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2017-09-12Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20170831' of ↵Linus Torvalds26-50/+77
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore: "A relatively quiet period for SELinux, 11 patches with only two/three having any substantive changes. These noteworthy changes include another tweak to the NNP/nosuid handling, per-file labeling for cgroups, and an object class fix for AF_UNIX/SOCK_RAW sockets; the rest of the changes are minor tweaks or administrative updates (Stephen's email update explains the file explosion in the diffstat). Everything passes the selinux-testsuite" [ Also a couple of small patches from the security tree from Tetsuo Handa for Tomoyo and LSM cleanup. The separation of security policy updates wasn't all that clean - Linus ] * tag 'selinux-pr-20170831' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: selinux: constify nf_hook_ops selinux: allow per-file labeling for cgroupfs lsm_audit: update my email address selinux: update my email address MAINTAINERS: update the NetLabel and Labeled Networking information selinux: use GFP_NOWAIT in the AVC kmem_caches selinux: Generalize support for NNP/nosuid SELinux domain transitions selinux: genheaders should fail if too many permissions are defined selinux: update the selinux info in MAINTAINERS credits: update Paul Moore's info selinux: Assign proper class to PF_UNIX/SOCK_RAW sockets tomoyo: Update URLs in Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/tomoyo.rst LSM: Remove security_task_create() hook.
2017-09-08Merge tag 'audit-pr-20170907' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-2/+0
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit Pull audit updates from Paul Moore: "A small pull request for audit this time, only four patches and only two with any real code changes. Those two changes are the removal of a pointless SELinux AVC initialization audit event and a fix to improve the audit timestamp overhead. The other two patches are comment cleanup and administrative updates, nothing very exciting. Everything passes our tests" * tag 'audit-pr-20170907' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit: audit: update the function comments selinux: remove AVC init audit log message audit: update the audit info in MAINTAINERS audit: Reduce overhead using a coarse clock
2017-09-08Merge tag 'secureexec-v4.14-rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-20/+6
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux Pull secureexec update from Kees Cook: "This series has the ultimate goal of providing a sane stack rlimit when running set*id processes. To do this, the bprm_secureexec LSM hook is collapsed into the bprm_set_creds hook so the secureexec-ness of an exec can be determined early enough to make decisions about rlimits and the resulting memory layouts. Other logic acting on the secureexec-ness of an exec is similarly consolidated. Capabilities needed some special handling, but the refactoring removed other special handling, so that was a wash" * tag 'secureexec-v4.14-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: exec: Consolidate pdeath_signal clearing exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec exec: Consolidate dumpability logic smack: Remove redundant pdeath_signal clearing exec: Use secureexec for clearing pdeath_signal exec: Use secureexec for setting dumpability LSM: drop bprm_secureexec hook commoncap: Move cap_elevated calculation into bprm_set_creds commoncap: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook smack: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook selinux: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook apparmor: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook binfmt: Introduce secureexec flag exec: Correct comments about "point of no return" exec: Rename bprm->cred_prepared to called_set_creds
2017-09-05selinux: remove AVC init audit log messageRichard Guy Briggs1-2/+0
In the process of normalizing audit log messages, it was noticed that the AVC initialization code registered an audit log KERNEL record that didn't fit the standard format. In the process of attempting to normalize it it was determined that this record was not even necessary. Remove it. Ref: http://marc.info/?l=selinux&m=149614868525826&w=2 See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/48 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-08-29selinux: constify nf_hook_opsArvind Yadav1-1/+1
nf_hook_ops are not supposed to change at runtime. nf_register_net_hooks and nf_unregister_net_hooks are working with const nf_hook_ops. So mark the non-const nf_hook_ops structs as const. Signed-off-by: Arvind Yadav <arvind.yadav.cs@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-08-22selinux: allow per-file labeling for cgroupfsAntonio Murdaca1-1/+3
