diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'meta-security/meta-tpm/recipes-tpm2/tpm2-pkcs11/files/0001-ssl-compile-against-OSSL-3.0.patch')
| -rw-r--r-- | meta-security/meta-tpm/recipes-tpm2/tpm2-pkcs11/files/0001-ssl-compile-against-OSSL-3.0.patch | 1305 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 1305 deletions
diff --git a/meta-security/meta-tpm/recipes-tpm2/tpm2-pkcs11/files/0001-ssl-compile-against-OSSL-3.0.patch b/meta-security/meta-tpm/recipes-tpm2/tpm2-pkcs11/files/0001-ssl-compile-against-OSSL-3.0.patch deleted file mode 100644 index ac2f92c90e..0000000000 --- a/meta-security/meta-tpm/recipes-tpm2/tpm2-pkcs11/files/0001-ssl-compile-against-OSSL-3.0.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1305 +0,0 @@ -From f7a2e90e80fd8b4c43042f8099e821b4118234d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com> -Date: Fri, 3 Sep 2021 11:24:40 -0500 -Subject: [PATCH 1/2] ssl: compile against OSSL 3.0 - -Compile against OpenSSL. This moves functions non-deprecated things if -possible and ignores deprecation warnings when not. Padding manipulation -routines seem to have been marked deprecated in OSSL 3.0, so we need to -figure out a porting strategy here. - -Fixes: #686 - -Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com> - -Upstream-Status: Backport -Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com> - ---- - src/lib/backend_esysdb.c | 5 +- - src/lib/backend_fapi.c | 5 +- - src/lib/encrypt.c | 2 +- - src/lib/mech.c | 72 +--- - src/lib/object.c | 3 +- - src/lib/sign.c | 2 +- - src/lib/ssl_util.c | 531 ++++++++++++++++-------- - src/lib/ssl_util.h | 31 +- - src/lib/tpm.c | 6 +- - src/lib/utils.c | 35 +- - src/lib/utils.h | 13 - - test/integration/pkcs-sign-verify.int.c | 94 ++--- - 12 files changed, 441 insertions(+), 358 deletions(-) - -Index: git/src/lib/backend_esysdb.c -=================================================================== ---- git.orig/src/lib/backend_esysdb.c -+++ git/src/lib/backend_esysdb.c -@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ - #include "config.h" - #include "backend_esysdb.h" - #include "db.h" -+#include "ssl_util.h" - #include "tpm.h" - - CK_RV backend_esysdb_init(void) { -@@ -308,7 +309,7 @@ CK_RV backend_esysdb_token_unseal_wrappi - } - - twist sealsalt = user ? sealobj->userauthsalt : sealobj->soauthsalt; -- twist sealobjauth = utils_hash_pass(tpin, sealsalt); -+ twist sealobjauth = ssl_util_hash_pass(tpin, sealsalt); - if (!sealobjauth) { - rv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - goto error; -@@ -372,7 +373,7 @@ CK_RV backend_esysdb_token_changeauth(to - */ - twist oldsalt = !user ? tok->esysdb.sealobject.soauthsalt : tok->esysdb.sealobject.userauthsalt; - -- twist oldauth = utils_hash_pass(toldpin, oldsalt); -+ twist oldauth = ssl_util_hash_pass(toldpin, oldsalt); - if (!oldauth) { - goto out; - } -Index: git/src/lib/backend_fapi.c -=================================================================== ---- git.orig/src/lib/backend_fapi.c -+++ git/src/lib/backend_fapi.c -@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ - #include "backend_fapi.h" - #include "emitter.h" - #include "parser.h" -+#include "ssl_util.h" - #include "utils.h" - - #ifdef HAVE_FAPI -@@ -793,7 +794,7 @@ CK_RV backend_fapi_token_unseal_wrapping - } - - twist sealsalt = user ? tok->fapi.userauthsalt : tok->fapi.soauthsalt; -- twist sealobjauth = utils_hash_pass(tpin, sealsalt); -+ twist sealobjauth = ssl_util_hash_pass(tpin, sealsalt); - if (!sealobjauth) { - rv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - goto error; -@@ -889,7 +890,7 @@ CK_RV backend_fapi_token_changeauth(toke - } - rv = CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; - -- oldauth = utils_hash_pass(toldpin, user ? tok->fapi.userauthsalt : tok->fapi.soauthsalt); -+ oldauth = ssl_util_hash_pass(toldpin, user ? tok->fapi.userauthsalt : tok->fapi.soauthsalt); - if (!oldauth) { - goto out; - } -Index: git/src/lib/encrypt.c -=================================================================== ---- git.orig/src/lib/encrypt.c -+++ git/src/lib/encrypt.c -@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ void encrypt_op_data_free(encrypt_op_dat - CK_RV sw_encrypt_data_init(mdetail *mdtl, CK_MECHANISM *mechanism, tobject *tobj, sw_encrypt_data **enc_data) { - - EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; -- CK_RV rv = ssl_util_tobject_to_evp(&pkey, tobj); -+ CK_RV rv = ssl_util_attrs_to_evp(tobj->attrs, &pkey); - if (rv != CKR_OK) { - return rv; - } -Index: git/src/lib/mech.c -=================================================================== ---- git.orig/src/lib/mech.c -+++ git/src/lib/mech.c -@@ -693,7 +693,7 @@ CK_RV ecc_keygen_validator(mdetail *m, C - } - - int nid = 0; -- CK_RV rv = ec_params_to_nid(a, &nid); -+ CK_RV rv = ssl_util_params_to_nid(a, &nid); - if (rv != CKR_OK) { - return rv; - } -@@ -857,11 +857,11 @@ CK_RV rsa_pkcs_synthesizer(mdetail *mdtl - } - - /* Apply the PKCS1.5 padding */ -- int rc = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(outbuf, padded_len, -- inbuf, inlen); -- if (!rc) { -+ CK_RV rv = ssl_util_add_PKCS1_TYPE_1(inbuf, inlen, -+ outbuf, padded_len); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) { - LOGE("Applying RSA padding failed"); -- return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; -+ return rv; - } - - *outlen = padded_len; -@@ -893,22 +893,21 @@ CK_RV rsa_pkcs_unsynthesizer(mdetail *md - size_t key_bytes = *keybits / 8; - - unsigned char buf[4096]; -- int rc = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(buf, sizeof(buf), -- inbuf, inlen, -- key_bytes); -- if (rc < 0) { -+ CK_ULONG buflen = sizeof(buf); -+ CK_RV rv = ssl_util_check_PKCS1_TYPE_2(inbuf, inlen, key_bytes, -+ buf, &buflen); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) { - LOGE("Could not recover CKM_RSA_PKCS Padding"); -- return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; -+ return rv; - } - -- /* cannot be < 0 because of check above */ -- if (!outbuf || (unsigned)rc > *outlen) { -- *outlen = rc; -+ if (!outbuf || buflen > *outlen) { -+ *outlen = buflen; - return outbuf ? CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL : CKR_OK; - } - -- *outlen = rc; -- memcpy(outbuf, buf, rc); -+ *outlen = buflen; -+ memcpy(outbuf, buf, buflen); - - return CKR_OK; - } -@@ -944,50 +943,21 @@ CK_RV rsa_pss_synthesizer(mdetail *mdtl, - return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; - } - -- CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR exp_attr = attr_get_attribute_by_type(attrs, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT); -- if (!exp_attr) { -- LOGE("Signing key has no CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT"); -- return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; -- } -- - if (modulus_attr->ulValueLen > *outlen) { - LOGE("Output buffer is too small, got: %lu, required at least %lu", - *outlen, modulus_attr->ulValueLen); - return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; - } - -- BIGNUM *e = BN_bin2bn(exp_attr->pValue, exp_attr->ulValueLen, NULL); -- if (!e) { -- LOGE("Could not convert exponent to bignum"); -- return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; -- } -- -- BIGNUM *n = BN_bin2bn(modulus_attr->pValue, modulus_attr->ulValueLen, NULL); -- if (!n) { -- LOGE("Could not convert modulus to bignum"); -- BN_free(e); -- return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; -- } -- -- RSA *rsa = RSA_new(); -- if (!rsa) { -- LOGE("oom"); -- return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; -- } -- -- int rc = RSA_set0_key(rsa, n, e, NULL); -- if (!rc) { -- LOGE("Could not set modulus and exponent to OSSL RSA key"); -- BN_free(n); -- BN_free(e); -- RSA_free(rsa); -- return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; -+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; -+ rv = ssl_util_attrs_to_evp(attrs, &pkey); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) { -+ return rv; - } - -- rc = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS(rsa, outbuf, -- inbuf, md, -1); -- RSA_free(rsa); -- if (!rc) { -+ rv = ssl_util_add_PKCS1_PSS(pkey, inbuf, md, outbuf); -+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) { - LOGE("Applying RSA padding failed"); - return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; - } -Index: git/src/lib/object.c -=================================================================== ---- git.orig/src/lib/object.c -+++ git/src/lib/object.c -@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ - #include "object.h" - #include "pkcs11.h" - #include "session_ctx.h" -+#include "ssl_util.h" - #include "token.h" - #include "utils.h" - -@@ -121,7 +122,7 @@ CK_RV tobject_get_min_buf_size(tobject * - } - - int nid = 0; -- CK_RV rv = ec_params_to_nid(a, &nid); -+ CK_RV rv = ssl_util_params_to_nid(a, &nid); - if (rv != CKR_OK) { - return rv; - } -Index: git/src/lib/sign.c -=================================================================== ---- git.orig/src/lib/sign.c -+++ git/src/lib/sign.c -@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ static sign_opdata *sign_opdata_new(mdet - } - - EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; -- rv = ssl_util_tobject_to_evp(&pkey, tobj); -+ rv = ssl_util_attrs_to_evp(tobj->attrs, &pkey); - if (rv != CKR_OK) { - return NULL; - } -Index: git/src/lib/ssl_util.c -=================================================================== ---- git.orig/src/lib/ssl_util.c -+++ git/src/lib/ssl_util.c -@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ - #include <openssl/rsa.h> - #include <openssl/sha.h> - -+#include "attrs.h" - #include "log.h" - #include "pkcs11.h" - #include "ssl_util.h" -@@ -19,194 +20,228 @@ - #include <openssl/evperr.h> - #endif - --#if defined(LIB_TPM2_OPENSSL_OPENSSL_PRE11) -+#if defined(LIB_TPM2_OPENSSL_OPENSSL_POST300) -+#include <openssl/core_names.h> -+#endif - - /* -- * Pre openssl 1.1 doesn't have EC_POINT_point2buf, so use EC_POINT_point2oct to -- * create an API compatible version of it. -+ * TODO Port these routines -+ * Deprecated function block to port -+ * -+ * There are no padding routine replacements in OSSL 3.0. -+ * - per Matt Caswell (maintainer) on mailing list. -+ * Signature verification can likely be done with EVP Verify interface. - */ --size_t EC_POINT_point2buf(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, -- point_conversion_form_t form, -- unsigned char **pbuf, BN_CTX *ctx) { -- -- /* Get the required buffer length */ -- size_t len = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, point, form, NULL, 0, NULL); -- if (!len) { -- return 0; -- } -+#if defined(LIB_TPM2_OPENSSL_OPENSSL_POST300) -+#pragma GCC diagnostic push -+#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wdeprecated-declarations" -+#endif - -- /* allocate it */ -- unsigned char *buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len); -- if (!buf) { -- return 0; -- } -+CK_RV ssl_util_add_PKCS1_PSS(EVP_PKEY *pkey, -+ const CK_BYTE_PTR inbuf, const EVP_MD *md, -+ CK_BYTE_PTR outbuf) { - -- /* convert it */ -- len = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, point, form, buf, len, ctx); -- if (!len) { -- OPENSSL_free(buf); -- return 0; -+ RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey); -+ if (!rsa) { -+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; - } - -- *pbuf = buf; -- return len; --} -+ int rc = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS(rsa, outbuf, -+ inbuf, md, -1); - --size_t OBJ_length(const ASN1_OBJECT *obj) { -+ return rc == 1 ? CKR_OK : CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; -+} - -- if (!obj) { -- return 0; -- } -+CK_RV ssl_util_add_PKCS1_TYPE_1(const CK_BYTE_PTR inbuf, CK_ULONG inlen, -+ CK_BYTE_PTR outbuf, CK_ULONG outbuflen) { - -- return obj->length; -+ return RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(outbuf, outbuflen, -+ inbuf, inlen) == 1 ? CKR_OK : CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; - } - --const unsigned char *OBJ_get0_data(const ASN1_OBJECT *obj) { -+CK_RV ssl_util_check_PKCS1_TYPE_2(const CK_BYTE_PTR inbuf, CK_ULONG inlen, CK_ULONG rsa_len, -+ CK_BYTE_PTR outbuf, CK_ULONG_PTR outbuflen) { - -- if (!obj) { -- return NULL; -+ int rc = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(outbuf, *outbuflen, -+ inbuf, inlen, rsa_len); -+ if (rc < 0) { -+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; - } - -- return obj->data; -+ /* cannot be negative due to check above */ -+ *outbuflen = rc; -+ return CKR_OK; - } - --const unsigned char *ASN1_STRING_get0_data(const ASN1_STRING *x) { -- return ASN1_STRING_data((ASN1_STRING *)x); --} -+#if defined(LIB_TPM2_OPENSSL_OPENSSL_POST300) -+#pragma GCC diagnostic pop -+#endif - --int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d) { -+#if defined(LIB_TPM2_OPENSSL_OPENSSL_POST300) - -- if ((r->n == NULL && n == NULL) || (r->e == NULL && e == NULL)) { -- return 0; -- } -+static CK_RV get_RSA_evp_pubkey(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR e_attr, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR n_attr, EVP_PKEY **out_pkey) { -+ -+ OSSL_PARAM params[] = { -+ OSSL_PARAM_BN("n", n_attr->pValue, n_attr->ulValueLen), -+ OSSL_PARAM_BN("e", e_attr->pValue, e_attr->ulValueLen), -+ OSSL_PARAM_END -+ }; - -- if (n != NULL) { -- BN_free(r->n); -- r->n = n; -+ /* convert params to EVP key */ -+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *evp_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_RSA, NULL); -+ if (!evp_ctx) { -+ SSL_UTIL_LOGE("EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id"); -+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; - } - -- if (e != NULL) { -- BN_free(r->e); -- r->e = e; -+ int rc = EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(evp_ctx); -+ if (rc != 1) { -+ SSL_UTIL_LOGE("EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init"); -+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(evp_ctx); -+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; - } - -- if (d != NULL) { -- BN_free(r->d); -- r->d = d; -+ rc = EVP_PKEY_fromdata(evp_ctx, out_pkey, EVP_PKEY_PUBLIC_KEY, params); -+ if (rc != 1) { -+ SSL_UTIL_LOGE("EVP_PKEY_fromdata"); -+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(evp_ctx); -+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; - } - -- return 1; -+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(evp_ctx); -+ -+ return CKR_OK; - } - --int ECDSA_SIG_set0(ECDSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s) { -+static CK_RV get_EC_evp_pubkey(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ecparams, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ecpoint, EVP_PKEY **out_pkey) { -+ -+ /* -+ * The simplest way I have found to deal with this is to convert the ASN1 object in -+ * the ecparams attribute (was done previously with d2i_ECParameters) is to a nid and -+ * then take the int nid and convert it to a friendly name like prime256v1. -+ * EVP_PKEY_fromdata can handle group by name. -+ * -+ * Per the spec this is "DER-encoding of an ANSI X9.62 Parameters value". -+ */ -+ int curve_id = 0; -+ CK_RV rv = ssl_util_params_to_nid(ecparams, &curve_id); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) { -+ LOGE("Could not get nid from params"); -+ return rv; -+ } - -- if (!r || !s) { -- return 0; -+ /* Per the spec CKA_EC_POINT attribute is the "DER-encoding of ANSI X9.62 ECPoint value Q */ -+ const unsigned char *x = ecpoint->pValue; -+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, &x, ecpoint->ulValueLen); -+ if (!os) { -+ SSL_UTIL_LOGE("d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING: %s"); -+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; - } - -- BN_free(sig->r); -- BN_free(sig->s); -+ OSSL_PARAM params[] = { -+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, (char *)OBJ_nid2sn(curve_id), 0), -+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, os->data, os->length), -+ OSSL_PARAM_END -+ }; - -- sig->r = r; -- sig->s = s; -+ /* convert params to EVP key */ -+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *evp_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL); -+ if (!evp_ctx) { -+ SSL_UTIL_LOGE("EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id"); -+ OPENSSL_free(os); -+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; -+ } - -- return 1; --} -+ int rc = EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(evp_ctx); -+ if (rc != 1) { -+ SSL_UTIL_LOGE("EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init: %s"); -+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(evp_ctx); -+ OPENSSL_free(os); -+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; -+ } - --EC_KEY *EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey) { -- if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) { -- return NULL; -+ rc = EVP_PKEY_fromdata(evp_ctx, out_pkey, EVP_PKEY_PUBLIC_KEY, params); -+ if (rc != 1) { -+ SSL_UTIL_LOGE("EVP_PKEY_fromdata"); -+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(evp_ctx); -+ OPENSSL_free(os); -+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; - } - -- return pkey->pkey.ec; -+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(evp_ctx); -+ OPENSSL_free(os); -+ -+ return CKR_OK; - } --#endif - --static CK_RV convert_pubkey_RSA(RSA **outkey, attr_list *attrs) { -+#else - -- RSA *rsa = NULL; -- BIGNUM *e = NULL, *n = NULL; -+static CK_RV get_RSA_evp_pubkey(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR e_attr, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR n_attr, EVP_PKEY **out_pkey) { - -- CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR exp = attr_get_attribute_by_type(attrs, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT); -- if (!exp) { -- LOGE("RSA Object must have attribute CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT"); -+ BIGNUM *e = BN_bin2bn(e_attr->pValue, e_attr->ulValueLen, NULL); -+ if (!e) { -+ LOGE("Could not convert exponent to bignum"); - return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; - } - -- CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR mod = attr_get_attribute_by_type(attrs, CKA_MODULUS); -- if (!mod) { -- LOGE("RSA Object must have attribute CKA_MODULUS"); -+ BIGNUM *n = BN_bin2bn(n_attr->pValue, n_attr->ulValueLen, NULL); -+ if (!n) { -+ LOGE("Could not convert modulus to bignum"); -+ BN_free(e); - return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; - } - -- rsa = RSA_new(); -+ RSA *rsa = RSA_new(); - if (!rsa) { -- SSL_UTIL_LOGE("Failed to allocate OpenSSL RSA structure"); -- goto error; -+ LOGE("oom"); -+ return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - } - -- e = BN_bin2bn(exp->pValue, exp->ulValueLen, NULL); -- if (!e) { -- SSL_UTIL_LOGE("Failed to convert exponent to SSL internal format"); -- goto error; -+ int rc = RSA_set0_key(rsa, n, e, NULL); -+ if (!rc) { -+ LOGE("Could not set modulus and exponent to OSSL RSA key"); -+ BN_free(n); -+ BN_free(e); -+ RSA_free(rsa); -+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; - } - -- n = BN_bin2bn(mod->pValue, mod->ulValueLen, NULL); -- if (!n) { -- SSL_UTIL_LOGE("Failed to convert modulus to SSL internal format"); -- goto error; -+ /* assigned to RSA key */ -+ n = e = NULL; -+ -+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = EVP_PKEY_new(); -+ if (!pkey) { -+ SSL_UTIL_LOGE("EVP_PKEY_new"); -+ RSA_free(rsa); -+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; - } - -- if (!RSA_set0_key(rsa, n, e, NULL)) { -- SSL_UTIL_LOGE("Failed to set RSA modulus and exponent components"); -+ rc = EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa); -+ if (rc != 1) { - RSA_free(rsa); -- BN_free(e); -- BN_free(n); -- goto error; -+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); -+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; - } - -- *outkey = rsa; -+ *out_pkey = pkey; - - return CKR_OK; -- --error: -- RSA_free(rsa); -- if (e) { -- BN_free(e); -- } -- if (n) { -- BN_free(n); -- } -- -- return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; - } - --static CK_RV convert_pubkey_ECC(EC_KEY **outkey, attr_list *attrs) { -+static CK_RV get_EC_evp_pubkey(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ecparams, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ecpoint, EVP_PKEY **out_pkey) { - -- EC_KEY *key = EC_KEY_new(); -- if (!key) { -+ EC_KEY *ecc = EC_KEY_new(); -+ if (!ecc) { - LOGE("oom"); - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; - } - -- CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ecparams = attr_get_attribute_by_type(attrs, CKA_EC_PARAMS); -- if (!ecparams) { -- LOGE("ECC Key must have attribute CKA_EC_PARAMS"); -- return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; -- } -- -- CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ecpoint = attr_get_attribute_by_type(attrs, CKA_EC_POINT); -- if (!ecpoint) { -- LOGE("ECC Key must have attribute CKA_EC_POINT"); -- return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; -- } -- - /* set params */ - const unsigned char *x = ecparams->pValue; -- EC_KEY *k = d2i_ECParameters(&key, &x, ecparams->ulValueLen); -+ EC_KEY *k = d2i_ECParameters(&ecc, &x, ecparams->ulValueLen); - if (!k) { - SSL_UTIL_LOGE("Could not update key with EC Parameters"); -- EC_KEY_free(key); -+ EC_KEY_free(ecc); - return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; - } - -@@ -215,22 +250,38 @@ static CK_RV convert_pubkey_ECC(EC_KEY * - ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, &x, ecpoint->ulValueLen); - if (os) { - x = os->data; -- k = o2i_ECPublicKey(&key, &x, os->length); -+ k = o2i_ECPublicKey(&ecc, &x, os->length); - ASN1_STRING_free(os); - if (!k) { - SSL_UTIL_LOGE("Could not update key