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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2024-05-24 22:47:28 +0300
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2024-05-24 22:47:28 +0300
commit0b32d436c015d5a88b3368405e3d8fe82f195a54 (patch)
treebca3ff3546fe073d766d527f87b3fb6cdfb87e0c
parentf1f9984fdc5e37303d7180ff7a85dfecb8e57e85 (diff)
parenta52b4f11a2e17109c4b9f7df4ff19215b1752efc (diff)
downloadlinux-0b32d436c015d5a88b3368405e3d8fe82f195a54.tar.xz
Merge tag 'mm-stable-2024-05-24-11-49' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Pull more mm updates from Andrew Morton: "Jeff Xu's implementation of the mseal() syscall" * tag 'mm-stable-2024-05-24-11-49' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: selftest mm/mseal read-only elf memory segment mseal: add documentation selftest mm/mseal memory sealing mseal: add mseal syscall mseal: wire up mseal syscall
-rw-r--r--Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst1
-rw-r--r--Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst199
-rw-r--r--arch/alpha/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl1
-rw-r--r--arch/arm/tools/syscall.tbl1
-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h2
-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h2
-rw-r--r--arch/m68k/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl1
-rw-r--r--arch/microblaze/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl1
-rw-r--r--arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl1
-rw-r--r--arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl1
-rw-r--r--arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl1
-rw-r--r--arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl1
-rw-r--r--arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl1
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl1
-rw-r--r--arch/sh/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl1
-rw-r--r--arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl1
-rw-r--r--arch/xtensa/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl1
-rw-r--r--include/linux/syscalls.h1
-rw-r--r--include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h5
-rw-r--r--kernel/sys_ni.c1
-rw-r--r--mm/Makefile4
-rw-r--r--mm/internal.h37
-rw-r--r--mm/madvise.c12
-rw-r--r--mm/mmap.c31
-rw-r--r--mm/mprotect.c10
-rw-r--r--mm/mremap.c31
-rw-r--r--mm/mseal.c307
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/mm/.gitignore2
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/mm/Makefile2
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/mm/mseal_test.c1894
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/mm/seal_elf.c179
33 files changed, 2732 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst
index afecfe3cc4a8..5926115ec0ed 100644
--- a/Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ System calls
futex2
ebpf/index
ioctl/index
+ mseal
Security-related interfaces
===========================
diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4132eec995a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+=====================
+Introduction of mseal
+=====================
+
+:Author: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
+
+Modern CPUs support memory permissions such as RW and NX bits. The memory
+permission feature improves security stance on memory corruption bugs, i.e.
+the attacker can’t just write to arbitrary memory and point the code to it,
+the memory has to be marked with X bit, or else an exception will happen.
+
+Memory sealing additionally protects the mapping itself against
+modifications. This is useful to mitigate memory corruption issues where a
+corrupted pointer is passed to a memory management system. For example,
+such an attacker primitive can break control-flow integrity guarantees
+since read-only memory that is supposed to be trusted can become writable
+or .text pages can get remapped. Memory sealing can automatically be
+applied by the runtime loader to seal .text and .rodata pages and
+applications can additionally seal security critical data at runtime.
+
+A similar feature already exists in the XNU kernel with the
+VM_FLAGS_PERMANENT flag [1] and on OpenBSD with the mimmutable syscall [2].
+
+User API
+========
+mseal()
+-----------
+The mseal() syscall has the following signature:
+
+``int mseal(void addr, size_t len, unsigned long flags)``
+
+**addr/len**: virtual memory address range.
+
+The address range set by ``addr``/``len`` must meet:
+ - The start address must be in an allocated VMA.
+ - The start address must be page aligned.
+ - The end address (``addr`` + ``len``) must be in an allocated VMA.
+ - no gap (unallocated memory) between start and end address.
+
+The ``len`` will be paged aligned implicitly by the kernel.
+
+**flags**: reserved for future use.
+
+**return values**:
+
+- ``0``: Success.
+
+- ``-EINVAL``:
+ - Invalid input ``flags``.
+ - The start address (``addr``) is not page aligned.
+ - Address range (``addr`` + ``len``) overflow.
+
+- ``-ENOMEM``:
+ - The start address (``addr``) is not allocated.
+ - The end address (``addr`` + ``len``) is not allocated.
+ - A gap (unallocated memory) between start and end address.
+
+- ``-EPERM``:
+ - sealing is supported only on 64-bit CPUs, 32-bit is not supported.
+
+- For above error cases, users can expect the given memory range is
+ unmodified, i.e. no partial update.
+
+- There might be other internal errors/cases not listed here, e.g.
+ error during merging/splitting VMAs, or the process reaching the max
+ number of supported VMAs. In those cases, partial updates to the given
+ memory range could happen. However, those cases should be rare.
+
+**Blocked operations after sealing**:
+ Unmapping, moving to another location, and shrinking the size,
+ via munmap() and mremap(), can leave an empty space, therefore
+ can be replaced with a VMA with a new set of attributes.
+
+ Moving or expanding a different VMA into the current location,
+ via mremap().
+
+ Modifying a VMA via mmap(MAP_FIXED).
+
+ Size expansion, via mremap(), does not appear to pose any
+ specific risks to sealed VMAs. It is included anyway because
+ the use case is unclear. In any case, users can rely on
+ merging to expand a sealed VMA.
+
+ mprotect() and pkey_mprotect().
+
+ Some destructive madvice() behaviors (e.g. MADV_DONTNEED)
+ for anonymous memory, when users don't have write permission to the
+ memory. Those behaviors can alter region contents by discarding pages,
+ effectively a memset(0) for anonymous memory.
+
+ Kernel will return -EPERM for blocked operations.
+
+ For blocked operations, one can expect the given address is unmodified,
+ i.e. no partial update. Note, this is different from existing mm
+ system call behaviors, where partial updates are made till an error is
+ found and returned to userspace. To give an example:
+
+ Assume following code sequence:
+
+ - ptr = mmap(null, 8192, PROT_NONE);
+ - munmap(ptr + 4096, 4096);
+ - ret1 = mprotect(ptr, 8192, PROT_READ);
+ - mseal(ptr, 4096);
+ - ret2 = mprotect(ptr, 8192, PROT_NONE);
+
+ ret1 will be -ENOMEM, the page from ptr is updated to PROT_READ.
+
+ ret2 will be -EPERM, the page remains to be PROT_READ.
+
+**Note**:
+
+- mseal() only works on 64-bit CPUs, not 32-bit CPU.
+
+- users can call mseal() multiple times, mseal() on an already sealed memory
+ is a no-action (not error).
+
+- munseal() is not supported.
+
+Use cases:
+==========
+- glibc:
+ The dynamic linker, during loading ELF executables, can apply sealing to
+ non-writable memory segments.
+
+- Chrome browser: protect some security sensitive data-structures.
+
+Notes on which memory to seal:
+==============================
+
+It might be important to note that sealing changes the lifetime of a mapping,
+i.e. the sealed mapping won’t be unmapped till the process terminates or the
+exec system call is invoked. Applications can apply sealing to any virtual
+memory region from userspace, but it is crucial to thoroughly analyze the
+mapping's lifetime prior to apply the sealing.
+
+For example:
+
+- aio/shm
+
+ aio/shm can call mmap()/munmap() on behalf of userspace, e.g. ksys_shmdt() in
+ shm.c. The lifetime of those mapping are not tied to the lifetime of the
+ process. If those memories are sealed from userspace, then munmap() will fail,
+ causing leaks in VMA address space during the lifetime of the process.
+
+- Brk (heap)
+
+ Currently, userspace applications can seal parts of the heap by calling
+ malloc() and mseal().
+ let's assume following calls from user space:
+
+ - ptr = malloc(size);
+ - mprotect(ptr, size, RO);
+ - mseal(ptr, size);
+ - free(ptr);
+
+ Technically, before mseal() is added, the user can change the protection of
+ the heap by calling mprotect(RO). As long as the user changes the protection
+ back to RW before free(), the memory range can be reused.
+
+ Adding mseal() into the picture, however, the heap is then sealed partially,
+ the user can still free it, but the memory remains to be RO. If the address
+ is re-used by the heap manager for another malloc, the process might crash
+ soon after. Therefore, it is important not to apply sealing to any memory
+ that might get recycled.
+
+ Furthermore, even if the application never calls the free() for the ptr,
+ the heap manager may invoke the brk system call to shrink the size of the
+ heap. In the kernel, the brk-shrink will call munmap(). Consequently,
+ depending on the location of the ptr, the outcome of brk-shrink is
+ nondeterministic.
+
+
+Additional notes:
+=================
+As Jann Horn pointed out in [3], there are still a few ways to write
+to RO memory, which is, in a way, by design. Those cases are not covered
+by mseal(). If applications want to block such cases, sandbox tools (such as
+seccomp, LSM, etc) might be considered.
+
+Those cases are:
+
+- Write to read-only memory through /proc/self/mem interface.
+- Write to read-only memory through ptrace (such as PTRACE_POKETEXT).
+- userfaultfd.
+
+The idea that inspired this patch comes from Stephen Röttger’s work in V8
+CFI [4]. Chrome browser in ChromeOS will be the first user of this API.
