diff options
| author | Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> | 2024-02-23 20:25:05 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> | 2024-04-10 00:14:57 +0300 |
| commit | 3253804773c0613a1bad5bfea2edf172b760d8b6 (patch) | |
| tree | d3f6b1b665725dbf66221496577d3030b9a9692f /security | |
| parent | c21632b66895eb23c05e4eeedb68128fb243d168 (diff) | |
| download | linux-3253804773c0613a1bad5bfea2edf172b760d8b6.tar.xz | |
security: allow finer granularity in permitting copy-up of security xattrs
Copying up xattrs is solely based on the security xattr name. For finer
granularity add a dentry parameter to the security_inode_copy_up_xattr
hook definition, allowing decisions to be based on the xattr content as
well.
Co-developed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> (LSM,SELinux)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/security.c | 5 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 2 |
4 files changed, 6 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index 81dbade5b9b3..b0a862bfd74a 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -946,7 +946,7 @@ static void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0); } -static int evm_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) +static int evm_inode_copy_up_xattr(struct dentry *src, const char *name) { if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0) return 1; /* Discard */ diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 0a9a0ac3f266..e5da848c50b9 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -2628,6 +2628,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up); /** * security_inode_copy_up_xattr() - Filter xattrs in an overlayfs copy-up op + * @src: union dentry of copy-up file * @name: xattr name * * Filter the xattrs being copied up when a unioned file is copied up from a @@ -2638,7 +2639,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up); * if the security module does not know about attribute, or a negative * error code to abort the copy up. */ -int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) +int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(struct dentry *src, const char *name) { int rc; @@ -2647,7 +2648,7 @@ int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) * xattr), -EOPNOTSUPP if it does not know anything about the xattr or * any other error code in case of an error. */ - rc = call_int_hook(inode_copy_up_xattr, name); + rc = call_int_hook(inode_copy_up_xattr, src, name); if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_copy_up_xattr)) return rc; diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 3448454c82d0..9f018f51e47a 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3530,7 +3530,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new) return 0; } -static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) +static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) { /* The copy_up hook above sets the initial context on an inode, but we * don't then want to overwrite it by blindly copying all the lower diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 146667937811..79d8dc633b9a 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -4885,7 +4885,7 @@ static int smack_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *dentry, struct cred **new) return 0; } -static int smack_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) +static int smack_inode_copy_up_xattr(struct dentry *src, const char *name) { /* * Return 1 if this is the smack access Smack attribute. |