with EC Points"); -- EC_KEY_free(key); -+ EC_KEY_free(ecc); - return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; - } - } - -- *outkey = key; -+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = EVP_PKEY_new(); -+ if (!pkey) { -+ SSL_UTIL_LOGE("EVP_PKEY_new"); -+ EC_KEY_free(ecc); -+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; -+ } -+ -+ int rc = EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey, ecc); -+ if (!rc) { -+ SSL_UTIL_LOGE("Could not set pkey with ec key"); -+ EC_KEY_free(ecc); -+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); -+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; -+ } -+ -+ *out_pkey = pkey; - return CKR_OK; - } -+#endif - --CK_RV ssl_util_tobject_to_evp(EVP_PKEY **outpkey, tobject *obj) { -+CK_RV ssl_util_attrs_to_evp(attr_list *attrs, EVP_PKEY **outpkey) { - -- CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR a = attr_get_attribute_by_type(obj->attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE); -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR a = attr_get_attribute_by_type(attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE); - if (!a) { - LOGE("Expected object to have attribute CKA_KEY_TYPE"); - return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; -@@ -253,44 +304,52 @@ CK_RV ssl_util_tobject_to_evp(EVP_PKEY * - return CKR_OK; - } - -- EVP_PKEY *pkey = EVP_PKEY_new(); -- if (!pkey) { -- LOGE("oom"); -- return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; -- } -+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; - - if (key_type == CKK_EC) { -- EC_KEY *e = NULL; -- rv = convert_pubkey_ECC(&e, obj->attrs); -- if (rv != CKR_OK) { -- return rv; -+ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ecparams = attr_get_attribute_by_type(attrs, CKA_EC_PARAMS); -+ if (!ecparams) { -+ LOGE("ECC Key must have attribute CKA_EC_PARAMS"); -+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; - } -- int rc = EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey, e); -- if (!rc) { -- SSL_UTIL_LOGE("Could not set pkey with ec key"); -- EC_KEY_free(e); -- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); -+ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ecpoint = attr_get_attribute_by_type(attrs, CKA_EC_POINT); -+ if (!ecpoint) { -+ LOGE("ECC Key must have attribute CKA_EC_POINT"); - return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; - } -- } else if (key_type == CKK_RSA) { -- RSA *r = NULL; -- rv = convert_pubkey_RSA(&r, obj->attrs); -+ -+ rv = get_EC_evp_pubkey(ecparams, ecpoint, &pkey); - if (rv != CKR_OK) { - return rv; - } -- int rc = EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, r); -- if (!rc) { -- SSL_UTIL_LOGE("Could not set pkey with rsa key"); -- RSA_free(r); -- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); -+ -+ } else if (key_type == CKK_RSA) { -+ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR exp = attr_get_attribute_by_type(attrs, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT); -+ if (!exp) { -+ LOGE("RSA Object must have attribute CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT"); - return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; - } -+ -+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR mod = attr_get_attribute_by_type(attrs, CKA_MODULUS); -+ if (!mod) { -+ LOGE("RSA Object must have attribute CKA_MODULUS"); -+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; -+ } -+ -+ rv = get_RSA_evp_pubkey(exp, mod, &pkey); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) { -+ return rv; -+ } -+ - } else { - LOGE("Invalid CKA_KEY_TYPE, got: %lu", key_type); -- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; - } - -+ assert(pkey); - *outpkey = pkey; - - return CKR_OK; -@@ -406,10 +465,12 @@ CK_RV ssl_util_setup_evp_pkey_ctx(EVP_PK - } - } - -- rc = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pkey_ctx, md); -- if (!rc) { -- SSL_UTIL_LOGE("EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md failed"); -- goto error; -+ if (md) { -+ rc = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pkey_ctx, md); -+ if (!rc) { -+ SSL_UTIL_LOGE("EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md failed"); -+ goto error; -+ } - } - - *outpkey_ctx = pkey_ctx; -@@ -421,21 +482,12 @@ error: - return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; - } - --static CK_RV do_sig_verify_rsa(EVP_PKEY *pkey, -- int padding, const EVP_MD *md, -- CK_BYTE_PTR digest, CK_ULONG digest_len, -- CK_BYTE_PTR signature, CK_ULONG signature_len) { -+static CK_RV sig_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, -+ const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen, -+ const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) { - - CK_RV rv = CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; -- -- EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL; -- rv = ssl_util_setup_evp_pkey_ctx(pkey, padding, md, -- EVP_PKEY_verify_init, &pkey_ctx); -- if (rv != CKR_OK) { -- return rv; -- } -- -- int rc = EVP_PKEY_verify(pkey_ctx, signature, signature_len, digest, digest_len); -+ int rc = EVP_PKEY_verify(ctx, sig, siglen, tbs, tbslen); - if (rc < 0) { - SSL_UTIL_LOGE("EVP_PKEY_verify failed"); - } else if (rc == 1) { -@@ -444,11 +496,11 @@ static CK_RV do_sig_verify_rsa(EVP_PKEY - rv = CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; - } - -- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); - return