+
+Reference:
+==========
+[1] https://github.com/apple-oss-distributions/xnu/blob/1031c584a5e37aff177559b9f69dbd3c8c3fd30a/osfmk/mach/vm_statistics.h#L274
+
+[2] https://man.openbsd.org/mimmutable.2
+
+[3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez3ShUYey+ZAFsU2i1RpQn0a5eOs2hzQ426FkcgnfUGLvA@mail.gmail.com
+
+[4] https://docs.google.com/document/d/1O2jwK4dxI3nRcOJuPYkonhTkNQfbmwdvxQMyXgeaRHo/edit#heading=h.bvaojj9fu6hc
diff --git a/arch/alpha/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl b/arch/alpha/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
index 26cce7e7f70b..74720667fe09 100644
--- a/arch/alpha/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
+++ b/arch/alpha/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
@@ -501,3 +501,4 @@
569 common lsm_get_self_attr sys_lsm_get_self_attr
570 common lsm_set_self_attr sys_lsm_set_self_attr
571 common lsm_list_modules sys_lsm_list_modules
+572 common mseal sys_mseal
diff --git a/arch/arm/tools/syscall.tbl b/arch/arm/tools/syscall.tbl
index b6c9e01e14f5..2ed7d229c8f9 100644
--- a/arch/arm/tools/syscall.tbl
+++ b/arch/arm/tools/syscall.tbl
@@ -475,3 +475,4 @@
459 common lsm_get_self_attr sys_lsm_get_self_attr
460 common lsm_set_self_attr sys_lsm_set_self_attr
461 common lsm_list_modules sys_lsm_list_modules
+462 common mseal sys_mseal
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h
index 491b2b9bd553..1346579f802f 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
#define __ARM_NR_compat_set_tls (__ARM_NR_COMPAT_BASE + 5)
#define __ARM_NR_COMPAT_END (__ARM_NR_COMPAT_BASE + 0x800)
-#define __NR_compat_syscalls 462
+#define __NR_compat_syscalls 463
#endif
#define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h
index 7118282d1c79..266b96acc014 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h
@@ -929,6 +929,8 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_lsm_get_self_attr, sys_lsm_get_self_attr)
__SYSCALL(__NR_lsm_set_self_attr, sys_lsm_set_self_attr)
#define __NR_lsm_list_modules 461
__SYSCALL(__NR_lsm_list_modules, sys_lsm_list_modules)
+#define __NR_mseal 462
+__SYSCALL(__NR_mseal, sys_mseal)
/*
* Please add new compat syscalls above this comment and update
diff --git a/arch/m68k/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl b/arch/m68k/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
index 7fd43fd4c9f2..22a3cbd4c602 100644
--- a/arch/m68k/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
+++ b/arch/m68k/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
@@ -461,3 +461,4 @@
459 common lsm_get_self_attr sys_lsm_get_self_attr
460 common lsm_set_self_attr sys_lsm_set_self_attr
461 common lsm_list_modules sys_lsm_list_modules
+462 common mseal sys_mseal
diff --git a/arch/microblaze/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl b/arch/microblaze/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
index b00ab2cabab9..2b81a6bd78b2 100644
--- a/arch/microblaze/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
+++ b/arch/microblaze/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
@@ -467,3 +467,4 @@
459 common lsm_get_self_attr sys_lsm_get_self_attr
460 common lsm_set_self_attr sys_lsm_set_self_attr
461 common lsm_list_modules sys_lsm_list_modules
+462 common mseal sys_mseal
diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl b/arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl
index 83cfc9eb6b88..cc869f5d5693 100644
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl
@@ -400,3 +400,4 @@
459 n32 lsm_get_self_attr sys_lsm_get_self_attr
460 n32 lsm_set_self_attr sys_lsm_set_self_attr
461 n32 lsm_list_modules sys_lsm_list_modules
+462 n32 mseal sys_mseal
diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl b/arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl
index 532b855df589..1464c6be6eb3 100644
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl
@@ -376,3 +376,4 @@
459 n64 lsm_get_self_attr sys_lsm_get_self_attr
460 n64 lsm_set_self_attr sys_lsm_set_self_attr
461 n64 lsm_list_modules sys_lsm_list_modules
+462 n64 mseal sys_mseal
diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl b/arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl
index f45c9530ea93..008ebe60263e 100644
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl
@@ -449,3 +449,4 @@
459 o32 lsm_get_self_attr sys_lsm_get_self_attr
460 o32 lsm_set_self_attr sys_lsm_set_self_attr
461 o32 lsm_list_modules sys_lsm_list_modules
+462 o32 mseal sys_mseal
diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl b/arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
index b236a84c4e12..b13c21373974 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
+++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
@@ -460,3 +460,4 @@
459 common lsm_get_self_attr sys_lsm_get_self_attr
460 common lsm_set_self_attr sys_lsm_set_self_attr
461 common lsm_list_modules sys_lsm_list_modules
+462 common mseal sys_mseal
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl b/arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
index 17173b82ca21..3656f1ca7a21 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
@@ -548,3 +548,4 @@
459 common lsm_get_self_attr sys_lsm_get_self_attr
460 common lsm_set_self_attr sys_lsm_set_self_attr
461 common lsm_list_modules sys_lsm_list_modules
+462 common mseal sys_mseal
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl b/arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
index 095bb86339a7..bd0fee24ad10 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
@@ -464,3 +464,4 @@
459 common lsm_get_self_attr sys_lsm_get_self_attr sys_lsm_get_self_attr
460 common lsm_set_self_attr sys_lsm_set_self_attr sys_lsm_set_self_attr
461 common lsm_list_modules sys_lsm_list_modules sys_lsm_list_modules
+462 common mseal sys_mseal sys_mseal
diff --git a/arch/sh/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl b/arch/sh/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
index 86fe269f0220..bbf83a2db986 100644
--- a/arch/sh/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
+++ b/arch/sh/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
@@ -464,3 +464,4 @@
459 common lsm_get_self_attr sys_lsm_get_self_attr
460 common lsm_set_self_attr sys_lsm_set_self_attr
461 common lsm_list_modules sys_lsm_list_modules
+462 common mseal sys_mseal
diff --git a/arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl b/arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
index b23d59313589..ac6c281ccfe0 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
+++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
@@ -507,3 +507,4 @@
459 common lsm_get_self_attr sys_lsm_get_self_attr
460 common lsm_set_self_attr sys_lsm_set_self_attr
461 common lsm_list_modules sys_lsm_list_modules
+462 common mseal sys_mseal
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
index 5f8591ce7f25..7fd1f57ad3d3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
@@ -466,3 +466,4 @@
459 i386 lsm_get_self_attr sys_lsm_get_self_attr
460 i386 lsm_set_self_attr sys_lsm_set_self_attr
461 i386 lsm_list_modules sys_lsm_list_modules
+462 i386 mseal sys_mseal
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
index cc78226ffc35..a396f6e6ab5b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
@@ -383,6 +383,7 @@
459 common lsm_get_self_attr sys_lsm_get_self_attr
460 common lsm_set_self_attr sys_lsm_set_self_attr
461 common lsm_list_modules sys_lsm_list_modules
+462 common mseal sys_mseal
#
# Due to a historical design error, certain syscalls are numbered differently
diff --git a/arch/xtensa/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl b/arch/xtensa/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
index dd116598fb25..67083fc1b2f5 100644
--- a/arch/xtensa/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
+++ b/arch/xtensa/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl
@@ -432,3 +432,4 @@
459 common lsm_get_self_attr sys_lsm_get_self_attr
460 common lsm_set_self_attr sys_lsm_set_self_attr
461 common lsm_list_modules sys_lsm_list_modules
+462 common mseal sys_mseal
diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h
index e619ac10cd23..9104952d323d 100644
--- a/include/linux/syscalls.h
+++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h
@@ -821,6 +821,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_process_mrelease(int pidfd, unsigned int flags);
asmlinkage long sys_remap_file_pages(unsigned long start, unsigned long size,
unsigned long prot, unsigned long pgoff,
unsigned long flags);
+asmlinkage long sys_mseal(unsigned long start, size_t len, unsigned long flags);
asmlinkage long sys_mbind(unsigned long start, unsigned long len,
unsigned long mode,
const unsigned long __user *nmask,
diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h
index 75f00965ab15..d983c48a3b6a 100644
--- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h
+++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h
@@ -842,8 +842,11 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_lsm_set_self_attr, sys_lsm_set_self_attr)
#define __NR_lsm_list_modules 461
__SYSCALL(__NR_lsm_list_modules, sys_lsm_list_modules)
+#define __NR_mseal 462
+__SYSCALL(__NR_mseal, sys_mseal)
+
#undef __NR_syscalls
-#define __NR_syscalls 462
+#define __NR_syscalls 463
/*
* 32 bit systems traditionally used different
diff --git a/kernel/sys_ni.c b/kernel/sys_ni.c
index faad00cce269..d7eee421d4bc 100644
--- a/kernel/sys_ni.c
+++ b/kernel/sys_ni.c
@@ -196,6 +196,7 @@ COND_SYSCALL(migrate_pages);
COND_SYSCALL(move_pages);
COND_SYSCALL(set_mempolicy_home_node);
COND_SYSCALL(cachestat);
+COND_SYSCALL(mseal);
COND_SYSCALL(perf_event_open);
COND_SYSCALL(accept4);
diff --git a/mm/Makefile b/mm/Makefile
index 85f29ef7bedd..8fb85acda1b1 100644
--- a/mm/Makefile
+++ b/mm/Makefile
@@ -43,6 +43,10 @@ ifdef CONFIG_CROSS_MEMORY_ATTACH
mmu-$(CONFIG_MMU) += process_vm_access.o
endif
+ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
+mmu-$(CONFIG_MMU) += mseal.o
+endif
+
obj-y := filemap.o mempool.o oom_kill.o fadvise.o \
maccess.o page-writeback.o folio-compat.o \
readahead.o swap.o truncate.o vmscan.o shrinker.o \
diff --git a/mm/internal.h b/mm/internal.h
index 2adabe369403..b2c75b12014e 100644
--- a/mm/internal.h
+++ b/mm/internal.h
@@ -1435,6 +1435,43 @@ void __meminit __init_single_page(struct page *page, unsigned long pfn,
unsigned long shrink_slab(gfp_t gfp_mask, int nid, struct mem_cgroup *memcg,
int priority);
+#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
+/* VM is sealed, in vm_flags */
+#define VM_SEALED _BITUL(63)
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
+static inline int can_do_mseal(unsigned long flags)
+{
+ if (flags)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+bool can_modify_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start,
+ unsigned long end);
+bool can_modify_mm_madv(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start,
+ unsigned long end, int behavior);
+#else
+static inline int can_do_mseal(unsigned long flags)
+{
+ return -EPERM;
+}
+
+static inline bool can_modify_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start,
+ unsigned long end)
+{
+ return true;
+}
+
+static inline bool can_modify_mm_madv(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start,
+ unsigned long end, int behavior)
+{
+ return true;
+}
+#endif
+
#ifdef CONFIG_SHRINKER_DEBUG
static inline __printf(2, 0) int shrinker_debugfs_name_alloc(
struct shrinker *shrinker, const char *fmt, va_list ap)
diff --git a/mm/madvise.c b/mm/madvise.c
index c8ba3f3eb54d..a77893462b92 100644
--- a/mm/madvise.c
+++ b/mm/madvise.c
@@ -1401,6 +1401,7 @@ int madvise_set_anon_name(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start,
* -EIO - an I/O error occurred while paging in data.