This patch allows genfscon per-file labeling for cgroupfs. For instance, this allows to label the "release_agent" file within each cgroup mount and limit writes to it. Signed-off-by: Antonio Murdaca <amurdaca@redhat.com> [PM: subject line and merge tweaks] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-08-17selinux: update my email addressStephen Smalley25-25/+25
Update my email address since epoch.ncsc.mil no longer exists. MAINTAINERS and CREDITS are already correct. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-08-08selinux: use GFP_NOWAIT in the AVC kmem_cachesMichal Hocko1-8/+6
There is a strange __GFP_NOMEMALLOC usage pattern in SELinux, specifically GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC which doesn't make much sense. GFP_ATOMIC on its own allows to access memory reserves while __GFP_NOMEMALLOC dictates we cannot use memory reserves. Replace this with the much more sane GFP_NOWAIT in the AVC code as we can tolerate memory allocation failures in that code. Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-08-02selinux: Generalize support for NNP/nosuid SELinux domain transitionsStephen Smalley4-16/+42
As systemd ramps up enabling NNP (NoNewPrivileges) for system services, it is increasingly breaking SELinux domain transitions for those services and their descendants. systemd enables NNP not only for services whose unit files explicitly specify NoNewPrivileges=yes but also for services whose unit files specify any of the following options in combination with running without CAP_SYS_ADMIN (e.g. specifying User= or a CapabilityBoundingSet= without CAP_SYS_ADMIN): SystemCallFilter=, SystemCallArchitectures=, RestrictAddressFamilies=, RestrictNamespaces=, PrivateDevices=, ProtectKernelTunables=, ProtectKernelModules=, MemoryDenyWriteExecute=, or RestrictRealtime= as per the systemd.exec(5) man page. The end result is bad for the security of both SELinux-disabled and SELinux-enabled systems. Packagers have to turn off these options in the unit files to preserve SELinux domain transitions. For users who choose to disable SELinux, this means that they miss out on at least having the systemd-supported protections. For users who keep SELinux enabled, they may still be missing out on some protections because it isn't necessarily guaranteed that the SELinux policy for that service provides the same protections in all cases. commit 7b0d0b40cd78 ("selinux: Permit bounded transitions under NO_NEW_PRIVS or NOSUID.") allowed bounded transitions under NNP in order to support limited usage for sandboxing programs. However, defining typebounds for all of the affected service domains is impractical to implement in policy, since typebounds requires us to ensure that each domain is allowed everything all of its descendant domains are allowed, and this has to be repeated for the entire chain of domain transitions. There is no way to clone all allow rules from descendants to their ancestors in policy currently, and doing so would be undesirable even if it were practical, as it requires leaking permissions to objects and operations into ancestor domains that could weaken their own security in order to allow them to the descendants (e.g. if a descendant requires execmem permission, then so do all of its ancestors; if a descendant requires execute permission to a file, then so do all of its ancestors; if a descendant requires read to a symbolic link or temporary file, then so do all of its ancestors...). SELinux domains are intentionally not hierarchical / bounded in this manner normally, and making them so would undermine their protections and least privilege. We have long had a similar tension with SELinux transitions and nosuid mounts, albeit not as severe. Users often have had to choose between retaining nosuid on a mount and allowing SELinux domain transitions on files within those mounts. This likewise leads to unfortunate tradeoffs in security. Decouple NNP/nosuid from SELinux transitions, so that we don't have to make a choice between them. Introduce a nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability that enables transitions under NNP/nosuid to be based on a permission (nnp_transition for NNP; nosuid_transition for nosuid) between the old and new contexts in addition to the current support for bounded transitions. Domain transitions can then be allowed in policy without requiring the parent to be a strict superset of all of its children. With this change, systemd unit files can be left unmodified from upstream. SELinux-disabled and SELinux-enabled users will benefit from retaining any of the systemd-provided protections. SELinux policy will only need to be adapted to enable the new policy capability and to allow the new permissions between domain pairs as appropriate. NB: Allowing nnp_transition between two contexts opens up the potential for the old context to subvert the new context by installing seccomp filters before the execve. Allowing nosuid_transition between two contexts opens up the potential for a context transition to occur on a file from an untrusted filesystem (e.g. removable media or remote filesystem). Use with care. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-08-01selinux: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hookKees Cook1-19/+5
