
Make EVM functions as static (except for evm_inode_init_security(), which
is exported), and register them as hook implementations in init_evm_lsm().
Also move the inline functions evm_inode_remove_acl(),
evm_inode_post_remove_acl(), and evm_inode_post_set_acl() from the public
evm.h header to evm_main.c.
Unlike before (see commit to move IMA to the LSM infrastructure),
evm_inode_post_setattr(), evm_inode_post_set_acl(),
evm_inode_post_remove_acl(), and evm_inode_post_removexattr() are not
executed for private inodes.
Finally, add the LSM_ID_EVM case in lsm_list_modules_test.c
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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A few additional IMA hooks are needed to reset the cached appraisal
status, causing the file's integrity to be re-evaluated on next access.
Register these IMA-appraisal only functions separately from the rest of IMA
functions, as appraisal is a separate feature not necessarily enabled in
the kernel configuration.
Reuse the same approach as for other IMA functions, move hardcoded calls
from various places in the kernel to the LSM infrastructure. Declare the
functions as static and register them as hook implementations in
init_ima_appraise_lsm(), called by init_ima_lsm().
Also move the inline function ima_inode_remove_acl() from the public ima.h
header to ima_appraise.c.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Move hardcoded IMA function calls (not appraisal-specific functions) from
various places in the kernel to the LSM infrastructure, by introducing a
new LSM named 'ima' (at the end of the LSM list and always enabled like
'integrity').
Having IMA before EVM in the Makefile is sufficient to preserve the
relative order of the new 'ima' LSM in respect to the upcoming 'evm' LSM,
and thus the order of IMA and EVM function calls as when they were
hardcoded.
Make moved functions as static (except ima_post_key_create_or_update(),
which is not in ima_main.c), and register them as implementation of the
respective hooks in the new function init_ima_lsm().
Select CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH, to ensure that the path-based LSM hook
path_post_mknod is always available and ima_post_path_mknod() is always
executed to mark files as new, as before the move.
A slight difference is that IMA and EVM functions registered for the
inode_post_setattr, inode_post_removexattr, path_post_mknod,
inode_post_create_tmpfile, inode_post_set_acl and inode_post_remove_acl
won't be executed for private inodes. Since those inodes are supposed to be
fs-internal, they should not be of interest to IMA or EVM. The S_PRIVATE
flag is used for anonymous inodes, hugetlbfs, reiserfs xattrs, XFS scrub
and kernel-internal tmpfs files.
Conditionally register ima_post_key_create_or_update() if
CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS is enabled. Also, conditionally register
ima_kernel_module_request() if CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS is enabled.
Finally, add the LSM_ID_IMA case in lsm_list_modules_test.c.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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In preparation for removing the 'integrity' LSM, move
integrity_kernel_module_request() to IMA, and rename it to
ima_kernel_module_request(). Rewrite the function documentation, to explain
better what the problem is.
Compile it conditionally if CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS is enabled,
and call it from security.c (removed afterwards with the move of IMA to the
LSM infrastructure).
Adding this hook cannot be avoided, since IMA has no control on the flags
passed to crypto_alloc_sig() in public_key_verify_signature(), and thus
cannot pass CRYPTO_NOLOAD, which solved the problem for EVM hashing with
commit e2861fa71641 ("evm: Don't deadlock if a crypto algorithm is
unavailable").
EVM alone does not need to implement this hook, first because there is no
mutex to deadlock, and second because even if it had it, there should be a
recursive call. However, since verification from EVM can be initiated only
by setting inode metadata, deadlock would occur if modprobe would do the
same while loading a kernel module (which is unlikely).
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
the key_post_create_or_update hook.
Depending on policy, IMA measures the key content after creation or update,
so that remote verifiers are aware of the operation.
Other LSMs could similarly take some action after successful key creation
or update.
The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
reverted.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
the inode_post_remove_acl hook.
At inode_remove_acl hook, EVM verifies the file's existing HMAC value. At
inode_post_remove_acl, EVM re-calculates the file's HMAC with the passed
POSIX ACL removed and other file metadata.
Other LSMs could similarly take some action after successful POSIX ACL
removal.
The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
reverted.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
the inode_post_set_acl hook.
At inode_set_acl hook, EVM verifies the file's existing HMAC value. At
inode_post_set_acl, EVM re-calculates the file's HMAC based on the modified
POSIX ACL and other file metadata.
Other LSMs could similarly take some action after successful POSIX ACL
change.
The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
reverted.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
the inode_post_create_tmpfile hook.
As temp files can be made persistent, treat new temp files like other new
files, so that the file hash is calculated and stored in the security
xattr.
