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2017-09-08Merge tag 'secureexec-v4.14-rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-31/+3
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux Pull secureexec update from Kees Cook: "This series has the ultimate goal of providing a sane stack rlimit when running set*id processes. To do this, the bprm_secureexec LSM hook is collapsed into the bprm_set_creds hook so the secureexec-ness of an exec can be determined early enough to make decisions about rlimits and the resulting memory layouts. Other logic acting on the secureexec-ness of an exec is similarly consolidated. Capabilities needed some special handling, but the refactoring removed other special handling, so that was a wash" * tag 'secureexec-v4.14-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: exec: Consolidate pdeath_signal clearing exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec exec: Consolidate dumpability logic smack: Remove redundant pdeath_signal clearing exec: Use secureexec for clearing pdeath_signal exec: Use secureexec for setting dumpability LSM: drop bprm_secureexec hook commoncap: Move cap_elevated calculation into bprm_set_creds commoncap: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook smack: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook selinux: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook apparmor: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook binfmt: Introduce secureexec flag exec: Correct comments about "point of no return" exec: Rename bprm->cred_prepared to called_set_creds
2017-08-01smack: Remove redundant pdeath_signal clearingKees Cook1-15/+0
This removes the redundant pdeath_signal clearing in Smack: the check in smack_bprm_committing_creds() matches the check in smack_bprm_set_creds() (which used to be in the now-removed smack_bprm_securexec() hook) and since secureexec is now being checked for clearing pdeath_signal, this is redundant to the common exec code. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2017-08-01smack: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hookKees Cook1-17/+4
The Smack bprm_secureexec hook can be merged with the bprm_set_creds hook since it's dealing with the same information, and all of the details are finalized during the first call to the bprm_set_creds hook via prepare_binprm() (subsequent calls due to binfmt_script, etc, are ignored via bprm->called_set_creds). Here, the test can just happen at the end of the bprm_set_creds hook, and the bprm_secureexec hook can be dropped. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2017-08-01exec: Rename bprm->cred_prepared to called_set_credsKees Cook1-1/+1
The cred_prepared bprm flag has a misleading name. It has nothing to do with the bprm_prepare_cred hook, and actually tracks if bprm_set_creds has been called. Rename this flag and improve its comment. Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
2017-07-31netfilter: nf_hook_ops structs can be constFlorian Westphal1-1/+1
We no longer place these on a list so they can be const. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2017-06-01Smack: Use cap_capable in privilege checkCasey Schaufler2-9/+12
Use cap_capable() rather than capable() in the Smack privilege check as the former does not invoke other security module privilege check, while the later does. This becomes important when stacking. It may be a problem even with minor modules. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2017-06-01Smack: Safer check for a socket in file_receiveCasey Schaufler1-1/+1
The check of S_ISSOCK() in smack_file_receive() is not appropriate if the passed descriptor is a socket. Reported-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tyco.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2017-06-01smack: use pernet operations for hook registrationFlorian Westphal1-8/+18
It will allow us to remove the old netfilter hook api in the near future. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2017-05-09Merge branch 'work.misc' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-1/+1
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull misc vfs updates from Al Viro: "Assorted bits and pieces from various people. No common topic in this pile, sorry" * 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: fs/affs: add rename exchange fs/affs: add rename2 to prepare multiple methods Make stat/lstat/fstatat pass AT_NO_AUTOMOUNT to vfs_statx() fs: don't set *REFERENCED on single use objects fs: compat: Remove warning from COMPATIBLE_IOCTL remove pointless extern of atime_need_update_rcu() fs: completely ignore unknown open flags fs: add a VALID_OPEN_FLAGS fs: remove _submit_bh() fs: constify tree_descr arrays passed to simple_fill_super() fs: drop duplicate header percpu-rwsem.h fs/affs: bugfix: Write files greater than page size on OFS fs/affs: bugfix: enable writes on OFS disks fs/affs: remove node generation check fs/affs: import amigaffs.h fs/affs: bugfix: make symbolic links work again