The SELinux bprm_secureexec hook can be merged with the bprm_set_creds hook since it's dealing with the same information, and all of the details are finalized during the first call to the bprm_set_creds hook via prepare_binprm() (subsequent calls due to binfmt_script, etc, are ignored via bprm->called_set_creds). Here, the test can just happen at the end of the bprm_set_creds hook, and the bprm_secureexec hook can be dropped. Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Tested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
2017-08-01exec: Rename bprm->cred_prepared to called_set_credsKees Cook1-1/+1
The cred_prepared bprm flag has a misleading name. It has nothing to do with the bprm_prepare_cred hook, and actually tracks if bprm_set_creds has been called. Rename this flag and improve its comment. Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
2017-07-31netfilter: nf_hook_ops structs can be constFlorian Westphal1-1/+1
We no longer place these on a list so they can be const. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2017-07-25selinux: Assign proper class to PF_UNIX/SOCK_RAW socketsLuis Ressel1-0/+1
For PF_UNIX, SOCK_RAW is synonymous with SOCK_DGRAM (cf. net/unix/af_unix.c). This is a tad obscure, but libpcap uses it. Signed-off-by: Luis Ressel <aranea@aixah.de> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-07-18xfrm: remove flow cacheFlorian Westphal1-3/+1
After rcu conversions performance degradation in forward tests isn't that noticeable anymore. See next patch for some numbers. A followup patcg could then also remove genid from the policies as we do not cache bundles anymore. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-06Merge branch 'work.memdup_user' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-7/+5
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull memdup_user() conversions from Al Viro: "A fairly self-contained series - hunting down open-coded memdup_user() and memdup_user_nul() instances" * 'work.memdup_user' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: bpf: don't open-code memdup_user() kimage_file_prepare_segments(): don't open-code memdup_user() ethtool: don't open-code memdup_user() do_ip_setsockopt(): don't open-code memdup_user() do_ipv6_setsockopt(): don't open-code memdup_user() irda: don't open-code memdup_user() xfrm_user_policy(): don't open-code memdup_user() ima_write_policy(): don't open-code memdup_user_nul() sel_write_validatetrans(): don't open-code memdup_user_nul()
2017-07-05Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-nextLinus Torvalds1-1/+2
Pull networking updates from David Miller: "Reasonably busy this cycle, but perhaps not as busy as in the 4.12 merge window: 1) Several optimizations for UDP processing under high load from Paolo Abeni. 2) Support pacing internally in TCP when using the sch_fq packet scheduler for this is not practical. From Eric Dumazet. 3) Support mutliple filter chains per qdisc, from Jiri Pirko. 4) Move to 1ms TCP timestamp clock, from Eric Dumazet. 5) Add batch dequeueing to vhost_net, from Jason Wang. 6) Flesh out more completely SCTP checksum offload support, from Davide Caratti. 7) More plumbing of extended netlink ACKs, from David Ahern, Pablo Neira Ayuso, and Matthias Schiffer. 8) Add devlink support to nfp driver, from Simon Horman. 9) Add RTM_F_FIB_MATCH flag to RTM_GETROUTE queries, from Roopa Prabhu. 10) Add stack depth tracking to BPF verifier and use this information in the various eBPF JITs. From Alexei Starovoitov. 11) Support XDP on qed device VFs, from Yuval Mintz. 12) Introduce BPF PROG ID for better introspection of installed BPF programs. From Martin KaFai Lau. 13) Add bpf_set_hash helper for TC bpf programs, from Daniel Borkmann. 14) For loads, allow narrower accesses in bpf verifier checking, from Yonghong Song. 15) Support MIPS in the BPF selftests and samples infrastructure, the MIPS eBPF JIT will be merged in via the MIPS GIT tree. From David Daney. 16) Support kernel based TLS, from Dave Watson and others. 17) Remove completely DST garbage collection, from Wei Wang. 18) Allow installing TCP MD5 rules using prefixes, from Ivan Delalande. 