LSMs could also take some action after temp files have been created.
The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
canceled.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
the path_post_mknod hook.
IMA-appraisal requires all existing files in policy to have a file
hash/signature stored in security.ima. An exception is made for empty files
created by mknod, by tagging them as new files.
LSMs could also take some action after files are created.
The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
reverted.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
the file_release hook.
IMA calculates at file close the new digest of the file content and writes
it to security.ima, so that appraisal at next file access succeeds.
The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
reverted.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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In preparation to move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce the
file_post_open hook. Also, export security_file_post_open() for NFS.
Based on policy, IMA calculates the digest of the file content and
extends the TPM with the digest, verifies the file's integrity based on
the digest, and/or includes the file digest in the audit log.
LSMs could similarly take action depending on the file content and the
access mask requested with open().
The new hook returns a value and can cause the open to be aborted.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
the inode_post_removexattr hook.
At inode_removexattr hook, EVM verifies the file's existing HMAC value. At
inode_post_removexattr, EVM re-calculates the file's HMAC with the passed
xattr removed and other file metadata.
Other LSMs could similarly take some action after successful xattr removal.
The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
reverted.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
the inode_post_setattr hook.
At inode_setattr hook, EVM verifies the file's existing HMAC value. At
inode_post_setattr, EVM re-calculates the file's HMAC based on the modified
file attributes and other file metadata.
Other LSMs could similarly take some action after successful file attribute
change.
The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
reverted.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Add the idmap parameter to the definition, so that evm_inode_setattr() can
be registered as this hook implementation.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Change evm_inode_post_setxattr() definition, so that it can be registered
as implementation of the inode_post_setxattr hook.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Change evm_inode_setxattr() definition, so that it can be registered as
implementation of the inode_setxattr hook.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Change ima_inode_removexattr() definition, so that it can be registered as
implementation of the inode_removexattr hook.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Change ima_inode_setxattr() definition, so that it can be registered as
implementation of the inode_setxattr hook.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Change ima_file_mprotect() definition, so that it can be registered
as implementation of the file_mprotect hook.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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security_setselfattr() has an integer overflow bug that leads to
out-of-bounds access when userspace provides bogus input:
`lctx->ctx_len + sizeof(*lctx)` is checked against `lctx->len` (and,
redundantly, also against `size`), but there are no checks on
`lctx->ctx_len`.
Therefore, userspace can provide an `lsm_ctx` with `->ctx_len` set to a
value between `-sizeof(struct lsm_ctx)` and -1, and this bogus `->ctx_len`
will then be passed to an LSM module as a buffer length, causing LSM
modules to perform out-of-bounds accesses.
The following reproducer will demonstrate this under ASAN (if AppArmor is
loaded as an LSM):
```
struct lsm_ctx {
uint64_t id;
uint64_t flags;
uint64_t len;
uint64_t ctx_len;
char ctx[];
};
int main(void) {
size_t size = sizeof(struct lsm_ctx);
struct lsm_ctx *ctx = malloc(size);
ctx->id = 104/*LSM_ID_APPARMOR*/;
ctx->flags = 0;
ctx->len = size;
ctx->ctx_len = -sizeof(struct lsm_ctx);
syscall(
460/*__NR_lsm_set_self_attr*/,
/*attr=*/ 100/*LSM_ATTR_CURRENT*/,
/*ctx=*/ ctx,
/*size=*/ size,
/*flags=*/ 0
);
}
```
Fixes: a04a1198088a ("LSM: syscalls for current process attributes")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subj tweak, removed ref to ASAN splat that isn't included]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Cross-merge networking fixes after downstream PR.
No conflicts or adjacent changes.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
|
|
For these hooks the true "neutral" value is -EOPNOTSUPP, which is
currently what is returned when no LSM provides this hook and what LSMs
return when there is no security context set on the socket. Correct the
value in <linux/lsm_hooks.h> and adjust the dispatch functions in
security/security.c to avoid issues when the BPF LSM is enabled.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 98e828a0650f ("security: Refactor declaration of LSM hooks")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
The inode_getsecctx LSM hook has previously been corrected to have
-EOPNOTSUPP instead of 0 as the default return value to fix BPF LSM
behavior. However, the call_int_hook()-generated loop in
security_inode_getsecctx() was left treating 0 as the neutral value, so
after an LSM returns 0, the loop continues to try other LSMs, and if one
of them returns a non-zero value, the function immediately returns with
said value. So in a situation where SELinux and the BPF LSMs registered
this hook, -EOPNOTSUPP would be incorrectly returned whenever SELinux
returned 0.