* -EBADF - map exists, but area maps something that isn't a file.
* -EAGAIN - a kernel resource was temporarily unavailable.
+ * -EPERM - memory is sealed.
*/
int do_madvise(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, size_t len_in, int behavior)
{
@@ -1444,6 +1445,15 @@ int do_madvise(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, size_t len_in, int beh
start = untagged_addr_remote(mm, start);
end = start + len;
+ /*
+ * Check if the address range is sealed for do_madvise().
+ * can_modify_mm_madv assumes we have acquired the lock on MM.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(!can_modify_mm_madv(mm, start, end, behavior))) {
+ error = -EPERM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
blk_start_plug(&plug);
switch (behavior) {
case MADV_POPULATE_READ:
@@ -1456,6 +1466,8 @@ int do_madvise(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, size_t len_in, int beh
break;
}
blk_finish_plug(&plug);
+
+out:
if (write)
mmap_write_unlock(mm);
else
diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index d6d8ab119b72..83b4682ec85c 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -1255,6 +1255,16 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
if (mm->map_count > sysctl_max_map_count)
return -ENOMEM;
+ /*
+ * addr is returned from get_unmapped_area,
+ * There are two cases:
+ * 1> MAP_FIXED == false
+ * unallocated memory, no need to check sealing.
+ * 1> MAP_FIXED == true
+ * sealing is checked inside mmap_region when
+ * do_vmi_munmap is called.
+ */
+
if (prot == PROT_EXEC) {
pkey = execute_only_pkey(mm);
if (pkey < 0)
@@ -2727,6 +2737,14 @@ int do_vmi_munmap(struct vma_iterator *vmi, struct mm_struct *mm,
if (end == start)
return -EINVAL;
+ /*
+ * Check if memory is sealed before arch_unmap.
+ * Prevent unmapping a sealed VMA.
+ * can_modify_mm assumes we have acquired the lock on MM.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(!can_modify_mm(mm, start, end)))
+ return -EPERM;
+
/* arch_unmap() might do unmaps itself. */
arch_unmap(mm, start, end);
@@ -2789,7 +2807,10 @@ unsigned long mmap_region(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
}
/* Unmap any existing mapping in the area */
- if (do_vmi_munmap(&vmi, mm, addr, len, uf, false))
+ error = do_vmi_munmap(&vmi, mm, addr, len, uf, false);
+ if (error == -EPERM)
+ return error;
+ else if (error)
return -ENOMEM;
/*
@@ -3139,6 +3160,14 @@ int do_vma_munmap(struct vma_iterator *vmi, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
{
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
+ /*
+ * Check if memory is sealed before arch_unmap.
+ * Prevent unmapping a sealed VMA.
+ * can_modify_mm assumes we have acquired the lock on MM.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(!can_modify_mm(mm, start, end)))
+ return -EPERM;
+
arch_unmap(mm, start, end);
return do_vmi_align_munmap(vmi, vma, mm, start, end, uf, unlock);
}
diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c
index 94878c39ee32..8c6cd8825273 100644
--- a/mm/mprotect.c
+++ b/mm/mprotect.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
#include <linux/sched/sysctl.h>
#include <linux/userfaultfd_k.h>
#include <linux/memory-tiers.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/mman.h>
#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
@@ -744,6 +745,15 @@ static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned long start, size_t len,
}
}
+ /*
+ * checking if memory is sealed.
+ * can_modify_mm assumes we have acquired the lock on MM.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(!can_modify_mm(current->mm, start, end))) {
+ error = -EPERM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
prev = vma_prev(&vmi);
if (start > vma->vm_start)
prev = vma;
diff --git a/mm/mremap.c b/mm/mremap.c
index f5aba752d35f..5f96bc5ee918 100644
--- a/mm/mremap.c
+++ b/mm/mremap.c
@@ -902,7 +902,25 @@ static unsigned long mremap_to(unsigned long addr, unsigned long old_len,
if ((mm->map_count + 2) >= sysctl_max_map_count - 3)
return -ENOMEM;
+ /*
+ * In mremap_to().
+ * Move a VMA to another location, check if src addr is sealed.
+ *
+ * Place can_modify_mm here because mremap_to()
+ * does its own checking for address range, and we only
+ * check the sealing after passing those checks.
+ *
+ * can_modify_mm assumes we have acquired the lock on MM.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(!can_modify_mm(mm, addr, addr + old_len)))
+ return -EPERM;
+
if (flags & MREMAP_FIXED) {
+ /*
+ * In mremap_to().
+ * VMA is moved to dst address, and munmap dst first.
+ * do_munmap will check if dst is sealed.
+ */
ret = do_munmap(mm, new_addr, new_len, uf_unmap_early);
if (ret)
goto out;
@@ -1062,6 +1080,19 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(mremap, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, old_len,
}
/*
+ * Below is shrink/expand case (not mremap_to())
+ * Check if src address is sealed, if so, reject.
+ * In other words, prevent shrinking or expanding a sealed VMA.
+ *
+ * Place can_modify_mm here so we can keep the logic related to
+ * shrink/expand together.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(!can_modify_mm(mm, addr, addr + old_len))) {
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
* Always allow a shrinking remap: that just unmaps
* the unnecessary pages..
* do_vmi_munmap does all the needed commit accounting, and
diff --git a/mm/mseal.c b/mm/mseal.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..bf783bba8ed0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mm/mseal.c
@@ -0,0 +1,307 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Implement mseal() syscall.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2023,2024 Google, Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/mempolicy.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/mm_inline.h>
+#include <linux/mmu_context.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include "internal.h"
+
+static inline bool vma_is_sealed(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+ return (vma->vm_flags & VM_SEALED);
+}
+
+static inline void set_vma_sealed(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+ vm_flags_set(vma, VM_SEALED);
+}
+
+/*
+ * check if a vma is sealed for modification.
+ * return true, if modification is allowed.
+ */
+static bool can_modify_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+ if (unlikely(vma_is_sealed(vma)))
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static bool is_madv_discard(int behavior)
+{
+ return behavior &
+ (MADV_FREE | MADV_DONTNEED | MADV_DONTNEED_LOCKED |
+ MADV_REMOVE | MADV_DONTFORK | MADV_WIPEONFORK);
+}
+
+static bool is_ro_anon(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+ /* check anonymous mapping. */
+ if (vma->vm_file || vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)
+ return false;
+
+ /*
+ * check for non-writable:
+ * PROT=RO or PKRU is not writeable.
+ */
+ if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE) ||
+ !arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, true, false, false))
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check if the vmas of a memory range are allowed to be modified.
+ * the memory ranger can have a gap (unallocated memory).
+ * return true, if it is allowed.
+ */
+bool can_modify_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
+{
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+
+ VMA_ITERATOR(vmi, mm, start);
+
+ /* going through each vma to check. */
+ for_each_vma_range(vmi, vma, end) {
+ if (unlikely(!can_modify_vma(vma)))
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ /* Allow by default. */
+ return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check if the vmas of a memory range are allowed to be modified by madvise.
+ * the memory ranger can have a gap (unallocated memory).
+ * return true, if it is allowed.
+ */
+bool can_modify_mm_madv(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
+ int behavior)
+{
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+
+ VMA_ITERATOR(vmi, mm, start);
+
+ if (!is_madv_discard(behavior))
+ return true;
+
+ /* going through each vma to check. */
+ for_each_vma_range(vmi, vma, end)
+ if (unlikely(is_ro_anon(vma) && !can_modify_vma(vma)))
+ return false;
+
+ /* Allow by default. */
+ return true;
+}
+
+static int mseal_fixup(struct vma_iterator *vmi, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+ struct vm_area_struct **prev, unsigned long start,
+ unsigned long end, vm_flags_t newflags)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ vm_flags_t oldflags = vma->vm_flags;
+
+ if (newflags == oldflags)
+ goto out;
+
+ vma = vma_modify_flags(vmi, *prev, vma, start, end, newflags);
+ if (IS_ERR(vma)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(vma);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ set_vma_sealed(vma);
+out:
+ *prev = vma;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check for do_mseal:
+ * 1> start is part of a valid vma.
+ * 2> end is part of a valid vma.
+ * 3> No gap (unallocated address) between start and end.
+ * 4> map is sealable.
+ */
+static int check_mm_seal(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
+{
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+ unsigned long nstart = start;
+
+ VMA_ITERATOR(vmi, current->mm, start);
+
+ /* going through each vma to check. */
+ for_each_vma_range(vmi, vma, end) {
+ if (vma->vm_start > nstart)
+ /* unallocated memory found. */
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (vma->vm_end >= end)
+ return 0;
+
+ nstart = vma->vm_end;
+ }
+
+ return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Apply sealing.
+ */
+static int apply_mm_seal(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
+{
+ unsigned long nstart;
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma, *prev;
+
+ VMA_ITERATOR(vmi, current->mm, start);
+
+ vma = vma_iter_load(&vmi);
+ /*
+ * Note: check_mm_seal should already checked ENOMEM case.
+ * so vma should not be null, same for the other ENOMEM cases.
+ */
+ prev = vma_prev(&vmi);
+ if (start > vma->vm_start)
+ prev = vma;
+
+ nstart = start;
+ for_each_vma_range(vmi, vma, end) {
+ int error;
+ unsigned long tmp;
+ vm_flags_t newflags;
+
+ newflags = vma->vm_flags | VM_SEALED;
+ tmp = vma->vm_end;
+ if (tmp > end)
+ tmp = end;
+ error = mseal_fixup(&vmi, vma, &prev, nstart, tmp, newflags);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+ nstart = vma_iter_end(&vmi);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * mseal(2) seals the VM's meta data from
+ * selected syscalls.
+ *
+ * addr/len: VM address range.
+ *
+ * The address range by addr/len must meet:
+ * start (addr) must be in a valid VMA.
+ * end (addr + len) must be in a valid VMA.
+ * no gap (unallocated memory) between start and end.
+ * start (addr) must be page aligned.
+ *
+ * len: len will be page aligned implicitly.
+ *
+ * Below VMA operations are blocked after sealing.
+ * 1> Unmapping, moving to another location, and shrinking
+ * the size, via munmap() and mremap(), can leave an empty
+ * space, therefore can be replaced with a VMA with a new
+ * set of attributes.
+ * 2> Moving or expanding a different vma into the current location,
+ * via mremap().
+ * 3> Modifying a VMA via mmap(MAP_FIXED).
