From 3e52e5b077f6c3e26801d87335aac35411744108 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mickaël Salaün Date: Fri, 9 Dec 2022 20:38:13 +0100 Subject: landlock: Explain file descriptor access rights MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Starting with LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE, it is worth explaining why we choose to restrict access checks at open time. This new "File descriptor access rights" section is complementary to the existing "Inode access rights" section. Add a new guiding principle related to this section. Reviewed-by: Günther Noack Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221209193813.972012-1-mic@digikod.net [mic: Include the latest Günther's suggestion, and fix spelling] Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün --- Documentation/security/landlock.rst | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'Documentation/security') diff --git a/Documentation/security/landlock.rst b/Documentation/security/landlock.rst index c0029d5d02eb..36f26501fd15 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/landlock.rst +++ b/Documentation/security/landlock.rst @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ Landlock LSM: kernel documentation ================================== :Author: Mickaël Salaün -:Date: September 2022 +:Date: December 2022 Landlock's goal is to create scoped access-control (i.e. sandboxing). To harden a whole system, this feature should be available to any process, @@ -41,12 +41,16 @@ Guiding principles for safe access controls processes. * Computation related to Landlock operations (e.g. enforcing a ruleset) shall only impact the processes requesting them. +* Resources (e.g. file descriptors) directly obtained from the kernel by a + sandboxed process shall retain their scoped accesses (at the time of resource + acquisition) whatever process use them. + Cf. `File descriptor access rights`_. Design choices ============== -Filesystem access rights ------------------------- +Inode access rights +------------------- All access rights are tied to an inode and what can be accessed through it. Reading the content of a directory does not imply to be allowed to read the @@ -57,6 +61,30 @@ directory, not the unlinked inode. This is the reason why ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE`` or ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER`` are not allowed to be tied to files but only to directories. +File descriptor access rights +----------------------------- + +Access rights are checked and tied to file descriptors at open time. The +underlying principle is that equivalent sequences of operations should lead to +the same results, when they are executed under the same Landlock domain. + +Taking the ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE`` right as an example, it may be +allowed to open a file for writing without being allowed to +:manpage:`ftruncate` the resulting file descriptor if the related file +hierarchy doesn't grant such access right. The following sequences of +operations have the same semantic and should then have the same result: + +* ``truncate(path);`` +* ``int fd = open(path, O_WRONLY); ftruncate(fd); close(fd);`` + +Similarly to file access modes (e.g. ``O_RDWR``), Landlock access rights +attached to file descriptors are retained even if they are passed between +processes (e.g. through a Unix domain socket). Such access rights will then be +enforced even if the receiving process is not sandboxed by Landlock. Indeed, +this is required to keep a consistent access control over the whole system, and +this avoids unattended bypasses through file descriptor passing (i.e. confused +deputy attack). + Tests ===== -- cgit v1.2.3