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Pull io_uring updates from Jens Axboe:
"Mostly just come fixes and cleanups, but one feature as well. In
detail:
- Harden the check for handling IOPOLL based on return (Pavel)
- Various minor optimizations (Pavel)
- Drop remnants of SCM_RIGHTS fd passing support, now that it's no
longer supported since 6.7 (me)
- Fix for a case where bytes_done wasn't initialized properly on a
failure condition for read/write requests (me)
- Move the register related code to a separate file (me)
- Add support for returning the provided ring buffer head (me)
- Add support for adding a direct descriptor to the normal file table
(me, Christian Brauner)
- Fix for ensuring pending task_work for a ring with DEFER_TASKRUN is
run even if we timeout waiting (me)"
* tag 'for-6.8/io_uring-2024-01-08' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux:
io_uring: ensure local task_work is run on wait timeout
io_uring/kbuf: add method for returning provided buffer ring head
io_uring/rw: ensure io->bytes_done is always initialized
io_uring: drop any code related to SCM_RIGHTS
io_uring/unix: drop usage of io_uring socket
io_uring/register: move io_uring_register(2) related code to register.c
io_uring/openclose: add support for IORING_OP_FIXED_FD_INSTALL
io_uring/cmd: inline io_uring_cmd_get_task
io_uring/cmd: inline io_uring_cmd_do_in_task_lazy
io_uring: split out cmd api into a separate header
io_uring: optimise ltimeout for inline execution
io_uring: don't check iopoll if request completes
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Pull header cleanups from Kent Overstreet:
"The goal is to get sched.h down to a type only header, so the main
thing happening in this patchset is splitting out various _types.h
headers and dependency fixups, as well as moving some things out of
sched.h to better locations.
This is prep work for the memory allocation profiling patchset which
adds new sched.h interdepencencies"
* tag 'header_cleanup-2024-01-10' of https://evilpiepirate.org/git/bcachefs: (51 commits)
Kill sched.h dependency on rcupdate.h
kill unnecessary thread_info.h include
Kill unnecessary kernel.h include
preempt.h: Kill dependency on list.h
rseq: Split out rseq.h from sched.h
LoongArch: signal.c: add header file to fix build error
restart_block: Trim includes
lockdep: move held_lock to lockdep_types.h
sem: Split out sem_types.h
uidgid: Split out uidgid_types.h
seccomp: Split out seccomp_types.h
refcount: Split out refcount_types.h
uapi/linux/resource.h: fix include
x86/signal: kill dependency on time.h
syscall_user_dispatch.h: split out *_types.h
mm_types_task.h: Trim dependencies
Split out irqflags_types.h
ipc: Kill bogus dependency on spinlock.h
shm: Slim down dependencies
workqueue: Split out workqueue_types.h
...
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Some ioctl commands do not require ioctl permission, but are routed to
other permissions such as FILE_GETATTR or FILE_SETATTR. This routing is
done by comparing the ioctl cmd to a set of 64-bit flags (FS_IOC_*).
However, if a 32-bit process is running on a 64-bit kernel, it emits
32-bit flags (FS_IOC32_*) for certain ioctl operations. These flags are
being checked erroneously, which leads to these ioctl operations being
routed to the ioctl permission, rather than the correct file
permissions.
This was also noted in a RED-PEN finding from a while back -
"/* RED-PEN how should LSM module know it's handling 32bit? */".
This patch introduces a new hook, security_file_ioctl_compat(), that is
called from the compat ioctl syscall. All current LSMs have been changed
to support this hook.
Reviewing the three places where we are currently using
security_file_ioctl(), it appears that only SELinux needs a dedicated
compat change; TOMOYO and SMACK appear to be functional without any
change.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 0b24dcb7f2f7 ("Revert "selinux: simplify ioctl checking"")
Signed-off-by: Alfred Piccioni <alpic@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
[PM: subject tweak, line length fixes, and alignment corrections]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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list_head is in types.h, not list.h., and the uapi header wasn't needed.
Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>
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linux/io_uring.h is slowly becoming a rubbish bin where we put
anything exposed to other subsystems. For instance, the task exit
hooks and io_uring cmd infra are completely orthogonal and don't need
each other's definitions. Start cleaning it up by splitting out all
command bits into a new header file.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/7ec50bae6e21f371d3850796e716917fc141225a.1701391955.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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As the kernel test robot helpfully reminded us, all of the lsm_id
instances defined inside the various LSMs should be marked as static.