19) Add XDP support to Intel i40e driver, from Björn Töpel 20) Add support for TC flower offload in nfp driver, from Simon Horman, Pieter Jansen van Vuuren, Benjamin LaHaise, Jakub Kicinski, and Bert van Leeuwen. 21) IPSEC offloading support in mlx5, from Ilan Tayari. 22) Add HW PTP support to macb driver, from Rafal Ozieblo. 23) Networking refcount_t conversions, From Elena Reshetova. 24) Add sock_ops support to BPF, from Lawrence Brako. This is useful for tuning the TCP sockopt settings of a group of applications, currently via CGROUPs" * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1899 commits) net: phy: dp83867: add workaround for incorrect RX_CTRL pin strap dt-bindings: phy: dp83867: provide a workaround for incorrect RX_CTRL pin strap cxgb4: Support for get_ts_info ethtool method cxgb4: Add PTP Hardware Clock (PHC) support cxgb4: time stamping interface for PTP nfp: default to chained metadata prepend format nfp: remove legacy MAC address lookup nfp: improve order of interfaces in breakout mode net: macb: remove extraneous return when MACB_EXT_DESC is defined bpf: add missing break in for the TCP_BPF_SNDCWND_CLAMP case bpf: fix return in load_bpf_file mpls: fix rtm policy in mpls_getroute net, ax25: convert ax25_cb.refcount from atomic_t to refcount_t net, ax25: convert ax25_route.refcount from atomic_t to refcount_t net, ax25: convert ax25_uid_assoc.refcount from atomic_t to refcount_t net, sctp: convert sctp_ep_common.refcnt from atomic_t to refcount_t net, sctp: convert sctp_transport.refcnt from atomic_t to refcount_t net, sctp: convert sctp_chunk.refcnt from atomic_t to refcount_t net, sctp: convert sctp_datamsg.refcnt from atomic_t to refcount_t net, sctp: convert sctp_auth_bytes.refcnt from atomic_t to refcount_t ...
2017-07-05Merge branch 'next' of ↵Linus Torvalds14-106/+743
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security layer updates from James Morris: - a major update for AppArmor. From JJ: * several bug fixes and cleanups * the patch to add symlink support to securityfs that was floated on the list earlier and the apparmorfs changes that make use of securityfs symlinks * it introduces the domain labeling base code that Ubuntu has been carrying for several years, with several cleanups applied. And it converts the current mediation over to using the domain labeling base, which brings domain stacking support with it. This finally will bring the base upstream code in line with Ubuntu and provide a base to upstream the new feature work that Ubuntu carries. * This does _not_ contain any of the newer apparmor mediation features/controls (mount, signals, network, keys, ...) that Ubuntu is currently carrying, all of which will be RFC'd on top of this. - Notable also is the Infiniband work in SELinux, and the new file:map permission. From Paul: "While we're down to 21 patches for v4.13 (it was 31 for v4.12), the diffstat jumps up tremendously with over 2k of line changes. Almost all of these changes are the SELinux/IB work done by Daniel Jurgens; some other noteworthy changes include a NFS v4.2 labeling fix, a new file:map permission, and reporting of policy capabilities on policy load" There's also now genfscon labeling support for tracefs, which was lost in v4.1 with the separation from debugfs. - Smack incorporates a safer socket check in file_receive, and adds a cap_capable call in privilege check. - TPM as usual has a bunch of fixes and enhancements. - Multiple calls to security_add_hooks() can now be made for the same LSM, to allow LSMs to have hook declarations across multiple files. - IMA now supports different "ima_appraise=" modes (eg. log, fix) from the boot command line. * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (126 commits) apparmor: put back designators in struct initialisers seccomp: Switch from atomic_t to recount_t seccomp: Adjust selftests to avoid double-join seccomp: Clean up core dump logic IMA: update IMA policy documentation to include pcr= option ima: Log the same audit cause whenever a file has no signature ima: Simplify policy_func_show. integrity: Small code improvements ima: fix get_binary_runtime_size() ima: use ima_parse_buf() to parse template data ima: use ima_parse_buf() to parse measurements headers ima: introduce ima_parse_buf() ima: Add cgroups2 to the defaults list ima: use memdup_user_nul ima: fix up #endif comments IMA: Correct Kconfig dependencies for hash selection ima: define is_ima_appraise_enabled() ima: define Kconfig IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM option ima: define a set of appraisal rules requiring file signatures ima: extend the "ima_policy" boot command line to support multiple policies ...