Fix this by open-coding the call_int_hook() loop and making it use the
correct LSM_RET_DEFAULT() value as the neutral one, similar to what
other hooks do.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/CAEjxPJ4ev-pasUwGx48fDhnmjBnq_Wh90jYPwRQRAqXxmOKD4Q@mail.gmail.com/
Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2257983
Fixes: b36995b8609a ("lsm: fix default return value for inode_getsecctx")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Wire up bpf_token_create and bpf_token_free LSM hooks, which allow to
allocate LSM security blob (we add `void *security` field to struct
bpf_token for that), but also control who can instantiate BPF token.
This follows existing pattern for BPF map and BPF prog.
Also add security_bpf_token_allow_cmd() and security_bpf_token_capable()
LSM hooks that allow LSM implementation to control and negate (if
necessary) BPF token's delegation of a specific bpf_cmd and capability,
respectively.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-12-andrii@kernel.org
|
|
Similarly to bpf_prog_alloc LSM hook, rename and extend bpf_map_alloc
hook into bpf_map_create, taking not just struct bpf_map, but also
bpf_attr and bpf_token, to give a fuller context to LSMs.
Unlike bpf_prog_alloc, there is no need to move the hook around, as it
currently is firing right before allocating BPF map ID and FD, which
seems to be a sweet spot.
But like bpf_prog_alloc/bpf_prog_free combo, make sure that bpf_map_free
LSM hook is called even if bpf_map_create hook returned error, as if few
LSMs are combined together it could be that one LSM successfully
allocated security blob for its needs, while subsequent LSM rejected BPF
map creation. The former LSM would still need to free up LSM blob, so we
need to ensure security_bpf_map_free() is called regardless of the
outcome.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-11-andrii@kernel.org
|
|
Based on upstream discussion ([0]), rework existing
bpf_prog_alloc_security LSM hook. Rename it to bpf_prog_load and instead
of passing bpf_prog_aux, pass proper bpf_prog pointer for a full BPF
program struct. Also, we pass bpf_attr union with all the user-provided
arguments for BPF_PROG_LOAD command. This will give LSMs as much
information as we can basically provide.
The hook is also BPF token-aware now, and optional bpf_token struct is
passed as a third argument. bpf_prog_load LSM hook is called after
a bunch of sanity checks were performed, bpf_prog and bpf_prog_aux were
allocated and filled out, but right before performing full-fledged BPF
verification step.
bpf_prog_free LSM hook is now accepting struct bpf_prog argument, for
consistency. SELinux code is adjusted to all new names, types, and
signatures.
Note, given that bpf_prog_load (previously bpf_prog_alloc) hook can be
used by some LSMs to allocate extra security blob, but also by other
LSMs to reject BPF program loading, we need to make sure that
bpf_prog_free LSM hook is called after bpf_prog_load/bpf_prog_alloc one
*even* if the hook itself returned error. If we don't do that, we run
the risk of leaking memory. This seems to be possible today when
combining SELinux and BPF LSM, as one example, depending on their
relative ordering.
Also, for BPF LSM setup, add bpf_prog_load and bpf_prog_free to
sleepable LSM hooks list, as they are both executed in sleepable
context. Also drop bpf_prog_load hook from untrusted, as there is no
issue with refcount or anything else anymore, that originally forced us
to add it to untrusted list in c0c852dd1876 ("bpf: Do not mark certain LSM
hook arguments as trusted"). We now trigger this hook much later and it
should not be an issue anymore.
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/9fe88aef7deabbe87d3fc38c4aea3c69.paul@paul-moore.com/
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-10-andrii@kernel.org
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
- Add a new IMA/EVM maintainer and reviewer
- Disable EVM on overlayfs
The EVM HMAC and the original file signatures contain filesystem
specific metadata (e.g. i_ino, i_generation and s_uuid), preventing
the security.evm xattr from directly being copied up to the overlay.
Further before calculating and writing out the overlay file's EVM
HMAC, EVM must first verify the existing backing file's
'security.evm' value.
For now until a solution is developed, disable EVM on overlayfs.
- One bug fix and two cleanups
* tag 'integrity-v6.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
overlay: disable EVM
evm: add support to disable EVM on unsupported filesystems
evm: don't copy up 'security.evm' xattr
MAINTAINERS: Add Eric Snowberg as a reviewer to IMA
MAINTAINERS: Add Roberto Sassu as co-maintainer to IMA and EVM
KEYS: encrypted: Add check for strsep
ima: Remove EXPERIMENTAL from Kconfig
ima: Reword IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull security module updates from Paul Moore:
- Add three new syscalls: lsm_list_modules(), lsm_get_self_attr(), and
lsm_set_self_attr().