The one exception is Landlock which uses its lsm_id variable across
multiple source files with an extern declaration in a header file.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Suggested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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While we have a lsm_fill_user_ctx() helper function designed to make
life easier for LSMs which return lsm_ctx structs to userspace, we
didn't include all of the buffer length safety checks and buffer
padding adjustments in the helper. This led to code duplication
across the different LSMs and the possibility for mistakes across the
different LSM subsystems. In order to reduce code duplication and
decrease the chances of silly mistakes, we're consolidating all of
this code into the lsm_fill_user_ctx() helper.
The buffer padding is also modified from a fixed 8-byte alignment to
an alignment that matches the word length of the machine
(BITS_PER_LONG / 8).
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Implement Smack support for security_[gs]etselfattr.
Refactor the setprocattr hook to avoid code duplication.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Create a struct lsm_id to contain identifying information about Linux
Security Modules (LSMs). At inception this contains the name of the
module and an identifier associated with the security module. Change
the security_add_hooks() interface to use this structure. Change the
individual modules to maintain their own struct lsm_id and pass it to
security_add_hooks().
The values are for LSM identifiers are defined in a new UAPI
header file linux/lsm.h. Each existing LSM has been updated to
include it's LSMID in the lsm_id.
The LSM ID values are sequential, with the oldest module
LSM_ID_CAPABILITY being the lowest value and the existing modules
numbered in the order they were included in the main line kernel.
This is an arbitrary convention for assigning the values, but
none better presents itself. The value 0 is defined as being invalid.
The values 1-99 are reserved for any special case uses which may
arise in the future. This may include attributes of the LSM
infrastructure itself, possibly related to namespacing or network
attribute management. A special range is identified for such attributes
to help reduce confusion for developers unfamiliar with LSMs.
LSM attribute values are defined for the attributes presented by
modules that are available today. As with the LSM IDs, The value 0
is defined as being invalid. The values 1-99 are reserved for any
special case uses which may arise in the future.
Cc: linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Mickael Salaun <mic@digikod.net>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Nacked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
[PM: forward ported beyond v6.6 due merge window changes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Pull smack updates from Casey Schaufler:
"Two minor fixes: is a simple spelling fix. The other is a bounds check
for a very likely underflow"
* tag 'Smack-for-6.6' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next:
smackfs: Prevent underflow in smk_set_cipso()
security: smack: smackfs: fix typo (lables->labels)
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull LSM updates from Paul Moore:
- Add proper multi-LSM support for xattrs in the
security_inode_init_security() hook
Historically the LSM layer has only allowed a single LSM to add an
xattr to an inode, with IMA/EVM measuring that and adding its own as
well. As we work towards promoting IMA/EVM to a "proper LSM" instead
of the special case that it is now, we need to better support the
case of multiple LSMs each adding xattrs to an inode and after
several attempts we now appear to have something that is working
well. It is worth noting that in the process of making this change we
uncovered a problem with Smack's SMACK64TRANSMUTE xattr which is also
fixed in this pull request.
- Additional LSM hook constification
Two patches to constify parameters to security_capget() and
security_binder_transfer_file(). While I generally don't make a
special note of who submitted these patches, these were the work of
an Outreachy intern, Khadija Kamran, and that makes me happy;
hopefully it does the same for all of you reading this.
- LSM hook comment header fixes
One patch to add a missing hook comment header, one to fix a minor
typo.
- Remove an old, unused credential function declaration
It wasn't clear to me who should pick this up, but it was trivial,
obviously correct, and arguably the LSM layer has a vested interest
in credentials so I merged it. Sadly I'm now noticing that despite my
subject line cleanup I didn't cleanup the "unsued" misspelling, sigh
* tag 'lsm-pr-20230829' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
lsm: constify the 'file' parameter in security_binder_transfer_file()
lsm: constify the 'target' parameter in security_capget()
lsm: add comment block for security_sk_classify_flow LSM hook
security: Fix ret values doc for security_inode_init_security()
cred: remove unsued extern declaration change_create_files_as()
evm: Support multiple LSMs providing an xattr
evm: Align evm_inode_init_security() definition with LSM infrastructure
smack: Set the SMACK64TRANSMUTE xattr in smack_inode_init_security()
security: Allow all LSMs to provide xattrs for inode_init_security hook
lsm: fix typo in security_file_lock() comment header
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sharing
When NFS superblocks are created by automounting, their LSM parameters
aren't set in the fs_context struct prior to sget_fc() being called,
leading to failure to match existing superblocks.