rv; - } - --static CK_RV create_ecdsa_sig(CK_BYTE_PTR sig, CK_ULONG siglen, ECDSA_SIG **outsig) { -+static CK_RV create_ecdsa_sig(CK_BYTE_PTR sig, CK_ULONG siglen, -+ unsigned char **outbuf, size_t *outlen) { - - if (siglen & 1) { - LOGE("Expected ECDSA signature length to be even, got : %lu", -@@ -487,21 +539,48 @@ static CK_RV create_ecdsa_sig(CK_BYTE_PT - return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; - } - -- *outsig = ossl_sig; -+ int sig_len =i2d_ECDSA_SIG(ossl_sig, NULL); -+ if (sig_len <= 0) { -+ if (rc < 0) { -+ SSL_UTIL_LOGE("ECDSA_do_verify failed"); -+ } else { -+ LOGE("Expected length to be greater than 0"); -+ } -+ ECDSA_SIG_free(ossl_sig); -+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; -+ } -+ -+ unsigned char *buf = calloc(1, sig_len); -+ if (!buf) { -+ LOGE("oom"); -+ ECDSA_SIG_free(ossl_sig); -+ return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; -+ } -+ -+ unsigned char *p = buf; -+ int sig_len2 = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(ossl_sig, &p); -+ if (sig_len2 < 0) { -+ SSL_UTIL_LOGE("ECDSA_do_verify failed"); -+ ECDSA_SIG_free(ossl_sig); -+ free(buf); -+ return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; -+ } -+ -+ assert(sig_len == sig_len2); -+ -+ ECDSA_SIG_free(ossl_sig); -+ -+ *outbuf = buf; -+ *outlen = sig_len; - - return CKR_OK; - } - - static CK_RV do_sig_verify_ec(EVP_PKEY *pkey, -+ const EVP_MD *md, - CK_BYTE_PTR digest, CK_ULONG digest_len, - CK_BYTE_PTR signature, CK_ULONG signature_len) { - -- EC_KEY *eckey = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey); -- if (!eckey) { -- LOGE("Expected EC Key"); -- return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; -- } -- - /* - * OpenSSL expects ASN1 framed signatures, PKCS11 does flat - * R + S signatures, so convert it to ASN1 framing. -@@ -509,21 +588,47 @@ static CK_RV do_sig_verify_ec(EVP_PKEY * - * https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-pkcs11/issues/277 - * For details. - */ -- ECDSA_SIG *ossl_sig = NULL; -- CK_RV rv = create_ecdsa_sig(signature, signature_len, &ossl_sig); -+ unsigned char *buf = NULL; -+ size_t buflen = 0; -+ CK_RV rv = create_ecdsa_sig(signature, signature_len, &buf, &buflen); - if (rv != CKR_OK) { - return rv; - } - -- int rc = ECDSA_do_verify(digest, digest_len, ossl_sig, eckey); -- if (rc < 0) { -- ECDSA_SIG_free(ossl_sig); -- SSL_UTIL_LOGE("ECDSA_do_verify failed"); -- return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; -+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL; -+ rv = ssl_util_setup_evp_pkey_ctx(pkey, 0, md, -+ EVP_PKEY_verify_init, &pkey_ctx); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) { -+ free(buf); -+ return rv; - } -- ECDSA_SIG_free(ossl_sig); - -- return rc == 1 ? CKR_OK : CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; -+ rv = sig_verify(pkey_ctx, buf, buflen, digest, digest_len); -+ -+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); -+ free(buf); -+ -+ return rv; -+} -+ -+static CK_RV do_sig_verify_rsa(EVP_PKEY *pkey, -+ int padding, const EVP_MD *md, -+ CK_BYTE_PTR digest, CK_ULONG digest_len, -+ CK_BYTE_PTR signature, CK_ULONG signature_len) { -+ -+ CK_RV rv = CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; -+ -+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL; -+ rv = ssl_util_setup_evp_pkey_ctx(pkey, padding, md, -+ EVP_PKEY_verify_init, &pkey_ctx); -+ if (rv != CKR_OK) { -+ return rv; -+ } -+ -+ rv = sig_verify(pkey_ctx, signature, signature_len, digest, digest_len); -+ -+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); -+ return rv; - } - - CK_RV ssl_util_sig_verify(EVP_PKEY *pkey, -@@ -538,7 +643,7 @@ CK_RV ssl_util_sig_verify(EVP_PKEY *pkey - digest, digest_len, - signature, signature_len); - case EVP_PKEY_EC: -- return do_sig_verify_ec(pkey, digest, digest_len, -+ return do_sig_verify_ec(pkey, md, digest, digest_len, - signature, signature_len); - default: - LOGE("Unknown PKEY type, got: %d", type); -@@ -577,3 +682,65 @@ CK_RV ssl_util_verify_recover(EVP_PKEY * - EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); - return rv; - } -+ -+twist ssl_util_hash_pass(const twist pin, const twist salt) { -+ -+ -+ twist out = NULL; -+ unsigned char md[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; -+ -+ EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); -+ if (!ctx) { -+ SSL_UTIL_LOGE("EVP_MD_CTX_new"); -+ return NULL; -+ } -+ -+ int rc = EVP_DigestInit(ctx, EVP_sha256()); -+ if (rc != 1) { -+ SSL_UTIL_LOGE("EVP_DigestInit"); -+ goto error; -+ } -+ -+ rc = EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, pin, twist_len(pin)); -+ if (rc != 1) { -+ SSL_UTIL_LOGE("EVP_DigestUpdate"); -+ goto error; -+ } -+ -+ rc = EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, salt, twist_len(salt)); -+ if (rc != 1) { -+ SSL_UTIL_LOGE("EVP_DigestUpdate"); -+ goto error; -+ } -+ -+ unsigned int len = sizeof(md); -+ rc = EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, md, &len); -+ if (rc != 1) { -+ SSL_UTIL_LOGE("EVP_DigestFinal"); -+ goto error; -+ } -+ -+ /* truncate the password to 32 characters */ -+ out = twist_hex_new((char *)md, sizeof(md)/2); -+ -+error: -+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); -+ -+ return out; -+} -+ -+CK_RV ssl_util_params_to_nid(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ecparams, int *nid) { -+ -+ const unsigned char *p = ecparams->pValue; -+ -+ ASN1_OBJECT *a = d2i_ASN1_OBJECT(NULL, &p, ecparams->ulValueLen); -+ if (!a) { -+ LOGE("Unknown CKA_EC_PARAMS value"); -+ return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID; -+ } -+ -+ *nid = OBJ_obj2nid(a); -+ ASN1_OBJECT_free(a); -+ -+ return CKR_OK; -+} -Index: git/src/lib/ssl_util.h -=================================================================== ---- git.orig/src/lib/ssl_util.h -+++ git/src/lib/ssl_util.h -@@ -11,8 +11,8 @@ - - #include "pkcs11.h" - -+#include "attrs.h" - #include "log.h" --#include "object.h" - #include "twist.h" - - #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x1010000fL && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)) || (defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x20700000L) /* OpenSSL 1.1.0 */ -@@ -22,6 +22,10 @@ - #define LIB_TPM2_OPENSSL_OPENSSL_POST111 0x1010100f - #endif - -+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000) /* OpenSSL 3.0.0 */ -+#define LIB_TPM2_OPENSSL_OPENSSL_POST300 0x1010100f -+#endif -+ - /* OpenSSL Backwards Compat APIs */ - #if defined(LIB_TPM2_OPENSSL_OPENSSL_PRE11) - #include <string.h> -@@ -58,7 +62,7 @@ static inline void *OPENSSL_memdup(const - - #define SSL_UTIL_LOGE(m) LOGE("%s: %s", m, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); - --CK_RV ssl_util_tobject_to_evp(EVP_PKEY **outpkey, tobject *obj); -+CK_RV ssl_util_attrs_to_evp(attr_list *attrs, EVP_PKEY **outpkey); - - CK_RV ssl_util_encrypt(EVP_PKEY *pkey, - int padding, twist label, const EVP_MD *md, -@@ -82,4 +86,27 @@ CK_RV ssl_util_setup_evp_pkey_ctx(EVP_PK - fn_EVP_PKEY_init init_fn, - EVP_PKEY_CTX **outpkey_ctx); - -+CK_RV ssl_util_add_PKCS1_PSS(EVP_PKEY *pkey, -+ const CK_BYTE_PTR inbuf, const EVP_MD *md, -+ CK_BYTE_PTR outbuf); -+ -+CK_RV ssl_util_add_PKCS1_TYPE_1(const CK_BYTE_PTR inbuf, CK_ULONG inlen, -+ CK_BYTE_PTR outbuf, CK_ULONG outbuflen); -+ -+CK_RV ssl_util_check_PKCS1_TYPE_2(const CK_BYTE_PTR inbuf, CK_ULONG inlen, CK_ULONG rsa_len, -+ CK_BYTE_PTR outbuf, CK_ULONG_PTR outbuflen); -+ -+twist ssl_util_hash_pass(const twist pin, const twist salt); -+ -+/** -+ * Given an attribute of CKA_EC_PARAMS returns the nid value. -+ * @param ecparams -+ * The DER X9.62 parameters value -+ * @param nid -+ * The nid to set -+ * @return -+ * CKR_OK on success. -+ */ -+CK_RV ssl_util_params_to_nid(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ecparams, int *nid); -+ - #endif /* SRC_LIB_SSL_UTIL_H_ */ -Index: git/src/lib/tpm.c -=================================================================== ---- git.orig/src/lib/tpm.c -+++ git/src/lib/tpm.c -@@ -3099,7 +3099,7 @@ static CK_RV handle_ecparams(CK_ATTRIBUT - tpm_key_data *keydat = (tpm_key_data *)udata; - - int nid = 0; -- CK_RV rv = ec_params_to_nid(attr, &nid); -+ CK_RV rv = ssl_util_params_to_nid(attr, &nid); - if (rv != CKR_OK) { - return rv; - } -@@ -3451,7 +3451,7 @@ static EC_POINT *tpm_pub_to_ossl_pub(EC_ - goto out; - } - -- int rc = EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, -+ int rc = EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates(group, - pub_key_point_tmp, - bn_x, - bn_y, -@@ -4579,7 +4579,7 @@ CK_RV tpm_get_pss_sig_state(tpm_ctx *tct - goto out; - } - -- rv = ssl_util_tobject_to_evp(&pkey, tobj); -+ rv = ssl_util_attrs_to_evp(tobj->attrs, &pkey); - if (rv != CKR_OK) { - goto out; - } -Index: git/src/lib/utils.c -=================================================================== ---- git.orig/src/lib/utils.c -+++ git/src/lib/utils.c -@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ - #include <openssl/sha.h> - - #include "log.h" -+#include "ssl_util.h" - #include "token.h" - #include "utils.h" - -@@ -45,7 +46,7 @@ CK_RV utils_setup_new_object_auth(twist - pin_to_use = newpin; - } - -- *newauthhex = utils_hash_pass(pin_to_use, salt_to_use); -+ *newauthhex = ssl_util_hash_pass(pin_to_use, salt_to_use); - if (!*newauthhex) { - goto out; - } -@@ -330,22 +331,6 @@ out: - - } - --twist utils_hash_pass(const twist pin, const twist salt) { -- -- -- unsigned char md[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; -- -- SHA256_CTX sha256; -- SHA256_Init(&sha256); -- -- SHA256_Update(&sha256, pin, twist_len(pin)); -- SHA256_Update(&sha256, salt, twist_len(salt)); -- SHA256_Final(md, &sha256); -- -- /* truncate the password to 32 characters */ -- return twist_hex_new((char *)md, sizeof(md)/2); --} -- - size_t utils_get_halg_size(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mttype) { - - switch(mttype) { -@@ -448,22 +433,6 @@ CK_RV utils_ctx_wrap_objauth(twist wrapp - - return CKR_OK; - } -- --CK_RV ec_params_to_nid(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ecparams, int *nid) { -- -- const unsigned char *p = ecparams->pValue; -- -- ASN1_OBJECT *a = d2i_ASN1_OBJECT(NULL, &p, ecparams->ulValueLen); -- if (!a) { -- LOGE("Unknown CKA_EC_PARAMS value"); -- return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID; -- } -- -- *nid = OBJ_obj2nid(a); -- ASN1_OBJECT_free(a); -- -- return CKR_OK; --} - - CK_RV apply_pkcs7_pad(const CK_BYTE_PTR in, CK_ULONG inlen, - CK_BYTE_PTR out, CK_ULONG_PTR outlen) { -Index: git/src/lib/utils.h -=================================================================== ---- git.orig/src/lib/utils.h -+++ git/src/lib/utils.h -@@ -45,8 +45,6 @@ static inline void _str_padded_copy(CK_U - memcpy(dst, src, src_len); - } - --twist utils_hash_pass(const twist pin, const twist salt); -- - twist aes256_gcm_decrypt(const twist key, const twist