From a6e4f85d3820d00694ed10f581f4c650445dbcda Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michal Kazior Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2024 14:22:57 +0000 Subject: wifi: cfg80211: fix missing interfaces when dumping The nl80211_dump_interface() supports resumption in case nl80211_send_iface() doesn't have the resources to complete its work. The logic would store the progress as iteration offsets for rdev and wdev loops. However the logic did not properly handle resumption for non-last rdev. Assuming a system with 2 rdevs, with 2 wdevs each, this could happen: dump(cb=[0, 0]): if_start=cb[1] (=0) send rdev0.wdev0 -> ok send rdev0.wdev1 -> yield cb[1] = 1 dump(cb=[0, 1]): if_start=cb[1] (=1) send rdev0.wdev1 -> ok // since if_start=1 the rdev0.wdev0 got skipped // through if_idx < if_start send rdev1.wdev1 -> ok The if_start needs to be reset back to 0 upon wdev loop end. The problem is actually hard to hit on a desktop, and even on most routers. The prerequisites for this manifesting was: - more than 1 wiphy - a few handful of interfaces - dump without rdev or wdev filter I was seeing this with 4 wiphys 9 interfaces each. It'd miss 6 interfaces from the last wiphy reported to userspace. Signed-off-by: Michal Kazior Link: https://msgid.link/20240116142340.89678-1-kazikcz@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- net/wireless/nl80211.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/wireless/nl80211.c b/net/wireless/nl80211.c index 1cbbb11ea503..fbf95b7ff6b4 100644 --- a/net/wireless/nl80211.c +++ b/net/wireless/nl80211.c @@ -4008,6 +4008,7 @@ static int nl80211_dump_interface(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback * } wiphy_unlock(&rdev->wiphy); + if_start = 0; wp_idx++; } out: -- cgit v1.2.3 From 26490da5a71da9064e58f0d4ce82756c26ef9eb1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lukas Bulwahn Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2024 09:25:45 +0100 Subject: wifi: cfg80211/mac80211: remove dependency on non-existing option Commit ffbd0c8c1e7f ("wifi: mac80211: add an element parsing unit test") and commit 730eeb17bbdd ("wifi: cfg80211: add first kunit tests, for element defrag") add new configs that depend on !KERNEL_6_2, but the config option KERNEL_6_2 does not exist in the tree. This dependency is used for handling backporting to restrict the option to certain kernels but this really should not be carried around the mainline kernel tree. Clean up this needless dependency on the non-existing option KERNEL_6_2. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAKXUXMyfrM6amOR7Ysim3WNQ-Ckf9HJDqRhAoYmLXujo1UV+yA@mail.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Lukas Bulwahn Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- net/mac80211/Kconfig | 1 - net/wireless/Kconfig | 1 - 2 files changed, 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/mac80211/Kconfig b/net/mac80211/Kconfig index cb0291decf2e..13438cc0a6b1 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/Kconfig +++ b/net/mac80211/Kconfig @@ -62,7 +62,6 @@ config MAC80211_KUNIT_TEST depends on KUNIT depends on MAC80211 default KUNIT_ALL_TESTS - depends on !KERNEL_6_2 help Enable this option to test mac80211 internals with kunit. diff --git a/net/wireless/Kconfig b/net/wireless/Kconfig index a9ac85e09af3..10345388ad13 100644 --- a/net/wireless/Kconfig +++ b/net/wireless/Kconfig @@ -206,7 +206,6 @@ config CFG80211_KUNIT_TEST depends on KUNIT depends on CFG80211 default KUNIT_ALL_TESTS - depends on !KERNEL_6_2 help Enable this option to test cfg80211 functions with kunit. -- cgit v1.2.3 From b01a74b3ca6fd51b62c67733ba7c3280fa6c5d26 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johannes Berg Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2024 18:17:44 +0200 Subject: wifi: mac80211: fix potential sta-link leak When a station is allocated, links are added but not set to valid yet (e.g. during connection to an AP MLD), we might remove the station without ever marking links valid, and leak them. Fix that. Fixes: cb71f1d136a6 ("wifi: mac80211: add sta link addition/removal") Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Reviewed-by: Ilan Peer Signed-off-by: Miri Korenblit Link: https://msgid.link/20240111181514.6573998beaf8.I09ac2e1d41c80f82a5a616b8bd1d9d8dd709a6a6@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- net/mac80211/sta_info.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/mac80211/sta_info.c b/net/mac80211/sta_info.c index 0ba613dd1cc4..c33decbb97f2 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/sta_info.c +++ b/net/mac80211/sta_info.c @@ -404,7 +404,10 @@ void sta_info_free(struct ieee80211_local *local, struct sta_info *sta) int i; for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sta->link); i++) { - if (!(sta->sta.valid_links & BIT(i))) + struct link_sta_info *link_sta; + + link_sta = rcu_access_pointer(sta->link[i]); + if (!link_sta) continue; sta_remove_link(sta, i, false); -- cgit v1.2.3 From bcbc84af1183c8cf3d1ca9b78540c2185cd85e7f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Felix Fietkau Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2024 19:10:59 +0100 Subject: wifi: mac80211: fix race condition on enabling fast-xmit fast-xmit must only be enabled after the sta has been uploaded to the driver, otherwise it could end up passing the not-yet-uploaded sta via drv_tx calls to the driver, leading to potential crashes because of uninitialized drv_priv data. Add a missing sta->uploaded check and re-check fast xmit after inserting a sta. Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau Link: https://msgid.link/20240104181059.84032-1-nbd@nbd.name Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- net/mac80211/sta_info.c | 2 ++ net/mac80211/tx.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/mac80211/sta_info.c b/net/mac80211/sta_info.c index c33decbb97f2..bcf3f727fc6d 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/sta_info.c +++ b/net/mac80211/sta_info.c @@ -913,6 +913,8 @@ static int sta_info_insert_finish(struct sta_info *sta) __acquires(RCU) if (ieee80211_vif_is_mesh(&sdata->vif)) mesh_accept_plinks_update(sdata); + ieee80211_check_fast_xmit(sta); + return 0; out_remove: if (sta->sta.valid_links) diff --git a/net/mac80211/tx.c b/net/mac80211/tx.c index ed4fdf655343..4b2823e36a37 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/tx.c +++ b/net/mac80211/tx.c @@ -3048,7 +3048,7 @@ void ieee80211_check_fast_xmit(struct sta_info *sta) sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION) goto out; - if (!test_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_AUTHORIZED)) + if (!test_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_AUTHORIZED) || !sta->uploaded) goto out; if (test_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_PS_STA) || -- cgit v1.2.3 From dbc153fd3c142909e564bb256da087e13fbf239c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wen Gu Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2024 12:32:10 +0800 Subject: net/smc: fix illegal rmb_desc access in SMC-D connection dump A crash was found when dumping SMC-D connections. It can be reproduced by following steps: - run nginx/wrk test: smc_run nginx smc_run wrk -t 16 -c 1000 -d -H 'Connection: Close' - continuously dump SMC-D connections in parallel: watch -n 1 'smcss -D' BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000030 CPU: 2 PID: 7204 Comm: smcss Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 6.7.0+ #55 RIP: 0010:__smc_diag_dump.constprop.0+0x5e5/0x620 [smc_diag] Call Trace: ? __die+0x24/0x70 ? page_fault_oops+0x66/0x150 ? exc_page_fault+0x69/0x140 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 ? __smc_diag_dump.constprop.0+0x5e5/0x620 [smc_diag] ? __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x35d/0x430 ? __alloc_skb+0x77/0x170 smc_diag_dump_proto+0xd0/0xf0 [smc_diag] smc_diag_dump+0x26/0x60 [smc_diag] netlink_dump+0x19f/0x320 __netlink_dump_start+0x1dc/0x300 smc_diag_handler_dump+0x6a/0x80 [smc_diag] ? __pfx_smc_diag_dump+0x10/0x10 [smc_diag] sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x121/0x140 ? __pfx_sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 netlink_rcv_skb+0x5a/0x110 sock_diag_rcv+0x28/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x22a/0x330 netlink_sendmsg+0x1f8/0x420 __sock_sendmsg+0xb0/0xc0 ____sys_sendmsg+0x24e/0x300 ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x62/0x80 ___sys_sendmsg+0x7c/0xd0 ? __do_fault+0x34/0x160 ? do_read_fault+0x5f/0x100 ? do_fault+0xb0/0x110 ? __handle_mm_fault+0x2b0/0x6c0 __sys_sendmsg+0x4d/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x69/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 It is possible that the connection is in process of being established when we dump it. Assumed that the connection has been registered in a link group by smc_conn_create() but the rmb_desc has not yet been initialized by smc_buf_create(), thus causing the illegal access to conn->rmb_desc. So fix it by checking before dump. Fixes: 4b1b7d3b30a6 ("net/smc: add SMC-D diag support") Signed-off-by: Wen Gu Reviewed-by: Dust Li Reviewed-by: Wenjia Zhang Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/smc/smc_diag.