diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'meta-openembedded/meta-filesystems/recipes-support/fuse/files')
-rw-r--r-- | meta-openembedded/meta-filesystems/recipes-support/fuse/files/CVE-2018-10906-1.patch | 52 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | meta-openembedded/meta-filesystems/recipes-support/fuse/files/CVE-2018-10906-2.patch | 48 |
2 files changed, 100 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-filesystems/recipes-support/fuse/files/CVE-2018-10906-1.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-filesystems/recipes-support/fuse/files/CVE-2018-10906-1.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..83bef30229 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-filesystems/recipes-support/fuse/files/CVE-2018-10906-1.patch @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +From 28bdae3d113ef479c1660a581ef720cdc33bf466 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> +Date: Fri, 13 Jul 2018 15:15:36 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH] fusermount: don't feed "escaped commas" into mount options + +The old code permits the following behavior: + +$ _FUSE_COMMFD=10000 priv_strace -etrace=mount -s200 fusermount -o 'foobar=\,allow_other' mount +mount("/dev/fuse", ".", "fuse", MS_NOSUID|MS_NODEV, "foobar=\\,allow_other,fd=3,rootmode=40000,user_id=1000,group_id=1000") = -1 EINVAL (Invalid argument) + +However, backslashes do not have any special meaning for the kernel here. + +As it happens, you can't abuse this because there is no FUSE mount option +that takes a string value that can contain backslashes; but this is very +brittle. Don't interpret "escape characters" in places where they don't +work. + +CVE: CVE-2018-10906 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/commit/28bdae3d113ef479c1660a581ef720cdc33bf466] + +Signed-off-by: Jagadeesh Krishnanjanappa <jkrishnanjanappa@mvista.com> +--- + util/fusermount.c | 5 ++++- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/util/fusermount.c b/util/fusermount.c +index 0e1d34d..143bd4a 100644 +--- a/util/fusermount.c ++++ b/util/fusermount.c +@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ + #include <sys/socket.h> + #include <sys/utsname.h> + #include <sched.h> ++#include <stdbool.h> + + #define FUSE_COMMFD_ENV "_FUSE_COMMFD" + +@@ -754,8 +755,10 @@ static int do_mount(const char *mnt, char **typep, mode_t rootmode, + unsigned len; + const char *fsname_str = "fsname="; + const char *subtype_str = "subtype="; ++ bool escape_ok = begins_with(s, fsname_str) || ++ begins_with(s, subtype_str); + for (len = 0; s[len]; len++) { +- if (s[len] == '\\' && s[len + 1]) ++ if (escape_ok && s[len] == '\\' && s[len + 1]) + len++; + else if (s[len] == ',') + break; +-- +2.13.3 + diff --git a/meta-openembedded/meta-filesystems/recipes-support/fuse/files/CVE-2018-10906-2.patch b/meta-openembedded/meta-filesystems/recipes-support/fuse/files/CVE-2018-10906-2.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..104aa171bd --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-openembedded/meta-filesystems/recipes-support/fuse/files/CVE-2018-10906-2.patch @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +From 5018a0c016495155ee598b7e0167b43d5d902414 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> +Date: Sat, 14 Jul 2018 03:47:50 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH] fusermount: refuse unknown options + +Blacklists are notoriously fragile; especially if the kernel wishes to add +some security-critical mount option at a later date, all existing systems +with older versions of fusermount installed will suddenly have a security +problem. +Additionally, if the kernel's option parsing became a tiny bit laxer, the +blacklist could probably be bypassed. + +Whitelist known-harmless flags instead, even if it's slightly more +inconvenient. + +CVE: CVE-2018-10906 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/commit/5018a0c016495155ee598b7e0167b43d5d902414] + +Signed-off-by: Jagadeesh Krishnanjanappa <jkrishnanjanappa@mvista.com> +--- + util/fusermount.c | 8 +++++++- + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/util/fusermount.c b/util/fusermount.c +index 4e0f51a..2792407 100644 +--- a/util/fusermount.c ++++ b/util/fusermount.c +@@ -819,10 +819,16 @@ static int do_mount(const char *mnt, char **typep, mode_t rootmode, + flags |= flag; + else + flags &= ~flag; +- } else { ++ } else if (opt_eq(s, len, "default_permissions") || ++ opt_eq(s, len, "allow_other") || ++ begins_with(s, "max_read=") || ++ begins_with(s, "blksize=")) { + memcpy(d, s, len); + d += len; + *d++ = ','; ++ } else { ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: unknown option '%.*s'\n", progname, len, s); ++ exit(1); + } + } + } +-- +2.13.3 + |