+ * 4> Size expansion, via mremap(), does not appear to pose any
+ * specific risks to sealed VMAs. It is included anyway because
+ * the use case is unclear. In any case, users can rely on
+ * merging to expand a sealed VMA.
+ * 5> mprotect and pkey_mprotect.
+ * 6> Some destructive madvice() behavior (e.g. MADV_DONTNEED)
+ * for anonymous memory, when users don't have write permission to the
+ * memory. Those behaviors can alter region contents by discarding pages,
+ * effectively a memset(0) for anonymous memory.
+ *
+ * flags: reserved.
+ *
+ * return values:
+ * zero: success.
+ * -EINVAL:
+ * invalid input flags.
+ * start address is not page aligned.
+ * Address arange (start + len) overflow.
+ * -ENOMEM:
+ * addr is not a valid address (not allocated).
+ * end (start + len) is not a valid address.
+ * a gap (unallocated memory) between start and end.
+ * -EPERM:
+ * - In 32 bit architecture, sealing is not supported.
+ * Note:
+ * user can call mseal(2) multiple times, adding a seal on an
+ * already sealed memory is a no-action (no error).
+ *
+ * unseal() is not supported.
+ */
+static int do_mseal(unsigned long start, size_t len_in, unsigned long flags)
+{
+ size_t len;
+ int ret = 0;
+ unsigned long end;
+ struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+
+ ret = can_do_mseal(flags);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ start = untagged_addr(start);
+ if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(start))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ len = PAGE_ALIGN(len_in);
+ /* Check to see whether len was rounded up from small -ve to zero. */
+ if (len_in && !len)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ end = start + len;
+ if (end < start)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (end == start)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (mmap_write_lock_killable(mm))
+ return -EINTR;
+
+ /*
+ * First pass, this helps to avoid
+ * partial sealing in case of error in input address range,
+ * e.g. ENOMEM error.
+ */
+ ret = check_mm_seal(start, end);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ /*
+ * Second pass, this should success, unless there are errors
+ * from vma_modify_flags, e.g. merge/split error, or process
+ * reaching the max supported VMAs, however, those cases shall
+ * be rare.
+ */
+ ret = apply_mm_seal(start, end);
+
+out:
+ mmap_write_unlock(current->mm);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+SYSCALL_DEFINE3(mseal, unsigned long, start, size_t, len, unsigned long,
+ flags)
+{
+ return do_mseal(start, len, flags);
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/.gitignore b/tools/testing/selftests/mm/.gitignore
index d26e962f2ac4..0b9ab987601c 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/.gitignore
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/mm/.gitignore
@@ -47,3 +47,5 @@ mkdirty
va_high_addr_switch
hugetlb_fault_after_madv
hugetlb_madv_vs_map
+mseal_test
+seal_elf
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/mm/Makefile
index 60b8feb6a5ec..3b49bc3d0a3b 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/Makefile
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/mm/Makefile
@@ -59,6 +59,8 @@ TEST_GEN_FILES += mlock2-tests
TEST_GEN_FILES += mrelease_test
TEST_GEN_FILES += mremap_dontunmap
TEST_GEN_FILES += mremap_test
+TEST_GEN_FILES += mseal_test
+TEST_GEN_FILES += seal_elf
TEST_GEN_FILES += on-fault-limit
TEST_GEN_FILES += pagemap_ioctl
TEST_GEN_FILES += thuge-gen
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/mseal_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/mm/mseal_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..41998cf1dcf5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/mm/mseal_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1894 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include "../kselftest.h"
+#include <syscall.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/vfs.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+/*
+ * need those definition for manually build using gcc.
+ * gcc -I ../../../../usr/include -DDEBUG -O3 -DDEBUG -O3 mseal_test.c -o mseal_test
+ */
+#ifndef PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS
+# define PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS 0x1
+#endif
+
+#ifndef PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE
+# define PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE 0x2
+#endif
+
+#ifndef PKEY_BITS_PER_PKEY
+#define PKEY_BITS_PER_PKEY 2
+#endif
+
+#ifndef PKEY_MASK
+#define PKEY_MASK (PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS | PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE)
+#endif
+
+#define FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(c) do {\
+ if (!(c)) {\
+ ksft_test_result_fail("%s, line:%d\n", __func__, __LINE__);\
+ goto test_end;\
+ } \
+ } \
+ while (0)
+
+#define SKIP_TEST_IF_FALSE(c) do {\
+ if (!(c)) {\
+ ksft_test_result_skip("%s, line:%d\n", __func__, __LINE__);\
+ goto test_end;\
+ } \
+ } \
+ while (0)
+
+
+#define TEST_END_CHECK() {\
+ ksft_test_result_pass("%s\n", __func__);\
+ return;\
+test_end:\
+ return;\
+}
+
+#ifndef u64
+#define u64 unsigned long long
+#endif
+
+static unsigned long get_vma_size(void *addr, int *prot)
+{
+ FILE *maps;
+ char line[256];
+ int size = 0;
+ uintptr_t addr_start, addr_end;
+ char protstr[5];
+ *prot = 0;
+
+ maps = fopen("/proc/self/maps", "r");
+ if (!maps)
+ return 0;
+
+ while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), maps)) {
+ if (sscanf(line, "%lx-%lx %4s", &addr_start, &addr_end, protstr) == 3) {
+ if (addr_start == (uintptr_t) addr) {
+ size = addr_end - addr_start;
+ if (protstr[0] == 'r')
+ *prot |= 0x4;
+ if (protstr[1] == 'w')
+ *prot |= 0x2;
+ if (protstr[2] == 'x')
+ *prot |= 0x1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ fclose(maps);
+ return size;
+}
+
+/*
+ * define sys_xyx to call syscall directly.
+ */
+static int sys_mseal(void *start, size_t len)
+{
+ int sret;
+
+ errno = 0;
+ sret = syscall(__NR_mseal, start, len, 0);
+ return sret;
+}
+
+static int sys_mprotect(void *ptr, size_t size, unsigned long prot)
+{
+ int sret;
+
+ errno = 0;
+ sret = syscall(__NR_mprotect, ptr, size, prot);
+ return sret;
+}
+
+static int sys_mprotect_pkey(void *ptr, size_t size, unsigned long orig_prot,
+ unsigned long pkey)
+{
+ int sret;
+
+ errno = 0;
+ sret = syscall(__NR_pkey_mprotect, ptr, size, orig_prot, pkey);
+ return sret;
+}
+
+static void *sys_mmap(void *addr, unsigned long len, unsigned long prot,
+ unsigned long flags, unsigned long fd, unsigned long offset)
+{
+ void *sret;
+
+ errno = 0;
+ sret = (void *) syscall(__NR_mmap, addr, len, prot,
+ flags, fd, offset);
+ return sret;
+}
+
+static int sys_munmap(void *ptr, size_t size)
+{
+ int sret;
+
+ errno = 0;
+ sret = syscall(__NR_munmap, ptr, size);
+ return sret;
+}
+
+static int sys_madvise(void *start, size_t len, int types)
+{
+ int sret;
+
+ errno = 0;
+ sret = syscall(__NR_madvise, start, len, types);
+ return sret;
+}
+
+static int sys_pkey_alloc(unsigned long flags, unsigned long init_val)
+{
+ int ret = syscall(__NR_pkey_alloc, flags, init_val);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static unsigned int __read_pkey_reg(void)
+{
+ unsigned int pkey_reg = 0;
+#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) /* arch */
+ unsigned int eax, edx;
+ unsigned int ecx = 0;
+
+ asm volatile(".byte 0x0f,0x01,0xee\n\t"
+ : "=a" (eax), "=d" (edx)
+ : "c" (ecx));
+ pkey_reg = eax;
+#endif
+ return pkey_reg;
+}
+
+static void __write_pkey_reg(u64 pkey_reg)
+{
+#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) /* arch */
+ unsigned int eax = pkey_reg;
+ unsigned int ecx = 0;
+ unsigned int edx = 0;
+
+ asm volatile(".byte 0x0f,0x01,0xef\n\t"
+ : : "a" (eax), "c" (ecx), "d" (edx));
+#endif
+}
+
+static unsigned long pkey_bit_position(int pkey)
+{
+ return pkey * PKEY_BITS_PER_PKEY;
+}
+
+static u64 set_pkey_bits(u64 reg, int pkey, u64 flags)
+{
+ unsigned long shift = pkey_bit_position(pkey);
+
+ /* mask out bits from pkey in old value */
+ reg &= ~((u64)PKEY_MASK << shift);
+ /* OR in new bits for pkey */
+ reg |= (flags & PKEY_MASK) << shift;
+ return reg;
+}
+
+static void set_pkey(int pkey, unsigned long pkey_value)
+{
+ u64 new_pkey_reg;
+
+ new_pkey_reg = set_pkey_bits(__read_pkey_reg(), pkey, pkey_value);
+ __write_pkey_reg(new_pkey_reg);
+}
+
+static void setup_single_address(int size, void **ptrOut)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+
+ ptr = sys_mmap(NULL, size, PROT_READ, MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
+ *ptrOut = ptr;
+}
+
+static void setup_single_address_rw(int size, void **ptrOut)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ unsigned long mapflags = MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE;
+
+ ptr = sys_mmap(NULL, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, mapflags, -1, 0);
+ *ptrOut = ptr;
+}
+
+static int clean_single_address(void *ptr, int size)
+{
+ int ret;
+ ret = munmap(ptr, size);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int seal_single_address(void *ptr, int size)
+{
+ int ret;
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr, size);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+bool seal_support(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+ void *ptr;
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+
+ ptr = sys_mmap(NULL, page_size, PROT_READ, MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
+ if (ptr == (void *) -1)
+ return false;
+
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr, page_size);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool pkey_supported(void)
+{
+#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) /* arch */
+ int pkey = sys_pkey_alloc(0, 0);
+
+ if (pkey > 0)
+ return true;
+#endif
+ return false;
+}
+
+static void test_seal_addseal(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+ void *ptr;
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+ unsigned long size = 4 * page_size;
+
+ setup_single_address(size, &ptr);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ptr != (void *)-1);
+
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr, size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ TEST_END_CHECK();
+}
+
+static void test_seal_unmapped_start(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+ void *ptr;
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+ unsigned long size = 4 * page_size;
+
+ setup_single_address(size, &ptr);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ptr != (void *)-1);
+
+ /* munmap 2 pages from ptr. */
+ ret = sys_munmap(ptr, 2 * page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ /* mprotect will fail because 2 pages from ptr are unmapped. */
+ ret = sys_mprotect(ptr, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret < 0);
+
+ /* mseal will fail because 2 pages from ptr are unmapped. */
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr, size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret < 0);
+
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr + 2 * page_size, 2 * page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ TEST_END_CHECK();
+}
+
+static void test_seal_unmapped_middle(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+ void *ptr;
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+ unsigned long size = 4 * page_size;
+
+ setup_single_address(size, &ptr);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ptr != (void *)-1);
+
+ /* munmap 2 pages from ptr + page. */
+ ret = sys_munmap(ptr + page_size, 2 * page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ /* mprotect will fail, since middle 2 pages are unmapped. */
+ ret = sys_mprotect(ptr, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret < 0);
+
+ /* mseal will fail as well. */
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr, size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret < 0);
+
+ /* we still can add seal to the first page and last page*/
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr, page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr + 3 * page_size, page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ TEST_END_CHECK();
+}
+
+static void test_seal_unmapped_end(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+ void *ptr;
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+ unsigned long size = 4 * page_size;
+
+ setup_single_address(size, &ptr);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ptr != (void *)-1);