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/smc/smc_diag.c b/net/smc/smc_diag.c index 52f7c4f1e767..5a33908015f3 100644 --- a/net/smc/smc_diag.c +++ b/net/smc/smc_diag.c @@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ static int __smc_diag_dump(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, } if (smc_conn_lgr_valid(&smc->conn) && smc->conn.lgr->is_smcd && (req->diag_ext & (1 << (SMC_DIAG_DMBINFO - 1))) && - !list_empty(&smc->conn.lgr->list)) { + !list_empty(&smc->conn.lgr->list) && smc->conn.rmb_desc) { struct smc_connection *conn = &smc->conn; struct smcd_diag_dmbinfo dinfo; struct smcd_dev *smcd = conn->lgr->smcd; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 198bc90e0e734e5f98c3d2833e8390cac3df61b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zhengchao Shao Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2024 09:20:19 +0800 Subject: tcp: make sure init the accept_queue's spinlocks once When I run syz's reproduction C program locally, it causes the following issue: pvqspinlock: lock 0xffff9d181cd5c660 has corrupted value 0x0! WARNING: CPU: 19 PID: 21160 at __pv_queued_spin_unlock_slowpath (kernel/locking/qspinlock_paravirt.h:508) Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:__pv_queued_spin_unlock_slowpath (kernel/locking/qspinlock_paravirt.h:508) Code: 73 56 3a ff 90 c3 cc cc cc cc 8b 05 bb 1f 48 01 85 c0 74 05 c3 cc cc cc cc 8b 17 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 30 20 ce 8f e8 ad 56 42 ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 0f 0b 0f 1f 40 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 RSP: 0018:ffffa8d200604cb8 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff9d1ef60e0908 RDX: 00000000ffffffd8 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: ffff9d1ef60e0900 RBP: ffff9d181cd5c280 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000ffff7fff R10: ffffa8d200604b68 R11: ffffffff907dcdc8 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff9d181cd5c660 R14: ffff9d1813a3f330 R15: 0000000000001000 FS: 00007fa110184640(0000) GS:ffff9d1ef60c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020000000 CR3: 000000011f65e000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: _raw_spin_unlock (kernel/locking/spinlock.c:186) inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add (net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1321) inet_csk_complete_hashdance (net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1358) tcp_check_req (net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c:868) tcp_v4_rcv (net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2260) ip_protocol_deliver_rcu (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205) ip_local_deliver_finish (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:234) __netif_receive_skb_one_core (net/core/dev.c:5529) process_backlog (./include/linux/rcupdate.h:779) __napi_poll (net/core/dev.c:6533) net_rx_action (net/core/dev.c:6604) __do_softirq (./arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:27) do_softirq (kernel/softirq.c:454 kernel/softirq.c:441) __local_bh_enable_ip (kernel/softirq.c:381) __dev_queue_xmit (net/core/dev.c:4374) ip_finish_output2 (./include/net/neighbour.h:540 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:235) __ip_queue_xmit (net/ipv4/ip_output.c:535) __tcp_transmit_skb (net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1462) tcp_rcv_synsent_state_process (net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6469) tcp_rcv_state_process (net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6657) tcp_v4_do_rcv (net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1929) __release_sock (./include/net/sock.h:1121 net/core/sock.c:2968) release_sock (net/core/sock.c:3536) inet_wait_for_connect (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:609) __inet_stream_connect (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:702) inet_stream_connect (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:748) __sys_connect (./include/linux/file.h:45 net/socket.c:2064) __x64_sys_connect (net/socket.c:2073 net/socket.c:2070 net/socket.c:2070) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:129) RIP: 0033:0x7fa10ff05a3d Code: 5b 41 5c c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d ab a3 0e 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fa110183de8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020000054 RCX: 00007fa10ff05a3d RDX: 000000000000001c RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007fa110183e20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007fa110184640 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fa10fe8b060 R15: 00007fff73e23b20 The issue triggering process is analyzed as follows: Thread A Thread B tcp_v4_rcv //receive ack TCP packet inet_shutdown tcp_check_req tcp_disconnect //disconnect sock ... tcp_set_state(sk, TCP_CLOSE) inet_csk_complete_hashdance ... inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add inet_listen //start listen spin_lock(&queue->rskq_lock) inet_csk_listen_start ... reqsk_queue_alloc ... spin_lock_init spin_unlock(&queue->rskq_lock) //warning When the socket receives the ACK packet during the three-way handshake, it will hold spinlock. And then the user actively shutdowns the socket and listens to the socket immediately, the spinlock will be initialized. When the socket is going to release the spinlock, a warning is generated. Also the same issue to fastopenq.lock. Move init spinlock to inet_create and inet_accept to make sure init the accept_queue's spinlocks once. Fixes: fff1f3001cc5 ("tcp: add a spinlock to protect struct request_sock_queue") Fixes: 168a8f58059a ("tcp: TCP Fast Open Server - main code path") Reported-by: Ming Shu Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240118012019.1751966-1-shaozhengchao@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- include/net/inet_connection_sock.h | 8 ++++++++ net/core/request_sock.c | 3 --- net/ipv4/af_inet.c | 3 +++ net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c | 4 ++++ 4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/include/net/inet_connection_sock.h b/include/net/inet_connection_sock.h index d0a2f827d5f2..9ab4bf704e86 100644 --- a/include/net/inet_connection_sock.h +++ b/include/net/inet_connection_sock.h @@ -357,4 +357,12 @@ static inline bool inet_csk_has_ulp(const struct sock *sk) return inet_test_bit(IS_ICSK, sk) && !!inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ulp_ops; } +static inline void inet_init_csk_locks(struct sock *sk) +{ + struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk); + + spin_lock_init(&icsk->icsk_accept_queue.rskq_lock); + spin_lock_init(&icsk->icsk_accept_queue.fastopenq.lock); +} + #endif /* _INET_CONNECTION_SOCK_H */ diff --git a/net/core/request_sock.c b/net/core/request_sock.c index f35c2e998406..63de5c635842 100644 --- a/net/core/request_sock.c +++ b/net/core/request_sock.c @@ -33,9 +33,6 @@ void reqsk_queue_alloc(struct request_sock_queue *queue) { - spin_lock_init(&queue->rskq_lock); - - spin_lock_init(&queue->fastopenq.lock); queue->fastopenq.rskq_rst_head = NULL; queue->fastopenq.rskq_rst_tail = NULL; queue->fastopenq.qlen = 0; diff --git a/net/ipv4/af_inet.c b/net/ipv4/af_inet.c index 835f4f9d98d2..4e635dd3d3c8 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/af_inet.c +++ b/net/ipv4/af_inet.c @@ -330,6 +330,9 @@ lookup_protocol: if (INET_PROTOSW_REUSE & answer_flags) sk->sk_reuse = SK_CAN_REUSE; + if (INET_PROTOSW_ICSK & answer_flags) + inet_init_csk_locks(sk); + inet = inet_sk(sk); inet_assign_bit(IS_ICSK, sk, INET_PROTOSW_ICSK & answer_flags); diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c b/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c index 8e2eb1793685..459af1f89739 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c +++ b/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c @@ -727,6 +727,10 @@ out: } if (req) reqsk_put(req); + + if (newsk) + inet_init_csk_locks(newsk); + return newsk; out_err: newsk = NULL; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 6c21660fe221a15c789dee2bc2fd95516bc5aeaf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lin Ma Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2024 21:03:06 +0800 Subject: vlan: skip nested type that is not IFLA_VLAN_QOS_MAPPING In the vlan_changelink function, a loop is used to parse the nested attributes IFLA_VLAN_EGRESS_QOS and IFLA_VLAN_INGRESS_QOS in order to obtain the struct ifla_vlan_qos_mapping. These two nested attributes are checked in the vlan_validate_qos_map function, which calls nla_validate_nested_deprecated with the vlan_map_policy. However, this deprecated validator applies a LIBERAL strictness, allowing the presence of an attribute with the type IFLA_VLAN_QOS_UNSPEC. Consequently, the loop in vlan_changelink may parse an attribute of type IFLA_VLAN_QOS_UNSPEC and believe it carries a payload of struct ifla_vlan_qos_mapping, which is not necessarily true. To address this issue and ensure compatibility, this patch introduces two type checks that skip attributes whose type is not IFLA_VLAN_QOS_MAPPING. Fixes: 07b5b17e157b ("[VLAN]: Use rtnl_link API") Signed-off-by: Lin Ma Reviewed-by: Simon Horman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240118130306.1644001-1-linma@zju.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/8021q/vlan_netlink.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/8021q/vlan_netlink.c b/net/8021q/vlan_netlink.c index 214532173536..a3b68243fd4b 100644 --- a/net/8021q/vlan_netlink.c +++ b/net/8021q/vlan_netlink.c @@ -118,12 +118,16 @@ static int vlan_changelink(struct net_device *dev, struct nlattr *tb[], } if (data[IFLA_VLAN_INGRESS_QOS]) { nla_for_each_nested(attr, data[IFLA_VLAN_INGRESS_QOS], rem) { + if (nla_type(attr) != IFLA_VLAN_QOS_MAPPING) + continue; m = nla_data(attr); vlan_dev_set_ingress_priority(dev, m->to, m->from); } } if (data[IFLA_VLAN_EGRESS_QOS]) { nla_for_each_nested(attr, data[IFLA_VLAN_EGRESS_QOS], rem) { + if (nla_type(attr) != IFLA_VLAN_QOS_MAPPING) + continue; m = nla_data(attr); err = vlan_dev_set_egress_priority(dev, m->from, m->to); if (err) -- cgit v1.2.3 From dad555c816a50c6a6a8a86be1f9177673918c647 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2024 18:36:25 +0000 Subject: llc: make llc_ui_sendmsg() more robust against bonding changes syzbot was able to trick llc_ui_sendmsg(), allocating an skb with no headroom, but subsequently trying to push 14 bytes of Ethernet header [1] Like some others, llc_ui_sendmsg() releases the socket lock before calling sock_alloc_send_skb(). Then it acquires it again, but does not redo all the sanity checks that were performed. This fix: - Uses LL_RESERVED_SPACE() to reserve space. - Check all conditions again after socket lock is held again. - Do not account Ethernet header for mtu limitation. [1] skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffff800088baa334 len:1514 put:14 head:ffff0000c9c37000 data:ffff0000c9c36ff2 tail:0x5dc end:0x6c0 dev:bond0 kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:193 ! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 6875 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.7.0-rc8-syzkaller-00101-g0802e17d9aca-dirty #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/17/2023 pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:189 [inline] pc : skb_under_panic+0x13c/0x140 net/core/skbuff.c:203 lr : skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:189 [inline] lr : skb_under_panic+0x13c/0x140 net/core/skbuff.c:203 sp : ffff800096f97000 x29: ffff800096f97010 x28: ffff80008cc8d668 x27: dfff800000000000 x26: ffff0000cb970c90 x25: 00000000000005dc x24: ffff0000c9c36ff2 x23: ffff0000c9c37000 x22: 00000000000005ea x21: 00000000000006c0 x20: 000000000000000e x19: ffff800088baa334 x18: 1fffe000368261ce x17: ffff80008e4ed000 x16: ffff80008a8310f8 x15: 0000000000000001 x14: 1ffff00012df2d58 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: 0000000000000001 x10: 0000000000ff0100 x9 : e28a51f1087e8400 x8 : e28a51f1087e8400 x7 : ffff80008028f8d0 x6 : 0000000000000000 x5 : 0000000000000001 x4 : 0000000000000001 x3 : ffff800082b78714 x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 0000000100000000 x0 : 0000000000000089 Call trace: skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:189 [inline] skb_under_panic+0x13c/0x140 net/core/skbuff.c:203 skb_push+0xf0/0x108 net/core/skbuff.c:2451 eth_header+0x44/0x1f8 net/ethernet/eth.c:83 dev_hard_header include/linux/netdevice.h:3188 [inline] llc_mac_hdr_init+0x110/0x17c net/llc/llc_output.c:33 llc_sap_action_send_xid_c+0x170/0x344 net/llc/llc_s_ac.c:85 llc_exec_sap_trans_actions net/llc/llc_sap.c:153 [inline] llc_sap_next_state net/llc/llc_sap.c:182 [inline] llc_sap_state_process+0x1ec/0x774 net/llc/llc_sap.c:209 llc_build_and_send_xid_pkt+0x12c/0x1c0 net/llc/llc_sap.c:270 llc_ui_sendmsg+0x7bc/0xb1c net/llc/af_llc.c:997 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0x194/0x274 net/socket.c:767 splice_to_socket+0x7cc/0xd58 fs/splice.c:881 do_splice_from fs/splice.c:933 [inline] direct_splice_actor+0xe4/0x1c0 fs/splice.c:1142 splice_direct_to_actor+0x2a0/0x7e4 fs/splice.c:1088 do_splice_direct+0x20c/0x348 fs/splice.c:1194 do_sendfile+0x4bc/0xc70 fs/read_write.c:1254 __do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1322 [inline] __se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1308 [inline] __arm64_sys_sendfile64+0x160/0x3b4 fs/read_write.c:1308 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:37 [inline] invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2b8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:51 el0_svc_common+0x130/0x23c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:136 do_el0_svc+0x48/0x58 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:155 el0_svc+0x54/0x158 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:678 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:696 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:595 Code: aa1803e6 aa1903e7 a90023f5 94792f6a (d4210000) Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+2a7024e9502df538e8ef@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240118183625.4007013-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/llc/af_llc.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/llc/af_llc.c b/net/llc/af_llc.c index 9b06c380866b..20551cfb7da6 100644 --- a/net/llc/af_llc.c +++ b/net/llc/af_llc.c @@ -928,14 +928,15 @@ copy_uaddr: */ static int llc_ui_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len) { + DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_llc *, addr, msg->msg_name); struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct llc_sock *llc = llc_sk(sk); - DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_llc *, addr, msg->msg_name); int flags = msg->msg_flags; int noblock = flags & MSG_DONTWAIT; + int rc = -EINVAL, copied = 0, hdrlen, hh_len; struct sk_buff *skb = NULL; + struct net_device *dev; size_t size = 0; - int rc = -EINVAL, copied = 0, hdrlen; dprintk("%s: sending from %02X to %02X\n", __func__, llc->laddr.lsap, llc->daddr.lsap); @@ -955,22 +956,29 @@ static int llc_ui_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len) if (rc) goto out; } - hdrlen = llc->dev->hard_header_len + llc_ui_header_len(sk, addr); + dev = llc->dev; + hh_len = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dev); + hdrlen = llc_ui_header_len(sk, addr); size = hdrlen + len; - if (size > llc->dev->mtu) - size = llc->dev->mtu; + size = min_t(size_t, size, READ_ONCE(dev->mtu)); copied = size - hdrlen; rc = -EINVAL; if (copied < 0) goto out; release_sock(sk); - skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk, size, noblock, &rc); + skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk, hh_len + size, noblock, &rc); lock_sock(sk); if (!skb) goto out; - skb->dev = llc->dev; + if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED) || + llc->dev != dev || + hdrlen != llc_ui_header_len(sk, addr) || + hh_len != LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dev) || + size > READ_ONCE(dev->mtu)) + goto out; + skb->dev = dev; skb->protocol = llc_proto_type(addr->sllc_arphrd); - skb_reserve(skb, hdrlen); + skb_reserve(skb, hh_len + hdrlen); rc = memcpy_from_msg(skb_put(skb, copied), msg, copied); if (rc) goto out; -- cgit v1.2.3 From e3f9bed9bee261e3347131764e42aeedf1ffea61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2024 17:55:15 -0800 Subject: llc: Drop support for ETH_P_TR_802_2. syzbot reported an uninit-value bug below. [0] llc supports ETH_P_802_2 (0x0004) and used to support ETH_P_TR_802_2 (0x0011), and syzbot abused the latter to trigger the bug. write$tun(r0, &(0x7f0000000040)={@val={0x0, 0x11}, @val, @mpls={[], @llc={@snap={0xaa, 0x1, ')', "90e5dd"}}}}, 0x16) llc_conn_handler() initialises local variables {saddr,daddr}.mac based on skb in llc_pdu_decode_sa()/llc_pdu_decode_da() and passes them to __llc_lookup(). However, the initialisation is done only when skb->protocol is htons(ETH_P_802_2), otherwise, __llc_lookup_established() and __llc_lookup_listener() will read garbage. The missing initialisation existed prior to commit 211ed865108e ("net: delete all instances of special processing for token ring"). It removed the part to kick out the token ring stuff but forgot to close the door allowing ETH_P_TR_802_2 packets to sneak into llc_rcv(). Let's remove llc_tr_packet_type and complete the deprecation. [0]: BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __llc_lookup_established+0xe9d/0xf90 __llc_lookup_established+0xe9d/0xf90 __llc_lookup net/llc/llc_conn.c:611 [inline] llc_conn_handler+0x4bd/0x1360 net/llc/llc_conn.c:791 llc_rcv+0xfbb/0x14a0 net/llc/llc_input.c:206 __netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5527 [inline] __netif_receive_skb+0x1a6/0x5a0 net/core/dev.c:5641 netif_receive_skb_internal net/core/dev.c:5727 [inline] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x660 net/core/dev.c:5786 tun_rx_batched+0x3ee/0x980 drivers/net/tun.c:1555 tun_get_user+0x53af/0x66d0 drivers/net/tun.c:2002 tun_chr_write_iter+0x3af/0x5d0 drivers/net/tun.c:2048 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2020 [inline] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:491 [inline] vfs_write+0x8ef/0x1490 fs/read_write.c:584 ksys_write+0x20f/0x4c0 fs/read_write.c:637 __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:649 [inline] __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:646 [inline] __x64_sys_write+0x93/0xd0 fs/read_write.c:646 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b Local variable daddr created at: llc_conn_handler+0x53/0x1360 net/llc/llc_conn.c:783 llc_rcv+0xfbb/0x14a0 net/llc/llc_input.c:206 CPU: 1 PID: 5004 Comm: syz-executor994 Not tainted 6.6.0-syzkaller-14500-g1c41041124bd #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/09/2023 Fixes: 211ed865108e ("net: delete all instances of special processing for token ring") Reported-by: syzbot+b5ad66046b913bc04c6f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=b5ad66046b913bc04c6f Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119015515.61898-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- include/net/llc_pdu.h | 6 ++---- net/llc/llc_core.c | 7 ------- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/include/net/llc_pdu.h b/include/net/llc_pdu.h index 7e73f8e5e497..1d55ba7c45be 100644 --- a/include/net/llc_pdu.h +++ b/include/net/llc_pdu.h @@ -262,8 +262,7 @@ static inline void llc_pdu_header_init(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 type, */ static inline void llc_pdu_decode_sa(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *sa) { - if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_802_2)) - memcpy(sa, eth_hdr(skb)->h_source, ETH_ALEN); + memcpy(sa, eth_hdr(skb)->h_source, ETH_ALEN); } /** @@ -275,8 +274,7 @@ static inline void llc_pdu_decode_sa(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *sa) */ static inline void llc_pdu_decode_da(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *da) { - if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_802_2)) - memcpy(da, eth_hdr(skb)->h_dest, ETH_ALEN); + memcpy(da, eth_hdr(skb)->h_dest, ETH_ALEN); } /** diff --git a/net/llc/llc_core.c b/net/llc/llc_core.c index 6e387aadffce..4f16d9c88350 100644 --- a/net/llc/llc_core.c +++ b/net/llc/llc_core.c @@ -135,22 +135,15 @@ static struct packet_type llc_packet_type __read_mostly = { .func = llc_rcv, }; -static struct packet_type llc_tr_packet_type __read_mostly = { - .type = cpu_to_be16(ETH_P_TR_802_2), - .func = llc_rcv, -}; - static int __init llc_init(void) { dev_add_pack(&llc_packet_type); - dev_add_pack(&llc_tr_packet_type); return 0; } static void __exit llc_exit(void) { dev_remove_pack(&llc_packet_type); - dev_remove_pack(&llc_tr_packet_type); } module_init(llc_init); -- cgit v1.2.3 From a54d51fb2dfb846aedf3751af501e9688db447f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2024 20:17:49 +0000 Subject: udp: fix busy polling Generic sk_busy_loop_end() only looks at sk->sk_receive_queue for presence of packets. Problem is that for UDP sockets after blamed commit, some packets could be present in another queue: udp_sk(sk)->reader_queue In some cases, a busy poller could spin until timeout expiration, even if some packets are available in udp_sk(sk)->reader_queue. v3: - make sk_busy_loop_end() nicer (Willem) v2: - add a READ_ONCE(sk->sk_family) in sk_is_inet() to avoid KCSAN splats. - add a sk_is_inet() check in sk_is_udp() (Willem feedback) - add a sk_is_inet() check in sk_is_tcp(). Fixes: 2276f58ac589 ("udp: use a separate rx queue for packet reception") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reviewed-by: Paolo Abeni Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- include/linux/skmsg.h | 6 ------ include/net/inet_sock.h | 5 ----- include/net/sock.h | 18 +++++++++++++++++- net/core/sock.c | 11 +++++++++-- 4 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/include/linux/skmsg.h b/include/linux/skmsg.h index 888a4b217829..e65ec3fd2799 100644 --- a/include/linux/skmsg.h +++ b/include/linux/skmsg.h @@ -505,12 +505,6 @@ static inline bool sk_psock_strp_enabled(struct sk_psock *psock) return !!psock->saved_data_ready; } -static inline bool sk_is_udp(const struct sock *sk) -{ - return sk->sk_type == SOCK_DGRAM && - sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_UDP; -} - #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NET_SOCK_MSG) #define BPF_F_STRPARSER (1UL << 1) diff --git a/include/net/inet_sock.h b/include/net/inet_sock.h index aa86453f6b9b..d94c242eb3ed 100644 --- a/include/net/inet_sock.h +++ b/include/net/inet_sock.h @@ -307,11 +307,6 @@ static inline unsigned long inet_cmsg_flags(const struct inet_sock *inet) #define inet_assign_bit(nr, sk, val) \ assign_bit(INET_FLAGS_##nr, &inet_sk(sk)->inet_flags, val) -static inline bool sk_is_inet(struct sock *sk) -{ - return sk->sk_family == AF_INET || sk->sk_family == AF_INET6; -} - /** * sk_to_full_sk - Access to a full socket * @sk: pointer to a socket diff --git a/include/net/sock.h b/include/net/sock.h index a7f815c7cfdf..54ca8dcbfb43 100644 --- a/include/net/sock.h +++ b/include/net/sock.h @@ -2765,9 +2765,25 @@ static inline void skb_setup_tx_timestamp(struct sk_buff *skb, __u16 tsflags) &skb_shinfo(skb)->tskey); } +static inline bool sk_is_inet(const struct sock *sk) +{ + int family = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_family); + + return family == AF_INET || family == AF_INET6; +} + static inline bool sk_is_tcp(const struct sock *sk) { - return sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM && sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_TCP; + return sk_is_inet(sk) && + sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM && + sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_TCP; +} + +static inline bool sk_is_udp(const struct sock *sk) +{ + return sk_is_inet(sk) && + sk->sk_type == SOCK_DGRAM && + sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_UDP; } static inline bool sk_is_stream_unix(const struct sock *sk) diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c index 158dbdebce6a..0a7f46c37f0c 100644 --- a/net/core/sock.c +++ b/net/core/sock.c @@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -4144,8 +4145,14 @@ bool sk_busy_loop_end(void *p, unsigned long start_time) { struct sock *sk = p; - return !skb_queue_empty_lockless(&sk->sk_receive_queue) || - sk_busy_loop_timeout(sk, start_time); + if (!skb_queue_empty_lockless(&sk->sk_receive_queue)) + return true; + + if (sk_is_udp(sk) && + !skb_queue_empty_lockless(&udp_sk(sk)->reader_queue)) + return true; + + return sk_busy_loop_timeout(sk, start_time); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(sk_busy_loop_end); #endif /* CONFIG_NET_RX_BUSY_POLL */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From d09486a04f5da0a812c26217213b89a3b1acf836 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jakub Kicinski Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2024 16:58:59 -0800 Subject: net: fix removing a namespace with conflicting altnames MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Mark reports a BUG() when a net namespace is removed. kernel BUG at net/core/dev.c:11520! Physical interfaces moved outside of init_net get "refunded" to init_net when that namespace disappears. The main interface name may get overwritten in the process if it would have conflicted. We need to also discard all conflicting altnames. Recent fixes addressed ensuring that altnames get moved with the main interface, which surfaced this problem. Reported-by: Марк Коренберг Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAEmTpZFZ4Sv3KwqFOY2WKDHeZYdi0O7N5H1nTvcGp=SAEavtDg@mail.gmail.com/ Fixes: 7663d522099e ("net: check for altname conflicts when changing netdev's netns") Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko Reviewed-by: Xin Long Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/dev.c | 9 +++++++++ net/core/dev.h | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c index f01a9b858347..cb2dab0feee0 100644 --- a/net/core/dev.c +++ b/net/core/dev.c @@ -11551,6 +11551,7 @@ static struct pernet_operations __net_initdata netdev_net_ops = { static void __net_exit default_device_exit_net(struct net *net) { + struct netdev_name_node *name_node, *tmp; struct net_device *dev, *aux; /* * Push all migratable network devices back to the @@ -11573,6 +11574,14 @@ static void __net_exit default_device_exit_net(struct net *net) snprintf(fb_name, IFNAMSIZ, "dev%d", dev->ifindex); if (netdev_name_in_use(&init_net, fb_name)) snprintf(fb_name, IFNAMSIZ, "dev%%d"); + + netdev_for_each_altname_safe(dev, name_node, tmp) + if (netdev_name_in_use(&init_net, name_node->name)) { + netdev_name_node_del(name_node); + synchronize_rcu(); + __netdev_name_node_alt_destroy(name_node); + } + err = dev_change_net_namespace(dev, &init_net, fb_name); if (err) { pr_emerg("%s: failed to move %s to init_net: %d\n", diff --git a/net/core/dev.h b/net/core/dev.h index cf93e188785b..7480b4c84298 100644 --- a/net/core/dev.h +++ b/net/core/dev.h @@ -63,6 +63,9 @@ int dev_change_name(struct net_device *dev, const char *newname); #define netdev_for_each_altname(dev, namenode) \ list_for_each_entry((namenode), &(dev)->name_node->list, list) +#define netdev_for_each_altname_safe(dev, namenode, next) \ + list_for_each_entry_safe((namenode), (next), &(dev)->name_node->list, \ + list) int netdev_name_node_alt_create(struct net_device *dev, const char *name); int netdev_name_node_alt_destroy(struct net_device *dev, const char *name); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 13e788deb7348cc88df34bed736c3b3b9927ea52 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sharath Srinivasan Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2024 17:48:39 -0800 Subject: net/rds: Fix UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in rds_cmsg_recv Syzcaller UBSAN crash occurs in rds_cmsg_recv(), which reads inc->i_rx_lat_trace[j + 1] with index 4 (3 + 1), but with array size of 4 (RDS_RX_MAX_TRACES). Here 'j' is assigned from rs->rs_rx_trace[i] and in-turn from trace.rx_trace_pos[i] in rds_recv_track_latency(), with both arrays sized 3 (RDS_MSG_RX_DGRAM_TRACE_MAX). So fix the off-by-one bounds check in rds_recv_track_latency() to prevent a potential crash in rds_cmsg_recv(). Found by syzcaller: ================================================================= UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in net/rds/recv.c:585:39 index 4 is out of range for type 'u64 [4]' CPU: 1 PID: 8058 Comm: syz-executor228 Not tainted 6.6.0-gd2f51b3516da #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x136/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:106 ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:217 [inline] __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0xd5/0x130 lib/ubsan.c:348 rds_cmsg_recv+0x60d/0x700 net/rds/recv.c:585 rds_recvmsg+0x3fb/0x1610 net/rds/recv.c:716 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1044 [inline] sock_recvmsg+0xe2/0x160 net/socket.c:1066 __sys_recvfrom+0x1b6/0x2f0 net/socket.c:2246 __do_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2264 [inline] __se_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2260 [inline] __x64_sys_recvfrom+0xe0/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2260 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x40/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b ================================================================== Fixes: 3289025aedc0 ("RDS: add receive message trace used by application") Reported-by: Chenyuan Yang Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-rdma/CALGdzuoVdq-wtQ4Az9iottBqC5cv9ZhcE5q8N7LfYFvkRsOVcw@mail.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Sharath Srinivasan Reviewed-by: Simon Horman Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/rds/af_rds.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/rds/af_rds.c b/net/rds/af_rds.c index 01c4cdfef45d..8435a20968ef 100644 --- a/net/rds/af_rds.c +++ b/net/rds/af_rds.c @@ -419,7 +419,7 @@ static int rds_recv_track_latency(struct rds_sock *rs, sockptr_t optval, rs->rs_rx_traces = trace.rx_traces; for (i = 0; i < rs->rs_rx_traces; i++) { - if (trace.rx_trace_pos[i] > RDS_MSG_RX_DGRAM_TRACE_MAX) { + if (trace.rx_trace_pos[i] >= RDS_MSG_RX_DGRAM_TRACE_MAX) { rs->rs_rx_traces = 0; return -EFAULT; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7267e8dcad6b2f9fce05a6a06335d7040acbc2b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Salvatore Dipietro Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2024 11:01:33 -0800 Subject: tcp: Add memory barrier to tcp_push() On CPUs with weak memory models, reads and updates performed by tcp_push to the sk variables can get reordered leaving the socket throttled when it should not. The tasklet running tcp_wfree() may also not observe the memory updates in time and will skip flushing any packets throttled by tcp_push(), delaying the sending. This can pathologically cause 40ms extra latency due to bad interactions with delayed acks. Adding a memory barrier in tcp_push removes the bug, similarly to the previous commit bf06200e732d ("tcp: tsq: fix nonagle handling"). smp_mb__after_atomic() is used to not incur in unnecessary overhead on x86 since not affected. Patch has been tested using an AWS c7g.2xlarge instance with Ubuntu 22.04 and Apache Tomcat 9.0.83 running the basic servlet below: import java.io.IOException; import java.io.OutputStreamWriter; import java.io.PrintWriter; import javax.servlet.ServletException; import javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet; import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest; import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletResponse; public class HelloWorldServlet extends HttpServlet { @Override protected void doGet(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response) throws ServletException, IOException { response.setContentType("text/html;charset=utf-8"); OutputStreamWriter osw = new OutputStreamWriter(response.getOutputStream(),"UTF-8"); String s = "a".repeat(3096); osw.write(s,0,s.length()); osw.flush(); } } Load was applied using wrk2 (https://github.com/kinvolk/wrk2) from an AWS c6i.8xlarge instance. Before the patch an additional 40ms latency from P99.99+ values is observed while, with the patch, the extra latency disappears. No patch and tcp_autocorking=1 ./wrk -t32 -c128 -d40s --latency -R10000 http://172.31.60.173:8080/hello/hello ... 50.000% 0.91ms 75.000% 1.13ms 90.000% 1.46ms 99.000% 1.74ms 99.900% 1.89ms 99.990% 41.95ms <<< 40+ ms extra latency 99.999% 48.32ms 100.000% 48.96ms With patch and tcp_autocorking=1 ./wrk -t32 -c128 -d40s --latency -R10000 http://172.31.60.173:8080/hello/hello ... 