This bug leads to messages like the following appearing in dmesg when
fscache is enabled:
NFS: Cache volume key already in use (nfs,4.2,2,108,106a8c0,1,,,,100000,100000,2ee,3a98,1d4c,3a98,1)
Fix this by adding a new LSM hook to load fc->security for submount
creation.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165962680944.3334508.6610023900349142034.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v1
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165962729225.3357250.14350728846471527137.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165970659095.2812394.6868894171102318796.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/166133579016.3678898.6283195019480567275.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v4
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/217595.1662033775@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v5
Fixes: 9bc61ab18b1d ("vfs: Introduce fs_context, switch vfs_kern_mount() to it.")
Fixes: 779df6a5480f ("NFS: Ensure security label is set for root inode")
Tested-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: "Christian Brauner (Microsoft)" <brauner@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Message-Id: <20230808-master-v9-1-e0ecde888221@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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There is a upper bound to "catlen" but no lower bound to prevent
negatives. I don't see that this necessarily causes a problem but we
may as well be safe.
Fixes: e114e473771c ("Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Fix a spelling error in smakcfs.
Signed-off-by: Tóth János <gomba007@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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With the newly added ability of LSMs to supply multiple xattrs, set
SMACK64TRASMUTE in smack_inode_init_security(), instead of d_instantiate().
Do it by incrementing SMACK_INODE_INIT_XATTRS to 2 and by calling
lsm_get_xattr_slot() a second time, if the transmuting conditions are met.
The LSM infrastructure passes all xattrs provided by LSMs to the
filesystems through the initxattrs() callback, so that filesystems can
store xattrs in the disk.
After the change, the SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE inode flag is always set by
d_instantiate() after fetching SMACK64TRANSMUTE from the disk. Before it
was done by smack_inode_post_setxattr() as result of the __vfs_setxattr()
call.
Removing __vfs_setxattr() also prevents invalidating the EVM HMAC, by
adding a new xattr without checking and updating the existing HMAC.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Currently, the LSM infrastructure supports only one LSM providing an xattr
and EVM calculating the HMAC on that xattr, plus other inode metadata.
Allow all LSMs to provide one or multiple xattrs, by extending the security
blob reservation mechanism. Introduce the new lbs_xattr_count field of the
lsm_blob_sizes structure, so that each LSM can specify how many xattrs it
needs, and the LSM infrastructure knows how many xattr slots it should
allocate.
Modify the inode_init_security hook definition, by passing the full
xattr array allocated in security_inode_init_security(), and the current
number of xattr slots in that array filled by LSMs. The first parameter
would allow EVM to access and calculate the HMAC on xattrs supplied by
other LSMs, the second to not leave gaps in the xattr array, when an LSM
requested but did not provide xattrs (e.g. if it is not initialized).
Introduce lsm_get_xattr_slot(), which LSMs can call as many times as the
number specified in the lbs_xattr_count field of the lsm_blob_sizes
structure. During each call, lsm_get_xattr_slot() increments the number of
filled xattrs, so that at the next invocation it returns the next xattr
slot to fill.
Cleanup security_inode_init_security(). Unify the !initxattrs and
initxattrs case by simply not allocating the new_xattrs array in the
former. Update the documentation to reflect the changes, and fix the
description of the xattr name, as it is not allocated anymore.
Adapt both SELinux and Smack to use the new definition of the
inode_init_security hook, and to call lsm_get_xattr_slot() to obtain and
fill the reserved slots in the xattr array.
Move the xattr->name assignment after the xattr->value one, so that it is
done only in case of successful memory allocation.
Finally, change the default return value of the inode_init_security hook
from zero to -EOPNOTSUPP, so that BPF LSM correctly follows the hook
conventions.
Reported-by: Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@clip-os.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/Y1FTSIo+1x+4X0LS@archlinux/
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: minor comment and variable tweaks, approved by RS]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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smack_dentry_create_files_as() determines whether transmuting should occur
based on the label of the parent directory the new inode will be added to,
and not the label of the directory where it is created.