+
+ /* unmap last 2 pages. */
+ ret = sys_munmap(ptr + 2 * page_size, 2 * page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ /* mprotect will fail since last 2 pages are unmapped. */
+ ret = sys_mprotect(ptr, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret < 0);
+
+ /* mseal will fail as well. */
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr, size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret < 0);
+
+ /* The first 2 pages is not sealed, and can add seals */
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr, 2 * page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ TEST_END_CHECK();
+}
+
+static void test_seal_multiple_vmas(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+ void *ptr;
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+ unsigned long size = 4 * page_size;
+
+ setup_single_address(size, &ptr);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ptr != (void *)-1);
+
+ /* use mprotect to split the vma into 3. */
+ ret = sys_mprotect(ptr + page_size, 2 * page_size,
+ PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ /* mprotect will get applied to all 4 pages - 3 VMAs. */
+ ret = sys_mprotect(ptr, size, PROT_READ);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ /* use mprotect to split the vma into 3. */
+ ret = sys_mprotect(ptr + page_size, 2 * page_size,
+ PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ /* mseal get applied to all 4 pages - 3 VMAs. */
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr, size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ TEST_END_CHECK();
+}
+
+static void test_seal_split_start(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+ void *ptr;
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+ unsigned long size = 4 * page_size;
+
+ setup_single_address(size, &ptr);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ptr != (void *)-1);
+
+ /* use mprotect to split at middle */
+ ret = sys_mprotect(ptr, 2 * page_size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ /* seal the first page, this will split the VMA */
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr, page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ /* add seal to the remain 3 pages */
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr + page_size, 3 * page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ TEST_END_CHECK();
+}
+
+static void test_seal_split_end(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+ void *ptr;
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+ unsigned long size = 4 * page_size;
+
+ setup_single_address(size, &ptr);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ptr != (void *)-1);
+
+ /* use mprotect to split at middle */
+ ret = sys_mprotect(ptr, 2 * page_size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ /* seal the last page */
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr + 3 * page_size, page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ /* Adding seals to the first 3 pages */
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr, 3 * page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ TEST_END_CHECK();
+}
+
+static void test_seal_invalid_input(void)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+ unsigned long size = 4 * page_size;
+ int ret;
+
+ setup_single_address(8 * page_size, &ptr);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ptr != (void *)-1);
+ ret = clean_single_address(ptr + 4 * page_size, 4 * page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ /* invalid flag */
+ ret = syscall(__NR_mseal, ptr, size, 0x20);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret < 0);
+
+ /* unaligned address */
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr + 1, 2 * page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret < 0);
+
+ /* length too big */
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr, 5 * page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret < 0);
+
+ /* length overflow */
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr, UINT64_MAX/page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret < 0);
+
+ /* start is not in a valid VMA */
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr - page_size, 5 * page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret < 0);
+
+ TEST_END_CHECK();
+}
+
+static void test_seal_zero_length(void)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+ unsigned long size = 4 * page_size;
+ int ret;
+
+ setup_single_address(size, &ptr);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ptr != (void *)-1);
+
+ ret = sys_mprotect(ptr, 0, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ /* seal 0 length will be OK, same as mprotect */
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr, 0);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ /* verify the 4 pages are not sealed by previous call. */
+ ret = sys_mprotect(ptr, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ TEST_END_CHECK();
+}
+
+static void test_seal_zero_address(void)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+ unsigned long size = 4 * page_size;
+ int ret;
+ int prot;
+
+ /* use mmap to change protection. */
+ ptr = sys_mmap(0, size, PROT_NONE,
+ MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED, -1, 0);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ptr == 0);
+
+ size = get_vma_size(ptr, &prot);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(size == 4 * page_size);
+
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr, size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ /* verify the 4 pages are sealed by previous call. */
+ ret = sys_mprotect(ptr, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret);
+
+ TEST_END_CHECK();
+}
+
+static void test_seal_twice(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+ void *ptr;
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+ unsigned long size = 4 * page_size;
+
+ setup_single_address(size, &ptr);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ptr != (void *)-1);
+
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr, size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ /* apply the same seal will be OK. idempotent. */
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr, size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ TEST_END_CHECK();
+}
+
+static void test_seal_mprotect(bool seal)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+ unsigned long size = 4 * page_size;
+ int ret;
+
+ setup_single_address(size, &ptr);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ptr != (void *)-1);
+
+ if (seal) {
+ ret = seal_single_address(ptr, size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+ }
+
+ ret = sys_mprotect(ptr, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
+ if (seal)
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret < 0);
+ else
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ TEST_END_CHECK();
+}
+
+static void test_seal_start_mprotect(bool seal)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+ unsigned long size = 4 * page_size;
+ int ret;
+
+ setup_single_address(size, &ptr);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ptr != (void *)-1);
+
+ if (seal) {
+ ret = seal_single_address(ptr, page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+ }
+
+ /* the first page is sealed. */
+ ret = sys_mprotect(ptr, page_size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
+ if (seal)
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret < 0);
+ else
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ /* pages after the first page is not sealed. */
+ ret = sys_mprotect(ptr + page_size, page_size * 3,
+ PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ TEST_END_CHECK();
+}
+
+static void test_seal_end_mprotect(bool seal)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+ unsigned long size = 4 * page_size;
+ int ret;
+
+ setup_single_address(size, &ptr);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ptr != (void *)-1);
+
+ if (seal) {
+ ret = seal_single_address(ptr + page_size, 3 * page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+ }
+
+ /* first page is not sealed */
+ ret = sys_mprotect(ptr, page_size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ /* last 3 page are sealed */
+ ret = sys_mprotect(ptr + page_size, page_size * 3,
+ PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
+ if (seal)
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret < 0);
+ else
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ TEST_END_CHECK();
+}
+
+static void test_seal_mprotect_unalign_len(bool seal)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+ unsigned long size = 4 * page_size;
+ int ret;
+
+ setup_single_address(size, &ptr);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ptr != (void *)-1);
+
+ if (seal) {
+ ret = seal_single_address(ptr, page_size * 2 - 1);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+ }
+
+ /* 2 pages are sealed. */
+ ret = sys_mprotect(ptr, page_size * 2, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
+ if (seal)
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret < 0);
+ else
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ ret = sys_mprotect(ptr + page_size * 2, page_size,
+ PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ TEST_END_CHECK();
+}
+
+static void test_seal_mprotect_unalign_len_variant_2(bool seal)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+ unsigned long size = 4 * page_size;
+ int ret;
+
+ setup_single_address(size, &ptr);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ptr != (void *)-1);
+ if (seal) {
+ ret = seal_single_address(ptr, page_size * 2 + 1);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+ }
+
+ /* 3 pages are sealed. */
+ ret = sys_mprotect(ptr, page_size * 3, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
+ if (seal)
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret < 0);
+ else
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ ret = sys_mprotect(ptr + page_size * 3, page_size,
+ PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ TEST_END_CHECK();
+}
+
+static void test_seal_mprotect_two_vma(bool seal)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+ unsigned long size = 4 * page_size;
+ int ret;
+
+ setup_single_address(size, &ptr);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ptr != (void *)-1);
+
+ /* use mprotect to split */
+ ret = sys_mprotect(ptr, page_size * 2, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ if (seal) {
+ ret = seal_single_address(ptr, page_size * 4);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+ }
+
+ ret = sys_mprotect(ptr, page_size * 2, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
+ if (seal)
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret < 0);
+ else
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ ret = sys_mprotect(ptr + page_size * 2, page_size * 2,
+ PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
+ if (seal)
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret < 0);
+ else
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ TEST_END_CHECK();
+}
+
+static void test_seal_mprotect_two_vma_with_split(bool seal)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+ unsigned long size = 4 * page_size;
+ int ret;
+
+ setup_single_address(size, &ptr);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ptr != (void *)-1);
+
+ /* use mprotect to split as two vma. */
+ ret = sys_mprotect(ptr, page_size * 2, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ /* mseal can apply across 2 vma, also split them. */
+ if (seal) {
+ ret = seal_single_address(ptr + page_size, page_size * 2);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+ }
+
+ /* the first page is not sealed. */
+ ret = sys_mprotect(ptr, page_size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ /* the second page is sealed. */
+ ret = sys_mprotect(ptr + page_size, page_size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
+ if (seal)
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret < 0);
+ else
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ /* the third page is sealed. */
+ ret = sys_mprotect(ptr + 2 * page_size, page_size,
+ PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
+ if (seal)
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret < 0);
+ else
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ /* the fouth page is not sealed. */