2017-04-27fs: constify tree_descr arrays passed to simple_fill_super()Eric Biggers1-1/+1
simple_fill_super() is passed an array of tree_descr structures which describe the files to create in the filesystem's root directory. Since these arrays are never modified intentionally, they should be 'const' so that they are placed in .rodata and benefit from memory protection. This patch updates the function signature and all users, and also constifies tree_descr.name. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2017-04-05Smack: Use GFP_KERNEL for smk_netlbl_mls().Tetsuo Handa1-1/+1
Since all callers of smk_netlbl_mls() are GFP_KERNEL context (smk_set_cipso() calls memdup_user_nul(), init_smk_fs() calls __kernfs_new_node(), smk_import_entry() calls kzalloc(GFP_KERNEL)), it is safe to use GFP_KERNEL from netlbl_catmap_setbit(). Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2017-04-05smack: fix double free in smack_parse_opts_str()Tetsuo Handa1-3/+1
smack_parse_opts_str() calls kfree(opts->mnt_opts) when kcalloc() for opts->mnt_opts_flags failed. But it should not have called it because security_free_mnt_opts() will call kfree(opts->mnt_opts). Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> fixes: 3bf2789cad9e6573 ("smack: allow mount opts setting over filesystems with binary mount data") Cc: Vivek Trivedi <t.vivek@samsung.com> Cc: Amit Sahrawat <a.sahrawat@samsung.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2017-03-06security: mark LSM hooks as __ro_after_initJames Morris1-1/+1
Mark all of the registration hooks as __ro_after_init (via the __lsm_ro_after_init macro). Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-02-24Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-1/+1
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace Pull namespace updates from Eric Biederman: "There is a lot here. A lot of these changes result in subtle user visible differences in kernel behavior. I don't expect anything will care but I will revert/fix things immediately if any regressions show up. From Seth Forshee there is a continuation of the work to make the vfs ready for unpriviled mounts. We had thought the previous changes prevented the creation of files outside of s_user_ns of a filesystem, but it turns we missed the O_CREAT path. Ooops. Pavel Tikhomirov and Oleg Nesterov worked together to fix a long standing bug in the implemenation of PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER where only children that are forked after the prctl are considered and not children forked before the prctl. The only known user of this prctl systemd forks all children after the prctl. So no userspace regressions will occur. Holding earlier forked children to the same rules as later forked children creates a semantic that is sane enough to allow checkpoing of processes that use this feature. There is a long delayed change by Nikolay Borisov to limit inotify instances inside a user namespace. Michael Kerrisk extends the API for files used to maniuplate namespaces with two new trivial ioctls to allow discovery of the hierachy and properties of namespaces. Konstantin Khlebnikov with the help of Al Viro adds code that when a network namespace exits purges it's sysctl entries from the dcache. As in some circumstances this could use a lot of memory. Vivek Goyal fixed a bug with stacked filesystems where the permissions on the wrong inode were being checked. I continue previous work on ptracing across exec. Allowing a file to be setuid across exec while being ptraced if the tracer has enough credentials in the user namespace, and if the process has CAP_SETUID in it's own namespace. Proc files for setuid or otherwise undumpable executables are now owned by the root in the user namespace of their mm. Allowing debugging of setuid applications in containers to work better. A bug I introduced with permission checking and automount is now fixed. The big change is to mark the mounts that the kernel initiates as a result of an automount. This allows the permission checks in sget to be safely suppressed for this kind of mount. As the permission check happened when the original filesystem was mounted. Finally a special case in the mount namespace is removed preventing unbounded chains in the mount hash table, and making the semantics simpler which benefits CRIU. The vfs fix along with related work in ima and evm I believe makes us ready to finish developing and merge fully unprivileged mounts of the fuse filesystem. The cleanups of the mount namespace makes discussing how to fix the worst case complexity of umount. The stacked filesystem fixes pave the way for adding multiple mappings for the filesystem uids so that efficient and safer containers can be implemented" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: proc/sysctl: Don't grab i_lock under sysctl_lock. vfs: Use upper filesystem inode in bprm_fill_uid() proc/sysctl: prune stale dentries during unregistering mnt: Tuck mounts under others instead of creating shadow/side mounts. prctl: propagate has_child_subreaper flag to every descendant introduce the walk_process_tree() helper nsfs: Add an ioctl() to return owner UID of a userns fs: Better permission checking for submounts exit: fix the setns() && PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER interaction vfs: open() with O_CREAT should not create inodes with unknown ids nsfs: Add an ioctl() to return the namespace type proc: Better ownership of files for non-dumpable tasks in user namespaces exec: Remove LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP exec: Test the ptracer's saved cred to see if the tracee can gain caps exec: Don't reset euid and egid when the tracee has CAP_SETUID inotify: Convert to using per-namespace limits