This helps for example to do transmuting on overlayfs, since the latter
first creates the inode in the working directory, and then moves it to the
correct destination.
However, despite smack_dentry_create_files_as() provides the correct label,
smack_inode_init_security() does not know from passed information whether
or not transmuting occurred. Without this information,
smack_inode_init_security() cannot set SMK_INODE_CHANGED in smk_flags,
which will result in the SMACK64TRANSMUTE xattr not being set in
smack_d_instantiate().
Thus, add the smk_transmuted field to the task_smack structure, and set it
in smack_dentry_create_files_as() to smk_task if transmuting occurred. If
smk_task is equal to smk_transmuted in smack_inode_init_security(), act as
if transmuting was successful but without taking the label from the parent
directory (the inode label was already set correctly from the current
credentials in smack_inode_alloc_security()).
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Enhance smack_inode_getsecurity() to retrieve the value for
SMACK64TRANSMUTE from the inode security blob, similarly to SMACK64.
This helps to display accurate values in the situation where the security
labels come from mount options and not from xattrs.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Pull smack updates from Casey Schaufler:
"There are two changes, one small and one more substantial:
- Remove of an unnecessary cast
- The mount option processing introduced with the mount rework makes
copies of mount option values. There is no good reason to make
copies of Smack labels, as they are maintained on a list and never
removed.
The code now uses pointers to entries on the list, reducing
processing time and memory use"
* tag 'Smack-for-6.4' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next:
Smack: Improve mount process memory use
smack_lsm: remove unnecessary type casting
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The existing mount processing code in Smack makes many unnecessary
copies of Smack labels. Because Smack labels never go away once
imported it is safe to use pointers to them rather than copies.
Replace the use of copies of label names to pointers to the global
label list entries.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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After working with the larger SELinux-based distros for several
years, we're finally at a place where we can disable the SELinux
runtime disable functionality. The existing kernel deprecation
notice explains the functionality and why we want to remove it:
The selinuxfs "disable" node allows SELinux to be disabled at
runtime prior to a policy being loaded into the kernel. If
disabled via this mechanism, SELinux will remain disabled until
the system is rebooted.
The preferred method of disabling SELinux is via the "selinux=0"
boot parameter, but the selinuxfs "disable" node was created to
make it easier for systems with primitive bootloaders that did not
allow for easy modification of the kernel command line.
Unfortunately, allowing for SELinux to be disabled at runtime makes
it difficult to secure the kernel's LSM hooks using the
"__ro_after_init" feature.
It is that last sentence, mentioning the '__ro_after_init' hardening,
which is the real motivation for this change, and if you look at the
diffstat you'll see that the impact of this patch reaches across all
the different LSMs, helping prevent tampering at the LSM hook level.
From a SELinux perspective, it is important to note that if you
continue to disable SELinux via "/etc/selinux/config" it may appear
that SELinux is disabled, but it is simply in an uninitialized state.
If you load a policy with `load_policy -i`, you will see SELinux
come alive just as if you had loaded the policy during early-boot.
It is also worth noting that the "/sys/fs/selinux/disable" file is
always writable now, regardless of the Kconfig settings, but writing
to the file has no effect on the system, other than to display an
error on the console if a non-zero/true value is written.
Finally, in the several years where we have been working on
deprecating this functionality, there has only been one instance of
someone mentioning any user visible breakage. In this particular
case it was an individual's kernel test system, and the workaround
documented in the deprecation notice ("selinux=0" on the kernel
command line) resolved the issue without problem.
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Remove unnecessary type casting.
The type of inode variable is struct inode *, so no type casting required.
Signed-off-by: XU pengfei <xupengfei@nfschina.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Pull smack update from Casey Schaufler:
"One fix for resetting CIPSO labeling"
* tag 'Smack-for-6.3' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next:
smackfs: Added check catlen
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If the catlen is 0, the memory for the netlbl_lsm_catmap
structure must be allocated anyway, otherwise the check of
such rules is not completed correctly.
Signed-off-by: Denis Arefev <arefev@swemel.ru>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Convert to struct mnt_idmap.
Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in
256c8aed2b42 ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts").
This is just the conversion to struct mnt_idmap.
Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a
mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to
conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces
that are relevent on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers
without detailed knowledge in this area this can be a potential source for
bugs.