+ ret = sys_mprotect(ptr + 3 * page_size, page_size,
+ PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ TEST_END_CHECK();
+}
+
+static void test_seal_mprotect_partial_mprotect(bool seal)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+ unsigned long size = 4 * page_size;
+ int ret;
+
+ setup_single_address(size, &ptr);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ptr != (void *)-1);
+
+ /* seal one page. */
+ if (seal) {
+ ret = seal_single_address(ptr, page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+ }
+
+ /* mprotect first 2 page will fail, since the first page are sealed. */
+ ret = sys_mprotect(ptr, 2 * page_size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
+ if (seal)
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret < 0);
+ else
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ TEST_END_CHECK();
+}
+
+static void test_seal_mprotect_two_vma_with_gap(bool seal)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+ unsigned long size = 4 * page_size;
+ int ret;
+
+ setup_single_address(size, &ptr);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ptr != (void *)-1);
+
+ /* use mprotect to split. */
+ ret = sys_mprotect(ptr, page_size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ /* use mprotect to split. */
+ ret = sys_mprotect(ptr + 3 * page_size, page_size,
+ PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ /* use munmap to free two pages in the middle */
+ ret = sys_munmap(ptr + page_size, 2 * page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ /* mprotect will fail, because there is a gap in the address. */
+ /* notes, internally mprotect still updated the first page. */
+ ret = sys_mprotect(ptr, 4 * page_size, PROT_READ);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret < 0);
+
+ /* mseal will fail as well. */
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr, 4 * page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret < 0);
+
+ /* the first page is not sealed. */
+ ret = sys_mprotect(ptr, page_size, PROT_READ);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret == 0);
+
+ /* the last page is not sealed. */
+ ret = sys_mprotect(ptr + 3 * page_size, page_size, PROT_READ);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret == 0);
+
+ TEST_END_CHECK();
+}
+
+static void test_seal_mprotect_split(bool seal)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+ unsigned long size = 4 * page_size;
+ int ret;
+
+ setup_single_address(size, &ptr);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ptr != (void *)-1);
+
+ /* use mprotect to split. */
+ ret = sys_mprotect(ptr, page_size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ /* seal all 4 pages. */
+ if (seal) {
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr, 4 * page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+ }
+
+ /* mprotect is sealed. */
+ ret = sys_mprotect(ptr, 2 * page_size, PROT_READ);
+ if (seal)
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret < 0);
+ else
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+
+ ret = sys_mprotect(ptr + 2 * page_size, 2 * page_size, PROT_READ);
+ if (seal)
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret < 0);
+ else
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ TEST_END_CHECK();
+}
+
+static void test_seal_mprotect_merge(bool seal)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+ unsigned long size = 4 * page_size;
+ int ret;
+
+ setup_single_address(size, &ptr);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ptr != (void *)-1);
+
+ /* use mprotect to split one page. */
+ ret = sys_mprotect(ptr, page_size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ /* seal first two pages. */
+ if (seal) {
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr, 2 * page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+ }
+
+ /* 2 pages are sealed. */
+ ret = sys_mprotect(ptr, 2 * page_size, PROT_READ);
+ if (seal)
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret < 0);
+ else
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ /* last 2 pages are not sealed. */
+ ret = sys_mprotect(ptr + 2 * page_size, 2 * page_size, PROT_READ);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret == 0);
+
+ TEST_END_CHECK();
+}
+
+static void test_seal_munmap(bool seal)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+ unsigned long size = 4 * page_size;
+ int ret;
+
+ setup_single_address(size, &ptr);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ptr != (void *)-1);
+
+ if (seal) {
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr, size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+ }
+
+ /* 4 pages are sealed. */
+ ret = sys_munmap(ptr, size);
+ if (seal)
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret < 0);
+ else
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ TEST_END_CHECK();
+}
+
+/*
+ * allocate 4 pages,
+ * use mprotect to split it as two VMAs
+ * seal the whole range
+ * munmap will fail on both
+ */
+static void test_seal_munmap_two_vma(bool seal)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+ unsigned long size = 4 * page_size;
+ int ret;
+
+ setup_single_address(size, &ptr);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ptr != (void *)-1);
+
+ /* use mprotect to split */
+ ret = sys_mprotect(ptr, page_size * 2, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ if (seal) {
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr, size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+ }
+
+ ret = sys_munmap(ptr, page_size * 2);
+ if (seal)
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret < 0);
+ else
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ ret = sys_munmap(ptr + page_size, page_size * 2);
+ if (seal)
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret < 0);
+ else
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ TEST_END_CHECK();
+}
+
+/*
+ * allocate a VMA with 4 pages.
+ * munmap the middle 2 pages.
+ * seal the whole 4 pages, will fail.
+ * munmap the first page will be OK.
+ * munmap the last page will be OK.
+ */
+static void test_seal_munmap_vma_with_gap(bool seal)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+ unsigned long size = 4 * page_size;
+ int ret;
+
+ setup_single_address(size, &ptr);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ptr != (void *)-1);
+
+ ret = sys_munmap(ptr + page_size, page_size * 2);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ if (seal) {
+ /* can't have gap in the middle. */
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr, size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret < 0);
+ }
+
+ ret = sys_munmap(ptr, page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ ret = sys_munmap(ptr + page_size * 2, page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ ret = sys_munmap(ptr, size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ TEST_END_CHECK();
+}
+
+static void test_munmap_start_freed(bool seal)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+ unsigned long size = 4 * page_size;
+ int ret;
+ int prot;
+
+ setup_single_address(size, &ptr);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ptr != (void *)-1);
+
+ /* unmap the first page. */
+ ret = sys_munmap(ptr, page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ /* seal the last 3 pages. */
+ if (seal) {
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr + page_size, 3 * page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+ }
+
+ /* unmap from the first page. */
+ ret = sys_munmap(ptr, size);
+ if (seal) {
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret < 0);
+
+ size = get_vma_size(ptr + page_size, &prot);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(size == page_size * 3);
+ } else {
+ /* note: this will be OK, even the first page is */
+ /* already unmapped. */
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ size = get_vma_size(ptr + page_size, &prot);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(size == 0);
+ }
+
+ TEST_END_CHECK();
+}
+
+static void test_munmap_end_freed(bool seal)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+ unsigned long size = 4 * page_size;
+ int ret;
+
+ setup_single_address(size, &ptr);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ptr != (void *)-1);
+
+ /* unmap last page. */
+ ret = sys_munmap(ptr + page_size * 3, page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ /* seal the first 3 pages. */
+ if (seal) {
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr, 3 * page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+ }
+
+ /* unmap all pages. */
+ ret = sys_munmap(ptr, size);
+ if (seal)
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret < 0);
+ else
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ TEST_END_CHECK();
+}
+
+static void test_munmap_middle_freed(bool seal)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+ unsigned long size = 4 * page_size;
+ int ret;
+ int prot;
+
+ setup_single_address(size, &ptr);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ptr != (void *)-1);
+
+ /* unmap 2 pages in the middle. */
+ ret = sys_munmap(ptr + page_size, page_size * 2);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ /* seal the first page. */
+ if (seal) {
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr, page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+ }
+
+ /* munmap all 4 pages. */
+ ret = sys_munmap(ptr, size);
+ if (seal) {
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret < 0);
+
+ size = get_vma_size(ptr, &prot);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(size == page_size);
+
+ size = get_vma_size(ptr + page_size * 3, &prot);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(size == page_size);
+ } else {
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ size = get_vma_size(ptr, &prot);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(size == 0);
+
+ size = get_vma_size(ptr + page_size * 3, &prot);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(size == 0);
+ }
+
+ TEST_END_CHECK();
+}
+
+static void test_seal_mremap_shrink(bool seal)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+ unsigned long size = 4 * page_size;
+ int ret;
+ void *ret2;
+
+ setup_single_address(size, &ptr);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ptr != (void *)-1);
+
+ if (seal) {
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr, size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+ }
+
+ /* shrink from 4 pages to 2 pages. */
+ ret2 = mremap(ptr, size, 2 * page_size, 0, 0);
+ if (seal) {
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret2 == MAP_FAILED);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(errno == EPERM);
+ } else {
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret2 != MAP_FAILED);
+
+ }
+
+ TEST_END_CHECK();
+}
+
+static void test_seal_mremap_expand(bool seal)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+ unsigned long size = 4 * page_size;
+ int ret;
+ void *ret2;
+
+ setup_single_address(size, &ptr);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ptr != (void *)-1);
+ /* ummap last 2 pages. */
+ ret = sys_munmap(ptr + 2 * page_size, 2 * page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ if (seal) {
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr, 2 * page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+ }
+
+ /* expand from 2 page to 4 pages. */
+ ret2 = mremap(ptr, 2 * page_size, 4 * page_size, 0, 0);
+ if (seal) {
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret2 == MAP_FAILED);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(errno == EPERM);
+ } else {
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret2 == ptr);
+
+ }
+
+ TEST_END_CHECK();
+}
+
+static void test_seal_mremap_move(bool seal)
+{
+ void *ptr, *newPtr;
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+ unsigned long size = page_size;
+ int ret;
+ void *ret2;
+
+ setup_single_address(size, &ptr);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ptr != (void *)-1);
+ setup_single_address(size, &newPtr);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(newPtr != (void *)-1);
+ ret = clean_single_address(newPtr, size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ if (seal) {
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr, size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+ }
+
+ /* move from ptr to fixed address. */
+ ret2 = mremap(ptr, size, size, MREMAP_MAYMOVE | MREMAP_FIXED, newPtr);
+ if (seal) {