50.000% 0.90ms 75.000% 1.13ms 90.000% 1.45ms 99.000% 1.72ms 99.900% 1.83ms 99.990% 2.11ms <<< no 40+ ms extra latency 99.999% 2.53ms 100.000% 2.62ms Patch has been also tested on x86 (m7i.2xlarge instance) which it is not affected by this issue and the patch doesn't introduce any additional delay. Fixes: 7aa5470c2c09 ("tcp: tsq: move tsq_flags close to sk_wmem_alloc") Signed-off-by: Salvatore Dipietro Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119190133.43698-1-dipiets@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni --- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c index 1baa484d2190..a1c6de385cce 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -722,6 +722,7 @@ void tcp_push(struct sock *sk, int flags, int mss_now, if (!test_bit(TSQ_THROTTLED, &sk->sk_tsq_flags)) { NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPAUTOCORKING); set_bit(TSQ_THROTTLED, &sk->sk_tsq_flags); + smp_mb__after_atomic(); } /* It is possible TX completion already happened * before we set TSQ_THROTTLED. -- cgit v1.2.3 From 234ec0b6034b16869d45128b8cd2dc6ffe596f04 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zhengchao Shao Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2024 09:18:07 +0800 Subject: netlink: fix potential sleeping issue in mqueue_flush_file I analyze the potential sleeping issue of the following processes: Thread A Thread B ... netlink_create //ref = 1 do_mq_notify ... sock = netlink_getsockbyfilp ... //ref = 2 info->notify_sock = sock; ... ... netlink_sendmsg ... skb = netlink_alloc_large_skb //skb->head is vmalloced ... netlink_unicast ... sk = netlink_getsockbyportid //ref = 3 ... netlink_sendskb ... __netlink_sendskb ... skb_queue_tail //put skb to sk_receive_queue ... sock_put //ref = 2 ... ... ... netlink_release ... deferred_put_nlk_sk //ref = 1 mqueue_flush_file spin_lock remove_notification netlink_sendskb sock_put //ref = 0 sk_free ... __sk_destruct netlink_sock_destruct skb_queue_purge //get skb from sk_receive_queue ... __skb_queue_purge_reason kfree_skb_reason __kfree_skb ... skb_release_all skb_release_head_state netlink_skb_destructor vfree(skb->head) //sleeping while holding spinlock In netlink_sendmsg, if the memory pointed to by skb->head is allocated by vmalloc, and is put to sk_receive_queue queue, also the skb is not freed. When the mqueue executes flush, the sleeping bug will occur. Use vfree_atomic instead of vfree in netlink_skb_destructor to solve the issue. Fixes: c05cdb1b864f ("netlink: allow large data transfers from user-space") Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240122011807.2110357-1-shaozhengchao@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni --- net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c index 4ed8ffd58ff3..9c962347cf85 100644 --- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c +++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c @@ -374,7 +374,7 @@ static void netlink_skb_destructor(struct sk_buff *skb) if (is_vmalloc_addr(skb->head)) { if (!skb->cloned || !atomic_dec_return(&(skb_shinfo(skb)->dataref))) - vfree(skb->head); + vfree_atomic(skb->head); skb->head = NULL; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 435e202d645c197dcfd39d7372eb2a56529b6640 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zhengchao Shao Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2024 18:20:01 +0800 Subject: ipv6: init the accept_queue's spinlocks in inet6_create In commit 198bc90e0e73("tcp: make sure init the accept_queue's spinlocks once"), the spinlocks of accept_queue are initialized only when socket is created in the inet4 scenario. The locks are not initialized when socket is created in the inet6 scenario. The kernel reports the following error: INFO: trying to register non-static key. The code is fine but needs lockdep annotation, or maybe you didn't initialize this object before use? turning off the locking correctness validator. Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:107) register_lock_class (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1289) __lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5015) lock_acquire.part.0 (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5756) _raw_spin_lock_bh (kernel/locking/spinlock.c:178) inet_csk_listen_stop (net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1386) tcp_disconnect (net/ipv4/tcp.c:2981) inet_shutdown (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:935) __sys_shutdown (./include/linux/file.h:32 net/socket.c:2438) __x64_sys_shutdown (net/socket.c:2445) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:129) RIP: 0033:0x7f52ecd05a3d Code: 5b 41 5c c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d ab a3 0e 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f52ecf5dde8 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000030 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f52ecf5e640 RCX: 00007f52ecd05a3d RDX: 00007f52ecc8b188 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007f52ecf5de20 R08: 00007ffdae45c69f R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 00007f52ecf5e640 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f52ecc8b060 R15: 00007ffdae45c6e0 Fixes: 198bc90e0e73 ("tcp: make sure init the accept_queue's spinlocks once") Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240122102001.2851701-1-shaozhengchao@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni --- net/ipv6/af_inet6.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c index 13a1833a4df5..959bfd9f6344 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c @@ -199,6 +199,9 @@ lookup_protocol: if (INET_PROTOSW_REUSE & answer_flags) sk->sk_reuse = SK_CAN_REUSE; + if (INET_PROTOSW_ICSK & answer_flags) + inet_init_csk_locks(sk); + inet = inet_sk(sk); inet_assign_bit(IS_ICSK, sk, INET_PROTOSW_ICSK & answer_flags); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 32f2a0afa95fae0d1ceec2ff06e0e816939964b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ido Schimmel Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2024 15:28:43 +0200 Subject: net/sched: flower: Fix chain template offload When a qdisc is deleted from a net device the stack instructs the underlying driver to remove its flow offload callback from the associated filter block using the 'FLOW_BLOCK_UNBIND' command. The stack then continues to replay the removal of the filters in the block for this driver by iterating over the chains in the block and invoking the 'reoffload' operation of the classifier being used. In turn, the classifier in its 'reoffload' operation prepares and emits a 'FLOW_CLS_DESTROY' command for each filter. However, the stack does not do the same for chain templates and the underlying driver never receives a 'FLOW_CLS_TMPLT_DESTROY' command when a qdisc is deleted. This results in a memory leak [1] which can be reproduced using [2]. Fix by introducing a 'tmplt_reoffload' operation and have the stack invoke it with the appropriate arguments as part of the replay. Implement the operation in the sole classifier that supports chain templates (flower) by emitting the 'FLOW_CLS_TMPLT_{CREATE,DESTROY}' command based on whether a flow offload callback is being bound to a filter block or being unbound from one. As far as I can tell, the issue happens since cited commit which reordered tcf_block_offload_unbind() before tcf_block_flush_all_chains() in __tcf_block_put(). The order cannot be reversed as the filter block is expected to be freed after flushing all the chains. [1] unreferenced object 0xffff888107e28800 (size 2048): comm "tc", pid 1079, jiffies 4294958525 (age 3074.287s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): b1 a6 7c 11 81 88 ff ff e0 5b b3 10 81 88 ff ff ..|......[...... 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 e0 aa b0 84 ff ff ff ff ................ backtrace: [] __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1e8/0x320 [] __kmalloc+0x4e/0x90 [] mlxsw_sp_acl_ruleset_get+0x34d/0x7a0 [] mlxsw_sp_flower_tmplt_create+0x145/0x180 [] mlxsw_sp_flow_block_cb+0x1ea/0x280 [] tc_setup_cb_call+0x183/0x340 [] fl_tmplt_create+0x3da/0x4c0 [] tc_ctl_chain+0xa15/0x1170 [] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x3cc/0xed0 [] netlink_rcv_skb+0x170/0x440 [] netlink_unicast+0x540/0x820 [] netlink_sendmsg+0x8d8/0xda0 [] ____sys_sendmsg+0x30f/0xa80 [] ___sys_sendmsg+0x13a/0x1e0 [] __sys_sendmsg+0x11c/0x1f0 [] do_syscall_64+0x40/0xe0 unreferenced object 0xffff88816d2c0400 (size 1024): comm "tc", pid 1079, jiffies 4294958525 (age 3074.287s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 57 f6 38 be 00 00 00 00 @.......W.8..... 10 04 2c 6d 81 88 ff ff 10 04 2c 6d 81 88 ff ff ..,m......,m.... backtrace: [] __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1e8/0x320 [] __kmalloc_node+0x51/0x90 [] kvmalloc_node+0xa6/0x1f0 [] bucket_table_alloc.isra.0+0x83/0x460 [] rhashtable_init+0x43b/0x7c0 [] mlxsw_sp_acl_ruleset_get+0x428/0x7a0 [] mlxsw_sp_flower_tmplt_create+0x145/0x180 [] mlxsw_sp_flow_block_cb+0x1ea/0x280 [] tc_setup_cb_call+0x183/0x340 [] fl_tmplt_create+0x3da/0x4c0 [] tc_ctl_chain+0xa15/0x1170 [] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x3cc/0xed0 [] netlink_rcv_skb+0x170/0x440 [] netlink_unicast+0x540/0x820 [] netlink_sendmsg+0x8d8/0xda0 [] ____sys_sendmsg+0x30f/0xa80 [2] # tc qdisc add dev swp1 clsact # tc chain add dev swp1 ingress proto ip chain 1 flower dst_ip 0.0.0.0/32 # tc qdisc del dev swp1 clsact # devlink dev reload pci/0000:06:00.0 Fixes: bbf73830cd48 ("net: sched: traverse chains in block with tcf_get_next_chain()") Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- include/net/sch_generic.h | 4 ++++ net/sched/cls_api.c | 9 ++++++++- net/sched/cls_flower.