Once the conversion to struct mnt_idmap is done all helpers down to the
really low-level helpers will take a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of
two namespace arguments. This way it becomes impossible to conflate the two
eliminating the possibility of any bugs. All of the vfs and all filesystems
only operate on struct mnt_idmap.
Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
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Convert to struct mnt_idmap.
Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in
256c8aed2b42 ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts").
This is just the conversion to struct mnt_idmap.
Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a
mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to
conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces
that are relevent on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers
without detailed knowledge in this area this can be a potential source for
bugs.
Once the conversion to struct mnt_idmap is done all helpers down to the
really low-level helpers will take a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of
two namespace arguments. This way it becomes impossible to conflate the two
eliminating the possibility of any bugs. All of the vfs and all filesystems
only operate on struct mnt_idmap.
Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
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Convert to struct mnt_idmap.
Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in
256c8aed2b42 ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts").
This is just the conversion to struct mnt_idmap.
Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a
mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to
conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces
that are relevent on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers
without detailed knowledge in this area this can be a potential source for
bugs.
Once the conversion to struct mnt_idmap is done all helpers down to the
really low-level helpers will take a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of
two namespace arguments. This way it becomes impossible to conflate the two
eliminating the possibility of any bugs. All of the vfs and all filesystems
only operate on struct mnt_idmap.
Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore:
- Improve the error handling in the device cgroup such that memory
allocation failures when updating the access policy do not
potentially alter the policy.
- Some minor fixes to reiserfs to ensure that it properly releases
LSM-related xattr values.
- Update the security_socket_getpeersec_stream() LSM hook to take
sockptr_t values.
Previously the net/BPF folks updated the getsockopt code in the
network stack to leverage the sockptr_t type to make it easier to
pass both kernel and __user pointers, but unfortunately when they did
so they didn't convert the LSM hook.
While there was/is no immediate risk by not converting the LSM hook,
it seems like this is a mistake waiting to happen so this patch
proactively does the LSM hook conversion.
- Convert vfs_getxattr_alloc() to return an int instead of a ssize_t
and cleanup the callers. Internally the function was never going to
return anything larger than an int and the callers were doing some
very odd things casting the return value; this patch fixes all that
and helps bring a bit of sanity to vfs_getxattr_alloc() and its
callers.
- More verbose, and helpful, LSM debug output when the system is booted
with "lsm.debug" on the command line. There are examples in the
commit description, but the quick summary is that this patch provides
better information about which LSMs are enabled and the ordering in
which they are processed.
- General comment and kernel-doc fixes and cleanups.
* tag 'lsm-pr-20221212' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
lsm: Fix description of fs_context_parse_param
lsm: Add/fix return values in lsm_hooks.h and fix formatting
lsm: Clarify documentation of vm_enough_memory hook
reiserfs: Add missing calls to reiserfs_security_free()
lsm,fs: fix vfs_getxattr_alloc() return type and caller error paths
device_cgroup: Roll back to original exceptions after copy failure
LSM: Better reporting of actual LSMs at boot
lsm: make security_socket_getpeersec_stream() sockptr_t safe
audit: Fix some kernel-doc warnings
lsm: remove obsoleted comments for security hooks
fs: edit a comment made in bad taste
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Commit 4ff09db1b79b ("bpf: net: Change sk_getsockopt() to take the
sockptr_t argument") made it possible to call sk_getsockopt()
with both user and kernel address space buffers through the use of
the sockptr_t type. Unfortunately at the time of conversion the
security_socket_getpeersec_stream() LSM hook was written to only
accept userspace buffers, and in a desire to avoid having to change
the LSM hook the commit author simply passed the sockptr_t's
userspace buffer pointer. Since the only sk_getsockopt() callers
at the time of conversion which used kernel sockptr_t buffers did
not allow SO_PEERSEC, and hence the
security_socket_getpeersec_stream() hook, this was acceptable but
also very fragile as future changes presented the possibility of
silently passing kernel space pointers to the LSM hook.
There are several ways to protect against this, including careful
code review of future commits, but since relying on code review to
catch bugs is a recipe for disaster and the upstream eBPF maintainer
is "strongly against defensive programming", this patch updates the
LSM hook, and all of the implementations to support sockptr_t and
safely handle both user and kernel space buffers.