2017-02-10Merge branch 'stable-4.11' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux ↵James Morris1-30/+1
into next
2017-01-27Merge branch 'smack-for-4.11' of git://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next into ↵James Morris3-27/+95
next
2017-01-24exec: Remove LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAPEric W. Biederman1-1/+1
With previous changes every location that tests for LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP also tests for LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE making the LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP redundant, so remove it. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2017-01-19LSM: Add /sys/kernel/security/lsmCasey Schaufler1-1/+1
I am still tired of having to find indirect ways to determine what security modules are active on a system. I have added /sys/kernel/security/lsm, which contains a comma separated list of the active security modules. No more groping around in /proc/filesystems or other clever hacks. Unchanged from previous versions except for being updated to the latest security next branch. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-01-12security,selinux,smack: kill security_task_wait hookStephen Smalley1-20/+0
As reported by yangshukui, a permission denial from security_task_wait() can lead to a soft lockup in zap_pid_ns_processes() since it only expects sys_wait4() to return 0 or -ECHILD. Further, security_task_wait() can in general lead to zombies; in the absence of some way to automatically reparent a child process upon a denial, the hook is not useful. Remove the security hook and its implementations in SELinux and Smack. Smack already removed its check from its hook. Reported-by: yangshukui <yangshukui@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2017-01-10Smack: ignore private inode for file functionsSeung-Woo Kim1-0/+12
The access to fd from anon_inode is always failed because there is no set xattr operations. So this patch fixes to ignore private inode including anon_inode for file functions. It was only ignored for smack_file_receive() to share dma-buf fd, but dma-buf has other functions like ioctl and mmap. Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/4/17/16 Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2017-01-10Smack: fix d_instantiate logic for sockfs and pipefsRafal Krypa1-7/+7
Since 4b936885a (v2.6.32) all inodes on sockfs and pipefs are disconnected. It caused filesystem specific code in smack_d_instantiate to be skipped, because all inodes on those pseudo filesystems were treated as root inodes. As a result all sockfs inodes had the Smack label set to floor. In most cases access checks for sockets use socket_smack data so the inode label is not important. But there are special cases that were broken. One example would be calling fcntl with F_SETOWN command on a socket fd. Now smack_d_instantiate expects all pipefs and sockfs inodes to be disconnected and has the logic in appropriate place. Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2017-01-10SMACK: Use smk_tskacc() instead of smk_access() for proper loggingHimanshu Shukla1-4/+1
smack_file_open() is first checking the capability of calling subject, this check will skip the SMACK logging for success case. Use smk_tskacc() for proper logging and SMACK access check. Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2017-01-10Smack: Traverse the smack_known_list using list_for_each_entry_rcu macroVishal Goel1-1/+1
In smack_from_secattr function,"smack_known_list" is being traversed using list_for_each_entry macro, although it is a rcu protected structure. So it should be traversed using "list_for_each_entry_rcu" macro to fetch the rcu protected entry. Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2017-01-10SMACK: Free the i_security blob in inode using RCUHimanshu Shukla2-4/+29
There is race condition issue while freeing the i_security blob in SMACK module. There is existing condition where i_security can be freed while inode_permission is called from path lookup on second CPU. There has been observed the page fault with such condition. VFS code and Selinux module takes care of this condition by freeing the inode and i_security field using RCU via call_rcu(). But in SMACK directly the i_secuirty blob is being freed. Use call_rcu() to fix this race condition issue. Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2017-01-10SMACK: Delete list_head repeated initializationHimanshu Shukla1-4/+0
