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authorKuan-Ying Lee <Kuan-Ying.Lee@mediatek.com>2021-08-14 02:54:24 +0300
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2021-08-14 03:09:31 +0300
commit6c7a00b843370feaf7710cef2350367c7e61cd1a (patch)
treec0549a35b4e880b6f222e6e90805743b839b66ee /mm/kmemleak.c
parentf8e6dfc64f6135d1b6c5215c14cd30b9b60a0008 (diff)
downloadlinux-6c7a00b843370feaf7710cef2350367c7e61cd1a.tar.xz
kasan, kmemleak: reset tags when scanning block
Patch series "kasan, slub: reset tag when printing address", v3. With hardware tag-based kasan enabled, we reset the tag when we access metadata to avoid from false alarm. This patch (of 2): Kmemleak needs to scan kernel memory to check memory leak. With hardware tag-based kasan enabled, when it scans on the invalid slab and dereference, the issue will occur as below. Hardware tag-based KASAN doesn't use compiler instrumentation, we can not use kasan_disable_current() to ignore tag check. Based on the below report, there are 11 0xf7 granules, which amounts to 176 bytes, and the object is allocated from the kmalloc-256 cache. So when kmemleak accesses the last 256-176 bytes, it causes faults, as those are marked with KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE == KASAN_TAG_INVALID == 0xfe. Thus, we reset tags before accessing metadata to avoid from false positives. BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in scan_block+0x58/0x170 Read at addr f7ff0000c0074eb0 by task kmemleak/138 Pointer tag: [f7], memory tag: [fe] CPU: 7 PID: 138 Comm: kmemleak Not tainted 5.14.0-rc2-00001-g8cae8cd89f05-dirty #134 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1b0 show_stack+0x1c/0x30 dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x84 print_address_description+0x7c/0x2b4 kasan_report+0x138/0x38c __do_kernel_fault+0x190/0x1c4 do_tag_check_fault+0x78/0x90 do_mem_abort+0x44/0xb4 el1_abort+0x40/0x60 el1h_64_sync_handler+0xb4/0xd0 el1h_64_sync+0x78/0x7c scan_block+0x58/0x170 scan_gray_list+0xdc/0x1a0 kmemleak_scan+0x2ac/0x560 kmemleak_scan_thread+0xb0/0xe0 kthread+0x154/0x160 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 Allocated by task 0: kasan_save_stack+0x2c/0x60 __kasan_kmalloc+0xec/0x104 __kmalloc+0x224/0x3c4 __register_sysctl_paths+0x200/0x290 register_sysctl_table+0x2c/0x40 sysctl_init+0x20/0x34 proc_sys_init+0x3c/0x48 proc_root_init+0x80/0x9c start_kernel+0x648/0x6a4 __primary_switched+0xc0/0xc8 Freed by task 0: kasan_save_stack+0x2c/0x60 kasan_set_track+0x2c/0x40 kasan_set_free_info+0x44/0x54 ____kasan_slab_free.constprop.0+0x150/0x1b0 __kasan_slab_free+0x14/0x20 slab_free_freelist_hook+0xa4/0x1fc kfree+0x1e8/0x30c put_fs_context+0x124/0x220 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x60/0xd4 kern_mount+0x24/0x4c bdev_cache_init+0x70/0x9c vfs_caches_init+0xdc/0xf4 start_kernel+0x638/0x6a4 __primary_switched+0xc0/0xc8 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff0000c0074e00 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-256 of size 256 The buggy address is located 176 bytes inside of 256-byte region [ffff0000c0074e00, ffff0000c0074f00) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:(____ptrval____) refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x100074 head:(____ptrval____) order:2 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 flags: 0xbfffc0000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0xffff|kasantag=0x0) raw: 0bfffc0000010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 f5ff0000c0002300 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000200020 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff0000c0074c00: f0 f0 f0 f0 f0 f0 f0 f0 f0 fe fe fe fe fe fe fe ffff0000c0074d00: fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe >ffff0000c0074e00: f7 f7 f7 f7 f7 f7 f7 f7 f7 f7 f7 fe fe fe fe fe ^ ffff0000c0074f00: fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe ffff0000c0075000: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint kmemleak: 181 new suspected memory leaks (see /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak) Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210804090957.12393-1-Kuan-Ying.Lee@mediatek.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210804090957.12393-2-Kuan-Ying.Lee@mediatek.com Signed-off-by: Kuan-Ying Lee <Kuan-Ying.Lee@mediatek.com> Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Nicholas Tang <nicholas.tang@mediatek.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Chinwen Chang <chinwen.chang@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'mm/kmemleak.c')
-rw-r--r--mm/kmemleak.c6
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/mm/kmemleak.c b/mm/kmemleak.c
index 228a2fbe0657..73d46d16d575 100644
--- a/mm/kmemleak.c
+++ b/mm/kmemleak.c
@@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ static void hex_dump_object(struct seq_file *seq,
warn_or_seq_printf(seq, " hex dump (first %zu bytes):\n", len);
kasan_disable_current();
warn_or_seq_hex_dump(seq, DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, HEX_ROW_SIZE,
- HEX_GROUP_SIZE, ptr, len, HEX_ASCII);
+ HEX_GROUP_SIZE, kasan_reset_tag((void *)ptr), len, HEX_ASCII);
kasan_enable_current();
}
@@ -1171,7 +1171,7 @@ static bool update_checksum(struct kmemleak_object *object)
kasan_disable_current();
kcsan_disable_current();
- object->checksum = crc32(0, (void *)object->pointer, object->size);
+ object->checksum = crc32(0, kasan_reset_tag((void *)object->pointer), object->size);
kasan_enable_current();
kcsan_enable_current();
@@ -1246,7 +1246,7 @@ static void scan_block(void *_start, void *_end,
break;
kasan_disable_current();
- pointer = *ptr;
+ pointer = *(unsigned long *)kasan_reset_tag((void *)ptr);
kasan_enable_current();
untagged_ptr = (unsigned long)kasan_reset_tag((void *)pointer);