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Diffstat (limited to 'poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/0001-upstream-fix-integer-overflow-in-XMSS-private-key-pa.patch')
-rw-r--r--poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/0001-upstream-fix-integer-overflow-in-XMSS-private-key-pa.patch40
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 40 deletions
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/0001-upstream-fix-integer-overflow-in-XMSS-private-key-pa.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/0001-upstream-fix-integer-overflow-in-XMSS-private-key-pa.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 3265be348..000000000
--- a/poky/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/0001-upstream-fix-integer-overflow-in-XMSS-private-key-pa.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-From 2014fad3d28090b59d2f8a0971166c06e5fa6da6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
-Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2019 14:56:58 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH] upstream: fix integer overflow in XMSS private key parsing.
-
-Reported by Adam Zabrocki via SecuriTeam's SSH program.
-
-Note that this code is experimental and not compiled by default.
-
-ok markus@
-
-OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cd0361896d15e8a1bac495ac583ff065ffca2be1
-
-Signed-off-by: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/a546b17bbaeb12beac4c9aeed56f74a42b18a93a]
-CVE: CVE-2019-16905
-
-Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <hongxu.jia@windriver.com>
----
- sshkey-xmss.c | 3 ++-
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/sshkey-xmss.c b/sshkey-xmss.c
-index aaae702..c57681a 100644
---- a/sshkey-xmss.c
-+++ b/sshkey-xmss.c
-@@ -977,7 +977,8 @@ sshkey_xmss_decrypt_state(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *encoded,
- goto out;
- }
- /* check that an appropriate amount of auth data is present */
-- if (sshbuf_len(encoded) < encrypted_len + authlen) {
-+ if (sshbuf_len(encoded) < authlen ||
-+ sshbuf_len(encoded) - authlen < encrypted_len) {
- r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
- goto out;
- }
---
-2.7.4
-