2017-06-22Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/netDavid S. Miller1-3/+2
Two entries being added at the same time to the IFLA policy table, whilst parallel bug fixes to decnet routing dst handling overlapping with the dst gc removal in net-next. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-21rtnetlink: add NEWCACHEREPORT message typeJulien Gomes1-1/+2
New NEWCACHEREPORT message type to be used for cache reports sent via Netlink, effectively allowing splitting cache report reception from mroute programming. Suggested-by: Ryan Halbrook <halbrook@arista.com> Signed-off-by: Julien Gomes <julien@arista.com> Reviewed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-20selinux: enable genfscon labeling for tracefsJeff Vander Stoep1-0/+1
In kernel version 4.1, tracefs was separated from debugfs into its own filesystem. Prior to this split, files in /sys/kernel/debug/tracing could be labeled during filesystem creation using genfscon or later from userspace using setxattr. This change re-enables support for genfscon labeling. Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-06-13selinux: fix double free in selinux_parse_opts_str()Paul Moore1-3/+2
This patch is based on a discussion generated by an earlier patch from Tetsuo Handa: * https://marc.info/?t=149035659300001&r=1&w=2 The double free problem involves the mnt_opts field of the security_mnt_opts struct, selinux_parse_opts_str() frees the memory on error, but doesn't set the field to NULL so if the caller later attempts to call security_free_mnt_opts() we trigger the problem. In order to play it safe we change selinux_parse_opts_str() to call security_free_mnt_opts() on error instead of free'ing the memory directly. This should ensure that everything is handled correctly, regardless of what the caller may do. Fixes: e0007529893c1c06 ("LSM/SELinux: Interfaces to allow FS to control mount options") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-06-09security/selinux: allow security_sb_clone_mnt_opts to enable/disable native ↵Scott Mayhew1-2/+33
labeling behavior When an NFSv4 client performs a mount operation, it first mounts the NFSv4 root and then does path walk to the exported path and performs a submount on that, cloning the security mount options from the root's superblock to the submount's superblock in the process. Unless the NFS server has an explicit fsid=0 export with the "security_label" option, the NFSv4 root superblock will not have SBLABEL_MNT set, and neither will the submount superblock after cloning the security mount options. As a result, setxattr's of security labels over NFSv4.2 will fail. In a similar fashion, NFSv4.2 mounts mounted with the context= mount option will not show the correct labels because the nfs_server->caps flags of the cloned superblock will still have NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL set. Allowing the NFSv4 client to enable or disable SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS behavior will ensure that the SBLABEL_MNT flag has the correct value when the client traverses from an exported path without the "security_label" option to one with the "security_label" option and vice versa. Similarly, checking to see if SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS is set upon return from security_sb_clone_mnt_opts() and clearing NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL if necessary will allow the correct labels to be displayed for NFSv4.2 mounts mounted with the context= mount option. Resolves: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/35 Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Tested-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-06-09selinux: use kmem_cache for ebitmapJunil Lee3-6/+27
The allocated size for each ebitmap_node is 192byte by kzalloc(). Then, ebitmap_node size is fixed, so it's possible to use only 144byte for each object by kmem_cache_zalloc(). It can reduce some dynamic allocation size. Signed-off-by: Junil Lee <junil0814.lee@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-06-02selinux: use pernet operations for hook registrationFlorian Westphal1-4/+20
It will allow us to remove the old netfilter hook api in the near future. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-05-26sel_write_validatetrans(): don't open-code memdup_user_nul()Al Viro1-7/+5
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2017-05-23selinux: Add a cache for quicker retreival of PKey SIDsDaniel Jurgens5-3/+288