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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The current way of setting and getting posix acls through the generic
xattr interface is error prone and type unsafe. The vfs needs to
interpret and fixup posix acls before storing or reporting it to
userspace. Various hacks exist to make this work. The code is hard to
understand and difficult to maintain in it's current form. Instead of
making this work by hacking posix acls through xattr handlers we are
building a dedicated posix acl api around the get and set inode
operations. This removes a lot of hackiness and makes the codepaths
easier to maintain. A lot of background can be found in [1].
So far posix acls were passed as a void blob to the security and
integrity modules. Some of them like evm then proceed to interpret the
void pointer and convert it into the kernel internal struct posix acl
representation to perform their integrity checking magic. This is
obviously pretty problematic as that requires knowledge that only the
vfs is guaranteed to have and has lead to various bugs. Add a proper
security hook for setting posix acls and pass down the posix acls in
their appropriate vfs format instead of hacking it through a void
pointer stored in the uapi format.
I spent considerate time in the security module infrastructure and
audited all codepaths. Smack has no restrictions based on the posix
acl values passed through it. The capability hook doesn't need to be
called either because it only has restrictions on security.* xattrs. So
these all becomes very simple hooks for smack.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1]
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
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Pull vfs constification updates from Al Viro:
"whack-a-mole: constifying struct path *"
* tag 'pull-path' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
ecryptfs: constify path
spufs: constify path
nd_jump_link(): constify path
audit_init_parent(): constify path
__io_setxattr(): constify path
do_proc_readlink(): constify path
overlayfs: constify path
fs/notify: constify path
may_linkat(): constify path
do_sys_name_to_handle(): constify path
->getprocattr(): attribute name is const char *, TYVM...
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Pull smack updates from Casey Schaufler:
"Two minor code clean-ups: one removes constants left over from the old
mount API, while the other gets rid of an unneeded variable.
The other change fixes a flaw in handling IPv6 labeling"
* tag 'Smack-for-6.1' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next:
smack: cleanup obsolete mount option flags
smack: lsm: remove the unneeded result variable
SMACK: Add sk_clone_security LSM hook
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These mount option flags are obsolete since commit 12085b14a444 ("smack:
switch to private smack_mnt_opts"), remove them.
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Return the value smk_ptrace_rule_check() directly instead of storing it
in another redundant variable.
Reported-by: Zeal Robot <zealci@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Xu Panda <xu.panda@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Using smk_of_current() during sk_alloc_security hook leads in
rare cases to a faulty initialization of the security context
of the created socket.
By adding the LSM hook sk_clone_security to SMACK this initialization
fault is corrected by copying the security context of the old socket
pointer to the newly cloned one.
Co-authored-by: Martin Ostertag: <martin.ostertag@elektrobit.com>
Signed-off-by: Lontke Michael <michael.lontke@elektrobit.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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cast of ->d_name.name to char * is completely wrong - nothing is
allowed to modify its contents.
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Limit io_uring "cmd" options to files for which the caller has
Smack read access. There may be cases where the cmd option may
be closer to a write access than a read, but there is no way
to make that determination.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ee692a21e9bf ("fs,io_uring: add infrastructure for uring-cmd")
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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It's not possible for inode->i_security to be NULL here because every
inode will call inode_init_always and then lsm_inode_alloc to alloc
memory for inode->security, this is what LSM infrastructure management
do, so remove this redundant code.
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Simplify the code by using kstrndup instead of kzalloc and strncpy in
smk_parse_smack(), which meanwhile remove strncpy as [1] suggests.
[1]: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/90
Signed-off-by: GONG, Ruiqi <gongruiqi1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull mount handling updates from Al Viro:
"Cleanups (and one fix) around struct mount handling.
The fix is usermode_driver.c one - once you've done kern_mount(), you
must kern_unmount(); simple mntput() will end up with a leak. Several
failure exits in there messed up that way... In practice you won't hit
those particular failure exits without fault injection, though"
* tag 'pull-18-rc1-work.mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
move mount-related externs from fs.h to mount.h
blob_to_mnt(): kern_unmount() is needed to undo kern_mount()
m->mnt_root->d_inode->i_sb is a weird way to spell m->mnt_sb...
linux/mount.h: trim includes
uninline may_mount() and don't opencode it in fspick(2)/fsopen(2)
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Get rid of redundant assignments which end up in values not being
read either because they are overwritten or the function ends.