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/include/net/sch_generic.h b/include/net/sch_generic.h index ba3e1b315de8..934fdb977551 100644 --- a/include/net/sch_generic.h +++ b/include/net/sch_generic.h @@ -375,6 +375,10 @@ struct tcf_proto_ops { struct nlattr **tca, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack); void (*tmplt_destroy)(void *tmplt_priv); + void (*tmplt_reoffload)(struct tcf_chain *chain, + bool add, + flow_setup_cb_t *cb, + void *cb_priv); struct tcf_exts * (*get_exts)(const struct tcf_proto *tp, u32 handle); diff --git a/net/sched/cls_api.c b/net/sched/cls_api.c index 92a12e3d0fe6..ff3d396a65aa 100644 --- a/net/sched/cls_api.c +++ b/net/sched/cls_api.c @@ -1560,6 +1560,9 @@ tcf_block_playback_offloads(struct tcf_block *block, flow_setup_cb_t *cb, chain_prev = chain, chain = __tcf_get_next_chain(block, chain), tcf_chain_put(chain_prev)) { + if (chain->tmplt_ops && add) + chain->tmplt_ops->tmplt_reoffload(chain, true, cb, + cb_priv); for (tp = __tcf_get_next_proto(chain, NULL); tp; tp_prev = tp, tp = __tcf_get_next_proto(chain, tp), @@ -1575,6 +1578,9 @@ tcf_block_playback_offloads(struct tcf_block *block, flow_setup_cb_t *cb, goto err_playback_remove; } } + if (chain->tmplt_ops && !add) + chain->tmplt_ops->tmplt_reoffload(chain, false, cb, + cb_priv); } return 0; @@ -3000,7 +3006,8 @@ static int tc_chain_tmplt_add(struct tcf_chain *chain, struct net *net, ops = tcf_proto_lookup_ops(name, true, extack); if (IS_ERR(ops)) return PTR_ERR(ops); - if (!ops->tmplt_create || !ops->tmplt_destroy || !ops->tmplt_dump) { + if (!ops->tmplt_create || !ops->tmplt_destroy || !ops->tmplt_dump || + !ops->tmplt_reoffload) { NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Chain templates are not supported with specified classifier"); module_put(ops->owner); return -EOPNOTSUPP; diff --git a/net/sched/cls_flower.c b/net/sched/cls_flower.c index e5314a31f75a..efb9d2811b73 100644 --- a/net/sched/cls_flower.c +++ b/net/sched/cls_flower.c @@ -2721,6 +2721,28 @@ static void fl_tmplt_destroy(void *tmplt_priv) kfree(tmplt); } +static void fl_tmplt_reoffload(struct tcf_chain *chain, bool add, + flow_setup_cb_t *cb, void *cb_priv) +{ + struct fl_flow_tmplt *tmplt = chain->tmplt_priv; + struct flow_cls_offload cls_flower = {}; + + cls_flower.rule = flow_rule_alloc(0); + if (!cls_flower.rule) + return; + + cls_flower.common.chain_index = chain->index; + cls_flower.command = add ? FLOW_CLS_TMPLT_CREATE : + FLOW_CLS_TMPLT_DESTROY; + cls_flower.cookie = (unsigned long) tmplt; + cls_flower.rule->match.dissector = &tmplt->dissector; + cls_flower.rule->match.mask = &tmplt->mask; + cls_flower.rule->match.key = &tmplt->dummy_key; + + cb(TC_SETUP_CLSFLOWER, &cls_flower, cb_priv); + kfree(cls_flower.rule); +} + static int fl_dump_key_val(struct sk_buff *skb, void *val, int val_type, void *mask, int mask_type, int len) @@ -3628,6 +3650,7 @@ static struct tcf_proto_ops cls_fl_ops __read_mostly = { .bind_class = fl_bind_class, .tmplt_create = fl_tmplt_create, .tmplt_destroy = fl_tmplt_destroy, + .tmplt_reoffload = fl_tmplt_reoffload, .tmplt_dump = fl_tmplt_dump, .get_exts = fl_get_exts, .owner = THIS_MODULE, -- cgit v1.2.3 From 01acb2e8666a6529697141a6017edbf206921913 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pablo Neira Ayuso Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2024 10:56:26 +0100 Subject: netfilter: nft_chain_filter: handle NETDEV_UNREGISTER for inet/ingress basechain Remove netdevice from inet/ingress basechain in case NETDEV_UNREGISTER event is reported, otherwise a stale reference to netdevice remains in the hook list. Fixes: 60a3815da702 ("netfilter: add inet ingress support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c b/net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c index 680fe557686e..274b6f7e6bb5 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c @@ -357,9 +357,10 @@ static int nf_tables_netdev_event(struct notifier_block *this, unsigned long event, void *ptr) { struct net_device *dev = netdev_notifier_info_to_dev(ptr); + struct nft_base_chain *basechain; struct nftables_pernet *nft_net; - struct nft_table *table; struct nft_chain *chain, *nr; + struct nft_table *table; struct nft_ctx ctx = { .net = dev_net(dev), }; @@ -371,7 +372,8 @@ static int nf_tables_netdev_event(struct notifier_block *this, nft_net = nft_pernet(ctx.net); mutex_lock(&nft_net->commit_mutex); list_for_each_entry(table, &nft_net->tables, list) { - if (table->family != NFPROTO_NETDEV) + if (table->family != NFPROTO_NETDEV && + table->family != NFPROTO_INET) continue; ctx.family = table->family; @@ -380,6 +382,11 @@ static int nf_tables_netdev_event(struct notifier_block *this, if (!nft_is_base_chain(chain)) continue; + basechain = nft_base_chain(chain); + if (table->family == NFPROTO_INET && + basechain->ops.hooknum != NF_INET_INGRESS) + continue; + ctx.chain = chain; nft_netdev_event(event, dev, &ctx); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From c9d9eb9c53d37cdebbad56b91e40baf42d5a97aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2024 13:11:32 +0100 Subject: netfilter: nft_limit: reject configurations that cause integer overflow Reject bogus configs where internal token counter wraps around. This only occurs with very very large requests, such as 17gbyte/s. Its better to reject this rather than having incorrect ratelimit. Fixes: d2168e849ebf ("netfilter: nft_limit: add per-byte limiting") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nft_limit.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_limit.c b/net/netfilter/nft_limit.c index 79039afde34e..cefa25e0dbb0 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_limit.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_limit.c @@ -58,17 +58,19 @@ static inline bool nft_limit_eval(struct nft_limit_priv *priv, u64 cost) static int nft_limit_init(struct nft_limit_priv *priv, const struct nlattr * const tb[], bool pkts) { + u64 unit, tokens, rate_with_burst; bool invert = false; - u64 unit, tokens; if (tb[NFTA_LIMIT_RATE] == NULL || tb[NFTA_LIMIT_UNIT] == NULL) return -EINVAL; priv->rate = be64_to_cpu(nla_get_be64(tb[NFTA_LIMIT_RATE])); + if (priv->rate == 0) + return -EINVAL; + unit = be64_to_cpu(nla_get_be64(tb[NFTA_LIMIT_UNIT])); - priv->nsecs = unit * NSEC_PER_SEC; - if (priv->rate == 0 || priv->nsecs < unit) + if (check_mul_overflow(unit, NSEC_PER_SEC, &priv->nsecs)) return -EOVERFLOW; if (tb[NFTA_LIMIT_BURST]) @@ -77,18 +79,25 @@ static int nft_limit_init(struct nft_limit_priv *priv, if (pkts && priv->burst == 0) priv->burst = NFT_LIMIT_PKT_BURST_DEFAULT; - if (priv->rate + priv->burst < priv->rate) + if (check_add_overflow(priv->rate, priv->burst, &rate_with_burst)) return -EOVERFLOW; if (pkts) { - tokens = div64_u64(priv->nsecs, priv->rate) * priv->burst; + u64 tmp = div64_u64(priv->nsecs, priv->rate); + + if (check_mul_overflow(tmp, priv->burst, &tokens)) + return -EOVERFLOW; } else { + u64 tmp; + /* The token bucket size limits the number of tokens can be * accumulated. tokens_max specifies the bucket size. * tokens_max = unit * (rate + burst) / rate. */ - tokens = div64_u64(priv->nsecs * (priv->rate + priv->burst), - priv->rate); + if (check_mul_overflow(priv->nsecs, rate_with_burst, &tmp)) + return -EOVERFLOW; + + tokens = div64_u64(tmp, priv->rate); } if (tb[NFTA_LIMIT_FLAGS]) { -- cgit v1.2.3 From b462579b2b86a8f5230543cadd3a4836be27baf7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2024 13:34:32 +0100 Subject: netfilter: nf_tables: restrict anonymous set and map names to 16 bytes nftables has two types of sets/maps, one where userspace defines the name, and anonymous sets/maps, where userspace defines a template name. For the latter, kernel requires presence of exactly one "%d". nftables uses "__set%d" and "__map%d" for this. The kernel will expand the format specifier and replaces it with the smallest unused number. As-is, userspace could define a template name that allows to move the set name past the 256 bytes upperlimit (post-expansion). I don't see how this could be a problem, but I would prefer if userspace cannot do this, so add a limit of 16 bytes for the '%d' template name. 16 bytes is the old total upper limit for set names that existed when nf_tables was merged initially. Fixes: 387454901bd6 ("netfilter: nf_tables: Allow set names of up to 255 chars") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c index 4b55533ce5ca..02f45424644b 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #include #define NFT_MODULE_AUTOLOAD_LIMIT (MODULE_NAME_LEN - sizeof("nft-expr-255-")) +#define NFT_SET_MAX_ANONLEN 16 unsigned int nf_tables_net_id __read_mostly; @@ -4413,6 +4414,9 @@ static int nf_tables_set_alloc_name(struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_set *set, if (p[1] != 'd' || strchr(p + 2, '%')) return -EINVAL; + if (strnlen(name, NFT_SET_MAX_ANONLEN) >= NFT_SET_MAX_ANONLEN) + return -EINVAL; + inuse = (unsigned long *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL); if (inuse == NULL) return -ENOMEM; -- cgit v1.2.3 From f342de4e2f33e0e39165d8639387aa6c19dff660 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal Date: Sat, 20 Jan 2024 22:50:04 +0100 Subject: netfilter: nf_tables: reject QUEUE/DROP verdict parameters This reverts commit e0abdadcc6e1. core.c:nf_hook_slow assumes that the upper 16 bits of NF_DROP verdicts contain a valid errno, i.e. -EPERM, -EHOSTUNREACH or similar, or 0. Due to the reverted commit, its possible to provide a positive value, e.g. NF_ACCEPT (1), which results in use-after-free. Its not clear to me why this commit was made. NF_QUEUE is not used by nftables; "queue" rules in nftables will result in use of "nft_queue" expression. If we later need to allow specifiying errno values from userspace (do not know why), this has to call NF_DROP_GETERR and check that "err <= 0" holds true. Fixes: e0abdadcc6e1 ("netfilter: nf_tables: accept QUEUE/DROP verdict parameters") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Notselwyn Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 16 ++++++---------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c index 02f45424644b..c537104411e7 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c @@ -10992,16 +10992,10 @@ static int nft_verdict_init(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_data *data, data->verdict.code = ntohl(nla_get_be32(tb[NFTA_VERDICT_CODE])); switch (data->verdict.code) { - default: - switch (data->verdict.code & NF_VERDICT_MASK) { - case NF_ACCEPT: - case NF_DROP: - case NF_QUEUE: - break; - default: - return -EINVAL; - } - fallthrough; + case NF_ACCEPT: + case NF_DROP: + case NF_QUEUE: + break; case NFT_CONTINUE: case NFT_BREAK: case NFT_RETURN: @@ -11036,6 +11030,8 @@ static int nft_verdict_init(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_data *data, data->verdict.chain = chain; break; + default: + return -EINVAL; } desc->len = sizeof(data->verdict); -- cgit v1.2.3 From d0009effa8862c20a13af4cb7475d9771b905693 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pablo Neira Ayuso Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2024 16:38:25 +0100 Subject: netfilter: nf_tables: validate NFPROTO_* family Several expressions explicitly refer to NF_INET_* hook definitions from expr->ops->validate, however, family is not validated. Bail out with EOPNOTSUPP in case they are used from unsupported families. Fixes: 0ca743a55991 ("netfilter: nf_tables: add compatibility layer for x_tables") Fixes: a3c90f7a2323 ("netfilter: nf_tables: flow offload expression") Fixes: 2fa841938c64 ("netfilter: nf_tables: introduce routing expression") Fixes: 554ced0a6e29 ("netfilter: nf_tables: add support for native socket matching") Fixes: ad49d86e07a4 ("netfilter: nf_tables: Add synproxy support") Fixes: 4ed8eb6570a4 ("netfilter: nf_tables: Add native tproxy support") Fixes: 6c47260250fc ("netfilter: nf_tables: add xfrm expression") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nft_compat.c | 12 ++++++++++++ net/netfilter/nft_flow_offload.c | 5 +++++ net/netfilter/nft_nat.c | 5 +++++ net/netfilter/nft_rt.c | 5 +++++ net/netfilter/nft_socket.c | 5 +++++ net/netfilter/nft_synproxy.c | 7 +++++-- net/netfilter/nft_tproxy.c | 5 +++++ net/netfilter/nft_xfrm.c | 5 +++++ 8 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_compat.c b/net/netfilter/nft_compat.c index 5284cd2ad532..f0eeda97bfcd 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_compat.