It is likely that the SID for the same PKey will be requested many times. To reduce the time to modify QPs and process MADs use a cache to store PKey SIDs. This code is heavily based on the "netif" and "netport" concept originally developed by James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> and Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> (see security/selinux/netif.c and security/selinux/netport.c for more information) Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-05-23selinux: Add IB Port SMP access vectorDaniel Jurgens4-0/+70
Add a type for Infiniband ports and an access vector for subnet management packets. Implement the ib_port_smp hook to check that the caller has permission to send and receive SMPs on the end port specified by the device name and port. Add interface to query the SID for a IB port, which walks the IB_PORT ocontexts to find an entry for the given name and port. Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-05-23selinux: Implement Infiniband PKey "Access" access vectorDaniel Jurgens4-0/+66
Add a type and access vector for PKeys. Implement the ib_pkey_access hook to check that the caller has permission to access the PKey on the given subnet prefix. Add an interface to get the PKey SID. Walk the PKey ocontexts to find an entry for the given subnet prefix and pkey. Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-05-23selinux: Allocate and free infiniband security hooksDaniel Jurgens2-1/+29
Implement and attach hooks to allocate and free Infiniband object security structures. Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-05-23selinux: Create policydb version for Infiniband supportDaniel Jurgens3-24/+118
Support for Infiniband requires the addition of two new object contexts, one for infiniband PKeys and another IB Ports. Added handlers to read and write the new ocontext types when reading or writing a binary policy representation. Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: Eli Cohen <eli@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-05-23selinux lsm IB/core: Implement LSM notification systemDaniel Jurgens2-0/+13
Add a generic notificaiton mechanism in the LSM. Interested consumers can register a callback with the LSM and security modules can produce events. Because access to Infiniband QPs are enforced in the setup phase of a connection security should be enforced again if the policy changes. Register infiniband devices for policy change notification and check all QPs on that device when the notification is received. Add a call to the notification mechanism from SELinux when the AVC cache changes or setenforce is cleared. Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-05-23selinux: Remove redundant check for unknown labeling behaviorMatthias Kaehlcke1-16/+0
The check is already performed in ocontext_read() when the policy is loaded. Removing the array also fixes the following warning when building with clang: security/selinux/hooks.c:338:20: error: variable 'labeling_behaviors' is not needed and will not be emitted [-Werror,-Wunneeded-internal-declaration] Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-05-23selinux: log policy capability state when a policy is loadedStephen Smalley3-11/+27
Log the state of SELinux policy capabilities when a policy is loaded. For each policy capability known to the kernel, log the policy capability name and the value set in the policy. For policy capabilities that are set in the loaded policy but unknown to the kernel, log the policy capability index, since this is the only information presently available in the policy. Sample output with a policy created with a new capability defined that is not known to the kernel: SELinux: policy capability network_peer_controls=1 SELinux: policy capability open_perms=1 SELinux: policy capability extended_socket_class=1 SELinux: policy capability always_check_network=0 SELinux: policy capability cgroup_seclabel=0 SELinux: unknown policy capability 5 Resolves: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/32 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-05-23selinux: do not check open permission on socketsStephen Smalley1-3/+7
open permission is currently only defined for files in the kernel (COMMON_FILE_PERMS rather than COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS). Construction of an artificial test case that tries to open a socket via /proc/pid/fd will generate a recvfrom avc denial because recvfrom and open happen to map to the same permission bit in socket vs file classes. open of a socket via /proc/pid/fd is not supported by the kernel regardless and will ultimately return ENXIO. But we hit the permission check first and can thus produce these odd/misleading denials. Omit the open check when operating on a socket. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-05-23selinux: add a map permission check for mmapStephen Smalley2-1/+13