Reported by clang-tidy [deadcode.DeadStores]
Signed-off-by: Michal Orzel <michalorzel.eng@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Remove inappropriate use of ntohs() and assign the
port value directly.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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The security_task_getsecid_subj() LSM hook invites misuse by allowing
callers to specify a task even though the hook is only safe when the
current task is referenced. Fix this by removing the task_struct
argument to the hook, requiring LSM implementations to use the
current task. While we are changing the hook declaration we also
rename the function to security_current_getsecid_subj() in an effort
to reinforce that the hook captures the subjective credentials of the
current task and not an arbitrary task on the system.
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
- Add LSM/SELinux/Smack controls and auditing for io-uring.
As usual, the individual commit descriptions have more detail, but we
were basically missing two things which we're adding here:
+ establishment of a proper audit context so that auditing of
io-uring ops works similarly to how it does for syscalls (with
some io-uring additions because io-uring ops are *not* syscalls)
+ additional LSM hooks to enable access control points for some of
the more unusual io-uring features, e.g. credential overrides.
The additional audit callouts and LSM hooks were done in conjunction
with the io-uring folks, based on conversations and RFC patches
earlier in the year.
- Fixup the binder credential handling so that the proper credentials
are used in the LSM hooks; the commit description and the code
comment which is removed in these patches are helpful to understand
the background and why this is the proper fix.
- Enable SELinux genfscon policy support for securityfs, allowing
improved SELinux filesystem labeling for other subsystems which make
use of securityfs, e.g. IMA.
* tag 'selinux-pr-20211101' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
security: Return xattr name from security_dentry_init_security()
selinux: fix a sock regression in selinux_ip_postroute_compat()
binder: use cred instead of task for getsecid
binder: use cred instead of task for selinux checks
binder: use euid from cred instead of using task
LSM: Avoid warnings about potentially unused hook variables
selinux: fix all of the W=1 build warnings
selinux: make better use of the nf_hook_state passed to the NF hooks
selinux: fix race condition when computing ocontext SIDs
selinux: remove unneeded ipv6 hook wrappers
selinux: remove the SELinux lockdown implementation
selinux: enable genfscon labeling for securityfs
Smack: Brutalist io_uring support
selinux: add support for the io_uring access controls
lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks to io_uring
io_uring: convert io_uring to the secure anon inode interface
fs: add anon_inode_getfile_secure() similar to anon_inode_getfd_secure()
audit: add filtering for io_uring records
audit,io_uring,io-wq: add some basic audit support to io_uring
audit: prepare audit_context for use in calling contexts beyond syscalls
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Pull smack updates from Casey Schaufler:
"Multiple corrections to smackfs:
- a change for overlayfs support that corrects the initial attributes
on created files
- code clean-up for netlabel processing
- several fixes in smackfs for a variety of reasons
- Errors reported by W=1 have been addressed
All told, nothing challenging"
* tag 'Smack-for-5.16' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next:
smackfs: use netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_del() for deleting cipso_v4_doi
smackfs: use __GFP_NOFAIL for smk_cipso_doi()
Smack: fix W=1 build warnings
smack: remove duplicated hook function
Smack:- Use overlay inode label in smack_inode_copy_up()
smack: Guard smack_ipv6_lock definition within a SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING block
smackfs: Fix use-after-free in netlbl_catmap_walk()
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syzbot is reporting UAF at cipso_v4_doi_search() [1], for smk_cipso_doi()
is calling kfree() without removing from the cipso_v4_doi_list list after
netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_map_add() returned an error. We need to use
netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_del() in order to remove from the list and wait for
RCU grace period before kfree().
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=93dba5b91f0fed312cbd [1]
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+93dba5b91f0fed312cbd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Fixes: 6c2e8ac0953fccdd ("netlabel: Update kernel configuration API")
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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syzbot is reporting kernel panic at smk_cipso_doi() due to memory
allocation fault injection [1]. The reason for need to use panic() was
not explained. But since no fix was proposed for 18 months, for now
let's use __GFP_NOFAIL for utilizing syzbot resource on other bugs.
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=89731ccb6fec15ce1c22 [1]
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+89731ccb6fec15ce1c22@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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A couple of functions had malformed comment blocks.
Namespace parameters were added without updating the
comment blocks. These are all repaired in the Smack code,
so "% make W=1 security/smack" is warning free.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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ipv4 and ipv6 hook functions are identical, remove one.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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