smk_copy_rules() and smk_copy_relabel() are initializing list_head though they have been initialized already in new_task_smack() function. Delete repeated initialization. Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2017-01-10SMACK: Add new lock for adding entry in smack master listVishal Goel1-0/+5
"smk_set_access()" function adds a new rule entry in subject label specific list(rule_list) and in global rule list(smack_rule_list) both. Mutex lock (rule_lock) is used to avoid simultaneous updates. But this lock is subject label specific lock. If 2 processes tries to add different rules(i.e with different subject labels) simultaneously, then both the processes can take the "rule_lock" respectively. So it will cause a problem while adding entries in master rule list. Now a new mutex lock(smack_master_list_lock) has been taken to add entry in smack_rule_list to avoid simultaneous updates of different rules. Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2017-01-10Smack: Fix the issue of wrong SMACK label update in socket bind fail caseVishal Goel2-0/+21
Fix the issue of wrong SMACK label (SMACK64IPIN) update when a second bind call is made to same IP address & port, but with different SMACK label (SMACK64IPIN) by second instance of server. In this case server returns with "Bind:Address already in use" error but before returning, SMACK label is updated in SMACK port-label mapping list inside smack_socket_bind() hook To fix this issue a new check has been added in smk_ipv6_port_label() function before updating the existing port entry. It checks whether the socket for matching port entry is closed or not. If it is closed then it means port is not bound and it is safe to update the existing port entry else return if port is still getting used. For checking whether socket is closed or not, one more field "smk_can_reuse" has been added in the "smk_port_label" structure. This field will be set to '1' in "smack_sk_free_security()" function which is called to free the socket security blob when the socket is being closed. In this function, port entry is searched in the SMACK port-label mapping list for the closing socket. If entry is found then "smk_can_reuse" field is set to '1'.Initially "smk_can_reuse" field is set to '0' in smk_ipv6_port_label() function after creating a new entry in the list which indicates that socket is in use. Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2017-01-10Smack: Fix the issue of permission denied error in ipv6 hookVishal Goel2-2/+4
Permission denied error comes when 2 IPv6 servers are running and client tries to connect one of them. Scenario is that both servers are using same IP and port but different protocols(Udp and tcp). They are using different SMACK64IPIN labels.Tcp server is using "test" and udp server is using "test-in". When we try to run tcp client with SMACK64IPOUT label as "test", then connection denied error comes. It should not happen since both tcp server and client labels are same.This happens because there is no check for protocol in smk_ipv6_port_label() function while searching for the earlier port entry. It checks whether there is an existing port entry on the basis of port only. So it updates the earlier port entry in the list. Due to which smack label gets changed for earlier entry in the "smk_ipv6_port_list" list and permission denied error comes. Now a check is added for socket type also.Now if 2 processes use same port but different protocols (tcp or udp), then 2 different port entries will be added in the list. Similarly while checking smack access in smk_ipv6_port_check() function, port entry is searched on the basis of both port and protocol. Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <Himanshu.sh@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2017-01-10SMACK: Add the rcu synchronization mechanism in ipv6 hooksVishal Goel1-5/+15
Add the rcu synchronization mechanism for accessing smk_ipv6_port_list in smack IPv6 hooks. Access to the port list is vulnerable to a race condition issue,it does not apply proper synchronization methods while working on critical section. It is possible that when one thread is reading the list, at the same time another thread is modifying the same port list, which can cause the major problems. To ensure proper synchronization between two threads, rcu mechanism has been applied while accessing and modifying the port list. RCU will also not affect the performance, as there are more accesses than modification where RCU is most effective synchronization mechanism. Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2017-01-09proc,security: move restriction on writing /proc/pid/attr nodes to procStephen Smalley1-10/+1