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_compat.c @@ -350,6 +350,12 @@ static int nft_target_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, unsigned int hook_mask = 0; int ret; + if (ctx->family != NFPROTO_IPV4 && + ctx->family != NFPROTO_IPV6 && + ctx->family != NFPROTO_BRIDGE && + ctx->family != NFPROTO_ARP) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + if (nft_is_base_chain(ctx->chain)) { const struct nft_base_chain *basechain = nft_base_chain(ctx->chain); @@ -595,6 +601,12 @@ static int nft_match_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, unsigned int hook_mask = 0; int ret; + if (ctx->family != NFPROTO_IPV4 && + ctx->family != NFPROTO_IPV6 && + ctx->family != NFPROTO_BRIDGE && + ctx->family != NFPROTO_ARP) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + if (nft_is_base_chain(ctx->chain)) { const struct nft_base_chain *basechain = nft_base_chain(ctx->chain); diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_flow_offload.c b/net/netfilter/nft_flow_offload.c index ab3362c483b4..397351fa4d5f 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_flow_offload.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_flow_offload.c @@ -384,6 +384,11 @@ static int nft_flow_offload_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, { unsigned int hook_mask = (1 << NF_INET_FORWARD); + if (ctx->family != NFPROTO_IPV4 && + ctx->family != NFPROTO_IPV6 && + ctx->family != NFPROTO_INET) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + return nft_chain_validate_hooks(ctx->chain, hook_mask); } diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_nat.c b/net/netfilter/nft_nat.c index 583885ce7232..808f5802c270 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_nat.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_nat.c @@ -143,6 +143,11 @@ static int nft_nat_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_nat *priv = nft_expr_priv(expr); int err; + if (ctx->family != NFPROTO_IPV4 && + ctx->family != NFPROTO_IPV6 && + ctx->family != NFPROTO_INET) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + err = nft_chain_validate_dependency(ctx->chain, NFT_CHAIN_T_NAT); if (err < 0) return err; diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_rt.c b/net/netfilter/nft_rt.c index 35a2c28caa60..24d977138572 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_rt.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_rt.c @@ -166,6 +166,11 @@ static int nft_rt_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, const struct nft_expr *exp const struct nft_rt *priv = nft_expr_priv(expr); unsigned int hooks; + if (ctx->family != NFPROTO_IPV4 && + ctx->family != NFPROTO_IPV6 && + ctx->family != NFPROTO_INET) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + switch (priv->key) { case NFT_RT_NEXTHOP4: case NFT_RT_NEXTHOP6: diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_socket.c b/net/netfilter/nft_socket.c index 9ed85be79452..f30163e2ca62 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_socket.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_socket.c @@ -242,6 +242,11 @@ static int nft_socket_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, const struct nft_expr *expr, const struct nft_data **data) { + if (ctx->family != NFPROTO_IPV4 && + ctx->family != NFPROTO_IPV6 && + ctx->family != NFPROTO_INET) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + return nft_chain_validate_hooks(ctx->chain, (1 << NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING) | (1 << NF_INET_LOCAL_IN) | diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_synproxy.c b/net/netfilter/nft_synproxy.c index 13da882669a4..1d737f89dfc1 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_synproxy.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_synproxy.c @@ -186,7 +186,6 @@ static int nft_synproxy_do_init(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, break; #endif case NFPROTO_INET: - case NFPROTO_BRIDGE: err = nf_synproxy_ipv4_init(snet, ctx->net); if (err) goto nf_ct_failure; @@ -219,7 +218,6 @@ static void nft_synproxy_do_destroy(const struct nft_ctx *ctx) break; #endif case NFPROTO_INET: - case NFPROTO_BRIDGE: nf_synproxy_ipv4_fini(snet, ctx->net); nf_synproxy_ipv6_fini(snet, ctx->net); break; @@ -253,6 +251,11 @@ static int nft_synproxy_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, const struct nft_expr *expr, const struct nft_data **data) { + if (ctx->family != NFPROTO_IPV4 && + ctx->family != NFPROTO_IPV6 && + ctx->family != NFPROTO_INET) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + return nft_chain_validate_hooks(ctx->chain, (1 << NF_INET_LOCAL_IN) | (1 << NF_INET_FORWARD)); } diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_tproxy.c b/net/netfilter/nft_tproxy.c index ae15cd693f0e..71412adb73d4 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_tproxy.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_tproxy.c @@ -316,6 +316,11 @@ static int nft_tproxy_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, const struct nft_expr *expr, const struct nft_data **data) { + if (ctx->family != NFPROTO_IPV4 && + ctx->family != NFPROTO_IPV6 && + ctx->family != NFPROTO_INET) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + return nft_chain_validate_hooks(ctx->chain, 1 << NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING); } diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_xfrm.c b/net/netfilter/nft_xfrm.c index 452f8587adda..1c866757db55 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_xfrm.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_xfrm.c @@ -235,6 +235,11 @@ static int nft_xfrm_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, const struct nft_expr *e const struct nft_xfrm *priv = nft_expr_priv(expr); unsigned int hooks; + if (ctx->family != NFPROTO_IPV4 && + ctx->family != NFPROTO_IPV6 && + ctx->family != NFPROTO_INET) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + switch (priv->dir) { case XFRM_POLICY_IN: hooks = (1 << NF_INET_FORWARD) | -- cgit v1.2.3 From 269009893146c495f41e9572dd9319e787c2eba9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Maciej Fijalkowski Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 20:15:52 +0100 Subject: xsk: recycle buffer in case Rx queue was full Add missing xsk_buff_free() call when __xsk_rcv_zc() failed to produce descriptor to XSK Rx queue. Fixes: 24ea50127ecf ("xsk: support mbuf on ZC RX") Acked-by: Magnus Karlsson Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240124191602.566724-2-maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov --- net/xdp/xsk.c | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/xdp/xsk.c b/net/xdp/xsk.c index 9f13aa3353e3..1eadfac03cc4 100644 --- a/net/xdp/xsk.c +++ b/net/xdp/xsk.c @@ -167,8 +167,10 @@ static int xsk_rcv_zc(struct xdp_sock *xs, struct xdp_buff *xdp, u32 len) contd = XDP_PKT_CONTD; err = __xsk_rcv_zc(xs, xskb, len, contd); - if (err || likely(!frags)) - goto out; + if (err) + goto err; + if (likely(!frags)) + return 0; xskb_list = &xskb->pool->xskb_list; list_for_each_entry_safe(pos, tmp, xskb_list, xskb_list_node) { @@ -177,11 +179,13 @@ static int xsk_rcv_zc(struct xdp_sock *xs, struct xdp_buff *xdp, u32 len) len = pos->xdp.data_end - pos->xdp.data; err = __xsk_rcv_zc(xs, pos, len, contd); if (err) - return err; + goto err; list_del(&pos->xskb_list_node); } -out: + return 0; +err: + xsk_buff_free(xdp); return err; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From f7f6aa8e24383fbb11ac55942e66da9660110f80 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Maciej Fijalkowski Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 20:15:53 +0100 Subject: xsk: make xsk_buff_pool responsible for clearing xdp_buff::flags XDP multi-buffer support introduced XDP_FLAGS_HAS_FRAGS flag that is used by drivers to notify data path whether xdp_buff contains fragments or not. Data path looks up mentioned flag on first buffer that occupies the linear part of xdp_buff, so drivers only modify it there. This is sufficient for SKB and XDP_DRV modes as usually xdp_buff is allocated on stack or it resides within struct representing driver's queue and fragments are carried via skb_frag_t structs. IOW, we are dealing with only one xdp_buff. ZC mode though relies on list of xdp_buff structs that is carried via xsk_buff_pool::xskb_list, so ZC data path has to make sure that fragments do *not* have XDP_FLAGS_HAS_FRAGS set. Otherwise, xsk_buff_free() could misbehave if it would be executed against xdp_buff that carries a frag with XDP_FLAGS_HAS_FRAGS flag set. Such scenario can take place when within supplied XDP program bpf_xdp_adjust_tail() is used with negative offset that would in turn release the tail fragment from multi-buffer frame. Calling xsk_buff_free() on tail fragment with XDP_FLAGS_HAS_FRAGS would result in releasing all the nodes from xskb_list that were produced by driver before XDP program execution, which is not what is intended - only tail fragment should be deleted from xskb_list and then it should be put onto xsk_buff_pool::free_list. Such multi-buffer frame will never make it up to user space, so from AF_XDP application POV there would be no traffic running, however due to free_list getting constantly new nodes, driver will be able to feed HW Rx queue with recycled buffers. Bottom line is that instead of traffic being redirected to user space, it would be continuously dropped. To fix this, let us clear the mentioned flag on xsk_buff_pool side during xdp_buff initialization, which is what should have been done right from the start of XSK multi-buffer support. Fixes: 1bbc04de607b ("ice: xsk: add RX multi-buffer support") Fixes: 1c9ba9c14658 ("i40e: xsk: add RX multi-buffer support") Fixes: 24ea50127ecf ("xsk: support mbuf on ZC RX") Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240124191602.566724-3-maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_xsk.c | 1 - drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_xsk.c | 1 - include/net/xdp_sock_drv.h | 1 + net/xdp/xsk_buff_pool.c | 1 + 4 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_xsk.