diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'poky/meta/recipes-extended')
| -rw-r--r-- | poky/meta/recipes-extended/cpio/cpio_2.15.bb (renamed from poky/meta/recipes-extended/cpio/cpio_2.14.bb) | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | poky/meta/recipes-extended/cpio/files/0001-configure-Include-needed-header-for-major-minor-macr.patch | 48 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | poky/meta/recipes-extended/rpcbind/rpcbind_1.2.6.bb | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/files/CVE-2023-4641.patch | 147 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/shadow.inc | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | poky/meta/recipes-extended/sudo/sudo_1.9.15p5.bb (renamed from poky/meta/recipes-extended/sudo/sudo_1.9.14p3.bb) | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | poky/meta/recipes-extended/zstd/zstd_1.5.5.bb | 2 |
7 files changed, 152 insertions, 53 deletions
diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/cpio/cpio_2.14.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/cpio/cpio_2.15.bb index 560038d2a6..55e9add5cd 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/cpio/cpio_2.14.bb +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/cpio/cpio_2.15.bb @@ -7,12 +7,11 @@ LICENSE = "GPL-3.0-only" LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=f27defe1e96c2e1ecd4e0c9be8967949" SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/cpio/cpio-${PV}.tar.gz \ - file://0001-configure-Include-needed-header-for-major-minor-macr.patch \ file://run-ptest \ file://test.sh \ " -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "145a340fd9d55f0b84779a44a12d5f79d77c99663967f8cfa168d7905ca52454" +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "efa50ef983137eefc0a02fdb51509d624b5e3295c980aa127ceee4183455499e" inherit autotools gettext texinfo ptest diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/cpio/files/0001-configure-Include-needed-header-for-major-minor-macr.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/cpio/files/0001-configure-Include-needed-header-for-major-minor-macr.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 95ece0bbf3..0000000000 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/cpio/files/0001-configure-Include-needed-header-for-major-minor-macr.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,48 +0,0 @@ -From 8179be21e664cedb2e9d238cc2f6d04965e97275 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Sergey Poznyakoff <gray@gnu.org> -Date: Thu, 11 May 2023 10:18:44 +0300 -Subject: [PATCH] configure: Include needed header for major/minor macros - -This helps in avoiding the warning about implicit function declaration -which is elevated as error with newer compilers e.g. clang 16 - -Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com> - -Upstream-Status: Backport -Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com> ---- - configure.ac | 18 ++++++++++++++++-- - 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac -index de479e7..c601029 100644 ---- a/configure.ac -+++ b/configure.ac -@@ -43,8 +43,22 @@ AC_TYPE_UID_T - AC_CHECK_TYPE(gid_t, int) - - AC_HEADER_DIRENT --AX_COMPILE_CHECK_RETTYPE([major], [0]) --AX_COMPILE_CHECK_RETTYPE([minor], [0]) -+AX_COMPILE_CHECK_RETTYPE([major], [0], [ -+#include <sys/types.h> -+#ifdef MAJOR_IN_MKDEV -+# include <sys/mkdev.h> -+#endif -+#ifdef MAJOR_IN_SYSMACROS -+# include <sys/sysmacros.h> -+#endif]) -+AX_COMPILE_CHECK_RETTYPE([minor], [0], [ -+#include <sys/types.h> -+#ifdef MAJOR_IN_MKDEV -+# include <sys/mkdev.h> -+#endif -+#ifdef MAJOR_IN_SYSMACROS -+# include <sys/sysmacros.h> -+#endif]) - - AC_CHECK_FUNCS([fchmod fchown]) - # This is needed for mingw build --- -2.34.1 - diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/rpcbind/rpcbind_1.2.6.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/rpcbind/rpcbind_1.2.6.bb index dd89726afc..dbd4d32e0a 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/rpcbind/rpcbind_1.2.6.bb +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/rpcbind/rpcbind_1.2.6.bb @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ PACKAGECONFIG[systemd] = "--with-systemdsystemunitdir=${systemd_system_unitdir}/ systemd \ " -EXTRA_OECONF += " --enable-warmstarts --with-rpcuser=rpc" +EXTRA_OECONF += " --enable-warmstarts --with-rpcuser=rpc --with-statedir=${runtimedir}/rpcbind" do_install:append () { install -d ${D}${sysconfdir}/init.d diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/files/CVE-2023-4641.patch b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/files/CVE-2023-4641.