Processes can only alter their own security attributes via /proc/pid/attr nodes. This is presently enforced by each individual security module and is also imposed by the Linux credentials implementation, which only allows a task to alter its own credentials. Move the check enforcing this restriction from the individual security modules to proc_pid_attr_write() before calling the security hook, and drop the unnecessary task argument to the security hook since it can only ever be the current task. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2016-12-16Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-1/+1
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull vfs updates from Al Viro: - more ->d_init() stuff (work.dcache) - pathname resolution cleanups (work.namei) - a few missing iov_iter primitives - copy_from_iter_full() and friends. Either copy the full requested amount, advance the iterator and return true, or fail, return false and do _not_ advance the iterator. Quite a few open-coded callers converted (and became more readable and harder to fuck up that way) (work.iov_iter) - several assorted patches, the big one being logfs removal * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: logfs: remove from tree vfs: fix put_compat_statfs64() does not handle errors namei: fold should_follow_link() with the step into not-followed link namei: pass both WALK_GET and WALK_MORE to should_follow_link() namei: invert WALK_PUT logics namei: shift interpretation of LOOKUP_FOLLOW inside should_follow_link() namei: saner calling conventions for mountpoint_last() namei.c: get rid of user_path_parent() switch getfrag callbacks to ..._full() primitives make skb_add_data,{_nocache}() and skb_copy_to_page_nocache() advance only on success [iov_iter] new primitives - copy_from_iter_full() and friends don't open-code file_inode() ceph: switch to use of ->d_init() ceph: unify dentry_operations instances lustre: switch to use of ->d_init()
2016-12-05don't open-code file_inode()Al Viro1-1/+1
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-11-15Smack: Remove unnecessary smack_known_invalidCasey Schaufler4-36/+4
The invalid Smack label ("") and the Huh ("?") Smack label serve the same purpose and having both is unnecessary. While pulling out the invalid label it became clear that the use of smack_from_secid() was inconsistent, so that is repaired. The setting of inode labels to the invalid label could never happen in a functional system, has never been observed in the wild and is not what you'd really want for a failure behavior in any case. That is removed. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2016-11-14Smack: Use GFP_KERNEL for smack_parse_opts_str().Tetsuo Handa1-2/+2
Since smack_parse_opts_str() is calling match_strdup() which uses GFP_KERNEL, it is safe to use GFP_KERNEL from kcalloc() which is called by smack_parse_opts_str(). Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2016-11-10Smack: ipv6 label match fixCasey Schaufler1-6/+6
The check for a deleted entry in the list of IPv6 host addresses was being performed in the wrong place, leading to most peculiar results in some cases. This puts the check into the right place. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2016-11-10SMACK: Fix the memory leak in smack_cred_prepare() hookHimanshu Shukla1-1/+2
Memory leak in smack_cred_prepare()function. smack_cred_prepare() hook returns error if there is error in allocating memory in smk_copy_rules() or smk_copy_relabel() function. If smack_cred_prepare() function returns error then the calling function should call smack_cred_free() function for cleanup. In smack_cred_free() function first credential is extracted and then all rules are deleted. In smack_cred_prepare() function security field is assigned in the end when all function return success. But this function may return before and memory will not be freed. Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2016-11-10SMACK: Do not apply star label in smack_setprocattr hookHimanshu Shukla1-3/+4
Smack prohibits processes from using the star ("*") and web ("@") labels. Checks have been added in other functions. In smack_setprocattr() hook, only check for web ("@") label has been added and restricted from applying web ("@") label. Check for star ("*") label should also be added in smack_setprocattr() hook. Return error should be "-EINVAL" not "-EPERM" as permission is there for setting label but not the label value as star ("*") or web ("@"). Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2016-11-10smack: parse mnt opts after privileges checkHimanshu Shukla1-25/+25
In smack_set_mnt_opts()first the SMACK mount options are being parsed and later it is being checked whether the user calling mount has CAP_MAC_ADMIN capability. This sequence of operationis will allow unauthorized user to add SMACK labels in label list and may cause denial of security attack by adding many labels by allocating kernel memory by unauthorized user. Superblock smack flag is also being set as initialized though function may return with EPERM error. First check the capability of calling user then set the SMACK attributes and smk_flags. Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2016-11-05Smack: Assign smack_known_web label for kernel thread'sjooseong lee1-2/+10