Add a map permission check on mmap so that we can distinguish memory mapped access (since it has different implications for revocation). When a file is opened and then read or written via syscalls like read(2)/write(2), we revalidate access on each read/write operation via selinux_file_permission() and therefore can revoke access if the process context, the file context, or the policy changes in such a manner that access is no longer allowed. When a file is opened and then memory mapped via mmap(2) and then subsequently read or written directly in memory, we presently have no way to revalidate or revoke access. The purpose of a separate map permission check on mmap(2) is to permit policy to prohibit memory mapping of specific files for which we need to ensure that every access is revalidated, particularly useful for scenarios where we expect the file to be relabeled at runtime in order to reflect state changes (e.g. cross-domain solution, assured pipeline without data copying). Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-05-23selinux: only invoke capabilities and selinux for CAP_MAC_ADMIN checksStephen Smalley1-8/+15
SELinux uses CAP_MAC_ADMIN to control the ability to get or set a raw, uninterpreted security context unknown to the currently loaded security policy. When performing these checks, we only want to perform a base capabilities check and a SELinux permission check. If any other modules that implement a capable hook are stacked with SELinux, we do not want to require them to also have to authorize CAP_MAC_ADMIN, since it may have different implications for their security model. Rework the CAP_MAC_ADMIN checks within SELinux to only invoke the capabilities module and the SELinux permission checking. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-05-23selinux: Return an error code only as a constant in sidtab_insert()Markus Elfring1-17/+10
* Return an error code without storing it in an intermediate variable. * Delete the local variable "rc" and the jump label "out" which became unnecessary with this refactoring. Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-05-23selinux: Return directly after a failed memory allocation in policydb_index()Markus Elfring1-10/+5
Replace five goto statements (and previous variable assignments) by direct returns after a memory allocation failure in this function. Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-05-23selinux: Use task_alloc hook rather than task_create hookTetsuo Handa1-2/+3
This patch is a preparation for getting rid of task_create hook because task_alloc hook which can do what task_create hook can do was revived. Creating a new thread is unlikely prohibited by security policy, for fork()/execve()/exit() is fundamental of how processes are managed in Unix. If a program is known to create a new thread, it is likely that permission to create a new thread is given to that program. Therefore, a situation where security_task_create() returns an error is likely that the program was exploited and lost control. Even if SELinux failed to check permission to create a thread at security_task_create(), SELinux can later check it at security_task_alloc(). Since the new thread is not yet visible from the rest of the system, nobody can do bad things using the new thread. What we waste will be limited to some initialization steps such as dup_task_struct(), copy_creds() and audit_alloc() in copy_process(). We can tolerate these overhead for unlikely situation. Therefore, this patch changes SELinux to use task_alloc hook rather than task_create hook so that we can remove task_create hook. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-05-09Merge branch 'work.misc' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-2/+2
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull misc vfs updates from Al Viro: "Assorted bits and pieces from various people. No common topic in this pile, sorry" * 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: fs/affs: add rename exchange fs/affs: add rename2 to prepare multiple methods Make stat/lstat/fstatat pass AT_NO_AUTOMOUNT to vfs_statx() fs: don't set *REFERENCED on single use objects fs: compat: Remove warning from COMPATIBLE_IOCTL remove pointless extern of atime_need_update_rcu() fs: completely ignore unknown open flags fs: add a VALID_OPEN_FLAGS fs: remove _submit_bh() fs: constify tree_descr arrays passed to simple_fill_super() fs: drop duplicate header percpu-rwsem.h fs/affs: bugfix: Write files greater than page size on OFS fs/affs: bugfix: enable writes on OFS disks fs/affs: remove node generation check fs/affs: import amigaffs.h fs/affs: bugfix: make symbolic links work again
2017-05-03Merge branch 'next' of ↵Linus Torvalds10-62/+81