The first syscall simply lists the LSMs enabled, while the second and
third get and set the current process' LSM attributes. Yes, these
syscalls may provide similar functionality to what can be found under
/proc or /sys, but they were designed to support multiple,
simultaneaous (stacked) LSMs from the start as opposed to the current
/proc based solutions which were created at a time when only one LSM
was allowed to be active at a given time.
We have spent considerable time discussing ways to extend the
existing /proc interfaces to support multiple, simultaneaous LSMs and
even our best ideas have been far too ugly to support as a kernel
API; after +20 years in the kernel, I felt the LSM layer had
established itself enough to justify a handful of syscalls.
Support amongst the individual LSM developers has been nearly
unanimous, with a single objection coming from Tetsuo (TOMOYO) as he
is worried that the LSM_ID_XXX token concept will make it more
difficult for out-of-tree LSMs to survive. Several members of the LSM
community have demonstrated the ability for out-of-tree LSMs to
continue to exist by picking high/unused LSM_ID values as well as
pointing out that many kernel APIs rely on integer identifiers, e.g.
syscalls (!), but unfortunately Tetsuo's objections remain.
My personal opinion is that while I have no interest in penalizing
out-of-tree LSMs, I'm not going to penalize in-tree development to
support out-of-tree development, and I view this as a necessary step
forward to support the push for expanded LSM stacking and reduce our
reliance on /proc and /sys which has occassionally been problematic
for some container users. Finally, we have included the linux-api
folks on (all?) recent revisions of the patchset and addressed all of
their concerns.
- Add a new security_file_ioctl_compat() LSM hook to handle the 32-bit
ioctls on 64-bit systems problem.
This patch includes support for all of the existing LSMs which
provide ioctl hooks, although it turns out only SELinux actually
cares about the individual ioctls. It is worth noting that while
Casey (Smack) and Tetsuo (TOMOYO) did not give explicit ACKs to this
patch, they did both indicate they are okay with the changes.
- Fix a potential memory leak in the CALIPSO code when IPv6 is disabled
at boot.
While it's good that we are fixing this, I doubt this is something
users are seeing in the wild as you need to both disable IPv6 and
then attempt to configure IPv6 labeled networking via
NetLabel/CALIPSO; that just doesn't make much sense.
Normally this would go through netdev, but Jakub asked me to take
this patch and of all the trees I maintain, the LSM tree seemed like
the best fit.
- Update the LSM MAINTAINERS entry with additional information about
our process docs, patchwork, bug reporting, etc.
I also noticed that the Lockdown LSM is missing a dedicated
MAINTAINERS entry so I've added that to the pull request. I've been
working with one of the major Lockdown authors/contributors to see if
they are willing to step up and assume a Lockdown maintainer role;
hopefully that will happen soon, but in the meantime I'll continue to
look after it.
- Add a handful of mailmap entries for Serge Hallyn and myself.
* tag 'lsm-pr-20240105' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: (27 commits)
lsm: new security_file_ioctl_compat() hook
lsm: Add a __counted_by() annotation to lsm_ctx.ctx
calipso: fix memory leak in netlbl_calipso_add_pass()
selftests: remove the LSM_ID_IMA check in lsm/lsm_list_modules_test
MAINTAINERS: add an entry for the lockdown LSM
MAINTAINERS: update the LSM entry
mailmap: add entries for Serge Hallyn's dead accounts
mailmap: update/replace my old email addresses
lsm: mark the lsm_id variables are marked as static
lsm: convert security_setselfattr() to use memdup_user()
lsm: align based on pointer length in lsm_fill_user_ctx()
lsm: consolidate buffer size handling into lsm_fill_user_ctx()
lsm: correct error codes in security_getselfattr()
lsm: cleanup the size counters in security_getselfattr()
lsm: don't yet account for IMA in LSM_CONFIG_COUNT calculation
lsm: drop LSM_ID_IMA
LSM: selftests for Linux Security Module syscalls
SELinux: Add selfattr hooks
AppArmor: Add selfattr hooks
Smack: implement setselfattr and getselfattr hooks
...
|
|
Some ioctl commands do not require ioctl permission, but are routed to
other permissions such as FILE_GETATTR or FILE_SETATTR. This routing is
done by comparing the ioctl cmd to a set of 64-bit flags (FS_IOC_*).
However, if a 32-bit process is running on a 64-bit kernel, it emits
32-bit flags (FS_IOC32_*) for certain ioctl operations. These flags are
being checked erroneously, which leads to these ioctl operations being
routed to the ioctl permission, rather than the correct file
permissions.