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret2 == MAP_FAILED);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(errno == EPERM);
+ } else {
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret2 != MAP_FAILED);
+
+ }
+
+ TEST_END_CHECK();
+}
+
+static void test_seal_mmap_overwrite_prot(bool seal)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+ unsigned long size = page_size;
+ int ret;
+ void *ret2;
+
+ setup_single_address(size, &ptr);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ptr != (void *)-1);
+
+ if (seal) {
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr, size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+ }
+
+ /* use mmap to change protection. */
+ ret2 = sys_mmap(ptr, size, PROT_NONE,
+ MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED, -1, 0);
+ if (seal) {
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret2 == MAP_FAILED);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(errno == EPERM);
+ } else
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret2 == ptr);
+
+ TEST_END_CHECK();
+}
+
+static void test_seal_mmap_expand(bool seal)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+ unsigned long size = 12 * page_size;
+ int ret;
+ void *ret2;
+
+ setup_single_address(size, &ptr);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ptr != (void *)-1);
+ /* ummap last 4 pages. */
+ ret = sys_munmap(ptr + 8 * page_size, 4 * page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ if (seal) {
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr, 8 * page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+ }
+
+ /* use mmap to expand. */
+ ret2 = sys_mmap(ptr, size, PROT_READ,
+ MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED, -1, 0);
+ if (seal) {
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret2 == MAP_FAILED);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(errno == EPERM);
+ } else
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret2 == ptr);
+
+ TEST_END_CHECK();
+}
+
+static void test_seal_mmap_shrink(bool seal)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+ unsigned long size = 12 * page_size;
+ int ret;
+ void *ret2;
+
+ setup_single_address(size, &ptr);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ptr != (void *)-1);
+
+ if (seal) {
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr, size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+ }
+
+ /* use mmap to shrink. */
+ ret2 = sys_mmap(ptr, 8 * page_size, PROT_READ,
+ MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED, -1, 0);
+ if (seal) {
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret2 == MAP_FAILED);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(errno == EPERM);
+ } else
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret2 == ptr);
+
+ TEST_END_CHECK();
+}
+
+static void test_seal_mremap_shrink_fixed(bool seal)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ void *newAddr;
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+ unsigned long size = 4 * page_size;
+ int ret;
+ void *ret2;
+
+ setup_single_address(size, &ptr);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ptr != (void *)-1);
+ setup_single_address(size, &newAddr);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(newAddr != (void *)-1);
+
+ if (seal) {
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr, size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+ }
+
+ /* mremap to move and shrink to fixed address */
+ ret2 = mremap(ptr, size, 2 * page_size, MREMAP_MAYMOVE | MREMAP_FIXED,
+ newAddr);
+ if (seal) {
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret2 == MAP_FAILED);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(errno == EPERM);
+ } else
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret2 == newAddr);
+
+ TEST_END_CHECK();
+}
+
+static void test_seal_mremap_expand_fixed(bool seal)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ void *newAddr;
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+ unsigned long size = 4 * page_size;
+ int ret;
+ void *ret2;
+
+ setup_single_address(page_size, &ptr);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ptr != (void *)-1);
+ setup_single_address(size, &newAddr);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(newAddr != (void *)-1);
+
+ if (seal) {
+ ret = sys_mseal(newAddr, size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+ }
+
+ /* mremap to move and expand to fixed address */
+ ret2 = mremap(ptr, page_size, size, MREMAP_MAYMOVE | MREMAP_FIXED,
+ newAddr);
+ if (seal) {
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret2 == MAP_FAILED);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(errno == EPERM);
+ } else
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret2 == newAddr);
+
+ TEST_END_CHECK();
+}
+
+static void test_seal_mremap_move_fixed(bool seal)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ void *newAddr;
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+ unsigned long size = 4 * page_size;
+ int ret;
+ void *ret2;
+
+ setup_single_address(size, &ptr);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ptr != (void *)-1);
+ setup_single_address(size, &newAddr);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(newAddr != (void *)-1);
+
+ if (seal) {
+ ret = sys_mseal(newAddr, size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+ }
+
+ /* mremap to move to fixed address */
+ ret2 = mremap(ptr, size, size, MREMAP_MAYMOVE | MREMAP_FIXED, newAddr);
+ if (seal) {
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret2 == MAP_FAILED);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(errno == EPERM);
+ } else
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret2 == newAddr);
+
+ TEST_END_CHECK();
+}
+
+static void test_seal_mremap_move_fixed_zero(bool seal)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+ unsigned long size = 4 * page_size;
+ int ret;
+ void *ret2;
+
+ setup_single_address(size, &ptr);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ptr != (void *)-1);
+
+ if (seal) {
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr, size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * MREMAP_FIXED can move the mapping to zero address
+ */
+ ret2 = mremap(ptr, size, 2 * page_size, MREMAP_MAYMOVE | MREMAP_FIXED,
+ 0);
+ if (seal) {
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret2 == MAP_FAILED);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(errno == EPERM);
+ } else {
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret2 == 0);
+
+ }
+
+ TEST_END_CHECK();
+}
+
+static void test_seal_mremap_move_dontunmap(bool seal)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+ unsigned long size = 4 * page_size;
+ int ret;
+ void *ret2;
+
+ setup_single_address(size, &ptr);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ptr != (void *)-1);
+
+ if (seal) {
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr, size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+ }
+
+ /* mremap to move, and don't unmap src addr. */
+ ret2 = mremap(ptr, size, size, MREMAP_MAYMOVE | MREMAP_DONTUNMAP, 0);
+ if (seal) {
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret2 == MAP_FAILED);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(errno == EPERM);
+ } else {
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret2 != MAP_FAILED);
+
+ }
+
+ TEST_END_CHECK();
+}
+
+static void test_seal_mremap_move_dontunmap_anyaddr(bool seal)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+ unsigned long size = 4 * page_size;
+ int ret;
+ void *ret2;
+
+ setup_single_address(size, &ptr);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ptr != (void *)-1);
+
+ if (seal) {
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr, size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The 0xdeaddead should not have effect on dest addr
+ * when MREMAP_DONTUNMAP is set.
+ */
+ ret2 = mremap(ptr, size, size, MREMAP_MAYMOVE | MREMAP_DONTUNMAP,
+ 0xdeaddead);
+ if (seal) {
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret2 == MAP_FAILED);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(errno == EPERM);
+ } else {
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret2 != MAP_FAILED);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE((long)ret2 != 0xdeaddead);
+
+ }
+
+ TEST_END_CHECK();
+}
+
+
+static void test_seal_merge_and_split(void)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+ unsigned long size;
+ int ret;
+ int prot;
+
+ /* (24 RO) */
+ setup_single_address(24 * page_size, &ptr);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ptr != (void *)-1);
+
+ /* use mprotect(NONE) to set out boundary */
+ /* (1 NONE) (22 RO) (1 NONE) */
+ ret = sys_mprotect(ptr, page_size, PROT_NONE);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+ ret = sys_mprotect(ptr + 23 * page_size, page_size, PROT_NONE);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+ size = get_vma_size(ptr + page_size, &prot);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(size == 22 * page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(prot == 4);
+
+ /* use mseal to split from beginning */
+ /* (1 NONE) (1 RO_SEAL) (21 RO) (1 NONE) */
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr + page_size, page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+ size = get_vma_size(ptr + page_size, &prot);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(size == page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(prot == 0x4);
+ size = get_vma_size(ptr + 2 * page_size, &prot);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(size == 21 * page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(prot == 0x4);
+
+ /* use mseal to split from the end. */
+ /* (1 NONE) (1 RO_SEAL) (20 RO) (1 RO_SEAL) (1 NONE) */
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr + 22 * page_size, page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+ size = get_vma_size(ptr + 22 * page_size, &prot);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(size == page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(prot == 0x4);
+ size = get_vma_size(ptr + 2 * page_size, &prot);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(size == 20 * page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(prot == 0x4);
+
+ /* merge with prev. */
+ /* (1 NONE) (2 RO_SEAL) (19 RO) (1 RO_SEAL) (1 NONE) */
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr + 2 * page_size, page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+ size = get_vma_size(ptr + page_size, &prot);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(size == 2 * page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(prot == 0x4);
+
+ /* merge with after. */
+ /* (1 NONE) (2 RO_SEAL) (18 RO) (2 RO_SEALS) (1 NONE) */
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr + 21 * page_size, page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+ size = get_vma_size(ptr + 21 * page_size, &prot);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(size == 2 * page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(prot == 0x4);
+
+ /* split and merge from prev */
+ /* (1 NONE) (3 RO_SEAL) (17 RO) (2 RO_SEALS) (1 NONE) */
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr + 2 * page_size, 2 * page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+ size = get_vma_size(ptr + 1 * page_size, &prot);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(size == 3 * page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(prot == 0x4);
+ ret = sys_munmap(ptr + page_size, page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret < 0);
+ ret = sys_mprotect(ptr + 2 * page_size, page_size, PROT_NONE);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret < 0);
+
+ /* split and merge from next */
+ /* (1 NONE) (3 RO_SEAL) (16 RO) (3 RO_SEALS) (1 NONE) */
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr + 20 * page_size, 2 * page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(prot == 0x4);
+ size = get_vma_size(ptr + 20 * page_size, &prot);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(size == 3 * page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(prot == 0x4);
+
+ /* merge from middle of prev and middle of next. */
+ /* (1 NONE) (22 RO_SEAL) (1 NONE) */
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr + 2 * page_size, 20 * page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+ size = get_vma_size(ptr + page_size, &prot);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(size == 22 * page_size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(prot == 0x4);