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "Highlights: IMA: - provide ">" and "<" operators for fowner/uid/euid rules KEYS: - add a system blacklist keyring - add KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING, exposes keyring link restriction functionality to userland via keyctl() LSM: - harden LSM API with __ro_after_init - add prlmit security hook, implement for SELinux - revive security_task_alloc hook TPM: - implement contextual TPM command 'spaces'" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (98 commits) tpm: Fix reference count to main device tpm_tis: convert to using locality callbacks tpm: fix handling of the TPM 2.0 event logs tpm_crb: remove a cruft constant keys: select CONFIG_CRYPTO when selecting DH / KDF apparmor: Make path_max parameter readonly apparmor: fix parameters so that the permission test is bypassed at boot apparmor: fix invalid reference to index variable of iterator line 836 apparmor: use SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK security/apparmor/lsm.c: set debug messages apparmor: fix boolreturn.cocci warnings Smack: Use GFP_KERNEL for smk_netlbl_mls(). smack: fix double free in smack_parse_opts_str() KEYS: add SP800-56A KDF support for DH KEYS: Keyring asymmetric key restrict method with chaining KEYS: Restrict asymmetric key linkage using a specific keychain KEYS: Add a lookup_restriction function for the asymmetric key type KEYS: Add KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING KEYS: Consistent ordering for __key_link_begin and restrict check KEYS: Add an optional lookup_restriction hook to key_type ...
2017-04-27fs: constify tree_descr arrays passed to simple_fill_super()Eric Biggers1-2/+2
simple_fill_super() is passed an array of tree_descr structures which describe the files to create in the filesystem's root directory. Since these arrays are never modified intentionally, they should be 'const' so that they are placed in .rodata and benefit from memory protection. This patch updates the function signature and all users, and also constifies tree_descr.name. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2017-03-31selinux: Fix an uninitialized variable bugDan Carpenter1-1/+1
We removed this initialization as a cleanup but it is probably required. The concern is that "nel" can be zero. I'm not an expert on SELinux code but I think it looks possible to write an SELinux policy which triggers this bug. GCC doesn't catch this, but my static checker does. Fixes: 9c312e79d6af ("selinux: Delete an unnecessary variable initialisation in range_read()") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-03-30selinux: Remove unnecessary check of array base in selinux_set_mapping()Matthias Kaehlcke1-1/+1
'perms' will never be NULL since it isn't a plain pointer but an array of u32 values. This fixes the following warning when building with clang: security/selinux/ss/services.c:158:16: error: address of array 'p_in->perms' will always evaluate to 'true' [-Werror,-Wpointer-bool-conversion] while (p_in->perms && p_in->perms[k]) { Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-03-29selinuxfs: Use seq_puts() in sel_avc_stats_seq_show()Markus Elfring1-4/+4
A string which did not contain data format specifications should be put into a sequence. Thus use the corresponding function "seq_puts". This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software. Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-03-29selinux: Adjust two checks for null pointersMarkus Elfring1-2/+2
The script "checkpatch.pl" pointed information out like the following. Comparison to NULL could be written !… Thus fix affected source code places. Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-03-29selinux: Use kmalloc_array() in sidtab_init()Markus Elfring1-1/+1
A multiplication for the size determination of a memory allocation indicated that an array data structure should be processed. Thus use the corresponding function "kmalloc_array". This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software. Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-03-29selinux: Return directly after a failed kzalloc() in roles_init()Markus Elfring1-2/+1
Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed at the beginning. Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-03-29selinux: Return directly after a failed kzalloc() in perm_read()Markus Elfring1-2/+1
Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed at the beginning. Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-03-29selinux: Return directly after a failed kzalloc() in common_read()Markus Elfring1-2/+1
Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed at the beginning. Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>