Assign smack_known_web label for kernel thread's socket Creating struct sock by sk_alloc function in various kernel subsystems like bluetooth doesn't call smack_socket_post_create(). In such case, received sock label is the floor('_') label and makes access deny. Signed-off-by: jooseong lee <jooseong.lee@samsung.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2016-10-11Merge branch 'work.xattr' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-6/+6
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull vfs xattr updates from Al Viro: "xattr stuff from Andreas This completes the switch to xattr_handler ->get()/->set() from ->getxattr/->setxattr/->removexattr" * 'work.xattr' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: vfs: Remove {get,set,remove}xattr inode operations xattr: Stop calling {get,set,remove}xattr inode operations vfs: Check for the IOP_XATTR flag in listxattr xattr: Add __vfs_{get,set,remove}xattr helpers libfs: Use IOP_XATTR flag for empty directory handling vfs: Use IOP_XATTR flag for bad-inode handling vfs: Add IOP_XATTR inode operations flag vfs: Move xattr_resolve_name to the front of fs/xattr.c ecryptfs: Switch to generic xattr handlers sockfs: Get rid of getxattr iop sockfs: getxattr: Fail with -EOPNOTSUPP for invalid attribute names kernfs: Switch to generic xattr handlers hfs: Switch to generic xattr handlers jffs2: Remove jffs2_{get,set,remove}xattr macros xattr: Remove unnecessary NULL attribute name check
2016-10-08xattr: Add __vfs_{get,set,remove}xattr helpersAndreas Gruenbacher1-6/+6
Right now, various places in the kernel check for the existence of getxattr, setxattr, and removexattr inode operations and directly call those operations. Switch to helper functions and test for the IOP_XATTR flag instead. Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-09-19Merge branch 'stable-4.9' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux ↵James Morris1-2/+2
into next
2016-09-08Smack: Signal delivery as an append operationCasey Schaufler3-7/+29
Under a strict subject/object security policy delivering a signal or delivering network IPC could be considered either a write or an append operation. The original choice to make both write operations leads to an issue where IPC delivery is desired under policy, but delivery of signals is not. This patch provides the option of making signal delivery an append operation, allowing Smack rules that deny signal delivery while allowing IPC. This was requested for Tizen. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2016-08-23Smack: Use memdup_user() rather than duplicating its implementationMarkus Elfring1-8/+3
Reuse existing functionality from memdup_user() instead of keeping duplicate source code. This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software. Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2016-08-08security: Use IS_ENABLED() instead of checking for built-in or moduleJavier Martinez Canillas1-2/+2
The IS_ENABLED() macro checks if a Kconfig symbol has been enabled either built-in or as a module, use that macro instead of open coding the same. Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javier@osg.samsung.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2016-07-30Merge branch 'next' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-1/+4
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "Highlights: - TPM core and driver updates/fixes - IPv6 security labeling (CALIPSO) - Lots of Apparmor fixes - Seccomp: remove 2-phase API, close hole where ptrace can change syscall #" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (156 commits) apparmor: fix SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT parameter handling tpm: Add TPM 2.0 support to the Nuvoton i2c driver (NPCT6xx family) tpm: Factor out common startup code tpm: use devm_add_action_or_reset tpm2_i2c_nuvoton: add irq validity check tpm: read burstcount from TPM_STS in one 32-bit transaction tpm: fix byte-order for the value read by tpm2_get_tpm_pt tpm_tis_core: convert max timeouts from msec to jiffies apparmor: fix arg_size computation for when setprocattr is null terminated apparmor: fix oops, validate buffer size in apparmor_setprocattr() apparmor: do not expose kernel stack apparmor: fix module parameters can be changed after policy is locked apparmor: fix oops in profile_unpack() when policy_db is not present apparmor: don't check for vmalloc_addr if kvzalloc() failed apparmor: add missing id bounds check on dfa verification apparmor: allow SYS_CAP_RESOURCE to be sufficient to prlimit another task apparmor: use list_next_entry instead of list_entry_next apparmor: fix refcount race when finding a child profile apparmor: fix ref count leak when profile sha1 hash is read apparmor: check that xindex is in trans_table bounds ...