+
+ TEST_END_CHECK();
+}
+
+static void test_seal_discard_ro_anon_on_rw(bool seal)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+ unsigned long size = 4 * page_size;
+ int ret;
+
+ setup_single_address_rw(size, &ptr);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ptr != (void *)-1);
+
+ if (seal) {
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr, size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+ }
+
+ /* sealing doesn't take effect on RW memory. */
+ ret = sys_madvise(ptr, size, MADV_DONTNEED);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ /* base seal still apply. */
+ ret = sys_munmap(ptr, size);
+ if (seal)
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret < 0);
+ else
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ TEST_END_CHECK();
+}
+
+static void test_seal_discard_ro_anon_on_pkey(bool seal)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+ unsigned long size = 4 * page_size;
+ int ret;
+ int pkey;
+
+ SKIP_TEST_IF_FALSE(pkey_supported());
+
+ setup_single_address_rw(size, &ptr);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ptr != (void *)-1);
+
+ pkey = sys_pkey_alloc(0, 0);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(pkey > 0);
+
+ ret = sys_mprotect_pkey((void *)ptr, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, pkey);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ if (seal) {
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr, size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+ }
+
+ /* sealing doesn't take effect if PKRU allow write. */
+ set_pkey(pkey, 0);
+ ret = sys_madvise(ptr, size, MADV_DONTNEED);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ /* sealing will take effect if PKRU deny write. */
+ set_pkey(pkey, PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE);
+ ret = sys_madvise(ptr, size, MADV_DONTNEED);
+ if (seal)
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret < 0);
+ else
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ /* base seal still apply. */
+ ret = sys_munmap(ptr, size);
+ if (seal)
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret < 0);
+ else
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ TEST_END_CHECK();
+}
+
+static void test_seal_discard_ro_anon_on_filebacked(bool seal)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+ unsigned long size = 4 * page_size;
+ int ret;
+ int fd;
+ unsigned long mapflags = MAP_PRIVATE;
+
+ fd = memfd_create("test", 0);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(fd > 0);
+
+ ret = fallocate(fd, 0, 0, size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ ptr = sys_mmap(NULL, size, PROT_READ, mapflags, fd, 0);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ptr != MAP_FAILED);
+
+ if (seal) {
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr, size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+ }
+
+ /* sealing doesn't apply for file backed mapping. */
+ ret = sys_madvise(ptr, size, MADV_DONTNEED);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ ret = sys_munmap(ptr, size);
+ if (seal)
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret < 0);
+ else
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+ close(fd);
+
+ TEST_END_CHECK();
+}
+
+static void test_seal_discard_ro_anon_on_shared(bool seal)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+ unsigned long size = 4 * page_size;
+ int ret;
+ unsigned long mapflags = MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_SHARED;
+
+ ptr = sys_mmap(NULL, size, PROT_READ, mapflags, -1, 0);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ptr != (void *)-1);
+
+ if (seal) {
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr, size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+ }
+
+ /* sealing doesn't apply for shared mapping. */
+ ret = sys_madvise(ptr, size, MADV_DONTNEED);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ ret = sys_munmap(ptr, size);
+ if (seal)
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret < 0);
+ else
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ TEST_END_CHECK();
+}
+
+static void test_seal_discard_ro_anon(bool seal)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+ unsigned long size = 4 * page_size;
+ int ret;
+
+ setup_single_address(size, &ptr);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ptr != (void *)-1);
+
+ if (seal) {
+ ret = seal_single_address(ptr, size);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+ }
+
+ ret = sys_madvise(ptr, size, MADV_DONTNEED);
+ if (seal)
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret < 0);
+ else
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ ret = sys_munmap(ptr, size);
+ if (seal)
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret < 0);
+ else
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ TEST_END_CHECK();
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ bool test_seal = seal_support();
+
+ ksft_print_header();
+
+ if (!test_seal)
+ ksft_exit_skip("sealing not supported, check CONFIG_64BIT\n");
+
+ if (!pkey_supported())
+ ksft_print_msg("PKEY not supported\n");
+
+ ksft_set_plan(80);
+
+ test_seal_addseal();
+ test_seal_unmapped_start();
+ test_seal_unmapped_middle();
+ test_seal_unmapped_end();
+ test_seal_multiple_vmas();
+ test_seal_split_start();
+ test_seal_split_end();
+ test_seal_invalid_input();
+ test_seal_zero_length();
+ test_seal_twice();
+
+ test_seal_mprotect(false);
+ test_seal_mprotect(true);
+
+ test_seal_start_mprotect(false);
+ test_seal_start_mprotect(true);
+
+ test_seal_end_mprotect(false);
+ test_seal_end_mprotect(true);
+
+ test_seal_mprotect_unalign_len(false);
+ test_seal_mprotect_unalign_len(true);
+
+ test_seal_mprotect_unalign_len_variant_2(false);
+ test_seal_mprotect_unalign_len_variant_2(true);
+
+ test_seal_mprotect_two_vma(false);
+ test_seal_mprotect_two_vma(true);
+
+ test_seal_mprotect_two_vma_with_split(false);
+ test_seal_mprotect_two_vma_with_split(true);
+
+ test_seal_mprotect_partial_mprotect(false);
+ test_seal_mprotect_partial_mprotect(true);
+
+ test_seal_mprotect_two_vma_with_gap(false);
+ test_seal_mprotect_two_vma_with_gap(true);
+
+ test_seal_mprotect_merge(false);
+ test_seal_mprotect_merge(true);
+
+ test_seal_mprotect_split(false);
+ test_seal_mprotect_split(true);
+
+ test_seal_munmap(false);
+ test_seal_munmap(true);
+ test_seal_munmap_two_vma(false);
+ test_seal_munmap_two_vma(true);
+ test_seal_munmap_vma_with_gap(false);
+ test_seal_munmap_vma_with_gap(true);
+
+ test_munmap_start_freed(false);
+ test_munmap_start_freed(true);
+ test_munmap_middle_freed(false);
+ test_munmap_middle_freed(true);
+ test_munmap_end_freed(false);
+ test_munmap_end_freed(true);
+
+ test_seal_mremap_shrink(false);
+ test_seal_mremap_shrink(true);
+ test_seal_mremap_expand(false);
+ test_seal_mremap_expand(true);
+ test_seal_mremap_move(false);
+ test_seal_mremap_move(true);
+
+ test_seal_mremap_shrink_fixed(false);
+ test_seal_mremap_shrink_fixed(true);
+ test_seal_mremap_expand_fixed(false);
+ test_seal_mremap_expand_fixed(true);
+ test_seal_mremap_move_fixed(false);
+ test_seal_mremap_move_fixed(true);
+ test_seal_mremap_move_dontunmap(false);
+ test_seal_mremap_move_dontunmap(true);
+ test_seal_mremap_move_fixed_zero(false);
+ test_seal_mremap_move_fixed_zero(true);
+ test_seal_mremap_move_dontunmap_anyaddr(false);
+ test_seal_mremap_move_dontunmap_anyaddr(true);
+ test_seal_discard_ro_anon(false);
+ test_seal_discard_ro_anon(true);
+ test_seal_discard_ro_anon_on_rw(false);
+ test_seal_discard_ro_anon_on_rw(true);
+ test_seal_discard_ro_anon_on_shared(false);
+ test_seal_discard_ro_anon_on_shared(true);
+ test_seal_discard_ro_anon_on_filebacked(false);
+ test_seal_discard_ro_anon_on_filebacked(true);
+ test_seal_mmap_overwrite_prot(false);
+ test_seal_mmap_overwrite_prot(true);
+ test_seal_mmap_expand(false);
+ test_seal_mmap_expand(true);
+ test_seal_mmap_shrink(false);
+ test_seal_mmap_shrink(true);
+
+ test_seal_merge_and_split();
+ test_seal_zero_address();
+
+ test_seal_discard_ro_anon_on_pkey(false);
+ test_seal_discard_ro_anon_on_pkey(true);
+
+ ksft_finished();
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/seal_elf.c b/tools/testing/selftests/mm/seal_elf.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f2babec79bb6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/mm/seal_elf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include "../kselftest.h"
+#include <syscall.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/vfs.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+/*
+ * need those definition for manually build using gcc.
+ * gcc -I ../../../../usr/include -DDEBUG -O3 -DDEBUG -O3 seal_elf.c -o seal_elf
+ */
+#define FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(c) do {\
+ if (!(c)) {\
+ ksft_test_result_fail("%s, line:%d\n", __func__, __LINE__);\
+ goto test_end;\
+ } \
+ } \
+ while (0)
+
+#define SKIP_TEST_IF_FALSE(c) do {\
+ if (!(c)) {\
+ ksft_test_result_skip("%s, line:%d\n", __func__, __LINE__);\
+ goto test_end;\
+ } \
+ } \
+ while (0)
+
+
+#define TEST_END_CHECK() {\
+ ksft_test_result_pass("%s\n", __func__);\
+ return;\
+test_end:\
+ return;\
+}
+
+#ifndef u64
+#define u64 unsigned long long
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * define sys_xyx to call syscall directly.
+ */
+static int sys_mseal(void *start, size_t len)
+{
+ int sret;
+
+ errno = 0;
+ sret = syscall(__NR_mseal, start, len, 0);
+ return sret;
+}
+
+static void *sys_mmap(void *addr, unsigned long len, unsigned long prot,
+ unsigned long flags, unsigned long fd, unsigned long offset)
+{
+ void *sret;
+
+ errno = 0;
+ sret = (void *) syscall(__NR_mmap, addr, len, prot,
+ flags, fd, offset);
+ return sret;
+}
+
+static inline int sys_mprotect(void *ptr, size_t size, unsigned long prot)
+{
+ int sret;
+
+ errno = 0;
+ sret = syscall(__NR_mprotect, ptr, size, prot);
+ return sret;
+}
+
+static bool seal_support(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+ void *ptr;
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+
+ ptr = sys_mmap(NULL, page_size, PROT_READ, MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
+ if (ptr == (void *) -1)
+ return false;
+
+ ret = sys_mseal(ptr, page_size);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+const char somestr[4096] = {"READONLY"};
+
+static void test_seal_elf(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+ FILE *maps;
+ char line[512];
+ uintptr_t addr_start, addr_end;
+ char prot[5];
+ char filename[256];
+ unsigned long page_size = getpagesize();
+ unsigned long long ptr = (unsigned long long) somestr;
+ char *somestr2 = (char *)somestr;
+
+ /*
+ * Modify the protection of readonly somestr
+ */
+ if (((unsigned long long)ptr % page_size) != 0)
+ ptr = (unsigned long long)ptr & ~(page_size - 1);
+
+ ksft_print_msg("somestr = %s\n", somestr);
+ ksft_print_msg("change protection to rw\n");
+ ret = sys_mprotect((void *)ptr, page_size, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+ *somestr2 = 'A';
+ ksft_print_msg("somestr is modified to: %s\n", somestr);
+ ret = sys_mprotect((void *)ptr, page_size, PROT_READ);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+
+ maps = fopen("/proc/self/maps", "r");
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(maps);
+
+ /*
+ * apply sealing to elf binary
+ */
+ while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), maps)) {
+ if (sscanf(line, "%lx-%lx %4s %*x %*x:%*x %*u %255[^\n]",
+ &addr_start, &addr_end, prot, filename) == 4) {
+ if (strlen(filename)) {
+ /*
+ * seal the mapping if read only.
+ */
+ if (strstr(prot, "r-")) {
+ ret = sys_mseal((void *)addr_start, addr_end - addr_start);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(!ret);
+ ksft_print_msg("sealed: %lx-%lx %s %s\n",
+ addr_start, addr_end, prot, filename);
+ if ((uintptr_t) somestr >= addr_start &&
+ (uintptr_t) somestr <= addr_end)
+ ksft_print_msg("mapping for somestr found\n");
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ fclose(maps);
+
+ ret = sys_mprotect((void *)ptr, page_size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
+ FAIL_TEST_IF_FALSE(ret < 0);
+ ksft_print_msg("somestr is sealed, mprotect is rejected\n");
+
+ TEST_END_CHECK();
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ bool test_seal = seal_support();
+
+ ksft_print_header();
+ ksft_print_msg("pid=%d\n", getpid());
+
+ if (!test_seal)
+ ksft_exit_skip("sealing not supported, check CONFIG_64BIT\n");
+
+ ksft_set_plan(1);
+
+ test_seal_elf();
+
+ ksft_finished();
+}