diff options
author | Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> | 2022-06-15 00:16:13 +0300 |
---|---|---|
committer | Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> | 2022-06-27 11:34:00 +0300 |
commit | fc02735b14fff8c6678b521d324ade27b1a3d4cf (patch) | |
tree | 9be32b1a805858cab02c043a740b2bab8f45a15c /arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | |
parent | bb06650634d3552c0f8557e9d16aa1a408040e28 (diff) | |
download | linux-fc02735b14fff8c6678b521d324ade27b1a3d4cf.tar.xz |
KVM: VMX: Prevent guest RSB poisoning attacks with eIBRS
On eIBRS systems, the returns in the vmexit return path from
__vmx_vcpu_run() to vmx_vcpu_run() are exposed to RSB poisoning attacks.
Fix that by moving the post-vmexit spec_ctrl handling to immediately
after the vmexit.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 1 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h index 1b1982448aa4..da654af12ccb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h @@ -405,6 +405,7 @@ void vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); struct vmx_uret_msr *vmx_find_uret_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr); void pt_update_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); void vmx_update_host_rsp(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long host_rsp); +void vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned int flags); unsigned int __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx); bool __vmx_vcpu_run(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long *regs, unsigned int flags); |