2016-07-30Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2-4/+38
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace Pull userns vfs updates from Eric Biederman: "This tree contains some very long awaited work on generalizing the user namespace support for mounting filesystems to include filesystems with a backing store. The real world target is fuse but the goal is to update the vfs to allow any filesystem to be supported. This patchset is based on a lot of code review and testing to approach that goal. While looking at what is needed to support the fuse filesystem it became clear that there were things like xattrs for security modules that needed special treatment. That the resolution of those concerns would not be fuse specific. That sorting out these general issues made most sense at the generic level, where the right people could be drawn into the conversation, and the issues could be solved for everyone. At a high level what this patchset does a couple of simple things: - Add a user namespace owner (s_user_ns) to struct super_block. - Teach the vfs to handle filesystem uids and gids not mapping into to kuids and kgids and being reported as INVALID_UID and INVALID_GID in vfs data structures. By assigning a user namespace owner filesystems that are mounted with only user namespace privilege can be detected. This allows security modules and the like to know which mounts may not be trusted. This also allows the set of uids and gids that are communicated to the filesystem to be capped at the set of kuids and kgids that are in the owning user namespace of the filesystem. One of the crazier corner casees this handles is the case of inodes whose i_uid or i_gid are not mapped into the vfs. Most of the code simply doesn't care but it is easy to confuse the inode writeback path so no operation that could cause an inode write-back is permitted for such inodes (aka only reads are allowed). This set of changes starts out by cleaning up the code paths involved in user namespace permirted mounts. Then when things are clean enough adds code that cleanly sets s_user_ns. Then additional restrictions are added that are possible now that the filesystem superblock contains owner information. These changes should not affect anyone in practice, but there are some parts of these restrictions that are changes in behavior. - Andy's restriction on suid executables that does not honor the suid bit when the path is from another mount namespace (think /proc/[pid]/fd/) or when the filesystem was mounted by a less privileged user. - The replacement of the user namespace implicit setting of MNT_NODEV with implicitly setting SB_I_NODEV on the filesystem superblock instead. Using SB_I_NODEV is a stronger form that happens to make this state user invisible. The user visibility can be managed but it caused problems when it was introduced from applications reasonably expecting mount flags to be what they were set to. There is a little bit of work remaining before it is safe to support mounting filesystems with backing store in user namespaces, beyond what is in this set of changes. - Verifying the mounter has permission to read/write the block device during mount. - Teaching the integrity modules IMA and EVM to handle filesystems mounted with only user namespace root and to reduce trust in their security xattrs accordingly. - Capturing the mounters credentials and using that for permission checks in d_automount and the like. (Given that overlayfs already does this, and we need the work in d_automount it make sense to generalize this case). Furthermore there are a few changes that are on the wishlist: - Get all filesystems supporting posix acls using the generic posix acls so that posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user and posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user may be removed. [Maintainability] - Reducing the permission checks in places such as remount to allow the superblock owner to perform them. - Allowing the superblock owner to chown files with unmapped uids and gids to something that is mapped so the files may be treated normally. I am not considering even obvious relaxations of permission checks until it is clear there are no more corner cases that need to be locked down and handled generically. Many thanks to Seth Forshee who kept this code alive, and putting up with me rewriting substantial portions of what he did to handle more corner cases, and for his diligent testing and reviewing of my changes" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (30 commits) fs: Call d_automount with the filesystems creds fs: Update i_[ug]id_(read|write) to translate relative to s_user_ns evm: Translate user/group ids relative to s_user_ns when computing HMAC dquot: For now explicitly don't support filesystems outside of init_user_ns quota: Handle quota data stored in s_user_ns in quota_setxquota quota: Ensure qids map to the filesystem vfs: Don't create inodes with a uid or gid unknown to the vfs vfs: Don't modify inodes with a uid or gid unknown to the vfs cred: Reject inodes with invalid ids in set_create_file_as() fs: Check for invalid i_uid in may_follow_link() vfs: Verify acls are valid within superblock's s_user_ns. userns: Handle -1 in k[ug]id_has_mapping when !CONFIG_USER_NS fs: Refuse uid/gid changes which don't map into s_user_ns selinux: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces Smack: Handle labels consistently in untrusted mounts Smack: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid fs: Limit file caps to the user namespace of the super block userns: Remove the now unnecessary FS_USERNS_DEV_MOUNT flag userns: Remove implicit MNT_NODEV fragility. ...
2016-07-08Merge branch 'smack-for-4.8' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next ↵James Morris1-0/+3
into next
2016-07-07Merge branch 'stable-4.8' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux ↵James Morris1-1/+1
into next
2016-06-27netlabel: Pass a family parameter to netlbl_skbuff_err().Huw Davies1-1/+1
This makes it possible to route the error to the appropriate labelling engine. CALIPSO is far less verbose than CIPSO when encountering a bogus packet, so there is no need for a CALIPSO error handler. Signed-off-by: Huw Davies <huw@codeweavers.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>