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_xsk.c index af7d5fa6cdc1..82aca0d16a3e 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_xsk.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_xsk.c @@ -498,7 +498,6 @@ int i40e_clean_rx_irq_zc(struct i40e_ring *rx_ring, int budget) xdp_res = i40e_run_xdp_zc(rx_ring, first, xdp_prog); i40e_handle_xdp_result_zc(rx_ring, first, rx_desc, &rx_packets, &rx_bytes, xdp_res, &failure); - first->flags = 0; next_to_clean = next_to_process; if (failure) break; diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_xsk.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_xsk.c index 5d1ae8e4058a..d9073a618ad6 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_xsk.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_xsk.c @@ -895,7 +895,6 @@ int ice_clean_rx_irq_zc(struct ice_rx_ring *rx_ring, int budget) if (!first) { first = xdp; - xdp_buff_clear_frags_flag(first); } else if (ice_add_xsk_frag(rx_ring, first, xdp, size)) { break; } diff --git a/include/net/xdp_sock_drv.h b/include/net/xdp_sock_drv.h index 526c1e7f505e..9819e2af0378 100644 --- a/include/net/xdp_sock_drv.h +++ b/include/net/xdp_sock_drv.h @@ -164,6 +164,7 @@ static inline void xsk_buff_set_size(struct xdp_buff *xdp, u32 size) xdp->data = xdp->data_hard_start + XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM; xdp->data_meta = xdp->data; xdp->data_end = xdp->data + size; + xdp->flags = 0; } static inline dma_addr_t xsk_buff_raw_get_dma(struct xsk_buff_pool *pool, diff --git a/net/xdp/xsk_buff_pool.c b/net/xdp/xsk_buff_pool.c index 28711cc44ced..ce60ecd48a4d 100644 --- a/net/xdp/xsk_buff_pool.c +++ b/net/xdp/xsk_buff_pool.c @@ -555,6 +555,7 @@ struct xdp_buff *xp_alloc(struct xsk_buff_pool *pool) xskb->xdp.data = xskb->xdp.data_hard_start + XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM; xskb->xdp.data_meta = xskb->xdp.data; + xskb->xdp.flags = 0; if (pool->dma_need_sync) { dma_sync_single_range_for_device(pool->dev, xskb->dma, 0, -- cgit v1.2.3 From c5114710c8ce86b8317e9b448f4fd15c711c2a82 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Maciej Fijalkowski Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 20:15:54 +0100 Subject: xsk: fix usage of multi-buffer BPF helpers for ZC XDP Currently when packet is shrunk via bpf_xdp_adjust_tail() and memory type is set to MEM_TYPE_XSK_BUFF_POOL, null ptr dereference happens: [1136314.192256] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000034 [1136314.203943] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [1136314.213768] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [1136314.223550] PGD 0 P4D 0 [1136314.230684] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [1136314.239621] CPU: 8 PID: 54203 Comm: xdpsock Not tainted 6.6.0+ #257 [1136314.250469] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0008.031920191559 03/19/2019 [1136314.265615] RIP: 0010:__xdp_return+0x6c/0x210 [1136314.274653] Code: ad 00 48 8b 47 08 49 89 f8 a8 01 0f 85 9b 01 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 f0 41 ff 48 34 75 32 4c 89 c7 e9 79 cd 80 ff 83 fe 03 75 17 41 34 01 0f 85 02 01 00 00 48 89 cf e9 22 cc 1e 00 e9 3d d2 86 [1136314.302907] RSP: 0018:ffffc900089f8db0 EFLAGS: 00010246 [1136314.312967] RAX: ffffc9003168aed0 RBX: ffff8881c3300000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [1136314.324953] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000003 RDI: ffffc9003168c000 [1136314.336929] RBP: 0000000000000ae0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000010000 [1136314.348844] R10: ffffc9000e495000 R11: 0000000000000040 R12: 0000000000000001 [1136314.360706] R13: 0000000000000524 R14: ffffc9003168aec0 R15: 0000000000000001 [1136314.373298] FS: 00007f8df8bbcb80(0000) GS:ffff8897e0e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [1136314.386105] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [1136314.396532] CR2: 0000000000000034 CR3: 00000001aa912002 CR4: 00000000007706f0 [1136314.408377] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [1136314.420173] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [1136314.431890] PKRU: 55555554 [1136314.439143] Call Trace: [1136314.446058] [1136314.452465] ? __die+0x20/0x70 [1136314.459881] ? page_fault_oops+0x15b/0x440 [1136314.468305] ? exc_page_fault+0x6a/0x150 [1136314.476491] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 [1136314.484927] ? __xdp_return+0x6c/0x210 [1136314.492863] bpf_xdp_adjust_tail+0x155/0x1d0 [1136314.501269] bpf_prog_ccc47ae29d3b6570_xdp_sock_prog+0x15/0x60 [1136314.511263] ice_clean_rx_irq_zc+0x206/0xc60 [ice] [1136314.520222] ? ice_xmit_zc+0x6e/0x150 [ice] [1136314.528506] ice_napi_poll+0x467/0x670 [ice] [1136314.536858] ? ttwu_do_activate.constprop.0+0x8f/0x1a0 [1136314.546010] __napi_poll+0x29/0x1b0 [1136314.553462] net_rx_action+0x133/0x270 [1136314.561619] __do_softirq+0xbe/0x28e [1136314.569303] do_softirq+0x3f/0x60 This comes from __xdp_return() call with xdp_buff argument passed as NULL which is supposed to be consumed by xsk_buff_free() call. To address this properly, in ZC case, a node that represents the frag being removed has to be pulled out of xskb_list. Introduce appropriate xsk helpers to do such node operation and use them accordingly within bpf_xdp_adjust_tail(). Fixes: 24ea50127ecf ("xsk: support mbuf on ZC RX") Acked-by: Magnus Karlsson # For the xsk header part Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240124191602.566724-4-maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov --- include/net/xdp_sock_drv.h | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ net/core/filter.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 2 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/include/net/xdp_sock_drv.h b/include/net/xdp_sock_drv.h index 9819e2af0378..c9aec9ab6191 100644 --- a/include/net/xdp_sock_drv.h +++ b/include/net/xdp_sock_drv.h @@ -159,6 +159,23 @@ static inline struct xdp_buff *xsk_buff_get_frag(struct xdp_buff *first) return ret; } +static inline void xsk_buff_del_tail(struct xdp_buff *tail) +{ + struct xdp_buff_xsk *xskb = container_of(tail, struct xdp_buff_xsk, xdp); + + list_del(&xskb->xskb_list_node); +} + +static inline struct xdp_buff *xsk_buff_get_tail(struct xdp_buff *first) +{ + struct xdp_buff_xsk *xskb = container_of(first, struct xdp_buff_xsk, xdp); + struct xdp_buff_xsk *frag; + + frag = list_last_entry(&xskb->pool->xskb_list, struct xdp_buff_xsk, + xskb_list_node); + return &frag->xdp; +} + static inline void xsk_buff_set_size(struct xdp_buff *xdp, u32 size) { xdp->data = xdp->data_hard_start + XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM; @@ -351,6 +368,15 @@ static inline struct xdp_buff *xsk_buff_get_frag(struct xdp_buff *first) return NULL; } +static inline void xsk_buff_del_tail(struct xdp_buff *tail) +{ +} + +static inline struct xdp_buff *xsk_buff_get_tail(struct xdp_buff *first) +{ + return NULL; +} + static inline void xsk_buff_set_size(struct xdp_buff *xdp, u32 size) { } diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c index 24061f29c9dd..36fb5ae8af69 100644 --- a/net/core/filter.c +++ b/net/core/filter.c @@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "dev.h" @@ -4096,6 +4097,40 @@ static int bpf_xdp_frags_increase_tail(struct xdp_buff *xdp, int offset) return 0; } +static void bpf_xdp_shrink_data_zc(struct xdp_buff *xdp, int shrink, + struct xdp_mem_info *mem_info, bool release) +{ + struct xdp_buff *zc_frag = xsk_buff_get_tail(xdp); + + if (release) { + xsk_buff_del_tail(zc_frag); + __xdp_return(NULL, mem_info, false, zc_frag); + } else { + zc_frag->data_end -= shrink; + } +} + +static bool bpf_xdp_shrink_data(struct xdp_buff *xdp, skb_frag_t *frag, + int shrink) +{ + struct xdp_mem_info *mem_info = &xdp->rxq->mem; + bool release = skb_frag_size(frag) == shrink; + + if (mem_info->type == MEM_TYPE_XSK_BUFF_POOL) { + bpf_xdp_shrink_data_zc(xdp, shrink, mem_info, release); + goto out; + } + + if (release) { + struct page *page = skb_frag_page(frag); + + __xdp_return(page_address(page), mem_info, false, NULL); + } + +out: + return release; +} + static int bpf_xdp_frags_shrink_tail(struct xdp_buff *xdp, int offset) { struct skb_shared_info *sinfo = xdp_get_shared_info_from_buff(xdp); @@ -4110,12 +4145,7 @@ static int bpf_xdp_frags_shrink_tail(struct xdp_buff *xdp, int offset) len_free += shrink; offset -= shrink; - - if (skb_frag_size(frag) == shrink) { - struct page *page = skb_frag_page(frag); - - __xdp_return(page_address(page), &xdp->rxq->mem, - false, NULL); + if (bpf_xdp_shrink_data(xdp, frag, shrink)) { n_frags_free++; } else { skb_frag_size_sub(frag, shrink); -- cgit v1.2.3 From fbadd83a612c3b7aad2987893faca6bd24aaebb3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Maciej Fijalkowski Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 20:16:00 +0100 Subject: xdp: reflect tail increase for MEM_TYPE_XSK_BUFF_POOL XSK ZC Rx path calculates the size of data that will be posted to XSK Rx queue via subtracting xdp_buff::data_end from xdp_buff::data. In bpf_xdp_frags_increase_tail(), when underlying memory type of xdp_rxq_info is MEM_TYPE_XSK_BUFF_POOL, add offset to data_end in tail fragment, so that later on user space will be able to take into account the amount of bytes added by XDP program. Fixes: 24ea50127ecf ("xsk: support mbuf on ZC RX") Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240124191602.566724-10-maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov --- net/core/filter.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c index 36fb5ae8af69..ef3e78b6a39c 100644 --- a/net/core/filter.c +++ b/net/core/filter.c @@ -4093,6 +4093,8 @@ static int bpf_xdp_frags_increase_tail(struct xdp_buff *xdp, int offset) memset(skb_frag_address(frag) + skb_frag_size(frag), 0, offset); skb_frag_size_add(frag, offset); sinfo->xdp_frags_size += offset; + if (rxq->mem.type == MEM_TYPE_XSK_BUFF_POOL) + xsk_buff_get_tail(xdp)->data_end += offset; return 0; } -- cgit v1.2.3