objauth); - - twist aes256_gcm_encrypt(twist keybin, twist plaintextbin); -@@ -77,17 +75,6 @@ CK_RV utils_ctx_unwrap_objauth(twist wra - CK_RV utils_ctx_wrap_objauth(twist wrappingkey, twist objauth, twist *wrapped_auth); - - /** -- * Given an attribute of CKA_EC_PARAMS returns the nid value. -- * @param ecparams -- * The DER X9.62 parameters value -- * @param nid -- * The nid to set -- * @return -- * CKR_OK on success. -- */ --CK_RV ec_params_to_nid(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ecparams, int *nid); -- --/** - * Removes a PKCS7 padding on a 16 byte block. - * @param in - * The PKCS5 padded input. -Index: git/test/integration/pkcs-sign-verify.int.c -=================================================================== ---- git.orig/test/integration/pkcs-sign-verify.int.c -+++ git/test/integration/pkcs-sign-verify.int.c -@@ -1061,70 +1061,13 @@ static void test_double_sign_final_call_ - assert_int_equal(rv, CKR_OK); - } - --static CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR get_attr(CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE type, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attrs, CK_ULONG attr_len) { -- -- CK_ULONG i; -- for (i=0; i < attr_len; i++) { -- CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR a = &attrs[i]; -- if (a->type == type) { -- return a; -- } -- } -- -- return NULL; --} -- --#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x1010000fL && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)) || (defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x20700000L) /* OpenSSL 1.1.0 */ --#define LIB_TPM2_OPENSSL_OPENSSL_PRE11 --#endif -- --RSA *template_to_rsa_pub_key(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attrs, CK_ULONG attr_len) { -- -- RSA *ssl_rsa_key = NULL; -- BIGNUM *e = NULL, *n = NULL; -- -- /* get the exponent */ -- CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR a = get_attr(CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, attrs, attr_len); -- assert_non_null(a); -- -- e = BN_bin2bn((void*)a->pValue, a->ulValueLen, NULL); -- assert_non_null(e); -- -- /* get the modulus */ -- a = get_attr(CKA_MODULUS, attrs, attr_len); -- assert_non_null(a); -- -- n = BN_bin2bn(a->pValue, a->ulValueLen, -- NULL); -- assert_non_null(n); -- -- ssl_rsa_key = RSA_new(); -- assert_non_null(ssl_rsa_key); -- --#if defined(LIB_TPM2_OPENSSL_OPENSSL_PRE11) -- ssl_rsa_key->e = e; -- ssl_rsa_key->n = n; --#else -- int rc = RSA_set0_key(ssl_rsa_key, n, e, NULL); -- assert_int_equal(rc, 1); --#endif -- -- return ssl_rsa_key; --} -- --static void verify(RSA *pub, CK_BYTE_PTR msg, CK_ULONG msg_len, CK_BYTE_PTR sig, CK_ULONG sig_len) { -- -- EVP_PKEY *pkey = EVP_PKEY_new(); -- assert_non_null(pkey); -- -- int rc = EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, pub); -- assert_int_equal(rc, 1); -+static void verify(EVP_PKEY *pkey, CK_BYTE_PTR msg, CK_ULONG msg_len, CK_BYTE_PTR sig, CK_ULONG sig_len) { - - EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); - const EVP_MD* md = EVP_get_digestbyname("SHA256"); - assert_non_null(md); - -- rc = EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL); -+ int rc = EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL); - assert_int_equal(rc, 1); - - rc = EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, NULL, md, NULL, pkey); -@@ -1136,7 +1079,6 @@ static void verify(RSA *pub, CK_BYTE_PTR - rc = EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(ctx, sig, sig_len); - assert_int_equal(rc, 1); - -- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx); - } - -@@ -1170,20 +1112,38 @@ static void test_sign_verify_public(void - assert_int_equal(siglen, 256); - - /* build an OSSL RSA key from parts */ -- CK_BYTE _tmp_bufs[2][1024]; -+ CK_BYTE _tmp_bufs[3][1024]; - CK_ATTRIBUTE attrs[] = { -- { .type = CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, .ulValueLen = sizeof(_tmp_bufs[0]), .pValue = &_tmp_bufs[0] }, -- { .type = CKA_MODULUS, .ulValueLen = sizeof(_tmp_bufs[1]), .pValue = &_tmp_bufs[1] }, -+ { .type = CKA_KEY_TYPE, .ulValueLen = sizeof(_tmp_bufs[0]), .pValue = &_tmp_bufs[0] }, -+ { .type = CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, .ulValueLen = sizeof(_tmp_bufs[0]), .pValue = &_tmp_bufs[1] }, -+ { .type = CKA_MODULUS, .ulValueLen = sizeof(_tmp_bufs[1]), .pValue = &_tmp_bufs[2] }, - }; - - rv = C_GetAttributeValue(session, pub_handle, attrs, ARRAY_LEN(attrs)); - assert_int_equal(rv, CKR_OK); - -- RSA *r = template_to_rsa_pub_key(attrs, ARRAY_LEN(attrs)); -- assert_non_null(r); -+ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKA_KEY_TYPE_BAD; -+ rv = attr_CK_KEY_TYPE(&attrs[0], &key_type); -+ assert_int_equal(rv, CKR_OK); -+ -+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; -+ attr_list *l = attr_list_new(); -+ -+ bool res = attr_list_add_int(l, CKA_KEY_TYPE, key_type); -+ assert_true(res); - -- verify(r, msg, sizeof(msg) - 1, sig, siglen); -- RSA_free(r); -+ res = attr_list_add_buf(l, attrs[1].type, attrs[1].pValue, attrs[1].ulValueLen); -+ assert_true(res); -+ -+ res = attr_list_add_buf(l, attrs[2].type, attrs[2].pValue, attrs[2].ulValueLen); -+ assert_true(res); -+ -+ rv = ssl_util_attrs_to_evp(l, &pkey); -+ assert_int_equal(rv, CKR_OK); -+ attr_list_free(l); -+ -+ verify(pkey, msg, sizeof(msg) - 1, sig, siglen); -+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - } - - static void test_sign_verify_context_specific_good(void **state) { |