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1fabfe928e --- /dev/null +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/files/CVE-2023-4641.patch @@ -0,0 +1,147 @@ +From 25dbe2ce166a13322b7536ff2f738786ea2e61e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org> +Date: Sat, 10 Jun 2023 16:20:05 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] gpasswd(1): Fix password leak + +How to trigger this password leak? +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +When gpasswd(1) asks for the new password, it asks twice (as is usual +for confirming the new password). Each of those 2 password prompts +uses agetpass() to get the password. If the second agetpass() fails, +the first password, which has been copied into the 'static' buffer +'pass' via STRFCPY(), wasn't being zeroed. + +agetpass() is defined in <./libmisc/agetpass.c> (around line 91), and +can fail for any of the following reasons: + +- malloc(3) or readpassphrase(3) failure. + + These are going to be difficult to trigger. Maybe getting the system + to the limits of memory utilization at that exact point, so that the + next malloc(3) gets ENOMEM, and possibly even the OOM is triggered. + About readpassphrase(3), ENFILE and EINTR seem the only plausible + ones, and EINTR probably requires privilege or being the same user; + but I wouldn't discard ENFILE so easily, if a process starts opening + files. + +- The password is longer than PASS_MAX. + + The is plausible with physical access. However, at that point, a + keylogger will be a much simpler attack. + +And, the attacker must be able to know when the second password is being +introduced, which is not going to be easy. + +How to read the password after the leak? +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Provoking the leak yourself at the right point by entering a very long +password is easy, and inspecting the process stack at that point should +be doable. Try to find some consistent patterns. + +Then, search for those patterns in free memory, right after the victim +leaks their password. + +Once you get the leak, a program should read all the free memory +searching for patterns that gpasswd(1) leaves nearby the leaked +password. + +On 6/10/23 03:14, Seth Arnold wrote: +> An attacker process wouldn't be able to use malloc(3) for this task. +> There's a handful of tools available for userspace to allocate memory: +> +> - brk / sbrk +> - mmap MAP_ANONYMOUS +> - mmap /dev/zero +> - mmap some other file +> - shm_open +> - shmget +> +> Most of these return only pages of zeros to a process. Using mmap of an +> existing file, you can get some of the contents of the file demand-loaded +> into the memory space on the first use. +> +> The MAP_UNINITIALIZED flag only works if the kernel was compiled with +> CONFIG_MMAP_ALLOW_UNINITIALIZED. This is rare. +> +> malloc(3) doesn't zero memory, to our collective frustration, but all the +> garbage in the allocations is from previous allocations in the current +> process. It isn't leftover from other processes. +> +> The avenues available for reading the memory: +> - /dev/mem and /dev/kmem (requires root, not available with Secure Boot) +> - /proc/pid/mem (requires ptrace privileges, mediated by YAMA) +> - ptrace (requires ptrace privileges, mediated by YAMA) +> - causing memory to be swapped to disk, and then inspecting the swap +> +> These all require a certain amount of privileges. + +How to fix it? +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +memzero(), which internally calls explicit_bzero(3), or whatever +alternative the system provides with a slightly different name, will +make sure that the buffer is zeroed in memory, and optimizations are not +allowed to impede this zeroing. + +This is not really 100% effective, since compilers may place copies of +the string somewhere hidden in the stack. Those copies won't get zeroed +by explicit_bzero(3). However, that's arguably a compiler bug, since +compilers should make everything possible to avoid optimizing strings +that are later passed to explicit_bzero(3). But we all know that +sometimes it's impossible to have perfect knowledge in the compiler, so +this is plausible. Nevertheless, there's nothing we can do against such +issues, except minimizing the time such passwords are stored in plain +text. + +Security concerns +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +We believe this isn't easy to exploit. Nevertheless, and since the fix +is trivial, this fix should probably be applied soon, and backported to +all supported distributions, to prevent someone else having more +imagination than us to find a way. + +Affected versions +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +All. Bug introduced in shadow 19990709. That's the second commit in +the git history. + +Fixes: 45c6603cc86c ("[svn-upgrade] Integrating new upstream version, shadow (19990709)") + +CVE: CVE-2023-4641 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/65c88a43a23c2391dcc90c0abda3e839e9c57904] + +Reported-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org> +Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> +Cc: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> +Cc: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com> +Cc: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> +Cc: Balint Reczey <rbalint@debian.org> +Cc: Sam James <sam@gentoo.org> +Cc: David Runge <dvzrv@archlinux.org> +Cc: Andreas Jaeger <aj@suse.de> +Cc: <~hallyn/shadow@lists.sr.ht> +Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org> +Signed-off-by: Xiangyu Chen <xiangyu.chen@windriver.com> +--- + src/gpasswd.c | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +diff --git a/src/gpasswd.c b/src/gpasswd.c +index 5983f787..2d8869ef 100644 +--- a/src/gpasswd.c ++++ b/src/gpasswd.c +@@ -896,6 +896,7 @@ static void change_passwd (struct group *gr) + strzero (cp); + cp = getpass (_("Re-enter new password: ")); + if (NULL == cp) { ++ memzero (pass, sizeof pass); + exit (1); + } + +-- +2.34.1 + diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/shadow.inc b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/shadow.inc index 83e1a84769..ce3ce62715 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/shadow.inc +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/shadow/shadow.inc @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GITHUB_BASE_URI}/download/${PV}/${BP}.tar.gz \ file://0001-Fix-can-not-print-full-login.patch \ file://CVE-2023-29383.patch \ file://0001-Overhaul-valid_field.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-4641.patch \ " SRC_URI:append:class-target = " \ diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/sudo/sudo_1.9.14p3.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/sudo/sudo_1.9.15p5.bb index d5c5718ea5..8e542015ad 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/sudo/sudo_1.9.14p3.bb +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/sudo/sudo_1.9.15p5.bb @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://www.sudo.ws/dist/sudo-${PV}.tar.gz \ PAM_SRC_URI = "file://sudo.pam" -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "a08318b1c4bc8582c004d4cd9ae2903abc549e7e46ba815e41fe81d1c0782b62" +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "558d10b9a1991fb3b9fa7fa7b07ec4405b7aefb5b3cb0b0871dbc81e3a88e558" DEPENDS += " virtual/crypt ${@bb.utils.contains('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'pam', 'libpam', '', d)}" RDEPENDS:${PN} += " ${@bb.utils.contains('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'pam', 'pam-plugin-limits pam-plugin-keyinit', '', d)}" diff --git a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/zstd/zstd_1.5.5.bb b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/zstd/zstd_1.5.5.bb index 5c5fb5e734..2d72af50a4 100644 --- a/poky/meta/recipes-extended/zstd/zstd_1.5.5.bb +++ b/poky/meta/recipes-extended/zstd/zstd_1.5.5.bb @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ It's backed by a very fast entropy stage, provided by Huff0 and FSE library." HOMEPAGE = "http://www.zstd.net/" SECTION = "console/utils" -LICENSE = "BSD-3-Clause & GPL-2.0-only" +LICENSE = "BSD-3-Clause | GPL-2.0-only" LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=0822a32f7acdbe013606746641746ee8 \ file://COPYING;md5=39bba7d2cf0ba1036f2a6e2be52fe3f0 \ " |