This was also noted in a RED-PEN finding from a while back -
"/* RED-PEN how should LSM module know it's handling 32bit? */".
This patch introduces a new hook, security_file_ioctl_compat(), that is
called from the compat ioctl syscall. All current LSMs have been changed
to support this hook.
Reviewing the three places where we are currently using
security_file_ioctl(), it appears that only SELinux needs a dedicated
compat change; TOMOYO and SMACK appear to be functional without any
change.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 0b24dcb7f2f7 ("Revert "selinux: simplify ioctl checking"")
Signed-off-by: Alfred Piccioni <alpic@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
[PM: subject tweak, line length fixes, and alignment corrections]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
The security.evm HMAC and the original file signatures contain
filesystem specific data. As a result, the HMAC and signature
are not the same on the stacked and backing filesystems.
Don't copy up 'security.evm'.
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
|
|
In preparation for pre-content permission events with file access range,
move fsnotify_file_perm() hook out of security_file_permission() and into
the callers.
Callers that have the access range information call the new hook
fsnotify_file_area_perm() with the access range.
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231212094440.250945-6-amir73il@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
|
|
We would like to make changes to the fsnotify access permission hook -
add file range arguments and add the pre modify event.
In preparation for these changes, split the fsnotify_perm() hook into
fsnotify_open_perm() and fsnotify_file_perm().
This is needed for fanotify "pre content" events.
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231212094440.250945-4-amir73il@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
|
|
As suggested by the kernel test robot, memdup_user() is a better
option than the combo of kmalloc()/copy_from_user().
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202310270805.2ArE52i5-lkp@intel.com/
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Using the size of a void pointer is much cleaner than
BITS_PER_LONG / 8.
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
While we have a lsm_fill_user_ctx() helper function designed to make
life easier for LSMs which return lsm_ctx structs to userspace, we
didn't include all of the buffer length safety checks and buffer
padding adjustments in the helper. This led to code duplication
across the different LSMs and the possibility for mistakes across the
different LSM subsystems. In order to reduce code duplication and
decrease the chances of silly mistakes, we're consolidating all of
this code into the lsm_fill_user_ctx() helper.
The buffer padding is also modified from a fixed 8-byte alignment to
an alignment that matches the word length of the machine
(BITS_PER_LONG / 8).
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
We should return -EINVAL if the user specifies LSM_FLAG_SINGLE without
supplying a valid lsm_ctx struct buffer.
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Zero out all of the size counters in the -E2BIG case (buffer too
small) to help make the current code a bit more robust in the face of
future code changes.
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Since IMA is not yet an LSM, don't account for it in the LSM_CONFIG_COUNT
calculation, used to limit how many LSMs can invoke security_add_hooks().
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Add lsm_name_to_attr(), which translates a text string to a
LSM_ATTR value if one is available.
Add lsm_fill_user_ctx(), which fills a struct lsm_ctx, including
the trailing attribute value.
Both are used in module specific components of LSM system calls.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Create a system call lsm_get_self_attr() to provide the security
module maintained attributes of the current process.
Create a system call lsm_set_self_attr() to set a security
module maintained attribute of the current process.
Historically these attributes have been exposed to user space via
entries in procfs under /proc/self/attr.
The attribute value is provided in a lsm_ctx structure. The structure
identifies the size of the attribute, and the attribute value. The format
of the attribute value is defined by the security module. A flags field
is included for LSM specific information. It is currently unused and must
be 0. The total size of the data, including the lsm_ctx structure and any
padding, is maintained as well.
struct lsm_ctx {
__u64 id;
__u64 flags;
__u64 len;
__u64 ctx_len;
__u8 ctx[];
};
Two new LSM hooks are used to interface with the LSMs.
security_getselfattr() collects the lsm_ctx values from the
LSMs that support the hook, accounting for space requirements.
security_setselfattr() identifies which LSM the attribute is
intended for and passes it along.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Use the LSM ID number instead of the LSM name to identify which
security module's attibute data should be shown in /proc/self/attr.
The security_[gs]etprocattr() functions have been changed to expect
the LSM ID. The change from a string comparison to an integer comparison
in these functions will provide a minor performance improvement.
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Mickael Salaun <mic@digikod.net>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
As LSMs are registered add their lsm_id pointers to a table.
This will be used later for attribute reporting.
Determine the number of possible security modules based on
their respective CONFIG options. This allows the number to be
known at build time. This allows data structures and tables
to use the constant.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Mickael Salaun <mic@digikod.net>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|