diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'meta-openbmc-mods/meta-common/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-aspeed/CVE-2022-20368.patch')
| -rw-r--r-- | meta-openbmc-mods/meta-common/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-aspeed/CVE-2022-20368.patch | 114 |
1 files changed, 114 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta-openbmc-mods/meta-common/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-aspeed/CVE-2022-20368.patch b/meta-openbmc-mods/meta-common/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-aspeed/CVE-2022-20368.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..99a7655bd --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-openbmc-mods/meta-common/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-aspeed/CVE-2022-20368.patch @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +From a055f5f2841f7522b44a2b1eccb1951b4b03d51a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> +Date: Sat, 12 Mar 2022 15:29:58 -0800 +Subject: [PATCH] net/packet: fix slab-out-of-bounds access in packet_recvmsg() + +[ Upstream commit c700525fcc06b05adfea78039de02628af79e07a ] + +syzbot found that when an AF_PACKET socket is using PACKET_COPY_THRESH +and mmap operations, tpacket_rcv() is queueing skbs with +garbage in skb->cb[], triggering a too big copy [1] + +Presumably, users of af_packet using mmap() already gets correct +metadata from the mapped buffer, we can simply make sure +to clear 12 bytes that might be copied to user space later. + +BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:225 [inline] +BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in packet_recvmsg+0x56c/0x1150 net/packet/af_packet.c:3489 +Write of size 165 at addr ffffc9000385fb78 by task syz-executor233/3631 + +CPU: 0 PID: 3631 Comm: syz-executor233 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc7-syzkaller-02396-g0b3660695e80 #0 +Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 +Call Trace: + <TASK> + __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] + dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106 + print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xf/0x336 mm/kasan/report.c:255 + __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:442 [inline] + kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf mm/kasan/report.c:459 + check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:183 [inline] + kasan_check_range+0x13d/0x180 mm/kasan/generic.c:189 + memcpy+0x39/0x60 mm/kasan/shadow.c:66 + memcpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:225 [inline] + packet_recvmsg+0x56c/0x1150 net/packet/af_packet.c:3489 + sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:948 [inline] + sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:966 [inline] + sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:962 [inline] + ____sys_recvmsg+0x2c4/0x600 net/socket.c:2632 + ___sys_recvmsg+0x127/0x200 net/socket.c:2674 + __sys_recvmsg+0xe2/0x1a0 net/socket.c:2704 + do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] + do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 + entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae +RIP: 0033:0x7fdfd5954c29 +Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 41 15 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 +RSP: 002b:00007ffcf8e71e48 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002f +RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007fdfd5954c29 +RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000500 RDI: 0000000000000005 +RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000000000000000d R09: 000000000000000d +R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffcf8e71e60 +R13: 00000000000f4240 R14: 000000000000c1ff R15: 00007ffcf8e71e54 + </TASK> + +addr ffffc9000385fb78 is located in stack of task syz-executor233/3631 at offset 32 in frame: + ____sys_recvmsg+0x0/0x600 include/linux/uio.h:246 + +this frame has 1 object: + [32, 160) 'addr' + +Memory state around the buggy address: + ffffc9000385fa80: 00 04 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + ffffc9000385fb00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 +>ffffc9000385fb80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f3 + ^ + ffffc9000385fc00: f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 + ffffc9000385fc80: f1 f1 f1 00 f2 f2 f2 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 +================================================================== + +Fixes: 0fb375fb9b93 ("[AF_PACKET]: Allow for > 8 byte hardware addresses.") +Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> +Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> +Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220312232958.3535620-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com +Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> +Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> +--- + net/packet/af_packet.c | 11 ++++++++++- + 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c +index e00c38f242c320..c0d4a65931de56 100644 +--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c ++++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c +@@ -2281,8 +2281,11 @@ static int tpacket_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, + copy_skb = skb_get(skb); + skb_head = skb->data; + } +- if (copy_skb) ++ if (copy_skb) { ++ memset(&PACKET_SKB_CB(copy_skb)->sa.ll, 0, ++ sizeof(PACKET_SKB_CB(copy_skb)->sa.ll)); + skb_set_owner_r(copy_skb, sk); ++ } + } + snaplen = po->rx_ring.frame_size - macoff; + if ((int)snaplen < 0) { +@@ -3434,6 +3437,8 @@ static int packet_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, + sock_recv_ts_and_drops(msg, sk, skb); + + if (msg->msg_name) { ++ const size_t max_len = min(sizeof(skb->cb), ++ sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)); + int copy_len; + + /* If the address length field is there to be filled +@@ -3456,6 +3461,10 @@ static int packet_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, + msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_ll); + } + } ++ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(copy_len > max_len)) { ++ copy_len = max_len; ++ msg->msg_namelen = copy_len; ++ } + memcpy(msg->msg_name, &PACKET_SKB_CB(skb)->sa, copy_len); + } + |