From 6a53b7593233ab9e4f96873ebacc0f653a55c3e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Cong Wang Date: Mon, 27 Nov 2017 11:15:16 -0800 Subject: xfrm: check id proto in validate_tmpl() syzbot reported a kernel warning in xfrm_state_fini(), which indicates that we have entries left in the list net->xfrm.state_all whose proto is zero. And xfrm_id_proto_match() doesn't consider them as a match with IPSEC_PROTO_ANY in this case. Proto with value 0 is probably not a valid value, at least verify_newsa_info() doesn't consider it valid either. This patch fixes it by checking the proto value in validate_tmpl() and rejecting invalid ones, like what iproute2 does in xfrm_xfrmproto_getbyname(). Reported-by: syzbot Cc: Steffen Klassert Cc: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Cong Wang Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert --- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+) (limited to 'net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c') diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c index 983b0233767b..c2cfcc6fdb34 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c @@ -1445,6 +1445,21 @@ static int validate_tmpl(int nr, struct xfrm_user_tmpl *ut, u16 family) default: return -EINVAL; } + + switch (ut[i].id.proto) { + case IPPROTO_AH: + case IPPROTO_ESP: + case IPPROTO_COMP: +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) + case IPPROTO_ROUTING: + case IPPROTO_DSTOPTS: +#endif + case IPSEC_PROTO_ANY: + break; + default: + return -EINVAL; + } + } return 0; -- cgit v1.2.3 From e719135881f00c01ca400abb8a5dadaf297a24f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michal Kubecek Date: Wed, 29 Nov 2017 18:23:56 +0100 Subject: xfrm: fix XFRMA_OUTPUT_MARK policy entry This seems to be an obvious typo, NLA_U32 is type of the attribute, not its (minimal) length. Fixes: 077fbac405bf ("net: xfrm: support setting an output mark.") Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert --- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c') diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c index c2cfcc6fdb34..ff58c37469d6 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c @@ -2485,7 +2485,7 @@ static const struct nla_policy xfrma_policy[XFRMA_MAX+1] = { [XFRMA_PROTO] = { .type = NLA_U8 }, [XFRMA_ADDRESS_FILTER] = { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_address_filter) }, [XFRMA_OFFLOAD_DEV] = { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_user_offload) }, - [XFRMA_OUTPUT_MARK] = { .len = NLA_U32 }, + [XFRMA_OUTPUT_MARK] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, }; static const struct nla_policy xfrma_spd_policy[XFRMA_SPD_MAX+1] = { -- cgit v1.2.3 From 732706afe1cc46ef48493b3d2b69c98f36314ae4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steffen Klassert Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2017 08:07:25 +0100 Subject: xfrm: Fix stack-out-of-bounds with misconfigured transport mode policies. On policies with a transport mode template, we pass the addresses from the flowi to xfrm_state_find(), assuming that the IP addresses (and address family) don't change during transformation. Unfortunately our policy template validation is not strict enough. It is possible to configure policies with transport mode template where the address family of the template does not match the selectors address family. This lead to stack-out-of-bound reads because we compare arddesses of the wrong family. Fix this by refusing such a configuration, address family can not change on transport mode. We use the assumption that, on transport mode, the first templates address family must match the address family of the policy selector. Subsequent transport mode templates must mach the address family of the previous template. Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert --- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) (limited to 'net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c') diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c index ff58c37469d6..bdb48e5dba04 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c @@ -1419,11 +1419,14 @@ static void copy_templates(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct xfrm_user_tmpl *ut, static int validate_tmpl(int nr, struct xfrm_user_tmpl *ut, u16 family) { + u16 prev_family; int i; if (nr > XFRM_MAX_DEPTH) return -EINVAL; + prev_family = family; + for (i = 0; i < nr; i++) { /* We never validated the ut->family value, so many * applications simply leave it at zero. The check was @@ -1435,6 +1438,12 @@ static int validate_tmpl(int nr, struct xfrm_user_tmpl *ut, u16 family) if (!ut[i].family) ut[i].family = family; + if ((ut[i].mode == XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT) && + (ut[i].family != prev_family)) + return -EINVAL; + + prev_family = ut[i].family; + switch (ut[i].family) { case AF_INET: break; -- cgit v1.2.3 From cc01572e2fb080e279ca625f239aca61f435ebf3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yossi Kuperman Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2018 15:52:41 +0200 Subject: xfrm: Add SA to hardware at the end of xfrm_state_construct() Current code configures the hardware with a new SA before the state has been fully initialized. During this time interval, an incoming ESP packet can cause a crash due to a NULL dereference. More specifically, xfrm_input() considers the packet as valid, and yet, anti-replay mechanism is not initialized. Move hardware configuration to the end of xfrm_state_construct(), and mark the state as valid once the SA is fully initialized. Fixes: d77e38e612a0 ("xfrm: Add an IPsec hardware offloading API") Signed-off-by: Aviad Yehezkel Signed-off-by: Aviv Heller Signed-off-by: Yossi Kuperman Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert --- net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 10 +++++++--- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 18 +++++++++++------- 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c') diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c index 429957412633..2d486492acdb 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c @@ -2272,8 +2272,6 @@ int __xfrm_init_state(struct xfrm_state *x, bool init_replay, bool offload) goto error; } - x->km.state = XFRM_STATE_VALID; - error: return err; } @@ -2282,7 +2280,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__xfrm_init_state); int xfrm_init_state(struct xfrm_state *x) { - return __xfrm_init_state(x, true, false); + int err; + + err = __xfrm_init_state(x, true, false); + if (!err) + x->km.state = XFRM_STATE_VALID; + + return err; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_init_state); diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c index bdb48e5dba04..7f52b8eb177d 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c @@ -598,13 +598,6 @@ static struct xfrm_state *xfrm_state_construct(struct net *net, goto error; } - if (attrs[XFRMA_OFFLOAD_DEV]) { - err = xfrm_dev_state_add(net, x, - nla_data(attrs[XFRMA_OFFLOAD_DEV])); - if (err) - goto error; - } - if ((err = xfrm_alloc_replay_state_esn(&x->replay_esn, &x->preplay_esn, attrs[XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL]))) goto error; @@ -620,6 +613,14 @@ static struct xfrm_state *xfrm_state_construct(struct net *net, /* override default values from above */ xfrm_update_ae_params(x, attrs, 0); + /* configure the hardware if offload is requested */ + if (attrs[XFRMA_OFFLOAD_DEV]) { + err = xfrm_dev_state_add(net, x, + nla_data(attrs[XFRMA_OFFLOAD_DEV])); + if (err) + goto error; + } + return x; error: @@ -662,6 +663,9 @@ static int xfrm_add_sa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, goto out; } + if (x->km.state == XFRM_STATE_VOID) + x->km.state = XFRM_STATE_VALID; + c.seq = nlh->nlmsg_seq; c.portid = nlh->nlmsg_pid; c.event = nlh->nlmsg_type; -- cgit v1.2.3