From f9d94b57e30fd1575b4935045b32d738668aa74b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Takashi Iwai Date: Tue, 24 Apr 2018 08:01:48 +0200 Subject: ALSA: asihpi: Hardening for potential Spectre v1 As recently Smatch suggested, a couple of places in ASIHPI driver may expand the array directly from the user-space value with speculation: sound/pci/asihpi/hpimsginit.c:70 hpi_init_response() warn: potential spectre issue 'res_size' (local cap) sound/pci/asihpi/hpioctl.c:189 asihpi_hpi_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'adapters' This patch puts array_index_nospec() for hardening against them. BugLink: https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152411496503418&w=2 Reported-by: Dan Carpenter Cc: Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai --- sound/pci/asihpi/hpimsginit.c | 13 +++++++++---- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'sound/pci/asihpi/hpimsginit.c') diff --git a/sound/pci/asihpi/hpimsginit.c b/sound/pci/asihpi/hpimsginit.c index 7eb617175fde..a31a70dccecf 100644 --- a/sound/pci/asihpi/hpimsginit.c +++ b/sound/pci/asihpi/hpimsginit.c @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ #include "hpi_internal.h" #include "hpimsginit.h" +#include /* The actual message size for each object type */ static u16 msg_size[HPI_OBJ_MAXINDEX + 1] = HPI_MESSAGE_SIZE_BY_OBJECT; @@ -39,10 +40,12 @@ static void hpi_init_message(struct hpi_message *phm, u16 object, { u16 size; - if ((object > 0) && (object <= HPI_OBJ_MAXINDEX)) + if ((object > 0) && (object <= HPI_OBJ_MAXINDEX)) { + object = array_index_nospec(object, HPI_OBJ_MAXINDEX + 1); size = msg_size[object]; - else + } else { size = sizeof(*phm); + } memset(phm, 0, size); phm->size = size; @@ -66,10 +69,12 @@ void hpi_init_response(struct hpi_response *phr, u16 object, u16 function, { u16 size; - if ((object > 0) && (object <= HPI_OBJ_MAXINDEX)) + if ((object > 0) && (object <= HPI_OBJ_MAXINDEX)) { + object = array_index_nospec(object, HPI_OBJ_MAXINDEX + 1); size = res_size[object]; - else + } else { size = sizeof(*phr); + } memset(phr, 0, sizeof(*phr)); phr->size = size; -- cgit v1.2.3